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ACODI NOTA EDITORIAL
La situaci6n del mundo actualmente difiere en gran medida de la que se vivi6 hace
algunos aflos. De igual forma, conforme pasa el tiempo, vemos como [a forma en que se
organiza la comunidad internacional cambia ripidamente.
Surgen nuevas alianzas y
uniones. La tecnologfa y los medios de comunicaci6n permiten que mensajes le den vuelta
al mundo en fracciones de segundo; y poco a poco vemos como la sociedad se acerca mis a
ser una comunidad global.
Esta nueva organizaci6n, a su vez, impone nuevos retos. As[, hemos sido
testigos, y formamos parte de un proceso de homogeneizaci6n en la forma que se organizan
sociedades originalmente distintas. El Derecho, par el papel que cumple dentro de la
sociedad, estS obligado asumir estos retos, y trascender las fronteras nacionales para
ajustarse a estas nuevas circunstancias. El primer paso para hacerlo es, sin duda alguna, el
conocimiento del media.
De esta forma, s6lo mediante el intercambio de ideas, a veces contrapuestas, se
logra obtener una nueva realidad, que se ajuste a las nuevas necesidades de esta era.
Gracias a esta constante dialctica que surgen ideas como el presente proyecto, que a su
vez, colabora con este proceso.
Par este motivo, aceptamos con gusto la propuesta del /LSA Journal of
International & Comparative Law de publicar, par vez primera, una revista de Derecho
Internacional y Comparado totalmente bilingfie en ingl6s y espafiol.
Asociaci6n
Costarricense de Derecho Internacional (ACODI), una joven y ambiciosa asociaci6n de
estudiantes y abogados interesados en el Derecho Internacional, no podia desaprovechar esta
oportunidad de trabajar al lado de esta organizaci6n y colaborar, en cierta forma, con el
desarrollo del Derecho Internacional.
De esta forma, vivimos [a experiencia no solo de formar parte en este proyecto
tinico en su tipo; sino tambi~n de trabajar al lado de una organizaci6n con ia experiencia y
el conocimiento necesario para poder hacerlo. Extendemos nuestro eterno agradecimiento
para los editores de esta revista par habernos hecho parte de este evento.
Par otro lado, recibimos tambidn la invaluable colaboraci6n de la Asociaci6n
Internacionalde Estudiantes de Abogacla (AIEA), con sede en Mendoza, Argentina. Con su
participaci6n han ampliado adn mis la perspectiva del proyecto, con lo que se logra un
resultado adn mis fructiffero que el inicialmente previsto.
Finalmente, no queda mis que colaborar con todos aquellos miembros de ACODI,
que de muchas formas han colaborado para que esta publicaci6n salga adelante.
Uri Weinstok M.
Coordinador de Publicaciones

Pamela Sittenfeld H..
Coordinadora del Proyecto
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the United States refusal to participate in the Nicaragua
case,' and its subsequent withdrawal from the so-called "optional clause,",
Ph.D., 1973 University of Washington; MA, 1970, University of Washington; BA, 1968,
University of Washington.
M.A., 1995 Portland State University.
"M.A., 1995 Portland State University.
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Statement on the United States Withdrawalfrom the Proceedings Initiatedby
Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (1985).
2. For the text of the United States August 26, 1946 declaration, see Declaration on the Part
of the United States of America, Aug. 26, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218; United States Declaration
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a great deal of pessimism surrounded the future of the International Court
of Justice.3 Less than a decade later, and only half way through the decade

of international law, it would appear, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that
reports of the court's demise were greatly exaggerated.' Recent literature
on the court, and on international law in general, shows a renewed
optimism about international adjudication, often bordering on the
idealistic. Some authors express a renewed interest in the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court and others simply discuss the bright future of the
court in a world ruled by international law.'
Recognizing Jurisdiction, 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 90-91 (1984). For the notice terminating United
States declaration see United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning
Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742-45 (1985); see
also Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1985-1986
I.C.J.Y.B. 60 (1986); U.S. Terminates Acceptance of .C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction,86 DEP'T.
ST. BULL. 67 (1986).
3. Anthony Guistini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The Past, The
Present, and Prospectsfor the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1986). For a discussion of
both optimistic and pessimistic views on the United States reacceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, see Jeffrey P. Bialos ET AL., Should the United
States Reconsider Its Acceptance of World Court Jurisdiction?,79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95
(1985).
4. Mood swings by the World Court are not a new phenomenon. More than 20 years ago
William D. Coplin and J.Martin Rochester noted, "Both optimism and pessimism about the role
of international institutions have been voiced during the past fifty years, with pessimism
predominating over the long run." William D. Coplin & J. Martin Rochester, The Permanent
Court of InternationalJustice, the InternationalCourt of Justice, the League of Nations, and the
United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 529 (1972); see also
William D. Coplin, Current Studies of the Functions of International Law: Assessments and
Suggestions, in 2 POL. SCI. ANN. 149 (1970). Similar sentiments have been expressed more
recently by Thomas M. Frank and Jerome M. Lehrman, who characterized the United States
commitment toward international adjudication as "the product of an inconclusive struggle
between two contradictory national tendencies: the messianic and the chauvinist." Thomas M.
Frank & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace
Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 3, 6 (L.
Damrosch ed., 1987).
5. See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 493 (1995); Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in
Business Again?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646 (1991); Peter H. F. Bekker, Correspondence, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 429 (1993); Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The
United States and the International Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J., 267-99 (1989); Geoffrey
R. Watson, Constitutionalism,Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1-45
(1993); Jose Maria Ruda, Some of the Contributions of the International Court of Justice to the
Development of International Law, 24 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 35-68 (1991); Jonathan
Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
227-56 (1994); Edward McWhinney, Acceptance, Withdrawal or Denial of World Court
Jurisdiction: Some Recent Trends as to Jurisdiction, 20 ISR. L. REV. 148-66 (1985); Anthony
D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the World Court, 80 AM. J.INT'L L. 331 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, Modifying
U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385

1996]

Scott

What is the reason for this dramatic turn around in views about the
court? Much of the current literature seems generated in response to the
sudden flood of cases brought before the court in the past few years.: The
apparent willingness of states to resort to the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter I.C.J.] in recent times has buoyed hope on the part of its
proponents and, at least temporarily, given silence to its detractors. This
is, perhaps, a natural outcome of the swing from a period of low court
business and a high level of defiance against the court, to a period of high
business and little or no defiance.
However, lest we be caught up in positing long-term trends from
short-term events, we should give some perspective to the current I.C.J.
activity. Periods of high activity for the World Court are not new. Both
the Permanent Court of International Justice [hereinafter P.C.I.J.] and the
I.C.J. demonstrated extremely active periods in their early years. Not
unlike the contemporary period, these two periods of high activity on the
court also were accompanied by optimistic literature regarding
international adjudication.' In each instance, though, these periods of high
court activity were followed by a decline in the court's business and, in the
case of the I.C.J., a period of troublesome defiance by states brought
before the court under its optional compulsory jurisdiction clause., In
order to assess whether this recent period of high activity indicates a more
(1985); Louis B. Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1988); Fred
L. Morrison, Reconsidering United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 148 WORLD AFF. 63 (1985); Richard Gardner, U.S. Termination
of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 421 (1986); J.Patrick Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 342 (1987); Robert E. Lutz, The World Court in a Changing World: An
Agenda for Expanding the Court's Role from a U.S. Perspective, 27 STAN. J.INT'L L. 265-343
(1991); Keith Wier, The International Court of Justice: Is it Time for a Change?, 8 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 175 (1985); Douglas Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145
(1986); Valerie Epps, Reinstating the United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the International Court ofJustice, 34 BOSTON BAR J. 8 (Jan./Feb. 1990).
6. See, e.g., Highet, supra note 5.
7. For literature on international jurisdiction, see Manley 0. Hudson's annual reports on
the work of the court contained in volumes of the American Journal of International Law
covering 1923-1959; see, e.g., Manley 0. Hudson, The Eleventh Year of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 11 (1933); Manley 0. Hudson, The Twenty-Second
Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 44 AM. J.INT'L L. 1 (1950). See also,
e.g.,

SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1934); SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958).

8. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Car', The L C.J. and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for
Closing the Clause, 81 AM. I. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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long-lasting trend, or just another cycle in the history of the court, we
must determine what factors accompanying this recent phase might
indicate a more permanent turn by states toward peaceful dispute
settlement by adjudication.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the recent court activity in
the context of the entire history of the World Court, for the purpose of
placing it in broader political perspective. From this vantage point we
hope to assess the future prospects for continued reliance on the court by
disputant states and also to determine if the current business before the
court gives any rise in hope for prospects of greater acceptance of the role
of compulsory jurisdiction.
II. THE ASCENDANCY OF LEGALISM
It has been frequently noted, though not always to great effect, that
any legal system must be reflective of the political system which gives it
birth. This is true of international law just as it is for domestic law.9
Because of this, any increased reliance on international law, and by
extension, the World Court, must be accompanied by a political
atmosphere which allows states to be willing to conceptualize their disputes
as legal disputes and to allow third party adjudication of those disputes.
Without such an atmosphere, any attempt to impose legal solutions on
states without their consent will be doomed to failure. Any attempt to fix
the Court or to push it beyond the tolerances of the political system will
only create an illusion of lawfulness, surely to be shattered the moment
international adjudication runs afoul of the realities of the international
political system.
It has been suggested that the normal political atmosphere of the
international system is far from conducive to the promotion of international
adjudication. 0 Thus, it takes an extra incentive for states to turn to
international adjudication, rather than self-reliance, for the settlement of
disputes. The aftermath of periods of high international instability, like
those created by wars, seem to have provided just such an incentive.

9. As Martin A. Rogoff has noted, "International law and international institutions, like
domestic law and domestic institutions, require political support for their efficacy." Martin A.
Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The United States and the International
Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 291 (1989). See also Scott & Carr, supra note 8; Gary
L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The International Court of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy,
16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347, 354-59 (1981).
10. Gary L. Scott & Karen D. Csajko, Compulsory Jurisdictionand Defiance in the World
Court: A Comparison of the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J., 16 DENY. J.INT'L L. & PoL'Y 377-87
passim (1988).
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Unfortunately, in the past these peaks of international legal ascendancy
have been all too easily eroded as memories of past conflagrations dim.
The two world wars were each followed by a period of legal
idealism that we earlier termed "post-war legal euphoria."" It is not
surprising that during each of these periods the business of the court was at
its peak.12 In the short time since the end of the Cold War, the I.C.J. has
also been beset with an influx of cases which approximates the numbers
before the court at the end of each of the two world wars. There seems
little doubt that in the period following the end of the Cold War, legal
scholars and states alike found renewed interest in international
adjudication. This is hardly surprising since the Cold War was probably
as disruptive to the functioning of the international system as either of the
two previous wars, and its end just as naturally gave rise to hope for the
rule of law as did the two preceding hot wars.
While recognizing that the end of the Cold War is a significantly
different event from the end of the two global conflagrations, there is some
reason to think that it has had a similar effect on the thinking of statesmen
and scholars alike toward international law. As Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley noted, "The resurgence of rules and procedures in the service of an
organized international order is the legacy of all wars, hot or cold."
There are, of course, important differences between the ends of
the two world wars and the end of the Cold War. Perhaps the most
important distinction, for the purpose of relating it to our analytic
framework, is that the ends of the two world wars can be tied to specific
dates: November 11, 1918, the signing of the German Armistice ending
World War 1, and August 15, 1945, the date of the Japanese surrender
ending World War II. Fixing a date for the end of the Cold War is
somewhat more problematic.
The breakup of the Soviet Union by 1992" brought the obvious
final chapter of the Cold War's end, but the demise of the Cold War really
preceded that by some considerable time. On November 20, 1990,
President George Bush announced, "The Cold War is over."'" The earlier
mid-1990 summit between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and
11. Id. at 386.
12. Id. at 387.
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A
DualAgenda, 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993).
14. Fred Hiatt, Minsk is No Moscow, and That's the Point for New Grouping, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9. 1991, at A16.
15. R.W. Apple, Jr., 34 Leaders Adopt Pact Proclaiminga United Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1990, at AI.
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President Bush probably provided the impetus for Bush's remark. The
crumbling of the Berlin wall, long a symbol of the Cold War, came earlier
on November 9, 1989.11 Even prior to that came the ascendancy of Soviet

President Gorbachev "whose 'new thinking' essentially discarded the old
rules of the Cold War game."" Perestroika and Glasnost, Gorbachev's
new reform programs were formally announced on February 25, 1986,"1
and probably formed the basis for the eventual end of Cold War
international politics.
There is yet another important difference that distinguishes legal
activity following the ends of the two world wars and the end of the Cold
War. We might call that differenci lead-in time. Prior to the ends of the
two world wars, at a time when it was clear that each war was reaching its
conclusion and also clear who the victors would be, the victors began
planning for the pursuit of peaceful and lawful activities in the post-war
period. For example, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October
1944, the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union
prepared a basic draft of the United Nations Organization 9 based on
agreements made earlier at the Moscow and Tehran Conference of 1943.20
In other words, the post-war effects on the thinking of political and legal
practitioners can be seen, at least in the planning stages, prior to the actual
end of the war. Such a phenomenon also happened at the end of the Cold
War. One can see both scholars' writings and practitioners' plans for the
end of the Cold War preceding the actual end of the Cold War, whichever
date one prefers to count as its actual end. The Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty 2' between the Soviet Union and the United States in
December 1987, is but one of these plans. The basic difference is that at
the ends of the two world wars states could only plan for the end of the
war while actual activity, like the formation of the United Nations or the
creation of the Court, had to await the cessation of hostilities.
16. Ferdinand Protzman, East Berliners Explore Land Long Forbidden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1989, at Al.
17. MEL GURTOV, GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE HUMAN INTEREST 2, 3 (2d ed, 1991).
Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985.
18. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, IZVESTIIA, Feb. 26, 1986, at 2-10 in 38
THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 8, at 4.
19. GEORG SCHILD, BRETrON WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS 168-72 (1995).
20. Id. at 42-47; 2 LESTER BRUNE, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS 823 (1985).

21. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8,
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,

DEP'T ST. PUBLICATION 9555 (1987).
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However, unlike the ends of the two world wars, the absence of
open warfare between the major participants in the Cold War allowed
states to begin actions that could proceed apace while the Cold War
diminished and eventually ended. Moreover, states could take immediate
advantage of the court, even as the Cold War waned, because it was
already in place, requiring no start-up time as it had at the ends of the two
world wars. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that increasing confidence
in international law and increasing reliance on the I.C.J. as a dispute
settlement mechanism may have been sparked by the anticipated, but
nonetheless obvious, ending of the Cold War. For purposes of this
analysis then, we have chosen 1986 as the beginning of the current phase
of I.C.J. activity.
III. THE P.C.I.J. AND THE I.C.J. IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There are distinct similarities in the early years of the P.C.I.J. and
the I.C.J. regarding state behavior toward the court. During the period
following the two world wars when legal optimism abounded, each court
was extremely active. For the P.C.I.J., this period was the busiest of its
short existence. For the I.C.J., this period was unsurpassed until the
recent spate of litigation before the court.
Each court similarly experienced a decline in activity during its
second decade. For both courts, the decline in activity was tied to an
increase in international tensions. The decline in activity for the P.C.I.J.
seems to be tied to the major international financial crisis begun in 1929,
and the rise of National Socialist Germany after 1933.22 The I.C.J.'s
decline in activity seems tied to the intensification of the Cold War and the
proliferation of new states following the period of rapid decolonization.
The major emphasis on the Cold War probably disinclined states to
conceptualize their disputes as legal disputes. The proliferation of new
states, mostly former colonies, might also have had a dampening effect on
the court's activities, because during this period the court was still
dominated by Western state judges before whom the new states may have
been reluctant to appear.
Beyond the initial surge of litigation before both courts and its
subsequent decline following increased international hostilities, the
similarities in the life cycles of the two courts end. Quite simply put, the
life of the P.C.I.J., for all practical purposes, lasted only twenty years
while the I.C.J. is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. The activity of the
P.C.I.J. was ended by the onset of World War II, while the I.C.J. was

22. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 387.
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able to continue into its next phase. Unfortunately for the I.C.J., this next

phase proved to be its darkest period thus far. The decade of the 1960's
saw very few cases brought before the court, but beginning in the early
1970's and continuing through the mid-1980's there was a period of
23
serious defiance of the court.

A. P.C.LJ. land LC.J. L
In roughly equivalent historical periods, one can compare patterns
of submissions to the World Court following each of the two world wars.
We shall call these periods P.C.I.J. I and I.C.J. I. These time periods

represent the busiest periods in the courts' schedules until the
contemporary period. During P.C.I.J. I (1923 through 1936) there were
twenty-seven contentious cases submitted to the P.C.I.J. There were also
twenty-eight cases submitted for advisory opinion. During a similar period
in the life of the I.C.J. (I.C.J. I, 1946 through 1962), thirty-one
contentious cases were submitted to the court. There were also twelve
submissions for advisory opinion during this period.
The patterns of these early submissions to both courts seem largely

to reflect a genuine interest in managing conflict through international
adjudication. With the exception of several political submissions to the
23.- The following are cases of defiance recorded during the period under consideration:
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24);
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20); FisheriesJurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.; F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 175 (July 25). Arguably, two other instances of
minor defiance occurred during this period. In Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v.
India), 1973 I.C.J. 347 (Dec. 15), India refused to appear, though it did communicate with the
Court throughout the proceedings until Pakistan decided to have the proceedings discontinued. In
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19), Turkey refused to
appear in the initial phase of the case, but since the court found in Turkey's favor on the
preliminary objections, no further defiance was forthcoming.
As Scott has noted elsewhere, "Itihe instances of defiance of the Court are well
documented and have been given a great deal of scholarly attention." See H.W.A. THIRLWAY,
NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE 3-20 (1985). See also
Keith Highet, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawalfrom the Nicaragua Case, 79 AM.
1. INT'L L. 992 (1985). There is some disagreement regarding what constitutes defiance and
what should be regarded as normal behavior provided for in the statute. THIRLWAY, supra, note
23, at 1-20. Rather than debate the merits of the various perspectives, we will classify defiance as
any behavior where a state is legally bound to the court's jurisdiction but disregards the orders of
the court in a willful manner. Thus, judgments about states' attitudes, as seen in their responses
to the court, become an important criterion for our determination. Our definition of defiance
includes both non-appearance and non-performance. Albania's non-payment of the damages
assessed in the Corfu Channel case is an example of the former; France's behavior in the nuclear
test cases is an example of the latter, and the United States behavior in the Nicaragua case,
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27), is an example of both willful non-appearance and non-performance. Scott & Csajko,
supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
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I.C.J. by the United States against the Soviet Union and other Communist
states, all submissions seem genuinely for the purpose of reaching a legal

settlement. 4 During P.C.I.J. I there were three cases submitted under the
optional clause 21 in which there were no preliminary objections by the
respondent state"l and there were ten joint submissions.2 Each of these
types of submissions indicates a willingness on the part of both parties to

come to a legal resolution of the problem.

There were no instances of

defiance of the court in P.C.I.J. I.
The pattern of submissions in I.C.J. I is similar. There were four

cases submitted under the optional clause with no preliminary objections"

24. For a discussion of various types of submissions, both political and legal, see Scott &
Csajko, supra note 10, at 389-91. Scott & Csajko categorize submissions to the court into legal
submissions and political submissions. Legal submissions are divided into adjudicatory
submissions and bargaining submissions, depending on the desired outcome by the parties.
Political submissions are further subdivided into symbolic submissions, wherein the state tries to
enlist the symbolism of the court against another state, and leverage submissions, wherein the
submittingstate tries to enlist the court as an ally against the respondent.
The cases in which the United States used the court for political leverage against the
Warsaw Pact states are as follows: Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of U.S.A. (U.S.
v. Hung.; U. S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. 99 (July 12); Aerial Incident of 10 Mar. 1953 (U.S. v.
Czech.), 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7 Oct. 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 I.C.1.
9 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7Nov. 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 I.C.J. 276 (Oct. 7).
25. The three cases were Memorial of Denmark, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den.
v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 62 (Oct. 31, 1931); Legal Status of the South-Eastern
Territory of Greenland (Nor. v. Den.; Den. v. Nor.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48 (Aug. 2);
and Appeal from Czechoslovak-HungarianMixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Royal Hungarian Peter
Pazmany University) (Czech. v. Hung.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (set. A/B) No. 61 (Dec. 15).
26. Supra note 25. See our discussion of these types of submissions which we call
Category I submissions, infra at 9.
27. Interpretation of Article 179, Annex Paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulg. &
Greece), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 3 (Sept. 12); SS Lotus (Fr. & Turk.), 927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (Sept. 7); Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. & the Serb-CroatSolvene State), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12); Payment in Gold of Brazilian
Federal Loans Issued in France (Braz. & Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12);
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (Czech., Den., Fr.,
Ger., Gr. Brit., Swed., & Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 23 (Sept, 10); The Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. & Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 (Aug. 19);
Delimitation of the Territorial Waters between Casteltorizo and Anatolia (Italy & Turk.), 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 51 (Jan. 26); Lighthouse Case between France and Greece (Fr. &
Greece), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Mar. 17); Oscar Chinn (BeIg. & Gr. Brit.), 1934
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12); Lighthouse in Crete & Samos (Fr. & Greece), 1936
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.71 (Oct. 8).
28. See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Rights of Nationals of the
United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27); Application of
the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Swed. v. Neth.), 1958 I.C.J. 55
(Nov. 28); Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 Dec. 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960
I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18).
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and six joint submissions.' 9 With the arguable exception of Albania's
refusal to pay damages in the Corfu Channel case,3 0 there were no
instances of defiance during I.C.J. I, thus matching the record of
compliance of P.C.I.J. I.
Both P.C.I.J. I and I.C.J. I reflect the willingness of states in the
post-war periods to have their conflicts settled by third party adjudication.
As will be shown in the discussion below of I.C.J. III, there are many
similarities in both the types of submissions and the lack of defiance of the
court exhibited during the contemporary post-cold war period.
B. P.C.I.J.H and l.C.J. II
In the periods immediately following these rather busy times, both
the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J. experienced a rather dramatic decline in the
number of cases submitted. We shall refer to these two periods as P.C.I.J.
II and I.C.J. II. From 1937 until the P.C.I.J.'s demise at the creation of
the I.C.J.,1' only seven contentious cases and no advisory requests were
submitted to the court. This was, quite obviously, because of the outbreak
of World War II. Interestingly, however, during I.C.J. II there was a
similar decline in the number of submissions, probably explained by the
intensification of cold war hostilities. In many ways the decline during
I.C.J. II was even more dramatic than during P.C.I.J. II. During the
period from 1963 through 1985, there were only twelve submissions of
contentious cases to the I.C.J. and six submissions for advisory opinion.
Moreover, several of these cases resulted in outright defiance of the
court's compulsory jurisdiction. 2
Though there are similarities in the second phases of both Courts,
perhaps the differences in these periods are more important. The P.C.I.J.
was obviously unable to operate during the open hostilities of World War
29. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 395 (Nov. 27); Haya De La Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951
I.C.J. 71 (June 13); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty
Over Certain Frontier Lands (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 l.C.J. 209 (June 20). Note that the number of
joint submissions is somewhat misleading because three of the cases involve essentially the same
incident between Columbia and Peru.
1 30. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15). For discussion indicating
that this might not accurately be described as defiance of the court see, e.g., THIRLWAY, see fn
23, at 6-7; GENEVIEVE GUYOMAR, LE D9FAUT DES PARTIES A UN DIFF9REND DEVANT
JURISDICTIONS INTERNATIONALE 30, 201-3 (1960), cited in Highet, supra note 23, at 994.
31. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E8, U.N.

Sales No. E.90.V.6. (1990).
32. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
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II and the decline in the court's business foreshadowed, only shortly, the
outbreak of fighting in Europe. In fact, it is rather amazing that in 1937
and 1938 there were actually two cases submitted to the court each year
"despite the fact that Germany had invaded and annexed Austria by March
1938.' Moreover, in spite of troubling times on the European continent,
there were no instances of defiance of the court during P.C.I.J. 1I."
During .C.J. II, a significantly longer period than P.C.I.J. II, the
court averaged only one case for every two years. The period from 1963
through 1970 saw the most startling decline in the court's business. Only
one case was submitted, that in 1967, following a four-year hiatus in
submissions and preceding another three-year period of no submissions.
This period marked the nadir of World Court activity in peacetime.
Because this period of inactivity came during the most intense period of
Cold War hostilities, following the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it
seems reasonable to argue that the Cold War had as significant an impact
on the court as did the open hostilities of World War lI.
During the remainder of I.C.J. II, the court experienced somewhat
more frequent submissions (a total of eleven - an average of still less than
one per year), but there were also four instances of outright defiance of the
court's compulsory jurisdiction during this time.16 There is no equivalent
period of defiance during the history of the P.C.I.J." By the time I.C.J. II
ended in 1985 and following the United States defiance of the court in the
Nicaragua case," the outlook for the future of international adjudication
looked quite bleak. There was little to portend the upsurge in the court's
business that emerged in the following period, 1986 to the present.

33. Interestingly, Belgium was involved in three of the four cases as the applicant state. See
Borchgrave (Belg. v. Spain), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 83 (May 13); Electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria (BeIg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 88 (Mo. Day); Soci6ti
Commerciale de Belgique (Beig. v. Greece), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 87 (May 4). The other
submission was by Estonia, Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C)
No. 86 (Oct. 25).
34. BRUNE, supra note 20, at 738.
35. The representative of Bulgaria failed to appear in the Electricity Co. of Sofia and
Bulgaria case, but he was unable to attend due to the outbreak of the war. Electricity Co. of Sofia
and Bulgaria (Beig. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77 (Apr. 4).
36. See Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
37. For a full discussion of comparisons of defiance of compulsory jurisdiction on the
P.C.1.J. and I.C.J., see Scott & Csajko, supra note 10.
38. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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IV. THE CONTEMPORARY COURT - I.C.J. III
A. Compulsory Jurisdiction - The Optional Clause.
Several things stand out about the court's activity in the period
from 1986 to the present. The first and most prominent differentiation
from the preceding period is the lack of defiance by states in cases brought
unilaterally under the court's compulsory jurisdiction as conferred by
article 36 (2) of the I.C.J. Statute.19 So far, during this most recent period
of court activity, seven cases have been brought under the optional
clause.'* As yet, none of these cases has resulted in any defiance of the
court's jurisdiction." While this might seem to be encouraging for the
institution of compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause, a closer
look at the cases reveals that we should be cautious about inferring too
much about the power of compulsory jurisdiction based on these cases.
In order to determine the importance of compulsory jurisdiction in
bringing certain states before the court, we will rely on an earlier analysis

of compulsory jurisdiction cases.' 2 To analyze the effect of compulsory
jurisdiction on the outcome of I.C.J. cases, the universe of optional clause
cases can be divided into four categories: Category I consists of cases
wherein the respondent state made no preliminary objections; Category II
consists of cases wherein there were preliminary objections that were
upheld by the court; Category III is made up of cases in which the
preliminary objections were overruled by the court, but where the decision
on the merits supported the respondent state's submissions; and finally,
39. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
40. The seven cases brought under article 36(2) of the Statute of the I.C.J. are as follows:
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993
I.C.J. 38 (June 12); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June
26); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12); East
Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 32 (May 19); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995, I.C.J.
Communiqu6 No. 95/19bis (June 30); Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992
I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16); FisheriesJurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1995 I.C.J. 87 (May

2).
Although article 36(2) was used as a basis for the court's jurisdiction in Nicaragua's
submission against Honduras, the court found its jurisdiction in article XXXI of the Pact of
Bogota. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
We have therefore not counted this case as an optional clause case. DeclarationRecognizing as
Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International Court of Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute
of the Court, supra note 31.
41. There are still two cases pending, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16), and Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.
Can.), 1995 I.C.J. 87 (May 2).
42. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 60; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
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Category IV includes cases wherein the court upheld the applicant state's
case on both objections and merits."1
From this categorization of compulsory jurisdiction cases under
article 36(2), it should be evident that compulsory jurisdiction does little to
enhance the court's role in Category I cases, which probably would have
been submitted to the court eventually even without compulsory
jurisdiction." In other words, there seems to be a willingness on the part
of the respondent states to participate in these cases which is implied by
the lack of preliminary objections. Category I cases are hard to distinguish
from joint submissions in terms of the disputant states' willingness to
conceptualize their dispute in legal terms.,,
Category II cases also do not reveal much about a state's
willingness to be bound by the court's decision because in these cases the
court simply finds it lacks jurisdiction.46 The respondent state, then, is
never really forced to make what might be a difficult choice between shortterm self-interest and the longer term interest of being seen as a lawabiding state. Thus, only Category III and IV cases provide a test of
states' willingness to abide by the court's compulsory jurisdiction. 4
Although our earlier analysis was of completed cases, and although two of
the cases in the present period are still pending, we nonetheless think this
categorization helpful in providing some perspective on this issue.
Of the seven cases brought under the optional clause during this
latest period, three had no preliminary objections and thus fall under
Category I." In the Maritime Delimitation case49 between Denmark and
Norway, the court decided in favor of the respondent, Norway. Despite
negotiations since 1980, Denmark contended it had not been possible to
find a solution to a dispute concerning delimitation off Denmark and
Norway's fishing zones and continental shelf areas in the waters between
the East Coast of Greenland and the Norwegian Island of Jan Mayan.
Denmark initiated proceedings against Norway, asking the court to

43. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 379-81.
46. Id. at 378.
47. Id.

48. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12);
Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June
14).
49. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
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adjudge and declare the parties' fishing zones and continental shelf areas.
Norway lodged no preliminary objections to the court's jurisdiction. The
court delivered a judgment which draws a delimitation line that divides the
continental shelf and fishery zones of the Kingdom of Denmark and the
Kingdom of Norway.?
Similarly, without preliminary objections, the Arbitral Award
case"' was submitted to the court by Guinea-Bissau against Senegal on the
basis of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the court.12 This dispute arose over
the delimitation of maritime boundaries which had been fixed in 1960 by
an agreement between Portugal and France" and reaffirmed by an
arbitration tribunal in 1989.34 Before the I.C.J., Guinea-Bissau claimed
that the arbitral award of July 31, 1989, should be declared inexistent.
Guinea-Bissau also claimed that Senegal was not justified in seeking
application of the null and void award." The court unanimously rejected
Guinea-Bissau's submission and found the award valid and binding. The
parties are thus bound by the earlier arbitration decision.'
In each of the cases above, the states involved seemed to be willing
to conceptualize their dispute in legal terms. Moreover, since the cases
were decided in favor of the respondents, there is little test of whether this
willingness to pursue legal remedies initially would have continued in the
face of a negative court decision. There is no reason to suppose it would
not. Past Category I cases have not resulted in defiance of the court's
decisions."
The third case in which there were no preliminary objections to the
court's jurisdiction under article 36(2)" is the case between Finland and
Denmark, Passage through the Great Belt. 9 As a result of an agreement
reached between the two parties, the case was discontinued at the request
of Finland.w0 Once again, it seems that the parties were originally willing

50. Id. at 46-47, paras. 91-92.
51. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 57.
54. Id. at 59-61.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 75-76.
57. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 61-62; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 379-81.
58. Supra note 31.
59. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 l.C.J. 12 (July 29).
60. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 i.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
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to conceptualize their dispute in legal terms. In this instance, however, the
lure of a political settlement apparently won out over a judicial remedy."
In the first optional clause case in which there were preliminary
objections, the court rejected those objections that were based upon
jurisdictional grounds. In Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru,'2 Australia
lodged six preliminary objections to the court's jurisdiction, only the first
of which applied directly to article 36(2).61 Australia also lodged a seventh
objection that pertained more to the scope of the subject matter within the
case." While the court rejected the objections based upon jurisdiction, it
upheld Australia's objection which excluded the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Commissioners from consideration in the instant case.6'
While the court found that it had jurisdiction based upon the two parties'
acceptance of the optional clause,* it excluded the part of Nauru's claim
that seemingly provided the raison d'etre for its case." Perhaps as a result
of that exclusion, during the following year the parties entered into
negotiations that resulted in an agreement between them,'6 and Nauru
requested a discontinuance of the case.61 With such a result, it is difficult
to conclude much about the role played by compulsory jurisdiction in this
case.
The second case in which there were preliminary objections to the
court's jurisdiction was the East Timor case'9 between Portugal and
Australia, wherein, "Portugal referred, in its application, to the
61. The settlement of the dispute was no doubt aided by Denmark's willingness to pay to
Finland the sum of 90 million Danish kroner. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. V. Den.),
1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); International Court of Justice: Order Discontinuing the Proceedings
in Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M. 101, 103 (1993).
This resulted in Finland's agreement to withdraw the case.
62. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
63. Australia's preliminary objection was based upon its reservation to its acceptance of the
optional clause deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on March 17, 1975.
Id. The court, by a vote of nine votes to four, found that it had jurisdiction on the basis of article
36(2). Id. at 269. The Australian reservation reads, "The Government of Australia further
declares that this declaration does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the parties thereto
have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement."
Austr., 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 69 (Mar. 13, 1975).
64. Australia's seventh objection stated, inter alia, "that Nauru's claim concerning the
overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners is inadmissible and that the Court has no
jurisdiction in relation to that claim, on the grounds that: the claim is a new one ....

"

Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 264 (June 26).
65. Id. at 268.
66. d. at 268-69.
67. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
68. Id.
69. East Timor (Port. v. Austi.), 1991-1992 I.C.J.Y.B. 179 (May 3, 1991).
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Declarations made by the two States under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court." 0 In this case, Portugal claimed that Australia's 1989
agreement with Indonesia, "relating to the exploration and exploitation of
the continental shelf in the area of the 'Timor Gap,'.

.

. had caused

particularly serious legal and moral damage to the people of East Timor
and to Portugal. ... ", Further, Portugal claimed material damage if the

exploitation of hydrocarbon resources should begin.71
Australia's principal objection in this case was that the court could
not adjudicate any dispute over the treaty in question without first
determining the lawfulness of Indonesia's entry into and continued
presence in East Timor. Moreover, the court could not do so without the
consent of Indonesia since Indonesia is not a party to the optional clause.
The court, by a vote of ten to five, upheld Australia's principal objection."
This case then falls under Category II and offers little on the impact of
compulsory jurisdiction.
In the Land and Maritime Boundary case between Cameroon and
Nigeria,4 preliminary objections concerning the jurisdiction of the court
and the admissibility of the claims by Cameroon were filed by Nigeria on
December 13, 1995.11 The respondent, however, had appointed an ad hoc
judge to the court, apparently indicating its willingness to participate in the
case. This is another serious case involving open hostilities over land and
maritime delimitation, but one in which the parties seem willing to seek a
judicial settlement. On March 15, 1996, at the request of Cameroon and
following hearings on the matter, the court issued an order on provisional
measures designed to stop the most recent outbreak of fighting in this
dispute .16
On March 28, 1995, Spain instituted proceedings against Canada"
using their mutual acceptances of the optional clause as the basis for the

70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. East Timor (Port. v. Austi.), I.C.J. Communiqud No. 95/19bis, June 30, 1995.

74. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16).

75. Id.; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/1, Jan. 11, 1996.
76.

Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),

I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/13, Mar. 15, 1996.
77. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1995 1.C.J. 87 (May 2).
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court's jurisdiction.7" This dispute arose generally over provisions of the
Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as amended on May 12, 1994,19
and specifically over the boarding on the high seas of a fishing boat flying
the Spanish flag."
Canada believes that the court does not have
jurisdiction over this matter because of the reservation to their acceptance
of the optional clause which excludes "disputes arising out of or
concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with
respect to vessels fishing in the [North Atlantic Fisheries Organization]
Regulatory Area

. .

.and the enforcement of such measures."" As of this

writing the parties have not yet submitted their written arguments
addressing the court's jurisdiction. It is thus too early to make any
judgment on the impact of this case on the institution of compulsory
jurisdiction.
Review of optional clause cases suggests that there is little reason
to be either optimistic or pessimistic about the success of the court's
compulsory jurisdiction based on the optional clause. It would seem that
there is no reason to differ with our earlier analyses of the P.C.LJ. and
I.C.J. experiences under the optional clause." That is, when states are
willing to conceptualize their disputes in legal terms, they will do so, and
they will follow through with adherence to the decisions of the court. This
seems true with or without compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2)."
There is nothing in the present record to suggest, however, that if a state
found it in its own best interest to defy compulsory jurisdiction that it
would not. Moreover, the record of state defiance in I.C.J. II dramatically
supports this conclusion. On the whole then, for the present period, the
evidence about compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause is
inconclusive. We should, however, add one qualifier to this.

78.

Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments in the World Court, AM. SOC. INT'L L.

NEWSL., June-Aug. 1995, at 4; Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqut No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; Fisheries
Jursdiction (Spain v. Can.), IC.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/12, May 2, 1995.

79. Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; see also Bekker, supra note 78, at 4.
80. Id.
81. Bekker, supra note 78, at 4.
82. Scott & Carr, supra note 8,at 74-76; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 391-92. But
see RENATA SZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1993).

83. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36,para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
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One of the most recent cases brought under the optional clause,
Cameroon v. Nigeria," has the potential to provide some evidence in

support of the effectiveness of the court's compulsory jurisdiction. There
are several elements about this case that have been associated in the past
with instances of defiance. There have been open hostilities in this
particular dispute (a security issue), there is a serious economic matter at

stake, it is a dispute about border and maritime delimitations," and the
power differential between the two states is large. 6 In light of these
factors, this dispute, should it be resolved against the respondent, Nigeria,
would be a serious test of a commitment to lawfulness in the post-Cold

War period. The preliminary signs are hopeful. Nigeria recognized the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court under article 36(2) in 1965.with no
reservations." There was a Nigerian judge on the court continuously from
1967 until 1994,u thus establishing Nigerian participation in the
international legal process soon after its independence.8 ' Furthermore,
Nigeria has thus far indicated a willingness to participate in this case by
the appointment of an ad hoc judge.0 It has also indicated its willingness
to abide by the court's order of provisional measures issued on March 15,
1996."1

B. Compromissory Clauses
We now turn to compulsory jurisdiction granted to the court under
compromissory clauses.Y During this period of I.C.J. activity there have
been several cases submitted to the court on the basis of compromissory
clauses in treaties. Our analysis of these cases, however, will necessarily
84. Cameroon brings a case against Nigeria, I.C.J. Communiqu6 94/12, Mar. 30, 1994.
85. "In the Application Cameroon refers to 'an aggression by the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, whose troops are occupying several Cameroonian localities on the Bakassi peninsula,'
resulting 'in great prejudice to the Republic of Cameroon.'" Id.
86. Scott & Csajko found that, "the best indicator of likely defiance seems to be 'power
differential' since most of the recent instances of defiance have occurred between states of great
power disparity." Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 392.
87. Nigeria, 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 93-94 (Aug. 14, 1965).
88. The Nigerian Judges were C.D. Onyeama, 1967-1976, and T.O. Elias, 1976-1994.
89. Nigeria achieved independence within the Commonwealth on October 1, 1960.
90. "The Federal Republic of Nigeria notified the Court of its intention to choose Mr. Bola
Ajibola to sit as judge ad hoc in the case." Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 106 (June 16).
91. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (broadcast Mar. 18, 1996).
92. For an excellent discussion of Compromissoy Clauses and I.C.J. jurisdiction see
Jonathan 1. Charney, Compromissory Clauses and The Jurisdictionof the International Court of
Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987).
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be limited since at the time of this writing only one of these cases had
come to judgment.93 Two cases were discontinued at the parties' request,"
and the remaining cases were still pending.
The first of the compromissory clause cases was between
Nicaragua and Honduras." Though Nicaragua presented two bases for the
court's jurisdiction, including Article 36(2) of the Statute, the court found
its jurisdiction in article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota." Beyond a judgment
on the preliminary objections, however, this case never came to judgment
on its merits. Though the judgment on the preliminary objections was
given on December 20, 1988," the case continued for the next three and
one half years because of extensions requested by the parties.'8 These
extensions were brought about because the parties were, "in the context of
arrangements aimed at achieving an extra-judicial settlement of the dispute
...
"" As a result of these negotiations, Nicaragua requested on May 11,
1992, that the court discontinue the proceedings.4
The effect of the court's compulsory jurisdiction in this case may
have been to cause the parties to seek a settlement they otherwise might
not have sought. That is, once faced with the prospect of going to court,
Honduras may have been more willing to settle the dispute in a process
over which it had some control (negotiation) rather than risk a judicial
settlement over which it had no control. Once the court ruled against the
Honduran preliminary objections and found it had jurisdiction, the only
other alternatives to negotiation for Honduras were to proceed with the
unwanted litigation or to defy the court. The latter does not seem to be a
prospect that most states undertake lightly, especially when jurisdiction is
based upon a compromissory clause.' 0'
The second case submitted 'to the court on the basis of a
compromissory clause was Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI),'l between

93. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
)4. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 1.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).

95. Id.
96. Id.at 107.
97. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
98. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222, 223 (May
27).

99. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1989 1.C.J. 174, 175 (Dec.
14).

100. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222, 223 (May
27).

101. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 67.
102. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 .C.J. 15 (July 20).
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the United States and Italy. The court's jurisdiction was based on the
dispute settlement clause in the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Italy. °3

Though this was a

unilateral application by the United States, there was no objection to the
court's jurisdiction by the respondent state.'0' In fact, the -response of Italy

in accepting the United States proposal was so quick that the case has the
look of a joint submission.' 0 A particularly interesting feature of this case

is that it was the first (and so far the only) case heard in chambers which
was submitted unilaterally on the basis of a compromissory clause.'10
The third case submitted to the court based upon its jurisdiction

conferred by treaty is the Aerial Incident case"'° between Iran and the
United States. This case is a quintessential example of protracted
adjudication that has ended in a negotiated settlement. It arose from the

destruction of an Iranian aircraft and the killing of its 290 passengers and
crew on July 3, 1988, and over the interpretation and applicability of the
1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 0' and the 1971
Convention and Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation.'0 ' Not only did the United States request extended time limits for

filing its Memorial prior to lodging preliminary objections, but it also
petitioned the court for more time to prepare its objections. At the time of

this writing, the case, having been extended several times, has been
discontinued at the request of the parties who have negotiated "an
agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims,

counterclaims and matters directly or indirectly raised by or capable of

103. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, arts. 16,
63 Stat. 2255 (entered into force July 26, 1949).
104. It is common ground between the Parties that the court has jurisdiction in the
present case, under Article 36, paragraph 1 of its Statute, and Article XXVI of the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce of its Statute, and Article XXVI of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, of 2 June 1948 ('the FCN Treaty'), between
Italy and the United States ....
Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 41 (July 20).
105. The United States submitted its application and request that the case be heard in
chambers to the court on February 6, 1987, and the Italian response accepting the United States
proposal was submitted to the court by telegram on February 13, 1987. Id. at 17-18.
106. Highet, supra note 5, at 647 n. 11.
107. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
108. Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 215.
109. Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Civil Aviation. Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
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arising out of, or directly or indirectly related to or connected with, this
case. "
There have been two cases submitted to the court by unilateral
application based upon earlier agreements to submit the dispute to the
court failing a resolution by other means. '"
In the Territorial Dispute between Libya and Chad,'- . the court
took its jurisdiction from a special agreement between the two parties"'
that conferred jurisdiction on the court with respect to the settlement of the
territorial dispute between them. Article 1 of the agreement stated, "The
two parties undertake to settle their territorial dispute first by all political
means, including conciliation, within one year, unless the Chiefs of State
decide upon another time period.""' Article 2 goes on to state, inter alia
"[i]n the absence of a political settlement of their territorial dispute, the
two parties undertake: A) to submit the dispute for judgment by the
International court of Justice."'

This was a case of high salience since it

involved a territorial dispute and there had been armed hostilities over the
area in question. Throughout the proceedings both parties seemed willing
to abide by the court's judgment and, following the court's judgment,
negotiated an agreement on the implementation of the judgment."6 Though
there is some chance that this case might have ended in defiance of the
court's judgment, this probability was lessened considerably by the court's
decision in favor of the respondent.
In Maritime Delimitation and TerritorialQuestions between Qatar
and Bahrain,"' Qatar brought a unilateral application to the court based
upon earlier agreements between the two parties. Bahrain objected to the
court's jurisdiction, but the court in its decision dated February 15, 1995,

110. Aerial Incident of 3 July (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/6, Feb. 23, 1996.
111. The two cases are: TerritorialDispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3); and
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Quatar and Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112
(July 1).
112. Territorial Dispute (Libya v, Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3).
113. Id.
114. Agreement On The Peaceful Settlement Of The Territorial Dispute Between The
Republic Of Chad and Libya, Aug. 31, 1989, Chad-Libya, 29 I.L.M. 15, 16 (1990).
115. Id. at 16.
116. Agreement Between The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and The
Republic Of Chad Concerning The Practical Modalities For The Implementation Of The
Judgement Delivered By The International Court Of Justice On Feb. 3, 1994, Apr. 4, 1994,
Chad-Libyan Ardo Jarrahirya, U.N. Doc. S/1994/402 (1994).
117. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communique No. 95/11, May 1. 1995.
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held that it had jurisdiction over the dispute."' It also found the application
of Qatar admissible and that it was seised of the whole dispute."19 At the
time of this writing the court had extended the timelimit for the filing of
memorials on the merits of the case to September 30, 1996.'2
During I.C.J. III then, the court has had a good record on

compulsory jurisdiction cases brought under compromissory clauses. This
is not unexpected. As we have noted above, states seem more compelled
to carry through with cases brought under compromissory clauses than
under the optional clause. This is probably because the treaty relationship
is held to be more important to them than the optional clause. In other
words, the treaty creates a social relationship between the parties, based on
their mutual self-interest, that engenders cooperative behavior in dispute

settlement procedures. This relationship is either lacking or much weaker
among parties to the optional clause.
C. Chambers
I.C.J. III has seen three cases decided in chambers.''
This
increased reliance upon chambers following the 1984 case, Gulf of
Maine,22 was the cause of some concern among international law scholars
and practitioners.'
While there may be some genuine issues to be raised
about over-reliance upon the institution of chambers,1 it may also increase
states' willingness to submit disputes to the court. This was, after all, the
main reason behind the change in the 1978 edition of the Rules of the
118. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1).
119. Id.
120. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar'v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqud No. 96/2, Feb. 5, 1996.
121. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 i.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22); Elettronica Siclua
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy). 89 I.C.J. 15 (July 20); Land, Island And Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
122. Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf Of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
123. See Highet, supra note 5, at 649. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal.
v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 28) (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). But see
Jennings, supra note 5, at 496-97.
124. Jennings raises a concern over the work load that chambers places on the Court.
The members of a chamber inevitably remain also members of the full court. If,
therefore, a chamber of the Court is faced with a very considerable task - as the
Chambers were in the Gulf of Maine case, and particularly in the Land, Island and
Maritime Frontiercase - it is practically unavoidable that the full Court should mark
time in order to permit the members of the Chamber to perform their task.
Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.
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Court designed to make the institution of chambers more accessible to
disputants.1' Moreover, if we view the purpose of the court as being the
settlement of legal disputes, then successful methods of dispute resolution,
including chambers, should be encouraged. During a period of extreme
under-use of the court, facilitating chambers seemed a good idea. In a
period of peak court activity it may seem less so. Nonetheless, chambers
has proven successful in resolving some serious disputes.
As Judge
Jennings points out, "Clearly it is not the lesser disputes where parties
have preferred a chamber.""'
Two very serious cases involving territorial disputes were settled
in chambers. The first was the FrontierDispute case' 2 between Burkina
Faso and Mali, submitted to the court by special agreement between the
two parties. This case, referred to as a "dangerous dispute" by Judge
Jennings,' 2 involved armed hostilities in the border region between the two
states.2 9 From indicated provisional measures through final judgment the
court played a very successful role in the resolution of this dispute. By the
time of the judgment both sides had agreed to withdraw their troops from
the disputed area and to return to their respective territories.,"
The second territorial dispute settled in Chambers during I.C.J. III
was Land, Island and Maritime FrontierDispute (El Salvador/ Honduras:
Nicaragua intervening)."' This very complicated case consumed two
straight months of hearings and was "the longest single case since the illfated 'merits' phase of the South West Africa cases in 1965. " "12 Moreover,
this case, according to Highet, was "really four, if not five, cases of
normal size and shape rolled into one . . . . "" Judge Jose Sette-Camara,
presiding judge of the chamber, called the case the most complicated in the
history of the court.,' Indeed, the issues were complex and involved open

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 L.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
Id.
Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.

130. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 L.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
131. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992
I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
132. Highet, supra note 5, at 648. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),
Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18), cited in Highet, supra note 5.
133. Highet, supra note 5, at 648.
134. World Court Settles a Latin Border Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at AlO.
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conflict between the parties prior to the litigation.'" Nonetheless, thecourt
was able to resolve this highly explosive territorial dispute in a. chamber of
five judges."' The decision, which favored Honduras, was difficult for El
Salvador for several reasons, but they apparently will abide by the terms of
the court's judgment."'
The third case brought before chambers involved economic issues.
In the 1987 ELSI Case,", the United States claimed that Italy had violated
their bilateral 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,"'
and the Supplementary Agreement'40 by executing an unjustified
involuntary bankruptcy of an Italian company."' The court found for the
respondent and held that the Government of Italy was not responsible to
2
pay compensation to the United States. ,,
D. Discontinued Cases
One interesting development during I.C.J. III is the number of
cases which have been discontinued as a result of states deciding to settle
their disputes prior to a judgment by the court. This current upswing is
reminiscent of earlier terminations by parties under the auspices of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. "3 During the summer of 1992,
Denmark and Finland negotiated a settlement of their 1991 dispute
Concerning Passage through the Great Belt.'" Both sides felt that their bilateral relations had suffered as a result of the conflict, and on September
3, 1992, Denmark agreed to pay ninety million Danish kroner if Finland
would agree to withdraw its application."'
135. The dispute over the territory in question was more than two centuries old and the
violence erupted in the so-called soccer war in 1969. Shirley Christian, In Land Lost To
Honduras, HeartsAre Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1992, at A4.
136. The judges in the chamber were: Sir Robert Jennings (Pres. of the court), Sigeru Oda
(Vice Pres. of the court), Jose Sette-Camara (Presiding over the chamber), Santiago Torres
BernArdez (Judge ad hoc for Hond.), and Nicolds Valticos (Judge ad hoc for El Sal.). Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept.
11).
137. Id. See also Christian, supra note 135, at 4.
138. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 41 (July 20).
139. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 103.
140. Agreement Supplementing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Protocol, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, 12 U.S.T. 131.
141. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 IC.J. 15 (July 20).
142. Id. at 70.
143. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385-86.
144. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
145. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M. 101, 103 (1993).
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In the Nicaraguacase,'" despite the fact that on June 27, 1986, the
court delivered a judgment against the United States, as of September 7,
1987, no agreement had been reached between the parties as to the form
and amount of the adjudged reparations. In view of this lack of progress,
Nicaragua requested that the I.C.J. make the necessary orders for further
review of the case. However, by September 1991 Nicaragua informed the
court that they did not wish to continue with the proceedings and
renounced all further rights in the case. Consequently, the court delivered
an Order of Discontinuance, removing the dispute from its docket, on
September 26, 1991 .'4
Nicaragua also requested discontinuance of its claim against the
Government of Honduras in the 1986 Border and Transborder Armed
Actions.,' Nicaragua further announced "that the Parties had reached an
out-of-court agreement aimed at enhancing their good neighborly relations.
"149

Similarly, in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru between Nauru
and Australia," regarding the legal entitlement to the Australian allocation
of overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the parties
reached an agreement outside the court and agreed to terminate their case.
This came after the court's judgment on Australia's preliminary objections,
but prior to a judgment on merits."'
The most recent case to be discontinued as a result of an amicable
settlement between the parties is the Aerial Incident case"' 2 between Iran
and the United States."3 After several extensions of time limits granted by
the court, the parties reached a final settlement. The length of time
allowed by the court at the request of the parties no doubt aided the ability
of the parties to reach a negotiated settlement.

146. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
147. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1991
I.C.J. 47, 48 (Sept. 26).
148. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222 (May 27).
149. Id
150. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
151. Id. at 323.

152. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988.(Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/6, Feb. 23,
1996.

153. Id.

26

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:1

These cases support the contention that states will consider the
court as one of several alternatives for dispute settlement.'11 Although
discontinuances represent a solution absent adjudication, in these cases the
court seems to have acted as a catalyst for a negotiated settlement. As
indicated, terminated cases represent a sincere "desire for dispute
settlement rather than a specifically judicial resolution."",
E. Other Cases
There are several other cases not discussed above which are still
pending. Although they cannot be included in our analysis, they deserve
mention because of the importance of their subject matter. In Oil
Platforms," 6 Iran and the United States requested' an extension of time

limits prior to the filing of preliminary objections by the respondent.'"'
This case was brought by Iran against the United States over the
destruction of oil platforms allegedly caused by United States troops during
the Iran-Iraq War in 1987 and 1988.'
Hearings on the preliminary
objections are set to open on September 16, 1996.59
Another lengthy proceeding involves Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie.11 This case arose over incidents which followed the
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December
21, 1988. The United States and the United Kingdom subsequently
indicted two Libyan nationals for bombing the aircraft, and the U.N.
Security Council demanded their extradition from Libya. The United
States and the United Kingdom also instituted economic boycotts against
Libya. Libya claimed that both states violated international law by their
actions which were contrary to the provisions of the Montreal
Convention'

which governs aviation matters among the parties.

Libya

154. For a discussion of the role of the court as a bargaining agent see William Coplin,
The World Court in the International Bargaining Process, in THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

AND ITS FUNCTIONS 317 (R. Gregg & M. Barkun eds., 1968).
155. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385.
156. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U. S.), 1994 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 18).
157. Id.
158. See Iran Sues U.S. Over Gulf Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at A6.
159. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/4, Feb. 6, 1996.

160. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14); Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14).
161. Montreal Convention for the Suspension of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
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initially asked the court to grant them interim measures of protection from
the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom, but these
measures were denied by the court. 6 2 At the time of this writing, the case
was proceeding on its merits phase.
In addition to cases jointly submitted by the parties to chambers,
there has been only one other joint submission during I.C.J. III. In
6
Hungary and Slovakia jointly brought to
Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project,'"
court a dispute over the implementation and the termination by Hungary of
the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the Gabikovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System, signed in Budapest on September 16, 1977.'" This case,
which arose over the building of a dam on the Danube, is of particular
interest involving both treaty law questions, and international
environmental law questions.163 At the time of this writing, the case was in
the stage of written pleadings.
In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,'" there were two applications for
provisional measures made by Bosnia and Herzegovina against
Yugoslavia.
The court ordered provisional measures in the first
application but found itself unable to order further provisional measures in
the second because of jurisdictional questions.'67 At the time of this writing
Yugoslavia has filed preliminary objections in this case, and the court has
fixed November 14, 1995, for the filing of a written statement by Bosnia

162. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr.

14).
163. Gabikovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1993 I.C.J. 319 (July 14).
164. Id.
165. See Dispute Over Danube Dam Threatens Hungarian Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1993, at AIO.
166. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
167. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8); Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13). See also Jennings, supra note 5, at

502.
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V. CONCLUSION

The results of cases submitted during the current period of the
I.C.J. is encouraging for international adjudication. Nonetheless, viewing
the current period as a trend in the lawful settlement of international
disputes should be approached with cautious optimism; there is some
probability that it might merely be another cycle of increased court
activity. Our comparisons of the immediate post-Cold War court (I.C.J.
III), with the court in the immediate post-World War periods (P.C.I.J. I
and I.C.J. I), indicate a similar willingness of states to rely on international
adjudication to resolve their disputes in periods following serious
international disruptions.
The I.C.J. in the current period has been used by states in a
variety of ways to resolve their disputes. The states have used it to gain
judicial settlement, and they have used it as an element in the international
bargaining process. This is evidenced by the number of cases which were
terminated because of solutions reached prior to judgment. This augers
well for international lawfulness and for the court. It is not necessary that
a dispute have a judicial resolution, only that it be settled. If the court can
play a role as a bargaining agent in the dispute settlement process, then it
has served a useful function.
A further encouraging sign is that states have not used the court
during I.C.J. III as a means merely for gaining political leverage against
each other, which happened often during I.C.J. 1, and particularly in the
cases of defiance during I.C.J. 11.110 Probably because of this, there have
been no instances in the current period of state defiance of the court's
authority. However, this deserves a cautionary note as well. In many of
the cases exhibiting elements which were present in earlier instances of
defiance, the cases were resolved in favor of the respondent state; thus
effectively removing any reason for the respondent state to defy the court.
Similarly, the court's compulsory jurisdiction has not been put to
any severe test. It has served in both optional clause jurisdiction and in
168. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J.
19, 1995.
169. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J.
6, 1996.
170. See generally supra note 23.

Punishment of the Crime of
Communique No. 95/21, July
Punishment of the Crime of
Communique No. 96/3, Feb.
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compromissory clause jurisdiction, when states seem predisposed toward
dispute settlement, and when the desired settlement is a legal one. While
there is no particular reason for pessimism over the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court, as there was during I.C.J. II, there is no
particular reason for extreme optimism either. The court has simply not
seen cases where one state is attempting to force another into litigation
through the use of the court's optional compulsory jurisdiction. Recent
cases certainly give no reason to try to increase the court's power of
compulsory jurisdiction. Compulsory jurisdiction works well enough in its
present optional form and would probably not work if attempts were made
to institute mandatory compulsory jurisdiction.
For reasons that may have to do with the end of the Cold War and
an accompanying sense of legal idealism, the current period of the I.C.J.
has been one wherein states have exhibited a concern for the lawful
settlement of disputes. Moreover, the disputes have been of high salience,
involving as they have, matters that have often been the subject of open
hostilities. In the matters presented before it, both in chambers and in the
full court, the court has been quite successful in performing its role of
dispute settlement. At this juncture there is no way of knowing whether the
current sense of lawfulness among states will outlive the post Cold War
period of legal idealism, or whether it will come to an end like those
periods of legalism which followed the two world wars. We can only be
hopeful that we are witnessing a trend toward international lawfulness and
not merely witnessing another cycle in the history of the World Court.

COSTA RICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

RULES AND THE U.S. FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT
Jurgen Nanne Koberg"
1.
II.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................

32

BASIC FRAMEWORK OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN COSTA RICA ..........................................

34

A.
B.
C.
D.
III.

IV.

The Constitution ..................................................
Civil Code ............................................................
Civil Procedure Code ............................................
New York and the Inter-American
Conventions .......................................................

35
35
36
37

BASIC FRAMEWORK OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES ................................ 38

A.
The FederalArbitrationAct .....................................
B.
State regulations .................................................
THE COSTA RICAN ARBITRATI6N RULES OF THE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE ...............................................
A.
Arbitration Process ..............................................
1.
Agreement to Arbitrate and
Arbitration Agreement ..................................
2.
Agreement to Arbitrate Means
Waiver of Right to Judicial Relief ......................
3.
Judicial Approval of Arbitration
Agreement and Appointment of
A rbitrators ..................................................
4.
Legal Fees of Arbitrators ...............................
5.
Arbitration Proceeding Provided by
the Civil Procedure Code ...............................
B.
Award and Appeal ................................................
1.
A w ard .......................................................

38
39
39
39
40
42

43
44
44
46
46

*Associate Niehaus, Adr6 & Niehaus, (Costa Rica), candidate for LLM, Fordham
University (1996), LLM from Duke University (1995), attorney from University of Costa Rica.

32

ILSA Journalof Int'l & Comparative Law

[Vol. 3:31

2.

V.

VI.

Grounds for Appeal or Vacation of
A w ard ....................................................... 46
C. Jurisdictionto Confirm and Vacate an
A w ard ............................................................... 49
1.
Confirmation by the Appellate Court .................. 49
2.
Confirmation by the Arbitrators .......................... 49
3.
Confirmation by the Enforcing Judge ............. 50
D.
Enforcement of the Award ....................................... 50
PROPOSITION OF AMENDMENTS TO COSTA RICAN
ARBITRATION RULES ACCORDING TO THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ............................................. 50
A.
Judicial Participationfor Approval of
Arbitration Agreement .......................................... 51
B.
Confirmation and Vacation of Award ......................... 53
1.
Confirmation of Award .................................. 53
2.
Vacation of Award ........................................ 54
C. Modification or Correctionof Award ......................... 55
CONCLUSION ............................................................. 55

I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial arbitration is a method of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) that is being used around the world to avoid lengthy and
costly legal appearances before judicial authorities. "In arbitration, the
parties voluntarily agree to refer their existing or future disputes to a third
party for determination and they agree in advance to accept the arbitrator's
decision as final and binding."' National and international organizations
and associations have recognized arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution method, including the United Nations Commission for the
Development of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),2 the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Inter-American Commission of
Commercial Arbitration,, the United Nations Economic Commission for
1. Zhaodong Jiang, FederalArbitrationLaw and State Court Proceedings, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 473, 474 (1990).

2. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly to
promote world harmonization of international trade law, and in 1985, 61 nations, including the
United States, had adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
The Model Law Was designed to establish a uniform procedure and practice for arbitration in
international commercial transactions. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 1 (1985).
3. The name in Spanish is Comisi6n Interamericanade Arbitraje Comercial (CIAC), and it
was created in 1934 according to Resolution XIII of the VII Conference of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1933.
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Europe,' and the American Arbitration Association (AAA).'
The
importance of commercial arbitration has also been recognized by many
countries around the world through the approval and ratification of
international arbitration conventions' such as the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Arbitration Convention, June 10, 1958), and the InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (InterAmerican Convention, January 30, 1975)."
Costa Rica is beginning to accept arbitration as an important
method of alternative dispute resolution. Although Costa Rica has ratified
the New York Arbitration Convention and Inter-American Convention in
addition to its own arbitration laws, arbitration proceedings and case law in
this area are extremely scarce.' There are several proposals to create

centers of alternative dispute resolution in Costa Rica to promote
arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute resolution.9 New
4. The Commission participated in the formation of the European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of April 21, 1961; the Convention has been applicable since
January 7, 1964.
5. The American Arbitration Association, with its main offices in New York City, is an
institution which provides arbitrators for settlement of disputes; it has its own arbitration rules.
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [hereinafter New York Arbitration Convention]. Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. Another convention, related only to the
settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, is the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1966,
which was ratified by the United States and implemented in 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650-1650a (1966).
7. See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6.
8. All insurance disputes which involve the Costa Rican National Insurance Institute, except
cases of professional risks, are solved through compulsory arbitration; insurance is, therefore, the
primary area where arbitration is used for dispute resolution in Costa Rica.
The survey firm CID-GALLUP concluded in July 1994 that arbitration was not even
considered by the surveyed as a means of alternative dispute resolution; only five percent agreed
to take their conflicts to a mediator, and two percent indicated other alternative means, none of
which included arbitration. Hernando Paris R., Resoluci6n Alternativa de Disputas [Alternative
Dispute Resolution], 91 IVSTITIA 5, 8 (1994).
In April 1995, CID-GALLUP executed a second survey and concluded that 38% of the
surveyed accepted conciliation as an alternative dispute resolution method, 31% mediation, 16%
arbitration, and 27% preferred the judiciary. Hernando Paris R., Resoluci6n Alternativa de
Conflictos [Alternative Resolution of Conflicts], 100 IVSTITIA 8, 11 (1995).
Lic. Hernando Paris R. is the Director of the Costa Rican Program for Alternative
Resolution of Disputes.
9. One of the proposals is the Arbitration Center of the Costa Rican Chamber of
Commerce, which was supposed to begin operating in May 1996, but has not done so. The Costa
Rican Supreme Court, the BogotA Chamber of Commerce, and the United States Agency for
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arbitration regulations are being prepared by different authorities and a
new commercial arbitration bill is being discussed and analyzed by the
Costa Rican Congress.10
The United States of America has also recognized the importance
of arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution. In 1925 the
Federal Arbitration Act" was enacted to establish that arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, and to ratify the New
York Arbitration Convention and the Inter-American Convention on
arbitration. 2 All of the states in the United States have their own
arbitration rules. 3
The purpose of this paper is to study the Costa Rican arbitration
rules which form part of the Civil Procedure Code and to recommend
several amendments which are considered necessary.
The Federal
Arbitration Act of the United States of America will be used as a guide to
propose amendments on confirmation, vacation, correction, modification,
and enforcement of arbitral awards.

II. BASIC FRAMEWORK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN COSTA
RICA

Commercial arbitration in Costa Rica is recognized and regulated
by the Constitution, Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code, the New York

Convention, and the Inter-American Convention."

International Development (A.I.D) have participated in the creation of the Arbitration Center, as
well as in the creation of an arbitration center for family matters, which recently began operating.
10. The Costa Rican Supreme Court, Bar Association, Chamber of Commerce, and BogotA
Chamber of Commerce are preparing a bill that should be discussed and analyzed by the Costa
Rican Congress in the near future. A bill proposed by Congressman Rodolfo Brenes G6mez and
published in LA GACETA on Monday, February 12, 1996, is now being discussed and analyzed
by the Costa Rican Congress. Brenes Gomez, LA GACETA, Feb. 12, 1996.
11. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1996).
12. The New York Arbitration Convention came into force on December 29, 1970. New
York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6. For its legislative history and purpose, see Pub. L.
No. 91-338, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601. The Inter-American Convention came into force in the
United States on October 27, 1990. Inter-American Convention, supra note 6. Legislative
history and purpose may be seen at Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990).
13. George A. Davidson, A Report of the New York State Bar Association International
Litigation Committee, Commercial and FederalLitigation Section: The UncitralModel Law on
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 94 (1990).
14. LA CONSTITUC16N POLITICA DE COSTA RICA [hereinafter CONsTrUCIN POLITICAL;
CODIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] (Costa Rica); CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [C.P.C.] (Costa Rica);
New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6; Inter-American Convention, supra note 6.
Costa Rica has also signed arbitration treaties with Switzerland (January 15, 1965), Italy
(February 8. 1910), Nicaragua (June 28, 1989), Portugal (May 1914), and Republic of Italy
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A. The Constitution"
The Constitution is the most important set of rules in the Costa
Rican legal system. Among other things, it explains how the government
is organized, including the division of executive, judiciary, and legislative
branches; it indicates the rights and obligations of citizens and foreigners,
and specifies who are citizens of Costa Rica.,,
The Constitution recognizes the right of nationals and foreigners to
settle their disputes with the aid of the judiciary and arbitration." Article
43 of the Constitution indicates that every person has the right to settle its
economic differences through the use of arbitrators, including cases in
which a judicial proceeding is pending.'"
B. Civil Code"
The Civil Code provides the framework for private law. It
recognizes and sets rules for obligations, contracts, real estate, chattels,
rights of creditors and debtors, limitations, and others.
Under Costa Rican law, the Civil Code is preempted by the
Constitution and by international treaties duly approved and ratified by
Congress and the President.'
Book IV, title XII, chapter II, article 1386 of the Civil Code refers
to the arbitration agreement; this article authorizes the parties to a dispute
(October 31,

1993).

Fernando Bolafios C~spedes,

Arbitraje Comercial en Costa Rica

[Commercial Arbitration in Costa Rica), 48 REVISTA JUDICIAL 71, 87 (1989).
15. The Costa Rican Constitution became effective as of November 8, 1949.
16. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA.
17. Id. at art 43.
18. According to the C.P.C. art. 507, an arbitration agreement can be made by the parties
before a judicial proceeding has begun or afterwards, but an arbitration agreement is not valid
when a judge has entered a first instance judgment. On its face, it appears article 507 of the C.
P.C. violates article 43 of the Constitution because the former limits or restricts arbitration as a
means for solving economic disputes. I cannot see anything wrong with the parties in conflict
requesting an arbitrator to decide their differences although a judge has already entered a
judgment on the issue. Parties should be free to choose the means to solve their differences.
Besides, the C.P.C. does not expressly indicate that an award is null and void if it is the outcome
of an arbitration agreement that was made after a judgment had been entered. CONSTITUCION
POLTICA art. 43 (Costa Rica); C.P.C. art. 507 (Costa Rica). Article 1386 of the Civil Code of
Costa Rica does not include a similar restriction as the one of the C.P.C., but since the C.P.C.
was enacted after the Civil Code, it could be said the restriction of the C.P.C. implicitly amends
the nonrestriction regulation of the Civil Code. CIVIL CODE art. 1386 (Costa Rica); C.P.C. art.
507 (Costa Rica).
19. The Civil Code of Costa Rica became effective on January 1, 1888.
20. CIVIL CODE (Costa Rica).
21. CONSTITUCIdN POLITICA art. 7, 10.
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to request arbitration. 22 Article 1392 indicates that the regulations for the
transaction agreement" will be applicable to the arbitration agreement,
unless they are contrary to the nature of an arbitration agreement.4
C. Civil Procedure Code"s
The Civil Procedure Code [hereinafter the Code] has regulations
for different types of judicial proceedings, including arbitration.26
Arbitration rules are located in different parts of the Civil Procedure
Code,2 1 although most regulations pertaining to arbitration are in chapter

III of title IV of book II, articles 507 through 529. This chapter
specifically refers to the arbitral process and defines it as a special process
different from any other process included in the Code.2 The third section

22. The literal translation of the agreement referred to by article 1386 is Compromise
(Compromiso). For purposes of this research paper, we will refer to it as arbitration agreement.
In the arbitration agreement, the parties agree on the terms of the arbitration proceeding, they
indicate on what issues they agree and disagree, and they indicate what issues have to be settled
by arbitration. In the agreement to arbitrate or in the arbitration clause, parties agree to submit
present and future disputes to arbitration. See CIVIL CODE art. 1386 (Costa Rica).
23. The term used in Spanish is contrato de transacci6n. In this type of contract, the
parties reach a final agreement to settle their disputes. The terms and conditions of the settlement
are written down and usually each of the parties partially gives up on their expectations.
According to Dr. Walter Niehaus-Bonilla, the contrato de transacci6n will be used to enforce the
awards made by the arbitrators of the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce while the Costa Rican
arbitration rules are being amended to allow the Chamber of Commerce to settle disputes through
arbitration. Once the awards are made, the parties will sign a document in which they accept the
terms of the award and agree to comply with it. This document will be the contrato de
transacci6n. If one of the parties does not comply with the agreement, then the other party will
have the right to request a judge to enforce the agreement. Interview with Dr. Walter NiehausBonilla, Appointed Arbitrator to the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce, in San Jos6, Costa Rica
(Mar. 18, 1996).
24. CIVIL CODE art. 1392 (Costa Rica).
25. The C.P.C. was enacted by the Costa Rican Congress on July 21, 1989. It was ratified
by the President on August 16, 1989, and was published in the official newspaper, La Gaceta, on
November 3, 1989. LA GACETA, Nov. 3, 1989. The C.P.C. has been effective since May 3,
1990.
26. Arbitration is viewed by the C.P.C. as a judicial process, which means that judicial
participation before and during arbitration proceedings is broad. C.P.C. bk. IV, ch. III (Costa
Rica).
27. Articles 11 and 12, found in chapter 1, title I of book I, refer to jurisdiction and to
judicial aid for execution of arbitral awards and other resolutions. C.P.C. arts. 11, 12 (Costa
Rica). Chapter IV of title I of book I refers to disqualification, recusation, self disqualification,
and liability of judges, including arbitrators; second subsection of section II of this chapter IV,
articles 76 to 77, specifically addresses the issue of recusation of arbitrators. C.P.C. arts. 76-78
(Costa Rica). Book III, titles I, II, and Ill, contains articles which refer to the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Title IV of book III refers to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
28. C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
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of chapter I of title I of the second book, article 298, paragraph 5, refers to
agreements to arbitrate and arbitration agreements as a procedural defense
during judicial proceedings."9

D. New York and the Inter-American Conventionslo
The New York Arbitration Convention applies to the "recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical
or legal."' The convention includes rules regarding the grounds for the
refusal of enforcement and recognizes agreements to arbitrate between
parties."

Among other issues, the Inter-American Convention specifies that
arbitration agreements between parties regarding differences which may
arise or have arisen between them with respect to commercial transactions
are valid."

29. C.P.C. art. 298 (Costa Rica). The literal translations for cidusula compromisoria
would be compromising or compromise clause and compromise. For the purposes of this
research, the wording used when referring to the defense will be agreement to arbitrate or
arbitration clause and arbitrationagreement, respectively. The wording of compromising or
compromise clause can lead to confusion because it might imply that an agreement to arbitrate is
not severable from the principal contract between the parties.
According to article 299, when a procedural defense has been alleged by the defendant,
a judge, before informing the plaintiff of the defendant's answer, has to decide on the issue of the
defense. If it is accepted, then the plaintiff has the right to appeal the decision and the procedure
will be stayed pending the decision. If the judge does not accept the defense, the defendant has
the right to appeal the decision, but the process will not be stayed. C.P.C. art. 299 (Costa Rica).
30. The New York Arbitration Convention was ratified by Costa Rica by Law 6157 on
December 1, 1977. The Inter-American Convention was enacted by Costa Rica through the Law
6165 of December 2, 1977. Although the New York Arbitration Convention was signed in 1958,
it was not until December 1, 1977, that it was ratified; only one day later the Inter-American
Convention was ratified. Costa Rica ratified the conventions without making any reservation.
This clearly shows one of the biggest problems of the Costa Rican Congress: conventions are
ratified long after they were signed and more than one refer to determined issues. New York
Arbitration Convention, supra note 6. Inter-American Convention, supra note 6.
31. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
32. Id. at arts. I!, V.
33. Inter-American Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
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III. BASIC FRAMEWORK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES

Commercial arbitration in the United States of America is legally
regulated by the Federal Arbitration Act,3' the New York Arbitration
Convention, the Inter-American Convention, and state law.
A. The FederalArbitrationAct
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925. It has three
chapters, the first regarding arbitration rules in general, the second
regarding the enactment of the New York Arbitration Convention, and the
third regarding the enactment of the Inter-American Convention."
Chapter 1 of the Act has sixteen sections. Each section refers to a
specific issue of arbitration, including scope, validity of agreements, stay
of judicial proceedings, failure to arbitrate, appointment of arbitrators or
umpires, applications to court, compelling of witnesses, proceedings for
libel in admiralty and seizure of vessel or property, confirmation,
modification, corrections and vacation of awards, notices, and
inapplicability of the Act of State doctrine and appeals."
As indicated, the enactment of the New York Arbitration
Convention is in chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Chapter 2
begins with section 201 and goes up to section 208, regulating the
enforcement of the convention, its scope, jurisdiction, venue, removal of
cases from state courts, order to compel arbitration and appointment of
arbitrators, jurisdiction and proceedings in the confirmation of an award,
and residual application of chapter 1 of the Act." The enactment of the
Inter-American Convention is in chapter 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act.',

34. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1996).
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3.

36. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
37. When the New York Arbitration Convention was ratified, the United States made the
following observations:
The United States of America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to
the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another
Contracting State .

. .

. The United States of America will apply the Convention only

to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are
considered as commercial under the national law of the United States . . . . The
Convention applies to all of the territories for the international relations of which the
United States of America is responsible.
9 U.S.C. § 201.
38. When the United States ratified the Inter-American Convention, the following
observations made were:
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B. State Regulations
Each of the fifty states has arbitration regulations applicable to
intrastate commercial disputes." Based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, thd Federal Arbitration Act preempts state
arbitration rules if the states' rules are in opposition to the Act.4
IV. THE COSTA RICAN ARBITRATION RULES OF THE CIVIL
PROCEDURE CODE
As has been shown, arbitration is allowed and accepted by the
Costa Rican Constitution, the Civil Code, and the Civil Procedure Code.
The main regulations of the Civil Procedure Code are included in articles
507 to 529." In the following sections, I will study the arbitration rules of
the Civil Procedure Code, including the arbitration procedure, the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and the participation of the
judiciary in an arbitration proceeding.
A. Arbitration Process
The Civil Procedure Code includes references to agreements to
arbitrate, arbitration agreements, waiver of right to access the judiciary,
judicial approval of arbitration agreements, appointment of arbitrators, and
fees for arbitrators.'4 The Code also provides for an arbitration procedure
to be followed in case the parties have not agreed on one. 3
Unless there is an express agreement among the parties to an arbitration agreement to
the contrary, where the requirement for the application of both the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration and the Convention of the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards are met, if a majority of
such parties are citizens of a state or states that have ratified or acceded to the InterAmerican Convention and are member states of the Organization of American States,
the Inter-American Convention shall apply. In all other cases, the Convention on. the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall apply .... The United
States of America will apply the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission which are in effect on the date that the Unites States of
America deposits its instrument of ratification, unless the United States of America
makes a later official determination to adopt and apply subsequent amendments to such
rules .... The United States of America will apply the Convention on the basis of
reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the
territory of another contracting state.
9 U.S.C. § 301 (1996).
39. Davidson, supra note 13, at 94.
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
41. C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
42. C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
43. C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
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1. Agreement to Arbitrate and Arbitration Agreement
The Code indicates that an agreement to arbitrate grants each party
the right to request the other party to the agreement to sign what the Code
calls an "arbitration compromise" and if the other party does not comply
with the request, that party will be responsible for money damages." The
judge with jurisdiction will draft the arbitration agreement in light of the
5
refusal of the other party to commit to arbitration.4
The arbitration agreement is considered extinguished in five
different cases." The first case is non-acceptance by the appointed
arbitrators, unless the parties had previously appointed a substitute or had
agreed on a procedure to appoint a substitute." On its face, the Code
indicates that a prior appointment of a substitute arbitrator or a previous
procedure to appoint a substitute arbitrator is needed to avoid the
extinction of the arbitration agreement." There should be no problem with
the proceeding if the parties are able to appoint post-facto a substitute
arbitrator or agree on a procedure to appoint one. Nevertheless, the law
44. C.P.C. art. 509 (Costa Rica).
45. C.P.C. art. 509 (Costa Rica).
The translation into English of compromiso arbitral appears to be arbitration
agreement; for purposes of this paper, we will continue to use the term arbitration agreement,
see supra note 22.
According to article 510 of the C.P.C., the arbitration agreement must be signed by the
parties as a private contract or must be notarized. The compromise will be addressed to the judge
with jurisdiction, and it must be signed by an attorney. The arbitration agreement must include
the following: 1) Clear and precise facts upon which the parties agree and disagree; 2) Petitions
and requests; 3) Issues to be solved by the arbitrators; 4) Names and last names, occupation, and
domicile of the arbitrators, or the procedure for their appointment; 5) Terms for the arbitrators to
grant the award; 6) If the value estimation of the proceeding is of "high or low" quantity,
according to the opinions of the Supreme Court; 7) Fees for the arbitrators and their helpers,
including a limited amount for expenses. In case an arbitrator is a judge or other member of the
judiciary, and the parties had chosen him because of his position, then he is not entitled to fees;
8) If the parties will deposit fees and costs before the judge and how much will be deposited; 9)
Procedure to be followed. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica). If the parties do not indicate a
procedure, then the one indicated in articles 521 through 524 will be followed; 10) If arbitration
is in law or equity. If neither is indicated, then law arbitration will be presumed. C.P.C. arts.
521-524 (Costa Rica).
46. See C.P.C. art. 518 (Costa Rica); supra note 18.
47. Article 512 of the C. P. C. indicates that the arbitration panel is comprised only of one
or three persons, except in cases where the arbitrators appointed is the Court of Cassation,
C.P.C. art. 512 (Costa Rica). This has been acknowledged by the judiciary, Sala Primera de la
C.S.J. [First Session of the Supreme Court], June 25, 1993 (Costa Rica).
I personally disagree with this provision, particularly considering that the free will of
the parties is being extremely limited. The parties should be permitted to agree to an arbitration
panel of more than three members, although there should always be an odd number of arbitrators.
48. C.P.C. art. 512 (Costa Rica).
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clearly requires a prior agreement, and only the judiciary can interpret the
law to not require a prior appointment or procedure to appoint.'4
Second, an arbitration agreement is considered extinguished by
agreement of the parties. This provision acknowledges the importance of
the parties freedom to enter into contracts.Y
The third case is the expiration of the term for the arbitrators to
grant an award, except in cases where the arbitrators are judges or other
members of the judiciary." The arbitration agreement should not be
extinguished if the term for making the award has expired and the parties
have agreed to extend or renew the term. On its face, paragraph 5 of
article 518 does not allow extensions of the terms, but article 519 provides
for an authorization of the parties to extend the term before it has
expired.12
The fourth case when the arbitration agreement is considered
extinguished is at the death or incapacity of an arbitrator, except in cases
where the parties appoint a substitute or agree on a procedure for their
substitution. Contrary to the non-acceptance of an arbitrator to their
appointment, this clause, on its face, does not require a prior appointment
of a substitute arbitrator or procedure to appoint the substitute arbitrator."
The fifth case is when the procedural defense of the existence of an
arbitration agreement is not alleged during a judicial proceeding.5 ' This
clause is directly related to article 298, which refers to the procedural
defenses which defendant parties can file at the beginning of a judicial
proceeding."
Oddly, the Code does not include any article or clause specifying
the cases in which agreements to arbitrate are considered extinguished. It
is not clear what happens when a defendant party does not file the
procedural defense of an agreement to arbitrate during a judicial
proceeding. Does that mean the agreement to arbitrate no longer exists?
49. C.P.C. art 512 (Costa Rica).

50. C.P.C. art 512 (Costa Rica).
51. C.P.C. art. 518 (1)-(4) (Costa Rica).
52. Article 519 also indicates that if the parties have not agreed on a term for the arbitrators
to enter an award, the term is six months from the beginning of the arbitration proceeding. The
article includes a very interesting provision regarding the authorized suspension or interruption of
the term; it allows the proceeding to be stayed, just as in judicial proceedings, due to death or
serious illness of the parties or their legal representatives, pending criminal proceedings that will
affect the outcome of the arbitration, and agreement of the parties. C.P.C. arts. 518-519 (Costa
Rica).
53. C.P.C. art. 518(4) (Costa Rica).
54. C.P.C. art. 1391 (Costa Rica).

55. C.P.C. art. 298 (Costa Rica).
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Since paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Code expressly indicates that not
alleging the exception of the existence of an arbitration agreement means
the agreement is extinguished, the agreement to arbitrate is not
extinguished if the exception of agreement to arbitrate is pleaded.Nevertheless, if the exception of the existence an agreement to arbitrate
and an arbitration agreement are not alleged, then the agreement to
arbitrate and the arbitration agreement are extinguished."
2. Agreement to Arbitrate Means Waiver of Right to Judicial
RelieP
The Code expressly indicates that the agreement of the parties to
arbitrate implies a waiver to their right to request the judiciary for a
resolution, and requires consent that the parties will accept the arbitral
award as final and binding."
During the proceedings before the
arbitrators, no appeals can be filed or injunctions requested before the
judiciary.60 This does not mean the participation of the judiciary is banned
from the arbitration proceeding since a judge will still be needed for the
enforcement of an award, for requesting and compelling presentation of
evidence, for seizure of moneys and other goods, and even for the
approval of the arbitration agreement. 6' Moreover, the parties in an
arbitration proceeding may still agree not to continue with arbitration and
to adjudicate their disputes through the judiciary. 6

56. C.P.C. art. 518 (Costa Rica).
57. C.P.C. art. 518(5) (Costa Rica).
58. Arbitration is based on the right to request a trustworthy person to settle disputes and to
waive the right to petition the judiciary for the settlement of the same disputes. Osvaldo J.
Marzorati, Derecho de los Negocios Internacionales [Rights of the International Businesses], 592
(1993).
59. C.P.C. art. 509 (Costa Rica); see supra note 18.
60. Tribunal Superior I Civil [First Civil Superior Court], Jan. 22, 1992 (Costa Rica).
61. C.P.C. arts. 507-533 (Costa Rica).
62. Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act enables the arbitrators to summon any person
and to require evidence to be produced. A United States District Court even has the power to
punish the witness for contempt in cases in which the witnesses do not appear before the
arbitrators even though there presence was required only by the arbitrators. Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). In Costa Rica, if arbitrators summon any person to appear and that
person does not appear, the person is not subject to any penalty unless the court itself had issued
the summons.
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3. Judicial Approval of Arbitration Agreement and Appointment of
Arbitrators
The arbitration agreement, once it has been signed by the parties
and by an attorney, will be filed with a judge having jurisdiction.'3 If the
arbitration agreement has any errors, omissions, or does not comply with
the format required by article 510, the judge has the obligation and
authority to request the parties to correct and modify the arbitration
agreement." When the arbitration agreement is approved by the judge, he
will ask the arbitrators appointed by the parties to accept or decline their
appointment." If the parties did not appoint any arbitrators, but included
in their agreement the method to appoint them, the judge will appoint the
arbitrators and will ask them to accept or decline their appointment."
In case the parties did not appoint arbitrators or did not indicate a
method for their appointment, or if the method suggested is not accepted
by the judge, the judge can appoint the arbitrators." If the arbitration is of
law," then the arbitrators will be appointed from a list of thirty
distinguished Costa Rican attorneys. 9 If the arbitration is of equity, the
judge will personally choose the arbitrators among honorable people
capable and able to conduct the arbitration proceeding.' °
Once the arbitrators have accepted their appointment and once
their fees and anticipated costs have been deposited before the judge, he
will then authorize the arbitrators to begin the arbitration proceedings."
63. C.P.C. art. 515 (Costa Rica); see supra note 18. The Code indicates that the
jurisdiction and venue issues of judges involved in arbitration are the same as the general
jurisdiction and venue provisions of articles 7 through 45. C.P.C. arts. 7-45 (Costa Rica).
64. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica).
65. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica).
66. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica).
67. C.P.C. art. 511 (Costa Rica).
68. Arbitration of law refers to awards made according to the law, as opposed to arbitration
of equity, in which awards are made according to what the arbitrators feel and know justice is.
C.P.C. art. 511 (Costa Rica).
69. The thirty attorneys are chosen by the Supreme Court in its first ordinary meeting of
each year. The attorneys must also have practiced law during a period of ten years prior to their
inclusion in the list. C.P.C. art. 511 (Costa Rica).
70. See supra note 68.
71. The deposit of fees and costs before the judge is only required if the parties had agreed
to make the deposit. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica). Notwithstanding said provision, article 516
indicates that the file of the case will be given to the arbitrators once they have accepted their
appointment and once the parties have deposited their fees and anticipated expenses before the
judge. C.P.C. art. 516 (Costa Rica). There is an evident contradiction between these two
provisions. Moreover, an arbitrator could condition his acceptance to the deposit of his fees
before the judge, and thus a conflict would arise if the parties had not agreed to do so. This
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4. Legal Fees of Arbitrators
If the parties do not agree on the fees of the arbitrators, Costa
Rican law will provide the following amounts:
1) for arbitration
proceedings estimated by the parties at $100,000.00 or less, the fees will
be ten percent if there is only one arbitrator, and five percent if there are
three arbitrators, and 2) if the estimation is above $100,000.00, each
arbitrator is entitled to an additional three percent.' 2 Each party has to pay
half of the legal fees, unless otherwise agreed, and the judge will not make
the payment to the arbitrators until the arbitrators have returned the file to
the judge."
5. Arbitration Proceeding Provided by the Civil Procedure Code
The Civil Procedure Code allows the parties to agree on the
procedure which is to be followed by the arbitrators in order to conduct
the arbitration proceeding and to enter an award." If the parties did not
agree on a procedure, they must follow the one provided by the Code in
articles 522 to 524." The steps of the proceedings are as follows:"

First, in cases where the panel is made up of more than one
arbitrator, a president must be elected."
The proceedings will be
would probably force the parties to agree to make the deposit in order not to delay the arbitration
proceedings or, according to article 518 paragraph 1, not to have their arbitration agreement
extinguished. C.P.C. art. 518 (Costa Rica). For the protection of the arbitrators, I believe that
the parties should always deposit before the judge the fees and anticipated expenses of the
arbitration process.
According to Dr. Walter Niehaus-Bonilla, judicial practice has always been to require
the deposit of fees before the files are given to the arbitrators. See supra note 23.
72. C.P.C. art. 519 (Costa Rica).
73. The last paragraph of article 517 should be modified so that the fees are not paid to the
arbitrators until the award is finally firm and unappealable. According to the actual reading of
the last paragraph of article 517, arbitrators would be entitled to payment if they return the file
without entering an award, or if they enter an award that was not made according to the
arbitration compromise, or if they enter an award that has omissions, errors, or mistakes of any
kind, including those that would make it null and void. C.P.C. art. 517 (Costa Rica).
74. C.P.C. art. 520 (Costa Rica).
75. C.P.C. arts. 522-524 (Costa Rica).
76. The proceeding is established in article 522, but it specifically addresses arbitration of
law. C.P.C. art. 522 (Cost Rica). For arbitration of equity, the proceeding can be similar to the
one of arbitration of law, but it must at least give the parties an opportunity to present their
allegations and evidence. C.P.C. art. 524 (Costa Rica).
77. According to article 523 of the C.P.C., in procedural matters in which there is no
majority vote, the president's vote will decide. If the panel authorizes the president to decide on
all procedural matters, his decision is binding. C.P.C. art. 523 (Costa Rica). According to
article 512 of the C.P.C., it is not clear why this article considers the possibility of not having a
majority decision, since the panel can only be of one or three arbitrators. C.P.C. art. 512 (Costa
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conducted in the agreed place of arbitration."8

The arbitration panel can

appoint a secretary, whose fees will be fixed in a reasonable form and will
be deposited before the judge. 9

Second, the parties will have no more than one-fourth of the term
given to the arbitrators to enter an award, to present their requests, and
offer the necessary evidence.1 One set of copies of all the documents must
be submitted.8 '

Third, the parties have no more than one-fourth of the term given
to the arbitrators to enter an award, to answer the claims of the other
party, and to offer the necessary evidence. 2
Fourth, once the parties have answered the claims of each other,
the arbitrators will order the reception of evidence during a term which
cannot exceed one-fourth of the term for the arbitrators to enter the
award."
Fifth, for the taking and reception of evidence and for service of
notices which cannot be done by the arbitrators, the arbitrators can request
the judge of the place where the arbitration is taking place for the
necessary help and cooperation."

Rica). It is also not clear who elects the president. The president should be elected by the
arbitrators themselves or by the parties.
78. C.P.C. art. 522(1) (Costa Rica). It is not clear who must decide the place of
arbitration. There might not be any problem if the parties previously agreed upon a place for the
arbitration. The problem might arise if the arbitrators decide on a place which is convenient for
them and not for the parties, or if the parties agree (after acceptance by the arbitrators of their
appointment) on a place which is not convenient for the arbitrators. The Code should provide an
answer for these problems. The arbitration location should be part of the arbitration agreement,
and if not, the judge should indicate where the arbitration will take place. Nevertheless, a better
solution could be to permit the arbitrators to decide where the place will be and have the decision
be final and binding.
79. It is not clear whether the secretary has to be part of the arbitration panel or if the
secretary can be any outside person chosen by the arbitrators. The secretary should not be
assigned functions common to arbitrators, especially the function of making decisions which
should be made only by the arbitrators. The secretary has the duty to serve notices to the parties,
witnesses, and authorities according to the procedure described in articles 173 to 185 of the Civil
Procedure Code. C.P.C. arts. 173-185 (Costa Rica).
80. C.P.C. art. 522(2) (Costa Rica).
81. C.P.C. art. 522(2) (Costa Rica). It is not clear why the Code requires the parties to
formulate their requests two times: the first being in the arbitration agreement and the second
durihg the arbitration proceeding. This could allow the parties to modify their intentions and
petitions' and this should not be permitted.
82. C,P.C. art. 522(3) (Costa Rica).
83. C.P.C. art. 522(4) (Costa Rica).
84. C.P.C. art. 522(5) (Costa Rica).
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Sixth, arbitrators can give the parties a term to present their
conclusions. 5
Seventh, after all evidence has been presented and after the parties
have submitted their concluding statements, arbitrators can request any
additional evidence deemed necessary."

B. Award and Appeal17
1. Award
The award shall address all issues presented by the parties and
must be entered during the term given for judgment.u According to article
525 of the Civil Procedure Code, the award must be written and entered

according to a unanimous or majority decision and include any dissenting
opinion.8 9 There is no provision regarding other formalities of the award;
specifically, if it should include issues of fact and reasoning or if it should
only include the holding. 0

2. Grounds for Appeal or Vacation of Award
The only ground for appeal of an award is the nullity of the same,
which cannot be waived by the parties. 9' The one exception is the case

where the arbitral panel is a Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice

85. C.P.C. art. 522(6) (Costa Rica).
86. C.P.C. art. 522(7) (Costa Rica) (citing to C.P.C. art 331).
87. The C.P.C. uses grounds of nullity to refer to the grounds for vacation of an award.
The term appeal will be used when a party has alleged a ground of nullity to vacate the award.
C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica).
88. C.P.C. art. 522 (Costa Rica); see supra note 18.
89. C.P.C. art. 525 (Costa Rica).
90. The second paragraph of article 525 of the Code provides a solution for cases in which
the arbitrators are not able to reach at least a majority decision. This provision is unimportant
since the arbitration panel must consist of one or three arbitrators, leaving no possibility for a tie.
C.P.C. art. 525 (Costa Rica).
91. See C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica). The parties should be allowed to deem the award of
the arbitrators as final and binding and to waive their right to appeal. The parties could waive
the right to appeal by not appealing the award within the term granted of fifteen days. If the nonwaiver of the right to appeal is a public policy consideration, then what could happen if the party
decides not to appeal, therefore renouncing its right? Should a party be obligated to appeal? The
purpose behind article 526 is probably to prohibit parties from renouncing to the nullity appeal
before the award has been granted.
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since an award made by this court is not subject to nullity." An award is
subject to nullity only on the following grounds:
First, if the award was entered after the expiration of the term of
the proceeding, except in cases where the arbitrators are part of the
judiciary."
Second, if the award included issues not submitted to the
arbitrators. 9
Third, if the award did not include issues submitted by the parties
to the arbitrators.%
Fourth, if the award was granted by an arbitrator who was
supposed to disqualify himself or if the request for disqualification or
recusation was presented and wrongfully denied."
Fifth, if the arbitral proceeding was not according to the agreement
of the parties, with evident prejudice for the appealing party." The expiration of the term of the arbitration proceeding should be
a ground for nullity only if the award was entered after the expiration of
the term and the parties did not extend the term. Moreover, an award
should be valid if it was entered after the expiration of the term, even
though the parties did not extend it, and only if the parties agreed after the
award was entered that the award was binding.
Regarding the second ground for nullity, it is clear the whole
award is null because the arbitrators decided upon a matter not submitted
to them." Nevertheless, if the decision on such issues does not affect the
matters submitted, then only the part of the award regarding matters not
submitted to arbitration should be null and void. Moreover, if the matters
submitted are affected by the decision regarding the matters not submitted,
the Court of Appeals should be able to exclude the parts of the decision

92. C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica). It explains which court acts as court of appeals and that
an appeal has to be filed within fifteen days after the parties have been notified of the award.
93. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica). Public policy is not a ground for appeal or vacation of
an award. I think public policy should be a ground for vacation of an award. Examples of
systems which accept public policy as a ground for vacation of an award are the Uncitral Model
Law, New York Arbitration Convention and Inter-American Convention. UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW art. 34 (1985); New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6; Inter-American
Convention, supra note 6.
94. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
95. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
96. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
97. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
98. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
99. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
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regarding the matters not submitted to arbitration, or to at least remand the
award to the arbitrators for modification and correction.1'0
If the arbitrators did not decide upon matters submitted to them,
the whole award should not be null and void. The issues included in the
award should not be declared null and void unless the merits of the
decision will change the arbitrators award on all the issues submitted to
them. The merits of the issues initially awarded should be binding unless
the merits of the decision upon the issues not initially considered affect the
original award.
The fourth ground for nullity should be limited to cases in which
there is evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrator or arbitrators.
This ground for nullity should not be limited to cases in which the
arbitrator had to disqualify himself or in which a disqualification or
recusation was requested and unjustly denied. Arbitrators could be partial
or corrupt even though there is no ground for disqualification or removal.
This ground for nullity should apply when there was evident partiality or
corruption of the arbitrators.
I agree with the fifth ground of nullity; the award should not be
annulled where a party has not been injured although the arbitrators did
not follow the rules set for the arbitration proceeding.
An additional ground for vacation of an award should be violation
of public policy. No award should be enforced if it violates public policy,
even if the losing party has not alleged any ground of nullity.1oI Although

the concept is not easily defined, the judiciary should be in charge of the
difficult task of determining Costa Rican public policy. Non-arbitrable
issues should be included as part of the concept of public policy. A
vacation of an award should even be permissible when no grounds of
nullity were alleged by the parties if the award is contrary to public policy.
The Civil Procedure Code, in article 527, allows arbitrators to
modify or correct the award without changing its merits.1° The arbitrators
can modify or correct the award at any time before the parties have been
notified.,03 After the parties are notified, they can request the modification

100. Article 617, paragraph 4, of the C.P.C. allows the court of appeals to annul awards
granted in equity only with respect to the issues not submitted to arbitration. A similar rule
should be established for arbitration of law. C.P.C. art. 617 (Costa Rica).
101. The New York Convention (article V.2) and the Inter-American Convention (article
5.2) recognize public policy as a ground for non recognition of an award by a country. New
York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6, at art. V.2; Inter-American Convention, supra note
6, at art. V.2.
102. C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica) (citing to C.P.C. art. 158, 161).
103. C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica).
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or correction of the award within the following three days.' °'

In cases

where there is an evident material miscalculation of figures or any other
material mistake in the award, the arbitrators can correct or modify the
award at any time.'10 Nevertheless, if the award is affected by any of the
grounds of nullity, no correction or modification by the arbitrators would
be permitted.'°0

C. Jurisdictionto Confirm and Vacate an Award
The Civil Procedure Code does not clearly indicate what judge will
confirm an arbitral award and on what grounds. 1° Based on the actual
wording of the Civil Procedure Code, three possible answers to this

problem exist:
1. Confirmation by the Appellate Court
The appellate court will confirm an award in cases where one of
the parties has alleged any of the grounds of nullity and the appellate court
determines that the award is not null, but valid.'1' The resolution of the
appellate court confirming the award would make the award enforceable.
If the appellate court considers the award null and void, then it would
vacate the award.'10
2. Confirmation by the Arbitrators
In cases where the award has been entered by a Chamber of the
Supreme Court acting as an arbitral tribunal, the award should be

104. C.P.C. art. 158 (Costa Rica); see supra note 18.

105. C.P.C. art. 161 (Costa Rica).
106. C.P.C. arts. 158, 526 (Costa Rica).
107. The C.P.C. does not even use the concept of confirmation or any other concept with a
similar definition. Nevertheless, we consider that confirmation is implicitly included in the Code
because an arbitration award cannot, or at least, should not be enforced without judicial approval.
C.P.C. arts. 525-29 (Costa Rica).
The Code does not provide any answer regarding the time requirements for the
confirmation and enforcement of an award; the Code does not indicate when a winning party has
to request the enforcement of an award (when there are no grounds of nullity alleged or when a
Court of Appeals has rejected any grounds of nullity alleged). The only possible solution could
be the prescription terms or statute of limitations of the Civil Code and the Commerce Code,
which may be of ten, four, or one year, depending on the dispute. The C.P.C. indicates in
article 214, paragraph 6, that during the enforcement of arbitral awards, if property of the losing
party has been seized and the enforcement is unreasonably stayed for more than three months, the
enforcing judge must order the cancellation of the seizure. C.P.C. art. 214 (Costa Rica).
108. C.P.C. arts. 560, 563 (Costa Rica).
109. C.P.C. an. 570 (Costa Rica).
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considered confirmed., ' The. arbitrators themselves will confirm the
award they entered by indicating that it is valid and enforceable, because
no grounds of nullity can be alleged when there is no appeal made.
3. Confirmation by the Enforcing Judge
If a Chamber of the Supreme Court is not the arbitral tribunal and
no grounds of nullity are alleged, then the confirmation of the award can
only be made by the enforcing judge.' It is not clear under what grounds
the award could be vacated or confirmed. The only' way to vacate an
award is to allege a ground of nullity within the fifteen day period." 2
Therefore, the enforcing judge cannot vacate an award if he receives the
award after the fifteen day period.
The problem of confirmation of the arbitral award can be avoided
only through a modification of the Civil Procedure Code. The best
solution would be to grant the enforcing judge power to confirm and
vacate awards; only one judge would be involved in the confirmation and
vacation of the award and the confusion would thus be eliminated.
D. Enforcement of the Award
An award can be enforced only when it has been confirmed by a
judge, since judicial participation is required for the enforcement of the
arbitral award"'. Once the award has been confirmed, it will be enforced
by the proper judge, applying the same rules and regulations as ordinary
judgments.", The judge who enforces the award is the same judge who
would have handled the case if the dispute had not been resolved through
arbitration."" '
V. PROPOSITION OF AMENDMENTS TO COSTA RICAN ARBITRATION
RULES ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

The Federal Arbitration Act and American case law provide
solutions for several of the problems of the Costa Rican arbitration rules,
110. C.P.C. art. 514 (Costa Rica).
111. C.P.C. art. 529 (Costa Rica).
112. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica).
113. See C.P.C. arts. 12, 529 (Costa Rica); supra note 18.
114. C.P.C. art. 529 (Costa Rica). The execution of judgments are specifically included in
Title III of Book III of the C.P.C., articles 692 through 704, although the remaining articles of
Book III could be applied in cases or situations not covered by articles 692 through 704. C.P.C.
arts. 692-704 (Costa Rica). Title IV of Book III, articles 705 through 708 regulate the execution
of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards. C.P.C. arts. 705-708 (Costa Rica).
"115. See C.P.C. arts. 12, 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica); supra
note 18.
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including judicial approval of the arbitration agreement, and confirmation
and vacation of arbitral awards."'
A. JudicialParticipationfor Approval of Arbitration Agreement
A Costa Rican arbitration regulation which should be eliminated is
that of judicial approval of the arbitration agreement in article 510 of the
Civil Procedure Code."" The arbitration agreement should not be
approved by a judge when the parties to the arbitration proceeding are
willing to submit their disputes to arbitration. The law must consider that
the parties in an arbitration procedure know what they are doing, and if
they do not, they will search for legal advice from a capable and
knowledgeable lawyer." 8 The law must also assume arbitrators are capable
of conducting a fair arbitration procedure and have the knowledge to
determine and approve the contents of an arbitration agreement.
Arbitrators, not judges, should approve the arbitration agreement.
When an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties, the
arbitration proceeding should be initiated by the parties themselves through
written notice. The party giving the notice should indicate to the other
party the grounds of the controversy and the relief sought. The party
receiving the notice should then agree to arbitrate under their agreement
and should also state its position. Both parties would then agree on the
arbitration proceeding, although the agreement on the terms of the
proceeding could have been included in the previous agreement to
arbitrate, or incorporated through the choice of a body of law or
arbitration institution.
Lic. Victor Garita Gonzilez, a Costa Rican lawyer, considers the
regulation of judicial approval of the arbitration agreement excessive. Lic.
Garita suggests Costa Rican arbitration law should recognize the existence
of institutional arbitration, and that the powers of the judge regarding the
approval of the arbitration agreement should be limited to a legalization of

116. The Federal Arbitration Act and American case law provide guidance in other
arbitration issues, including preclusive effects, manifest disregard of the law by arbitrators,
awards contrary to public policy, sufficiency of proof, fair hearings, arbitral partiality or bias,
provisional enforcement, judicial selection of arbitrators, deference to foreign law, severability,
consolidation of arbitral proceedings, and mutual assent. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1996).
117. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica).
118. 1 agree with the requirement of the C.P.C. to have a lawyer sign the arbitration
compromise. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica). Parties will be able to choose the lawyer who will
best protect their interests, and the lawyer will assume his professional responsibility by signing
and approving the arbitration agreement.
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the actions of the arbitration institution, which would be in charge of

approving the arbitration agreement."'
Although I agree with Lic. Garita's suggestion, I believe the
approval of the arbitration agreement should not be limited to arbitration
institutions; I would go further and allow ad hoc arbitrators to approve the
arbitration agreement and to conduct the arbitration proceeding according

to the agreement of the parties.
The Federal Arbitration Act does not regulate the arbitration
agreement like the Costa Rican Civil Procedure Code. I believe the lack
of regulation by the Federal Arbitration Act means arbitration agreements
should not be reviewed or approved by the judiciary.' 2 Moreover, the Act
clearly indicates "an

. .

.agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an

existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.

,,.2,This clause

demonstrates the importance given to the agreements between parties, and
it does not subject said agreements to judicial approval. The arbitration
agreement can be approved by the arbitrators themselves and not by a
court of law.", If Congress had intended to have the judiciary approve the
arbitration agreements of parties, it would have stated this intention in the
Federal Arbitration Act.
Judicial participation at the beginning of an arbitration proceeding
should be required only in cases where one of the parties to an arbitration
agreement is not willing to arbitrate disputes, when parties are not able to
agree on the arbitration proceeding itself, or when the parties have agreed
on a procedure which is clearly against the interests of one of the parties.
In cases where the parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes and have
agreed upon an arbitration procedure, then judicial participation should not
be necessary. The idea is not to eliminate judicial participation during
arbitration proceedings, but how judicial control can be efficient and less
disruptive of arbitration.1'1
119. Victor Garita Gonz~lez, Un Nuevo Horizontepara la Basqueda de woa Mejor Justicia
[A New Horizon for a Better Justice System], 1995 EL ARBITRAJE 10.
120. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
121. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996); see also Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State
Court Proceedings, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 473 (1990); Janet Lee Harold, Federal Preemption,
54 MIss. L.J. 571 (1984); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983).
122. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
123. Victor Manuel Garita, Conceptual Basis For a New Arbitral Statute for Costa Rica: A
New Approach in Latin America, 65 TUL.L. REV. 1633, 1653 (1991).
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B. Confirmationand Vacation of Award
The rules for the confirmation and vacation of arbitral awards of
the Costa Rican Civil Procedure Code require immediate modification to
avoid the confusion which they create.'24 The Federal Arbitration Act
provides guidance on these issues. '2
1. Confirmation of Award
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that after an arbitration
award has been made, "any party to the arbitration may apply to the court
so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected

....

,126 The Act also provides a term of one year for a party to

2
request the confirmation of the award by a court of law.1 7
Costa Rica has no clear rule regarding the confirmation of an
arbitration award, except for the cases Where the award was made by a
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice or where no grounds of nullity
were found.' 2s In order to avoid any possible confusion, the Costa Rican
Civil Procedure Code should include a rule similar to section 9 of the
Federal Arbitration Act'29 to provide the winning party with a mechanism
to confirm the award when the vacation of the award was not requested by
the losing party. The confirmation of the award should be allowed only
after the term for requesting the vacation of the award has expired. 30 This

124. C.P.C. arts. 525-529 (Costa Rica).
125. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996). See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, no. 94-560, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 3463 (May 22, 1995); Western Employees Ins. Co. v. Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258 (9th
Cir. 1992); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio
1981); Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953); Comprehensive
Accounting Corp. v. Ruddell, 760 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Wing v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 678 F. Supp, 622 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1983); International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas S.A. Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172
(S.D.N.Y 1990).
126. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996).
127. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996). Although the term of one year appears to be mandatory, case
law has indicated that the term is permissive; an award can be confirmed even more than one
year after it was granted, unless the award has already been vacated. See Kentucky River Mills,
206 F.2d at 111; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948);
Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Eng'g Co., 59 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
128. C.P.C. arts. 514, 526 (Costa Rica).
129. The losing party should be served notice of the confirmation of the award and should
be given the opportunity to have a hearing to comply with procedural due process. 9 U.S.C. § 9
(1996).
130. The term for the confirmation of the award should be reasonable. I think a term of
three months should satisfy the interest of dispute resolution through arbitration. This term
would begin the following day after the expiration of the term for requesting the vacation of the
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would assure the winning party that the enforcement of the award will not
be delayed under grounds of nullity of the award itself.
The judge with jurisdiction to confirm the award should be the
same judge who would have enforced a judicial resolution; therefore, it
should be the same judge who would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate
the case. 3'
2. Vacation of Award
The Federal Arbitration Act also provides regulations regarding
the vacation.of an arbitral award. When an award has been made, a
United States court may make an order vacating the award upon
application of any party to the arbitration on four grounds, including
where the award has been procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,
or where there was evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrators.'3
As was indicated above, the fourth ground of appeal of the Civil
Procedure Code should be modified to allow the vacation of an award
when the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,
including partiality of the arbitrator, as indicated in the Federal Arbitration
Act. 133 The fact that an arbitrator did not resign or that a request for his or
her impeachment was unduly denied should not be enough to vacate the
award. The award should be vacated only if there was evident partiality
by the impeached arbitrator, or if the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means. The issues of impeachment or resignation of
arbitrators alone should not be grounds for the vacation of awards.
Although I agree with the term of fifteen days given by the Civil
Procedure Code for requesting the nullity of the award, the term could be
even shorter. I consider a term of five days reasonable, because it is equal
to the one given by the Code to appeal final judgments of the courts.t3
It should be made clear, if the losing party does not request the
vacation of an award within the term, then it has lost all possibility of
vacation of the award, even during the proceeding for the confirmation of
the award.

award. When a request for vacation of the award has been presented, then a different problem
arises. The winning party should be served notice of the request for vacation of the award and
should be given the opportunity to request the confirmation of the award during the vacation
proceeding. In this case, the period of three months would no longer apply.
131. See C.P,C. arts. 12, 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica).
132. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (1996).
133. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1996).

134. C.P.C. art. 559 (Costa Rica); see supra note 18.
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The judge with jurisdiction to vacate the award should be the same
judge who would have enforced a judicial resolution; it should therefore be
the same judge who would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.",
C. Modification or Correctionof Award
A ground for modification or correction of an award should be
where the arbitrators have decided upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter which affects the merits of the matter under
deliberation by the tribunal, in which case the award should be null and
void. The fact that the arbitrators awarded on matters submitted to them
and on matters not submitted to them should not make an award null. If
the arbitrators make an award on the matters submitted to them, and by
mistake or any other reason they also award on matters not submitted to
them without affecting the merits of the award on the matters submitted,
then I see no reason to have the award be null and void. This is the same
position taken in the Federal Arbitration Act'36 and this should be the
position of the Costa Rican arbitration rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Costa Rican arbitration rules must be amended in order to
provide parties with unsettled disputes a safe alternative to judicial
proceedings. Arbitration must be seen as an important device to avoid the
long and costly appearance before courts to settle conflicts between
parties. Costa Rican law must recognize the free will of the parties and
must limit judicial intervention during arbitral proceedings. If judicial
intervention is permitted during arbitral proceedings, arbitration will no
longer be faster and more efficient than the judiciary. If the parties
involved in a transaction do not feel comfortable with arbitration, its use as
an alternative method for dispute resolution will continue to be limited.
Special emphasis must be given to confirmation, vacation,
correction, and modification of arbitral awards. Although parties may be
willing to arbitrate, they will not always be willing to comply with arbitral
awards. Rules regarding the enforcement of awards should be very clear
and precise in order to be trustworthy to the parties. The Federal
Arbitration Act of the United States and its case law provide guidance on
many arbitration issues, including enforcement.
Arbitration must be subject to an open debate among lawyers,
judges, businessmen, and people in general. The Supreme Court, the Bar
135. See C.P.C. arts. 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica).
136. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C § 11 (1996).
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Association, the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce, the Bogota Chamber
of Commerce, and the United States Agency for International
Development, are participating in this discussion and analysis of
arbitration. This research paper is useful for the debate on arbitration.
The opening of the Arbitration Center of the Costa Rican Chamber of
Commerce and the proposals of new arbitration rules are clear examples of
the new era for arbitration in Costa Rica. As discussions continue,. as the
arbitration centers operate, and as Congress realizes the importance of new
arbitration rules, the public will accept arbitration as an important method
of alternative dispute resolution.
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"One cause of the failure of mission work is that most of the missionaries
are entirely ignorant of our history . . . 'what do we care for heathen
records?' . . . and consequently estrange their religion from the habits of

thought we and our forefathers have been accustomed to for centuries
past."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Differences in the Approach to Forming a Contract
Generally, the Japanese approach to contract formation differs
significantly from the American approach. Indeed, without this difference
many disputes between the countries would not exist. Nevertheless,
presently, the typical American business person says the Japanese
approach to business negotiations wastes time.' Conversely, the Japanese
complain about the American dry approach to business deals. 3

The significance of a written document in the American legal
system is tremendous. For example, the Statute of Frauds, Parol Evidence
1. INAZO NITOBE, BUSHIDO: TIlE SOUL OF JAPAN (1905).
2. Robert J.Walters, Now That I Ate The Sushi, Do We Have a Dea., 12 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& BUS. 335, 339 (1991).
3. Danian Zhang & Kenji Kuroda, Beware of JapaneseNegotiation Style: How To
Negotiate With Japanese Companies, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 195, 209 (1989).
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Rule, and other theories highlight the importance of a written agreement.
As a result, American business people tend to start a relationship after they
have closed the deal. By contrast, the typical Japanese business enterprise
would not immediately enter into an agreement, especially with a foreign
enterprise. This might be the result of the historical skepticism towards

strangers in the Japanese society.' In any event, the Japanese business
entity will attempt to establish a trusting relationship with their potential
partners before they finally enter into an agreement. This slow process of
trying to know each other before entering into an agreement appears to be
an irritating process for American business people.
The attempt to establish a trustworthy relationship before entering
into a contract goes further. In other words, the Japanese entity will carry
over the established relationship beyond the closing of the deal. The
corollary of this attitude is that the end result of the deal, which is the

written contract itself, is no more than a signed agreement which would
prove a trustworthy relationship has been established. Accordingly, the
Japanese entity would not expect an entity with which they have a
trustworthy relationship to insist on a term which turned out to be a very
bad deal, not to mention initiate a lawsuit.'
In order to reduce the possibilities of a lawsuit, it is important to
identify the problems which may arise in the course of contracting. In
drafting a contract, the parties must envision two significant aspects in
which a problem may arise. One aspect concerns the use of words. The
use of unclear words creates an interpretation problem. This problem is

most prominent when two parties using different languages attempt to
agree to a document written in either language. The second problem
arises when the importance of a written document, as a matter of law,
4. The analysis of the historical skepticism of the Japanese towards strangers and foreigners
is beyond this article, and, therefore, is not discussed.
5. Professor Steven R. Salbu has mentioned in his article that:
[i]n the United States, finely articulated contract terminology combined with a high
incidence of litigation tends to create a mistrustful contracting environment relative to
other cultures. Yet, as contracting in the United States has progressed from classical to
neoclassical and even relational varieties, the American contracting culture may be
moving toward greater flexibility and reliance upon justifiably trustworthy alliances.
In other countries, such as Japan, contracts traditionally have been little more than
declarations of good faith and a general commitment to support future dealings with
another party.
Steven R. Salbu, ParentalCoordinationand Conflict in InternationalJoint Ventures: The Use of
Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1221,
1232-33 n.52 (1993). In the same article Professor Salbu states that the "Japanese business
people often rely on mutual trust to the exclusion of formal contracting," and that "[t]hey have
traditionally viewed the need to contract as a lack of good faith, potentially injuring future
relations between venture parents." Id. at 1260.
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differs significantly. This will especially be a problem between a Japanese
business enterprise and an American business enterprise because of their
being accustomed to legal systems in which one attaches significant
importance to a written document, and the other does not. These issues
will be discussed separately in the subsequent sections.
This article will describe the difference in attitude towards the
terms of a contract between Japanese business entities and American
business entities. The difference in attitude towards a written document in
America and Japan stems from the differences in the contract law itself.
The most significant difference is an absence of an equivalent to the
Anglo-American Parol Evidence Rule or the Statute of Frauds in Japanese
contract law. This article will highlight this absence and other differences
between Japanese contract law and American contract law by applying
Japanese contract law to the fact patterns of famous American cases.
Finally, this article will propose an ideal method of contracting with an
entity from a different jurisdiction.

B.

The Differences Between Anglo-American Law and Continental
Law

Before discussing the differences between Japanese contract law
and American contract law, one should understand the differences between
Anglo-American law and Continental law, which is the basis of Japanese
law. Generally, modern continental law is based on the will theory. In
other words, the law focuses on the specific intent of the contracting party.
For example, if an individual enters into a contract, the "modern
Continental law, apart from certain requirements of proof . . . asks only,
6
Did [sic] the promisor intend to create a binding duty?"
The origin of the will theory, therefore the origin of Continental
law, can be found in the thoughts of seventeenth century jurists. In the
seventeenth century, the decisive element to contract "was the idea of
deduction from the nature of man as a moral creature and of legal rules
and legal institutions which expressed this ideal of human nature."
Furthermore, in the period when the law was nothing more than a rule
describing the morals of human beings, the courts "searched the
conscience of a defendant by an examination under oath, and believed
[they] could reach subjective data that were beyond the cognizance of a
jury."8
Accordingly, the origins of Continental law relied on the

6.

ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 238 (1921).

7. Id. at 253.
8. Id.
at 271.
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metaphysical existence of a natural law which was dedujced from human
morality. As a result, it focused more on the intent and the morality of the
contracting party rather than on the effect created by the manifestation of
that intent.
On the other hand, "Anglo-American jurists paid little or no
attention to the systems of the metaphysical school. " In the wake of the
industrial revolution, the Anglo-American jurists recognized "[tihe need of
stability and certainty in the maturity of law and in the importance of the
social interests in security of acquisitions and security of transactions in a
commercial and industrial society."' 0 The philosophers of this school
thought the source of obligation to a contract was in the form itself."2
Accordingly, the rule was laid down "by parol the party is not obliged."
Furthermore, philosophers say that the American legal system does "not
give effect to promises on the basis of the will of the promisor, although
the [American] courts of equity have shown some tendency to move in that
direction.""

In summary, the origin of Anglo-American law "insists on
uniformity, the [Continental law] on morality; the former on form, the
latter on justice in the ethical sense; the former on remedies, the latter on
duties; the former on rule, the latter on reason."" As a result, these basic
notions still linger on to influence the present-day law in respective
nations.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF
INTERPRETATION AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. The Criticism of The ParolEvidence Rule
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts says the parol evidence
rule is a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence, which "renders
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 152 (1921).

10. Id. at 148.
11. See generally POUND, supra note 9.
[I]n the strict law the source of obligation was in the form itself. For in primitive
thinking forms have an intrinsic efficacy. It has often been pointed out that the faith in
legal forms belongs to the same order of thought as faith in forms of incantation and
that legal forms are frequently symbols to be classed psychologically with the symbols
of magic.
Id.
12. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 232 (1881).
13. POUND, supra note 6, at 270.
14. POUND, supra note 9, at 141.
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inoperative prior written agreements as well as prior oral agreements.""s
Accordingly, if the rule is applied literally, when a contract dispute arises,
any prior stipulated agreement or condition which did not appear in the
final written contract, cannot be considered in the trial.
The rigid application of this rule has been widely criticized among
legal scholars. Professor Arthur Corbin stated that "extrinsic evidence is
6
always necessary in the interpretation of a written instrument."
Specifically, the view that the written contract must be ambiguous before
the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence to determine their real
intentions has been criticized. Judge Posner observed that "a clear
document can be rendered unclear-even have its apparent meaning

reversed-by the way in which it connects, or fails to connect" with the
subjects it describes.1 7 "Discrepancy between the word and the world is a
common source of interpretive problems everywhere." 8 Furthermore, he
criticized the rule because it assumes a precision in language which cannot
exist, and because it requires the trial judge to determine the true intent of
the parties in a transaction to which he is far removed both in time and in

circumstance. 9
While the rule has been criticized for its rigid application,
American contract law is departing from such a rigid application. For
example, the Uniform Commercial Code allows evidence of course of

dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance to play a significant
role in the interpretation of commercial agreements.2° This requirement
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (1979). Section 213 states that:
1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is
inconsistent with them. 2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that they are within its scope. 3) An integrated agreement that
is not binding or that is voidable and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement.
But an integrated agreement, even though not binding, may be effective to render
inoperative a term which would have been part of the agreement if it had not been
integrated.
Id. at §213 cmt. a.
16. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 188-89 (1965).
17. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. Id. at 577.
19. URS Corp. v. Ash, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (II. App. Ct. 1981).
20. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994). This section provides that:
[tlerms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement, but may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of
trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence
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arises from the notion that commercial merchants are better off being
bound to the actual rules which bind ordinary merchants in the real
commercial world, than to be bound by the court-made rules which are
sometimes far from being practical in a commercial sense."
B. The Meaning of Interpretation
In international negotiations, it is almost impossible to ascertain the
true intention of the parties without introducing extrinsic evidence.
Therefore, the finality of a written agreement may cause difficulty in
performance because the meaning placed on a word is influenced, among
other things, by the interpreter's culture, age, and environment. For
example, a person who grew up in Boston might attach a different meaning
to a particular word than a person who grew up in Los Angeles.
Furthermore, a Japanese speaking person and an English speaking person
may attach different meanings to the same word as well. Even though a
rigid application of the rule has been criticized, the importance of a written
contract still remains quite intact. The written contract is still "meant to
finalize and formalize the agreement, so the use of less formalized oral
22
evidence to determine its meaning is considered retrograde."
The emphasis placed on a written contract is seen in the famous
chicken case.? In that case, a contract dispute arose between an American
seller and a Swiss buyer regarding the sale of chicken.24 The terms of the
agreement provided as follows: "US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A,
Government Inspected, Eviscerated 2 1/2 - 3 lbs. and 1 1/2 - 2 lbs., each,
all chicken individually wrapped in cryovac packed in secured fiber
cartons or wooden boxes, suitable for export.""5 A dispute arose when the
chicken sent to Switzerland turned out to be fowls and stewing chickens,
of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Id. at § 2-202.
21. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B Preface: Meeting the Information Age,
V (UCC Discussion Draft, Dec. 1, 1995); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8
(1974).
22. Salbu, supra note 5, at 1249. Professor Salbu further states that "even when there is
ambiguity, [the American] proclivity is to favor drafting intent over negotiating intent. The
[drafting] party's assertion of intent in choosing terms is generally considered more compelling
than a[n] [agreeing] party's statements concerning its understanding of intent at the time of
negotiation." Id.
23. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 117.
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rather than fryers and broilers as intended by the buyer.2 6 The New York
court said the issue in the case was "what is chicken?"27
The court held the fowls and stewing chickens sent to the buyers
"did coincide with one of the dictionary meanings" of chicken; the buyer
had the burden of proving the word was "used in the narrower rather than
the broader sense;""s and the buyer had not discharged its burden.2' As a
result, the court held the stewing chickens sent to the buyer were well
within the definition of chicken, and, therefore, held for the American
seller. 10 Thus, it can be said that instead of determining "what is
chicken?" the court determined "[wihether the goods the seller sent to the
buyer was chicken or not." 3'
The court did not look into whether the word chicken, if literally
translated into German, would constitute the same meaning in English.,,
Failing to look at a word's direct translation may produce problems when
a Japanese person enters into a contract with an American. For example,
according to the Shogakukan, Progressive: English- JapaneseDictionary,
the word chicken has more than one meaning as a noun." Its first meaning
"is a 'niwatori,'3 4 a chick (within one year of age); generally, a young
chicken. cf. fowl."'
It follows that Japanese people will ordinarily
associate a young tender chicken with the word chicken.16
If the courts do not to consider this extrinsic evidence just because
the judge finds the word unambiguous, a very unfair result may follow.
Furthermore, given the hierarchy of languages in the context of
international business transactions, those who have English as the native
language would have an advantage over other parties unless the courts are
willing to consider the cultural differences in societies. What is also

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
FrigalimentImporting, 190 F. Supp. at 121.

30. Id.
31. MARVIN A. CHIRLESTIEN, CONTRACTS 78(1990).
32. Frigaliment Importing, 190 F. Supp. at 116.
33. OKANA KATSUIINO JITSUYO SHIN [SHOGAKUKAN, PROGRESSIVE: ENGLISH-JAPANESE
DICTIONARY] 625 (3d ed. 1985).
34. Niwatori, is a domestic bird belonging to the pheasant family that is for edibles, eggs,
and appreciation. Id.
35. Id..
36. It must be noted that the word chicken is used as is in the Japanese language. In other
words, an ordinary person without any special knowledge of the English language would
understand the word chicken if one were to use it.
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troublesome, is that in the language context, some English words are used
as is in Japanese which do not have precisely the same meaning. For

example, the word mansion in English would describe a large expensive
home. On the other hand, the word mansion used as is in Japanese would
describe something close to an apartment house or a tenement house." If a
Japanese real estate developer and an American company were to enter
into a contract to lease a mansion, the result would be significantly

different in a Japanese court than in an American court.
III. How WRITTEN AGREEMENTS AND THE ISSUE OF
INTERPRETATION IS DEALT WITH IN JAPAN
Japanese contract law constitutes a part of the Japanese civil code.
The Japanese civil code adopted the German code in 1866.38 They adopted

the German code at that time in the hope they would become the Germany
of Asia. 9 Germany, which was a small country at that time, was
surrounded by France, Britain, Russia, and otier powerful nations. The
Japanese, after their civil revolution, desired to become a civilized nation
in the western sense, and therefore, searched for a role model in the
western civilization. As a result, they found themselves in a similar
situation to the Germans.
Additionally, the Japanese felt the way the Germans governed their
country fitted the needs for their own.40 Accordingly, the Japanese adopted
the law of that country.4' Still, in modern society, the civil code plays an
important role in business transactions although the Commercial Code will
also play a significant role.

37. If the reader has difficulty in comprehending this notion, think about the following.
The word futon, which is Japanese, would describe a soft cover used when sleeping in the United
States. In Japan, however, the word describes the cover, but also includes the mattress that goes
beneath the human body when we sleep. Similarly, the word hibachi, also a Japanese word,
would describe anything that has a grill with fire burning underneath. On the other hand, a
typical Japanese person would associate the word with a specific type of pot (which can be
interpreted as (b)hachi) made of ceramic with fire (which is interpreted as hi) burning from a pile
of charcoal.
38. See generally MINPO, Law No. 89 of 1896, Law No. 9 of 1898.
39. 1 RYOTARO SHIBA, TOqU GA GOTOKu 235 (1980). See also 3 ZENTARO KITAGAWA,
DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN § 3.01(4) (1990).
40. SHIBA, supra note 39, at 237. See also KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 3.01(4).
41. For a more detailed discussion on why the Japanese adopted German customs, see
SHIBA, supra note 39, at 74-75, 232-40 (describing the era after the Japanese Civil Revolution up
to when one of the prominent politicians of that era, Takamori Saigo, led an attempted coupd'dtat). See also 2 RYOTARO SHIBA, TOBU GA GOTOKU 161 (1980).
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A.

The Japanese Civil Code and the Relation With the Continental
Law
The basic theory behind the Continental law, as discussed
previously, is the notion of the will theory. Under the will theory, the law
focuses on the intention of the parties, and gives little attention to the
appearances of the intention of the parties.2 On the other hand, the
American common law is based on the relations theory." Under this
theory, the law focuses on the objective relation between the parties and
not the subjective intent of the party or parties."
Under the will theory, the Japanese Civil Code established the
principle that a "contract is a legal product which is created by the meeting
of two or more conflicting wills."" This general principle seemed to
operate until the industrial revolution. With the increase of trade business,
focusing only on the intention of the party produced problems because of
an individual's effect on third parties' reliance on their expression of their
intention." As a result, principles such as the requirement of honesty and
loyalty, developed in order to impose restrictions on the will theory."
B.

The Fundamental Principles of the Japanese Civil Code and
ContractLaw
There are three fundamental Civil Code principles constituting the
Japanese Civil Code. These include: 1) the freedom of contract; 2)
liability for negligence; and 3) the ownership principle. The freedom of
contract consists of four important aspects: 4' first, the freedom to make a
contract; second, freedom to enter into a contract with a chosen party;
third, freedom to determine the contents of the contract; and finally, the
freedom from formal requirements.49
42. See generally GILMORE, supra note 21, at 17.
43, This theory of relation must be absolutely distinguished from the so-called relational
contract theory. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 106 n.7.
44. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 41-45.
45. SAKAE WAGATSUMA, SHIN-TEl MINPO SOUSOKU 244 (1965); KIKUO ISHIDA, KEIYAKU
NO KOUSOKURYOKU [THE BINDING EFFECT OF CONTRACTS], 1 MINPO KOGI 88.
46. POUND, supra note 9, at 148.
47. TsUYOSHI KINOSHITA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 8; KEIYAKU-HO GAISETSU, CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 1, 4.
48. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.02 (1).
49. As Professor Kitagawa states, "fulnder the Civil and Commercial Codes, contracts are
consensual and thus need not be committed to writing to be effective. In fact, formality
requirements are alien to the Civil and Commercial Codes and even a gift contract may be
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Because of the practical effect of the fourth requirement, namely,
the freedom from formal requirements, Japanese judges have the luxury of
considering extrinsic evidence even if the contract is purported to be
integrated.'* Accordingly, the negotiators are accustomed to drafting
documents with this notion in mind. Furthermore, because written
agreements are nothing more than a document evincing mutual trust, the
contractual documents tend to be very short.
The Civil Code, which includes contract law, starts with general
provisions. Article one provides that: "1) individual rights are subject to
public policy. 2) The exercise of rights and performance of obligation
shall comply with the requirements of loyalty, and exercised with honesty.
3) Abuse of rights is not tolerated."" In performing the obligations of the
contract, time of performance, place of performance, and other specific
details may raise a problem. The law and the agreement itself may be able
to provide for the details, but in solving most of the problems, "the
parties, especially the promisor, are required to act honestly in order to
resolve the problem."' 2 In other words, the resolution of a problem is
premised on the honesty of the promisor. These principles were defined in
the French Civil Code"3 and the German Civil Code,- but not specifically
in the Japanese Civil Code. However, treatises and cases have taken the
same view.55
In interpreting the loyalty and honesty requirement, the Saiko
Saibansho, the Supreme Court of Japan, held the "principle of loyalty and
concluded orally." Id. There are, however, certain contracts which do require a certain written
document be submitted and filed with a governmental entity. This requirement, however, does
not prevent parties from creating a contract, and, furthermore, is in the realm of administrative
law. Accordingly, it is outside the scope of this article.
50. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39 Professor KITAGAWA provides that there are a number of
reasons for the differences in resolving ambiguities or uncertainties.
[Flirst, the maxim that a contract is to be interpreted so as to be effective and valid:
second, Japanese judges, being unhampered by either a parol evidence rule or by

exclusive rules of evidence, may concentrate directly on the parties 'purpose; and
third, optional provisions which clarify or supplement the parties' intentions often
dispense with the necessity for drafting detailed contract clauses.
Id. § 1.09(4).
51. MINPO [CIVIL CODE] art. 1 (1886) (Japan).
52. KIYOSHI IGARASHI ET AL., RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, I MINPO KoGI.
53. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
54. Biurgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [CIVIL CODE] art. 242 (G.D.R.).

55. Because Japanese law is not a system similar to common law, the significance of a prior
disposition of a court is somewhat less than that of a precedent in the United States. Treatises,
however, have a significant influence in determining the outcome of the cases. See generally
Wean Khing Wong, Protecting American Software in Japan, 8 COMPUTER L.J. 111, 115-16
(1988); KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 3.02(a).
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honesty not only applies to exercise of rights and performance of
6
obligations, but also constitutes a criteria in interpreting contracts.'
Accordingly, in determining the rights and obligations of the parties to a
contract, any evidence would be considered to determine whether the
parties acted in a loyal and honest way towards each other.
IV. CASES WHICH DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION AND
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE JAPANESE LAW

The following cases describe the development of the problem of
interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The first case is from the 1928
New York Court of Appeals where Judges Andrew, Kellog, and Cardozo
sat on the bench."7 The second group consists of three cases from the
California Supreme Court lead by Justice Traynor." The third group are
cases from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where Judge
Posner sat in as the Chief Judge.' 9
A. Mitchill v. Lath6o

1. The Disposition by the Original Court
The facts of the case are as follows: defendants, the Laths, hoped
to sell a parcel of farmland. On the other side of the road they owned an
icehouse which stood on the land owned by a third party. The plaintiff,
Mrs. Mitchill, thought of purchasing the land, but she thought the icehouse
to be objectionable. Subsequently, the Laths "orally promised and agreed
to remove the icehouse"6 1 the following spring, in consideration of the
purchase of their farm by Mrs. Mitchill. As a result of relying on the
promise, Mrs. Mitchill purchased the property and made substantial
improvements on the property. However, the Laths did not remove the
icehouse.

56. Judgment of July 5, 1957. Saikosai [Supreme Court], 11 MINSHU 1193 (Japan).
57. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
58. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968); Delta Dynamics, Inc. v.
Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
59. Briston v. Drake, Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic
Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995); Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d
1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646.
61. Id.
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The court had to determine whether the oral promise, which was
not included in the final written contract, could be enforced. 2 The court
stated that in order for an oral agreement to vary the written contract
(1) The agreement must in form be a collateral one; (2) it
must not contradict express or implied provisions of the
written contract; (3) it must be one that parties would not
ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing, or, put in
another way, an inspection of the written contract, read in
the light of surrounding circumstances, must not indicate
that the writing appears 'to contain the engagements of the
parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of
such engagement.' Or, again, it must not be so clearly
connected with the principal transaction as to be part and
parcel of it.63
The court found that the agreement did not fulfill any of the
requirements." Accordingly, the court held the oral agreement the Laths
had made was not enforceable. 5 Therefore, the Laths had no obligation to
remove the icehouse."6

2. Disposition by a Hypothetical Japanese Court
What would happen if this case was tried in a hypothetical
Japanese court? Would the result change? We will start the analysis by
applying the general principle of the Civil Code. First, as discussed
previously, the court will not prevent the introduction of the evidence that
the Laths had made an oral agreement with Mrs. Mitchill. Accordingly,
the oral agreement between the parties would constitute evidence. At this
point, it would already make a significant difference because the only
reason the majority in the New York Court of Appeals could not consider
the evidence was the existence of the parol evidence rule.,, Furthermore,
the reader of the case can easily infer how the court was reluctant to hold
for the Laths by looking at the court's expression such as, "we are not
62. Id.

63. Id. at 647.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 646.
66. Judge Lehmen dissents in this case and attempts to divide the agreement into two parts.
In other words, Judge Lehmen found the written agreement to convey the land and the oral
agreement to remove the icehouse to be two separate agreements. Accordingly, the agreement
does not fit the third condition, and, therefore, is not barred by the parol evidence rule. Mitchill,
160 N.E. at 648-50.

67. Id. at 647.
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dealing with moral delinquencies,"" implying that the Laths were morally
blameworthy.
The Civil Code further provides that the principle of loyalty and
honesty also require the courts to interpret the contract accordingly. The
problem here is that if the court were to interpret the contract itself
according to the trust and honesty principle, it would make no difference
from the result the New York court reached because the obligation is not
provided for in the contract. The main focus, however, of the loyalty and
honesty requirement is on the conduct of the parties, and, therefore, the
Civil Code would require the Laths to remove the icehouse.
In Sanjo-Kikai-Seisakusho, Inc. v. Sanko Diesel Inc., 61 the
defendants attempted to escape the liability of paying the amount of money
for the business which they acquired from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had
transferred the business according to the contract which was made several
years ago. Furthermore, the defendants had made improvements on the
business and had used the facilities which were assigned to the defendants
according to the contract.
The dispute arose because the defendants had not paid the purchase
amount for the business they acquired from the plaintiffs. The defendants'
argument was that the transfer of the business was not provided for in the
Articles of Incorporation pursuant to article 168, paragraph 1, item 6 of
the Commercial Code. In other words, the defendants were making an
argument substantially similar to that of the Laths which is you did not put
it in writing. The Japanese Supreme Court, however, held the defendants'
argument was against honesty and loyalty. The Japanese Supreme Court
explained that agreeing to perform pursuant to an oral agreement and
subsequently taking advantage of the fact the agreement was not reduced to
writing was in violation of the trust and honesty requirement.
Applying the principle derived from Sanjo-Kikai-Seisakusho, we
can infer that the Japanese court would require the Laths to remove the
icehouse even if the language was not provided in the written agreement.
Furthermore, although the Civil Code does not specifically provide for it,
Japanese contract law requires the parties to extend honesty and trust to
collateral contract duties. 0
In other words, requirements such as
disclosure at the time of the agreement and informing the other party of
any difficulties during the performance of the duty are requirements which

68. id. at 646.
69. Judgment of Sept. 11, 1986, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 624 HANREI TIMES 127
(Japan).
70. See generally 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.03(3)(0.
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must be complied with even in the absence of such terms in the contract."
Accordingly, the court would look to any collateral duties which the
parties were required to perform.
Another analysis may be made by applying a theory which is
analogous to the Anglo-American estoppel theory. Post-war Japanese
cases show the variable application of the trust and honesty requirement.
One of the concepts which can be derived from these applications by the
courts is a concept which is similar to the promissory estoppel theory. It is
contended that the application of the principle was used to police the
parties' antimoralistic conduct. 2 Some cases discuss situations in which a
party conducts itself in a certain way and performs in a way contradicting
the previous conduct. These are situations where the courts are applying a
theory similar to the Anglo-American estoppel theory." Accordingly, the
result a Japanese court may reach could be predicted by applying the
promissory estoppel theory without applying the parol evidence rule.
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts provides in pertinent
part that:
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
7
breach may be limited as justice requires. 4
An illustration provided in section 90 describes a situation which is
similar to the fact pattern in the Mitchill case, except for the existence of
the written document. If the written document constituted only a part of
the evidence, and there is other parol evidence, this illustration perfectly
fits the facts of the Mitchill case.
The illustration provides that "A promises B not to foreclose, for a
specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land. B thereafter makes
improvements on the land. A's promise is binding and may be enforced by
denial of foreclosure before the time has elapsed."Is This illustration may
be further simplified by describing the situation as follows: A promises to
do X. B performs Y relying on A's promise. A's promise shall be
enforced. In the Mitchill case, A is the Laths, B is Mrs. Mitchill, X is
71. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09 (3)(f) (Incidental Duties).
72. IGARASHI ET AL., supra note 52, at 20.

73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).

75. Id. § 90 cmt. a, illus. 2.
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removing the icehouse, and Y is purchasing the land and "[spending]
considerable sums in improving the property for use as a summer
residence." 6 The court would decide that A's (the Lath's) promise should
be enforced. Accordingly, the Japanese courts reach a contrary result by
utilizing a concept similar to the promissory estoppel theory, and
therefore, would enforce the Lath's oral promise.
According to the Mitchill Court, in many cases courts have held
the introduction of "collateral contracts said to have been the inducing
cause of the main contract"" was improper. The court further cited many
cases as authority, holding "an oral stipulation, said to have been the
inducing cause for the subsequent execution of the lease itself, concerning
some act to be done by the landlord, or some condition as to the leased
premises, might not be shown."" Japanese courts, however, would likely
arrive at a different result in each of these cases. If the opponent is able to
produce ample evidence, including prior oral agreements, and in fact, any
relevant evidence to establish bona fide reliance on the oral agreement, the
judge will enforce the collateral agreement pursuant to the honesty and
loyalty requirement.
3. Disposition by an American Court in the Present Day
Application of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (hereinafter
Restatement), ' 9 which is relied on as authority by many courts in the
present day, may render a different result in the Mitchill case. According
to the Restatement, if the document is a binding integrated agreement, it
"discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with
them. "0 Furthermore, if the document is completely integrated, it
8
"discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope." '
Whether a document is an integrated document is "determined by the trial
judge in the first instance as a question preliminary to an interpretative
ruling or to the application of the parol evidence rule."' 2 Furthermore,
determining whether the documents are integrated "is a question of fact to
76. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
77. Id. at 648.
78. Id. The Mitchill case cites cases such as Daly v. Piza, 94 N.Y.S. 154 (1905); Love v.
Hamel, 69 N.Y.S. 251 (1901); Taylor v. Hopper, 62 N.Y. 649 (1878) ); Wilson v. Deen, 74

N.Y. 531 (1875); Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N.Y. 280 (1873).
79. This section will refer to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the Restatement
because of the lack of necessity to refer to the first Restatement.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1).
81. Id. § 213(2).
82. Id. § 209 cmt. c.
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be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence."" In other words,
the judge will take all the relevant evidence into consideration and then
determine whether the document is integrated or not. Accordingly, in the
Mitchill case, the trial judge would take into consideration the fact that the
Laths had orally made an agreement to remove the icehouse to determine
whether the document was integrated.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the document was
integrated, and therefore, did not allow the evidence to be introduced.8
However, under the modem view, the evidence would likely be admissible
because the Restatement employs a more liberal standard than that used in
the Mitchill case. Furthermore, the jury (assuming there is a jury trial)
would consider the oral agreement made between the two parties and
probably would require the Laths to remove the icehouse.
This conclusion shows that the American courts are heading in the
direction towards the admission of any relevant evidence as long as it does
not create fraud. The problem of fraud is prevented by the screening
process conducted by the trial judge. The trial judge determines whether
credible evidence exists as to any prior or simultaneous written or oral
agreements in addition to any other parol evidence. If the trial judge
determines such evidence exists, the judge will determine the written
document was not integrated. This will allow any evidence to come in,
permitting the trier of fact to determine whether there was, in fact, an oral
agreement. This screening process, conducted by the judge, seems to be a
sufficient barrier because the judge is familiar with contract law as well as
the rules of evidence. The judges will be able to assess the potential harm
which the introduction of parol evidence may cause to the opponent of
such evidence, and will be able to avoid any injustice which might be
created therein. The trend towards destruction of the parol evidence rule
is further carried out in the following California cases from 1968.
B. The Traynor TrilogyM
1. Masterson v. Sine
In 1968, the Supreme Court of California, by the opinion of
Justice Traynor, substantially decreased the significance of the parol
evidence rule.96 It started with the case of Masterson v. Sine.' The facts
83.
84.
85.
found in
86.

Id.
Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
The discussion of these three cases which emasculated the parol evidence rule can be
PETER LINZER, A CONTRACT ANTHOLOGY 313 (1st ed. 1989).
Id.
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of the case are as follows: Dallas Masterson and his wife Rebecca, who
were the plaintiffs, conveyed a ranch to the defendants Medora, Dallas'
sister, and Lu Sines, the appellant in the case, by deed which stated:
[r]eserving unto the Grantors herein an option to purchase
the above described property on or before February 25,
1968, for the same consideration as being paid heretofore
plus their depreciation value of any improvements
Grantees may add to the property from and after two and a
half years from this date.u
After the conveyance the Grantor was adjudicated bankrupt. The trustee
in bankruptcy and Rebecca brought suit to establish their right to exercise
the option."9
The defendant grantees attempted to introduce into evidence the
testimony which would show "that the parties wanted the property kept in
the Masterson family and that the option was therefore personal to the
grantors and could not be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy."'
However, the trial court rejected the defendants' argument and excluded
the evidence that the option was personal to the grantors." The Supreme
Court of California lead by Justice Traynor reversed, holding the trial
judge erred in excluding the extrinsic evidence.92
Justice Traynor initiated the discussion by describing that the
"California cases have stated that whether there was an integration is to be
determined solely from the face of the instrument, (citation omitted) and
that the question for the court is whether it 'appears to be a complete
agreement.'" 93 Justice Traynor further stated that "[n]either of these strict
formulations of the rule, however, has been consistently applied. "9' He
offered two policies accommodating the parol evidence rule. One was that
"written evidence is more accurate that human memory," and the other
was based on the "fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses
interested in the outcome of the litigation will mislead the finder of facts."95
It seems Justice Traynor was specifically referring to the jury by using the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563.
Id.
95. Id. at 564.
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words "finder of facts." This is because later Justice Traynor stated the
"tendency of the jury [is] to find through sympathy and without a
dispassionate assessment of the probability of fraud or faulty memory that
the parties made an oral agreement collateral to the written contract, or
that preliminary tentative agreements were not abandoned when omitted
from the writing."96
As a result, Justice Traynor concluded that
"[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when
the fact finder is likely to be misled.""7 Again, in this context, it is safe to
say that fact finder describes the jury. Further, Justice Traynor provided
that the standards in which the credibility of the evidence could be assessed
is found in the Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code." The
corollary of this argument is that the parol evidence rule is based at least in
substantial part, if not wholly, on the court's distrust towards the jury.
The danger of not having a rule similar to the parol evidence rule
is substantially reduced in the Japanese courts because the Japanese legal
system does not utilize the jury system. In other words, all the
proceedings in Japan are tried as a bench trial. Accordingly, the danger
that the trier of fact would be misled would be substantially decreased or at
least reduced to the level as if the parol evidence rule was in force. This is
not to say the jury is never capable of assessing the truth, but to describe
the nonexistence of the parol evidence rule in Japan would not be a
problem, as in the United States, from the aspect of the policy described
by Justice Traynor.
2. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Draynage & Rigging
Co.
The second case in which the Supreme Court of California, lead
by Justice Traynor, discussed the problems of interpretation and the parol
evidence rule was Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co. Inc." This was an action for damages to the plaintiff's
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 240(1)(b) (1932). The Restatement
permits proof of a collateral agreement if it is "[sluch an agreement as might naturally be made
as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract." Id. In
other words, the Restatement employs a might naturally test. The Uniform Commercial Code
applies a more liberal test. Section 2-202 cmt. 3, provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the
additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the
document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the
trier of fact." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1994). In other words, the Uniform Commercial Code
employs a would certainly test.
99. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
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property under an indemnity clause in a contract. '® The defendant entered
into a contract to provide labor and equipment to remove and replace an
upper metal cover of the plaintiffs steam turbine. The written agreement
provided, in pertinent part, that the defendant "agreed to perform the work
at [its] own risk and 'expense' and 'indemnify' plaintiff 'against all loss,
damage, expense, and liability resulting from . . injury to property,
arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this
contract." ' 0 In the course of the performance, the cover fell and injured
the exposed rotor of the turbine. Subsequently, the trial judge found that
the indemnity clause covered the injury and held for the plaintiff. 0
The issue in the case was whether the trial court erred by
excluding the evidence offered by the defendant in the attempt to prove
that "in the indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to property
of third parties only and not to plaintiffs property."'03 In holding that the
trial court erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence offered to
show the indemnity clause in the contract was not intended to cover
injuries to plaintiffs property, the court stated that "[slome courts have
expressed the opinion that contractual obligations are created by the mere
use of certain words, whether or not there was any intention to incur such
obligations. "'1' This language describes the theory of objective intent or
anti-will theory which is in the tradition of the Holmesians.10 Justice
Traynor further stated that "[u]nder this view, contractual obligations flow,
not from the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used certain
magic words. Evidence of the parties' intention therefore becomes
irrelevant. "' This describes, although exaggerated, the objective theory
which is the foundation of the traditional Anglo-American common law
system.
Justice Traynor, as a prominent judge in the Anglo-American legal
system, held that in California "the intention of the parties as expressed in
the contract is the source of contractual rights and duties."' 7 Furthermore,
Justice Traynor stated that "[a] court must ascertain and give effect to this
intention by determining what the parties meant by the words they used." "0
100. Id. at 643.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, Justice Traynor also said "the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic
evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be justified
only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the parties gave to the
words from the instrument alone."'109 This assertion brings into the legal
analysis the metaphysics which the Anglo-American legal system has
vigorously rejected.1'' This case describes the movement of the relation
theory towards the will theory. Justice Traynor concluded by stating that
words "do not have absolute and constant references.""' In other words,
in Justice Traynor's view, the traditional theory of interpretation,
integration, and the parol evidence rule no longer has a place in American
jurisprudence.
3. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito
The third case is Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito,"' where the
manufacturer brought suit against the distributor for the breach of the
distributorship agreement. The written distributorship agreement provided
in pertinent part that, "'[s]hould [the distributor] fail to distribute in any
one year the minimum number of devices to be distributed by it . . .this
agreement shall be subject to termination' by [the manufacturer] on 30
days' notice."'" The written contract further provided that "[i]n the event
of breach of this agreement by either party, the party prevailing in any
action for damages or enforcement of the terms of this [a]greement shall
be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees."" 4 The distributor failed to
distribute the minimum number of devices, and the manufacturer
terminated the contract and brought suit to recover the damages for the
distributor's failure to purchase the first years' quota under the agreement.
The trial court rejected the distributer's argument that the only remedy
available for the manufacturer was to terminate the contract, and entered
judgment for the manufacturer. "I
In this case, Justice Traynor held that
109. Id. at 641.
110. KINOSHITA, supra note 47, at 4. According to Professor Kinoshita, Holmes said that
contractual liability accrues, not because of a meeting of the minds or a true synthesis of wills
existed, but because the words used by the promisor to describe his acceptance reasonably
induced a bargain from the other party to infer that business was to take place. Furthermore,
Kinoshita cites Holmes' words: "Contract theory is exclusively formal and external." Id. (citing
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 195-264 (1881)).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
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[t]he test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain
the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its
face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove
a meaning, to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible."'
The court found the language of the termination clause to be
ambiguous because it was susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.'"
One was that the parties may have included the termination clause to spell
out with specificity the condition on which the manufacturer would be
excused from further performance under the contract."' The other
reasonable interpretation, according to Justice Traynor, was that it was
intended "to set forth the exclusive remedy for a failure to meet the quota
in any year."" 9 As a result, the court held the trial court erred in
excluding the evidence offered to prove the meaning of the termination
clause contended for by the distributor. 12
In this case, Justice Mosk, who concurred in the previous two
2
cases,' ' dissented by noting that "[g]iven two experienced businessmen
dealing at arm's length, both represented by competent counsel, it has
become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to
draft a written contract that will produce predictable results in court." ' ' 12
This opinion fairly describes the problem of not having a rule giving
priority to a written agreement. However, an argument that the parties
disagree on the interpretation of the contract language renders the contract
ambiguous, might prevail in court. 23 Thus, if that situation is toarise, the
meaning of a written document will be reduced to nothing more than one
of the evidences.
The three cases discussed, however, do not exhibit the general
rules in the American courts today. The courts still hold valid the parol
evidence rule and exclude parol evidence which does not pass a certain
116. Id. at 787 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P,2d at 641).
117. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 787.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d
at 648.
122. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 789.
123. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 1975).
Although heavily criticized and virtually overruled, it was the law in Minnesota that the very fact
the two parties disagree to the interpretation of a particular word renders that word ambiguous.
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contractual muster. The following cases describe the present state of the
rule.
C. The Rule in the Present Day
A practitioner must bear in mind that the rules which can be
extracted from the three California cases are rather extreme. Accordingly,
the present general view adopted by courts must be determined. At least
one court has considered the rule recently. The next three cases were
decided in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
Judge Posner.
1. Briston v. Drake Street, Inc.2'
The Briston v. Drake Street, Inc. case arose from a breach of an
employment contract. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant to be an
associate producer of a play for the defendant who was the author and the
producer of the play.'25 The plaintiff was seeking the salary she would
have received between the termination and the scheduled expiration of the
contract.'1' The written agreement provided that the defendant would be
authorized to terminate the contract upon thirty days prior written notice,
or if the employer should cease conducting its business, or if the employer
becomes insolvent. The written agreement further provided that the only
ground on which the defendant could terminate the contract without
liability was the plaintiff's conviction of a crime.'" The remedies in the
agreement provided that "if the employee is terminated by employer for
any reason other than a conviction of illegal acts in connection with the
performance of her duties under the agreement then such termination shall
be deemed a breach of the agreement."','

Additionally, the contract

included a standard integration clause.1'2 The trial court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the written agreement was clear and unequivocal
on its face. ' 30 The court allowed testimony of the defendant that the
payment of the salary was contingent on the show remaining open,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's testimony that she had "insisted on an

124. Briston v. Drake Street, Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994).

125. Id. at 350.
126. Id.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 345.
Briston, 41 F.3d at 350.
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ironclad contract precisely because of the incessant if transient firings to
which the defendant had subjected her.""'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, lead by Judge
Posner, reversed the trial judge's ruling and held that the contract was
clear on its face, and the admission of the evidence to contradict the
writing was barred by the parol evidence rule.' 2 The court said that:
[i]f a contract so drafted can be upended by the selfserving oral testimony of one party to it that his duty to
perform was actually dependent on a condition nowhere
expressed in the contract and flatly contradicted by what is
expressed in the contract, .

.

. the parol evidence rule is

dead and integration clauses ineffectual."'
The court further noted that it had no intention of abolishing the
rule.'4 The court also explained how the dangers of using the parol
evidence rule are prevented. The screening by the judge, (allowing the
submission of extrinsic evidence to the judge for a determination whether a
knowledgeable insider would think the written contract meant something
different from what it appeared to mean),' and the judge's consideration
of evidence of trade usage,", are the devices which the judges use to
prevent absurd results.", One of the reasons, although not expressly
mentioned in the opinion, the court invoked the parol evidence rule was
that the person adversely affected was an employee who was sexually
harassed by the employer. The doctrine of contra proferentum, often
mentioned in insurance cases to prevent unjust results to the insured, is
probably the key in this case."' In other words, the proponent of the parol
131. Id. at 350-51.
132. Id. at 351.
133. Id.
134. id. at 345.
135. Only if the judge is persuaded by the evidence does he allow the jury to consider it.
This was referred to by this court as being the "doctrine of extrinsic ambiguity." Id. at 351-52.
136. The court explains that usage of trade, "because it is evidence about public facts,
public meanings, it is less easy to fake. Allowing it into evidence therefore does less harm to the
desire of parties who enter into written contract to fix their agreement in a form that will protect
commitments against being upset by juries." Briston, 41 F.3d at 352.
137. Id.
138. Similarly, in Japanese cases, the doctrine of contra proferentum is invoked. For
example, adhesion contracts are generally interpreted in favor of the party who is the draftee. In
a Tokyo Superior Court case where the landlord drafted a written agreement providing that "in
the default of the tenant's payment of the rent for a month, the landlord will acquire the right to
the tenant's immediate evacuation regardless of the existence of a security deposit," the court
held that the parties in these situations usually intend only to enter into a lease agreement and do
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evidence cannot, by self serving testimony, establish ambiguity in order to
introduce the evidence especially when the proponent is in a better
bargaining position.
2. AM International, Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates, Inc.'"
The facts of this case are as follows:
both parties were
manufacturers of printing machines used in the newspaper business. One
of these machines was called a "newspaper inserting machine," and it
came equipped with a Missed Insert Repair System (MIRS). These are
complicated and expensive machines, which must be customized to the
purchaser's specifications.' AM brought a patent infringement suit which
ended in a settlement including a license agreement, effective on the day of
the settlement.' 4 This agreement entitled AM to a royalty of $200,000 on
each MIRS-equipped newspaper inserting machine made by GMA and
shipped after the settlement date and before the expiration date of the
patent, which was to expire approximately three years later."
Furthermore, an exception to this agreement was inserted
providing that "beginning as of January 1, 1991 and continuing to July 23,
1991 royalty shall accrue on the receipt by GMA of a bona fide purchase
order for a product, provided that product is shipped prior to December
31, 1991." " Thereafter, GMA was ordered to provide nine machines to a
purchaser.T 4 Four of them were not shipped until after December 31,
1991. The other five were shipped between September and November of
1991, and thus before December 31. AM contended royalty was due on
these machines.
The court, in AM International, Inc., held that in determining
whether contract language is ambiguous or not, courts must look to the
objective and subjective evidence of ambiguity. ", The court reinstated the
rule that "a self serving statement that a party did not understand the

not intend to give effect to the printed words unless they are specifically negotiated and given
attention to by the parties. Accordingly, even though the whole contract was agreed to and
signed by the tenant, the said clause is only a hypothetical sentence and does not have a binding
effect. MINSHU 13-366 (Feb. 26, 1934).
139. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 574.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 575.
145. AM Int'l, Inc., 44 F.3d at 575.
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contract to mean what it says (or appears to say) will not suffice"'" to open
doors to extrinsic evidence. The court also said that "only an offer to show
that anyone who understood the context of the contract would realize it
could not mean what an untutored reader would suppose it meant will
suffice."'" Although the parties in this case, unlike the parties in the
previous case, were in the same bargaining position, the rule that self
serving testimony will not suffice to open the doors for introduction of
parol evidence was reinstated. "8
There are two noteworthy cases from the Japanese courts. One is
from the Japanese Supreme Court and the other is from the Fukuoka High
Court. The facts of the Fukuoka High Court case 4 9 were that: X and Y
entered into a supply contract where X was to supply oil in an amount not
exceeding 2,000,000 Yen. The writing in issue provided that "in the
default of the buyer to pay for the petroleum provided, the seller
immediately acquires a right to recover the amount of 2,000,000 Yen."
In other words, the party provided for a liquidated damages clause.
The buyer defaulted on the payment and the seller asserted that
they had a right to recover 2,000,000 Yen pursuant to the written
agreement even though no evidence existed that the petroleum provided
was worth 2,000,000 Yen. The court, however, held that the seller cannot
recover an amount in excess of the value of the petroleum provided for the
buyer.,' The court reasoned that the agreement included a tacit agreement
which upon default, the value of the provided petroleum for the buyer did
not exceed the amount of 2,000,000 Yen.' 2 The buyer would pay the
damages of 2,000,000 Yen, but at the same time would acquire a right to a
146. Id.
147. Judge Posner further states that
[e]ven the strongest devotees of the 'plain meaning' rule of statutory interpretation, a
rule that resembles the 'four corners' rule of contract law, allow it to bend when
necessary to avoid absurd results [citation omitted]. An absurdity in the application of
the plain-meaning rule usually results from a comparison of the apparently plain
meaning to the real-world setting in which the statute is to be applied. It is the same
point that a clear document can be rendered unclear . . . by the way in which it
connects, or fails to connect, with the activities that it regulates.
Id. at 577. He concludes that "[d]iscrepancy between the word and the world is a common
source of interpretive problems everywhere." d. In other words, Judge Posner recognizes the
practicality in bending the rigid rule of interpretation when necessary.
148. Id. at 575.
149. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, KOMINSHU (Japan).
150. Id. at 263.
151. Id. at 264.
152. Id. at 265.
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refund for the excess amount.'" Furthermore, the court found it was
unfair to interpret the agreement as asserted by the seller. '1
Although the Japanese court ignored the explicit language in the
written agreement, it may arrive at the same result in the AM International
case. One of the reasons the court created a new provision, which even
the parties did not agree to, was that the court felt that to require the buyer
to pay that amount of money for what they did not get was inequitable.'
Furthermore, the court felt that the immediate acquisition of a right to
damages by the seller in the event of a default constituted a forfeiture
which the court desired to avoid.'
In the AM International case, on the other hand, the protection of
intellectual property rights may not be enough for the Japanese court to
rewrite the contract.'" After all, in AM International, the holder of the
patent did collect the royalty from the licensee which was close to the full
amount asserted by the licensor.'" To attempt to collect further royalty by
producing only subjective testimony may constitute an abusive use of
rights in the Japanese courts.
Another case is from the Supreme Court of Japan."' The case
involved a mortgage on a land which was foreclosed."'6 The written
agreement provided for a Daibustu-Bensai, but the court held that the
written agreement should be interpreted to mean a Saiken-Tanpo. Again,
the court interpreted the words to create a new legal effect. The court's
intention was probably to prevent forfeiture against the debtor because the
court felt that it was better practice to let the debtor regain his property by
paying off the debt before the auction of the property even though he had
defaulted on the debt.

153. Id. at 267.
154. Id. at 265.
155. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, Kominshu (Japan).
156. Id.
157. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 574.
159. MINSHU 22-12-2710 (Nov. 19, 1968).
160. Because of the structural differences in the real property law area, the words
nonrecourse and recourse will not be used. For the sake of clarity, the following terms will be
used: Daibustu-Bensai, which is a concept similar to the Anglo-American accord and satisfaction;
Saiken-Tanpo, which is a concept similar to the concept of secured transaction where the creditor
acquires a right to first payment for the full amouit and the rest goes to the secondary creditors.
The simple difference in the two concepts is that in the former situation, the creditor acquires the
property no matter what the value is, and in the latter situation, the creditor acquires the right to
full recovery and not more. MINPO, arts. 377, 378, 482.
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3. Cannon v. Wittek Co. International'6
The facts of this case are as follows: Plaintiff Cannon was hired as
a full-time secretary floater by Wittek Companies International (hereinafter
Wittek) who provided health insurance to its employees through Health
Care Service Corporation, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan (hereinafter
Blue Cross). 62 Under the plan, new employees were automatically
enrolled in the insurance plan on the ninety-first day of their employment.
Cannon was separated from her employment in connection with a
reduction in the work force at Wittek, fifty-seven days into her
employment. The personnel transaction sheet read layoff as to Cannon's
type of separation.
Later that year, Cannon was called to return to the job without
filling out any job application form or an insurance form. They were
already filled out at the beginning of her employment. Fifty days after her
return she suffered a heart attack and incurred substantial medical
expenses. By then she had worked for Wittek for one hundred and twelve
non-consecutive days. She learned that Blue Cross was denying her
coverage due to their notion that Cannon was terminated instead of being
laid off and, therefore, her ninety-day waiting period was reinstated at the
time Wittek rehired Cannon.'6 The district court ruled that, in the absence
of any language to the contrary, the ninety days must be consecutive and
could not be tacked.'" As a result, the district court denied Cannon's
6
coverage by Blue Cross.
The issue relevant to this article that was raised on appeal was
whether Wittek was terminated instead of laidoff.'66 This would determine
whether the ninety days could be tacked in order to satisfy the condition to
the payment on the policy. After determining the personnel transaction
sheet was controlling on the issue of termination, the court pointed out the
fact that the sheet indicated that the type of separation was a layoff rather
than a discharge.16 Here again, the employer asserted by self-serving
testimony that even though the personnel transaction sheet indicates a
layoff, Wittek actually meant to terminate Cannon.'" The court rejected
161.
162.
163.
164.

Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1283.
d.
Id. at 1284.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 1285.
167. Cannon, 60 F.3d at 1285.
168. Id.
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the argument and restated that if an unambiguous contract "can be upended
by the self-serving oral testimony of one party to it that his duty to perform
was actually dependant on a condition nowhere expressed in the contract,
then the parol evidence rule is dead."6
The court finally came to a conclusion that "if Wittek is permitted
to go behind the plain language of the contract with self-serving testimony
about what it really meant when it checked off 'lay-off' on the Personnel
Transaction sheet, then the parol evidence rule would have no force."l70
Accordingly, the court recognized that the parol evidence rule was still
alive and well.
From the preceding cases we still can determine when the court, in
light of all the circumstances, concludes that the introduction of parol
evidence would render unjust results, an a prohibit its introduction.
Circumstances that render unjust results are determined on a case by case
basis, but facts indicating differences in bargaining power, the existence of
an independent tort, and lack of objective evidence that the parties had
agreed on a different meaning, etc., would constitute elements in
determining the admissibility of parol evidence.'"
D. The Japanese Courts' Disposition of the Cases
Certain rules can be extracted from the foregoing analysis of the
cases. The Japanese courts would consider all relevant evidence in
attempting to determine the true intention of the parties. On the other
hand, the American court would first introduce all relevant evidence to
determine whether the written agreement was meant to be the final
agreement. As a practical matter, the result would be the same because
the Japanese courts do not have a jury which could be mislead by the
introduction of parol evidence. The American courts would, at this point,
introduce the parol evidence to the judges only.
Next, the Japanese courts would determine whether the asserted
discrepancy actually existed. The American courts would conduct the
same analysis at this point. They may, however, impose a rule that selfserving testimony would not suffice to render the document ambiguous.
This would allow them to introduce parol evidence to prove the asserted
intention of the party. On the other hand, the Japanese courts would
probably consider the self-serving testimony as evidence in determining the
facts because, as discussed previously, the tradition of the Continental civil
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1282.

86

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:57

code focuses on the intention of the parties. It can be said, technically,
that self-serving testimony is also relevant in determining the intention of
the parties. Accordingly, discrepancies may exist at this stage.
This difference may not be significant, however, because of the
factual determination by the judge in Japanese courts. Because the distrust
towards the jury does not exist in Japanese courts, the possibility that the
factual determination will be misled decreases substantially. Furthermore,
the Japanese courts may require the proponent of the parol evidence to
show they have relied upon the alleged fact, which was not described in
the written agreement, in order to establish the violation of honesty and
loyalty requirement.'7 If the court finds that the party acted in response to
a fact which was not included in the final written agreement, the other
party will generally be required to perform their obligation."'
V. THE PROPOSED APPROACH IN CONTRACTING BETWEEN A
JAPANESE ENTERPRISE AND AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

Having described the differences in the two legal systems, it may
seem that the American law has become more liberal regarding the
introduction of parol evidence, and, therefore, the written contract has no
significance to it. Furthermore, it may seem that because of the
governmental requirements imposed on Japanese enterprises to file every
agreement entered into with a foreign enterprise, a Japanese enterprise
may agree to execute a fully detailed written contract that will exclude any
parol evidence.
Because the Japanese culture prefers avoiding
documentation of agreements, they are still likely to avoid detailed
contracts. For an American business entity it would be safer to assume
that the Japanese will resort to outside evidence when it comes to
performance."'
The first problem the parties must solve is in which language the
contract or the agreement will be drafted. Generally, the Japanese will
understand English more than the Americans will understand Japanese.
This generalization, however, must be studied carefully. The parties must
understand that the language they are using is not ordinary English, but
often legalese English. As previously discussed, words are understood in
conjunction with the surrounding circumstances and the situation in which
172. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09(4).
173. In Japan, as in most civil code countries, specific performance is the ordinary remedy
and, unlike in the United States, monetary damages are rare. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 14.
174. "Japanese businesspeople often rely on mutual trust to the exclusion of formal
contracting. They have traditionally viewed the need to contract as a lack of good faith,
potentially injuring future relations .. . ." Salbu, supra note 5, at 1260.
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they are used. Accordingly, it may seem impossible to agree on one
meaning of a word that describes a legal effect without knowing the whole
legal system. Even the word contract is understood differently within the
two systems."' Do the parties then have to describe the legal theory
behind every word that they are using? Unfortunately, in order to have a
complete understanding, the answer must be yes. One solution to this
problem is to negotiate with a lawyer or lawyers who have knowledge of
the law in which the document is being drafted. At the same time the
lawyer should be a native speaker, or a very fluent speaker of the language
that is not being used in the contract or the agreement. For example, if the
contract is going to be written in English, the American business entity
must negotiate with a delegate from the Japanese business entity who has
substantial knowledge of the American legal system and the English
language.
The second factor which the parties must concentrate on is the
choice of law clause. This is because the importance of a written
document may be significantly different.
The parties should first
determine whether any disputes which may arise shall be governed by
Japanese law or American law. This choice will determine the whole
mode of the negotiation. Furthermore, that choice will determine what the
final product will look like. If, for example, the parties determine
American contract law will govern the disputes, the written document will
have to include agreement. If the parties fail to insert any clause or
agreement into the final written document, the possibility that the prior
oral or written agreement will be subject to the parol evidence rule will be
significant, and will therefore, be excluded as evidence. Only if the judge
determines that the written document is fully integrated will the rule apply
and will parol evidence be excluded.
On the other hand, if the parties agree that Japanese law will
determine the disputes, it is not necessary to incorporate every single
agreement at which they arrived, although it is a better idea. From a
175. Commentators say that:
[w]hile contract is used in the United States to mean a legally enforceable promise or a
set of promises with accompanying duties and rights, keiyaku (which means "contract"
in Japanese) implies just part of the process of negotiation, namely, the promissory
stage, in which two parties agree to work together to create a mutually advantageous
relationship. The implications of a transaction created by a keiyaku is unclear to
Americans because much of the negotiation and most of the details of the transactions
are intended to be filled in later. . . . [Mlany Japanese negotiators deplore specificity
and verbosity in contracts because they believe that it is like making an arrangement
for divorce when preparing for marriage.
Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 3, at 206.
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practical point of view, however, it is much more convenient for both
parties to include all their agreements in the written document. It will be
easier for reference purposes and more efficient timewise.
The
practitioner or any lawyer who is giving advice to their client must realize
that written documents are not created for the purpose of being submitted
into evidence for trial.
Another notion the practitioner must bear in mind is that even
though the parties orally agreed to choose Japanese law as the governing
law, and thus will be able to introduce this into evidence in a Japanese
court, it is better to insert the choice of law clause in the agreement. This
is because the case may be thrown into an American court despite the fact
the parties orally agreed to choose Japanese law. Eventually, the oral
agreement pertaining to the governing law may be barred by the parol
evidence rule. Similarly, if the parties stipulated to American contract law
as the governing law, but were hailed into a Japanese court, an oral
assertion that Japanese law was agreed to may be admitted into evidence
despite its untruthfulness.
In any event, it is a better idea to insert a choice of law clause
even if it may manifest a hostile attitude towards the other party. The
parties will benefit from that determination by not having to worry about
whether or not the written document will constitute the only reference.
Similarly, choice of forum clauses may be important in the absence of a
choice of law clause because the forum court's law will determine which
law will apply. Although many of these agreements between foreign
business enterprises are submitted to arbitration, some will consider it
more advantageous to go to court. Accordingly, the choice of law clauses
and choice of forum clauses are best included in the agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. The Differences in The Law
So far we have examined the differences between Anglo-American
contract law and Japanese contract law by focusing on the rule concerning
written documents. Furthermore, we have seen that the gap between the
American interpretation of the written document and the Japanese
interpretation of the written document has been narrowed. This is
evidenced by the Uniform Commercial Code's requirement that in every
document a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied, in addition
to a liberation from the rigidity of the parol evidence rule.7 6 A
practitioner, however, still must not underestimate the differences.
176. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994).
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Part II of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods,171 which the United States of America has signed and approved,
conforms to the Civil Code principles of the freedom from formal
requirements." ' This means that the Statute of Frauds and the Parol
Evidence Rule have no application between signatory countries. Article
96, however, provides that a country whose ordinary practice requires a
written document, may opt out of the requirement.7 9 Since this article is
not concerned with the effect of the choice of law clause, but is concerned
with the way business enterprises negotiate with each other, there will be
no analysis as to what happens when a signatory country and a nonsignatory country enters into a contract. One must emphasize, however,
that the international transaction produces discrepancies in the importance
of a written document.
Accordingly, in the Japan - United States context, the American
practitioner must bear in mind that the Japanese party they are dealing with
is accustomed to simple documents and usually does not require putting
every single agreement in the document. On the other hand, the Japanese
practitioners must bear in mind that the party which they are dealing with
is accustomed to practicing under the Statute of Frauds and should have
some notion of the Parol Evidence Rule in mind.
B. The Differences in The Culture
So far the discussion has focused on the law itself and explains, for
the most part, the differences between the Japanese attitude and the
American attitude towards contracting. One significant aspect, however,
must never be overlooked. The aspect is the differences which stem from
the societal culture. It is not as simple as saying the Japanese appreciate
communitarian values and the Americans will cherish rugged
individualism. In other words, the Japanese are as aggressive as the
Americans and the Americans appreciate the value of community as well
as the Japanese. When the focus is on the society as a whole, however,
each society might have a tendency towards appreciating individualism
over societal values and vice versa.
The long history of the Japanese society's development shows that
the Japanese have always been required to contribute to the society by
sacrificing their individual values. This is true whether we are talking
about the 250 years of seclusion from the rest of the world, or about the
177. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex 1 (1980).
178. Id.
179. Id. at art. 96.
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unfortunate war in which the whole world was involved. Expression of
individuality was almost a crime in the pre-World War II era in Japan.
Accordingly, the communitarian values the Japanese are usually associated
with do not come from within the individual, but rather come from the
long history of compelled totalitarianism.
What emerged from this communitarianism are certain norms
which only those in the community understood. These norms are peculiar
to a society which has secluded itself from the rest of the world for a long
time. Unlike a country similar to the United States of America, where
diversity of the citizens is one of the most powerful elements of the
country, Japan derives its power from the homogeneity of the society. In
other words, the Japanese are not required to fully debate an issue in order
to reach a conclusion because the values the society appreciates and the
values the individuals are supposed to appreciate are often the same. On
the other hand, the American way is to give full credit to any minority
opinion. Accordingly, the society must fully debate an issue in order to
reach a conclusion because one value is rather alien to another. As a
result, Americans tend to debate every aspect of an issue in order to reach
a truly democratic conclusion.
One fact the Japanese society must realize is that they are no
longer living in a homogenetic society. The fact their products and
services are flowing into the United States and all over the world, and the
fact that most of the foods which reach Japanese children's mouths are
imported from around the world, requires them to realize they are living in
a truly international society. Accordingly, the values and the attitude
which would only be appreciated in a homogenetic society must be
abandoned, at least in a business setting including a foreign enterprise.
The adherence to a totalitarian character, i.e. resorting to norms that only
the insiders would understand, would only make the misunderstandings
worse. On the other hand, Americans must realize that this historical
character which has been around for more than a thousand years would not
be easily abandoned even if they tried. Thinking that the slow process of
's
negotiating by the Japanese is only strategic misses the whole point. w
Americans must understand the long tradition of this character.

180. Some commentators say that the Japanese use the technique of pretending not to
understand English or say that they have to ask their superiors in order to take time and come up
with the best solution. The negotiation styles of Japanese are discussed in Zhang & Kuroda,
supra note 3. Furthermore, a rather patriotic article may be Walters, supra note 2. This title,
Now That I Ate The Sushi, Do We Have a Deal? is highly offensive, and as long as these
inadvertent (or is it intentional?) expressions are used, the road to harmony between the two
societies will be very long.
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In conclusion, what can be and should be required from both
parties is that they should communicate the ambiguity to.the other party
when they are not sure of a certain aspect of the agreement, whether they
put it in writing or not. This can be described as the requirement of
presentation. In the United States, more and more cases recognize the
requirement of presentation,'"' and hold the party who takes advantage of
the other's lack of knowledge in breach of an implied covenant of good
dealing and fair play." This seems to be the American counterpart of the
Japanese honesty and loyalty requirement. Finally, the parties must not
forget that the Uniform Commercial Code and article I of the Japanese
Civil Code both require the notion of goodfaith, fair dealing, honesty, and
loyalty. Although the precise usage of the words are different, they mean
absolutely the same thing.

181 See generally LINZER, supra note 85.
182. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

From 1966 to 1972, despite permissive capital punishment statutes
in most states, only three men were executed in the United States.2 An
objective observer would have cited this trend as a forecast of the gradual
abandonment of this ultimate punishment., However, in 1972 the Supreme
Court gave its full attention to the impact of the United States Constitution
upon the imposition of capital punishment. In Furman v. Georgia,' the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution barred capital punishment as it
was applied by the states at that time.
While some people heralded this seminal event as the death blow
to capital punishment, ironically, Furman was a harbinger of the
The wholly divergent opinions within
punishment's re-emergence.
the Supreme Court into a fractious battle
members
of
Furman forced the
over the nature of a constitutional system of capital punishment. This
battle eventually led the Supreme Court to consciously erect a
constitutional system that encouraged frequent death sentences and their
implementation. Consequently, over 300 executions have occurred since
1977;1 fifty-six executions in 1995.6
In contrast, the Jewish experience with capital punishment has
been markedly different. The Bible specifies mandatory execution for a
substantial number of crimes., Despite this compulsion, executions were
exceedingly rare in the Jewish law.' This occurred due to the Sanhedrin's,
the highest Jewish court, disparaging attitude toward capital punishment.9

2. HUGO A. BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 23, 25 (3d ed. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1789-94 (1970) (citing present unusualness of death
penalty as marker for its unconstitutionality); Amicus Curiae Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund at 42-47, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (noting increasing public distaste for and
See also Rudolph v.
judicial decline of capital punishment as premise for its abandonment).
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (stating that certiorari should be granted to decide whether current popular trends may in

certain circumstances render death penalty unconstitutional).
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. As of January 7, 1996, the exact number of executions is 313. See, Executions on the
Rise, Capricious Penalty: With More People on Death Row, More Chances of Error,
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 7, 1996, at 2E.

6. Id.
7. See infra p. 3.
8. See infra pp. 17-18.
9. See infra pp. 14-17.
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The Sanhedrin consciously erected a procedural system that prevented the
issuance and realization of death sentences.' 0
This essay explores the reasons for these two divergent outcomes
through a comparative study of the judicial development of the Jewish and
United States constitutional law of capital punishment." It contrasts the
Jewish system of capital punishment with the United States judicial
experience. Through this judicial exploration the why and how of capital
punishment's sparing employment in the Jewish law and judicially
encouraged use in the United States is examined.2
This essay begins with a survey of the textual foundations of
capital punishment both in the Jewish law and the United States
Constitution. The basic texts of the Jewish law and the Constitution are
examined for their treatment, or lack thereof, of capital punishment. They
are then scrutinized for any potential mitigatory effect on the imposition,
structure, and use of capital punishment.
Having established the foundational law, this essay continues by
tracing the actual judicial development of capital punishment law in both
systems. A comparison is conducted of the interpretation applied to the
basic texts by the highest judicial court of each system. The essay
concludes by contrasting the two wholly divergent judicial interpretational
experiences to divine root causes of the present structure of, and judicial
attitude towards, capital punishment in the United States.
I.

TEXTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

In Jewish law, the Biblical legality of capital punishment is a
certainty. The text of the Bible states that the death penalty can be
imposed for thirty-six different crimes." While the imposition of death is
10. See generally Israel J. Kazis, Judaism and the Death Penalty, CONTEMPORARY JEWISH
ETHICS, 326 (1979).
11. This essay is limited only to the judicial experiences with capital punishment. Therefore,
this paper does not examine capital punishment as distributed non-statutorily by the Jewish King, the
so-called King's Justice. For an exploration of this aspect of Jewish law, see Bleich, Capital
Punishmentin the Noachide Code, in CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS (1981).
12. This essay is not pervasive in scope. Rather, it touches upon the structure and key tenets
of both systems in order to discern bedrock developmental principles. For further comparative
discussion of these two systems, see Bruce Ledewitz, Reflections on the Talmudic and American
Death Penalty, 6 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (1993). For a more comprehensive survey of the
modem Supreme Court experience with capital punishment see WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE EIGHnES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1987).
13. See SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JEWS 45 (1991). The
Jewish law provided for four methods of capital punishment: stoning; burning; decapitation; and
strangulation. Stoning was considered the most severe form of execution, strangulation the

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

96

[Vol. 3:93

discretionary for some crimes, in the majority of instances it is mandatory
if guilt is found."
In contrast, the United States Constitution is opaque on the legal
status of capital punishment. There is neither an explicit bar nor an
expression of its permissible use within the document. However, there are
strong inferences that its use is permissible. The opening sentence of the
Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.
The Double Jeopardy clause of this amendment prohibits being
"[t]wice put into jeopardy of life. .... "" Finally, the Due Process Clause
commands due process of law before an accused can "[b]e deprived of
1
life. "
. . .

'

Under the federal system constructed by the Constitution, what is
not delegated to the federal government or barred from the states is left to
the states."8 It would thus appear, with no affirmative bar in the
Constitution or implication to the opposite, that capital punishment and the
form of its implementation would be discretionary to the states. However,
only through deductive reading can any gloss be placed upon the
Constitution's position on capital punishment. This raises the specter that
the self-acknowledged judicial interpreter of the Constitution, the Supreme

weakest. Eighteen crimes were punishable by stoning: 1) incest with one's own mother; 2) with
his step-mother; 3) with his daughter-in-law; 4) with a betrothed virgin (rape); 5) pederasty; 6)
bestiality, practiced by a man; 7) the same practice by a women; 8) blasphemy; 9) idolatry; 10)
sacrificing one's own children to Moloch; 11) instigating individuals to embrace idolatry; 12)
instigating communities to do the like; 13) pythonism; 14) necromancy; 15) magic; 16) violating
the Sabbath; 17) cursing a parent; 18) violation of a filial duty. Ten Crimes were punishable by
burning: 1) adultery of a priest's daughter; 2) incest with one's own daughter; 3) with one's own
daughter's daughter; 4) with one's own son's daughter; 5) with one's own step-daughter; 6) with
one's own step-daughter's daughter; 7) with one's own step-son's daughter 8) with one's own
mother-in-law; 9) with her mother; 10) with one's own father in-law's mother. Two crimes were
punishable by decapitation: 1) murder; 2) communal apostasy from Judaism to idolatry. Six
crimes were punishable by strangulation: 1) adultery; 2) bruising a parent; 3) kidnapping; 4)
maladministration; 5) false prophecy; 6) prophesying in the name of heathen deities.
14. See generally Mainwnides 15:10-13.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The contours and history of the Court's Tenth Amendment
doctrine is traced in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (explaining that the Tenth Amendment analysis requires inquiry into
whether Constitution authorizes federal action); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985) (stating the Tenth Amendment prevents federal action invasive of powers of the
states).
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Court,'" could through reference to other passages, find the document
prohibitive or regulative of capital punishment.

III. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF MITIGATION INTHE JEWISH AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
In an initial blind encounter with the primary texts, the case for
capital punishment is clear in the Biblical code and seemingly permissible
in the Constitution. However, this judgment is based solely upon the
presence or absence of explicit statements within the texts concerning
capital punishment. It does not examine what bearing other sections of the
Bible, Jewish oral law, or the United States Constitution might have upon
the question of capital punishment.
A. The Jewish law
In the Bible, the main passage with tangential application to the
efficacy of capital punishment concerns the moral righteousness of mercy:
"And whether the mother is a cow or a ewe, you shall not kill both her
and the young in one day.""
The validity of mercy over punishment and primacy of forgiveness
also finds expression in the Midrash, the Jewish oral law, "The priests
forgave [Saul for his role at the slaughter at Nob], but the Gibeonites did
not forgive him, and therefore God rejected them."'
Beyond the realm of death the theme of mercy espoused in the
Midrash was also employed to show the righteousness of mercy upon the
undeserving. This was seen in the actions of Rabbi Joshua b. Levi:
In the neighborhood of Rabbi Joshua b. Levi there lived a
Sadducee who used to trouble him greatly with [his
interpretations of] texts. One day the rabbi ... thought..
'I shall curse him.' When the moment arrived, Rabbi
Joshua was dozing [On awakening] he said. I see from
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is").
20. Leviticus 22:28 (Midrash on Psalms). In subsequent commentaries this passage has been
used to illustrate misplaced mercy. The Midrash states: "Bar Kapara said, 'Doeg is called the
edomite because he forbade Saul to shed the blood of Agag.' For Doeg said, 'it is written in the
torah, Ye shall not kill it and its young on the same day: yet you are about to kill young and old,
children and women in one day'." Midrash on Psalms (to ps. 52), I, p. 479.
21. Shmot Rabbah 30:12. Other passages of the Jewish law address the role of mercy
generally. The Babylonian Talmud states: "[I) saw Akathriel Jah, the Lord of Hosts, seated
upon a high and exalted throne. He said to me: Ishmael, My son, Bless Me! I replied: May it
be Thy will that Thy mercy may suppress Thy anger and thy mercy prevail over Thy other
attributes." Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 46b.
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this that my intention was improper. For it is written and
his mercies are over all his works, and it is further written.
Neither is it good for the righteous to punish.22
Distilled from what has been detailed thus far, the case for the
widespread employment of capital punishment in the Jewish law is still
certain. There is a strain of mercy that is present; a strain that is explicitly
applicable to those convicted of capital crimes. It could permit a moral
judgment concerning the validity and frequency of capital punishment.
However, capital punishment, as has been noted, is in the Jewish law, a
mandatory event. Thus, it is yet to be seen what the quality of mercy can
directly do to forestall capital punishment in mandatory circumstances.
B. The ConstitutionalLaw
In the United States Constitution, the passages potentially relevant
to capital punishment have similar qualities to those just delineated in the
Jewish law. Both permit moral judgments with the potential to regulate
capital punishment and, in the case of the Constitution, to even venture so
far as to prohibit its use. However, the Constitution, while containing
language that potentially can go further than the Jewish law, does not
include the positive moral aspect of the Jewish law. Rather, in the
Constitution the relevant tangential clauses are at their basis morally
neutral. They can be employed to place a moral imprint upon capital
punishment, but the nature of that judgment, unlike the Jewish law, is
never detailed.
1. Substantive Due Process
The first relevant passage within the Constitution is the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. This clause states that "[n]o
person shall be .
deprived of life, liberty or property . . . without due
3
law."2
of
process
A quick skim through this passage would cause one to assume that
the clause's statement that life can be taken so long as Due Process is
adhered to, would negate any potential mitigation upon capital punishment.
However, this initial glance, while correct, would ignore the Supreme
Court's interpretation of this clause. If this interpretation is explored, the
status and use of capital punishment is debatable.

22. Berakoth 7a.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process clause embodies
a being which the Court has termed substantive due process .24 Substantive
due process has been held by the Court to bar government interference
with practices which are fundamental traditions in our society unless a
compelling reason exists.21 This prohibition has been expressed by the
Court as a protection of those acts essential to a concept of ordered
liberty.26 It has also been expressed as a negative commandment which
prevents the27 government from engaging in conduct "shocking to the
conscience. "
The Court, though, while stating that once an act is found to be

fundamental or necessary to ordered liberty and thus protected from
interference by substantive due process, has never definitively stated how
such a practice is determined to be fundamental or implicit to ordered
liberty. However, a survey of cases where the Court has found a practice
to be protected or government conduct to be shocking, exposes a pattern in
the Court's analysis. The Court has largely employed substantive due
process to protect traditions essential to the home and family and to bar
particularly brutal actions by the government."
Despite the uses which substantive due process has protected, it

has never contained or included an explicit moral element.

Rather,

substantive due process has been defined and provides content through the
subjective perceptions of the Court. The Court, through the employment
24. The Due Process Clause also contains a species known as procedural due process.
However, as capital punishment is largely the domain of the states any procedural structure under
the Due Process Clause would have to be imposed through substantive due process. See, e.g.,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). This exposition can therefore be confined to that concept.
25. See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
26. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
27. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Kinsella v. United States, 361
U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (explaining that the government violates due process when it acts without
fundamental fairness because it is shocking to the sense of justice).
28. See inter alia Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1,12 (1967) (holding that marriage is fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541-42 (1942) (holding that procreation is a fundamental right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453-54 (1972) (holding that contraception is fundamental); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that family is fundamental tradition). See generally Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798);
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1939); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (explaining that due process prevents government from arbitrarily
medicating individuals); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (explaining that due process forbids government from purposelessly
restraining individuals); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Kinsella v. United
States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (holding that government violates due process when it acts
without fundamental fairness, shocking to the sense of justice).
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of the tests above, has used the ideological composition of its own
membership to determine the scope and composition of substantive due
process. 29 Thus, a moral element is encompassed within the opinions of
the individual Justices, but that element has no explicit exposition as in the
Jewish law of mercy.
2. The Eighth Amendment
The second relevant text is the Eighth Amendment, which bars
cruel and unusual punishment." The Eighth Amendment was initially
erected to prohibit torture and other barbarous punishment.' However,
over time the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to espouse
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency."32 As such, the Court has come to view the amendment as a
flexible text which bars punishment conflicting "with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society." 3"
The determination of a societal standard of decency has been a
source of controversy in the Court. The Court has at times stated that the
decision that a punishment is in conflict with standards of decency is to be
taken with reference to both national and international standards.
International standards are apparently the international conventions and the
practices of other nations.Y The determination of what national standards
are has been a source of controversy and is difficult to pinpoint.
However, the Court at various times has drawn reference, with fluctuating
weight given, from their own perceptions," the populace's attitudes,16 the
state legislatures," and the practices of juries." It is rather needless to
29. The exact content and scope of substantive due process has been the source of heated
debate. Compare the concurring opinions of Justices White, Harlan, and Goldberg with the
dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Stewart. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

31. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
32. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

33. Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the international consensus against death
penalty for rape weighs against validity of punishment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
333-34 (1976) (holding that mandatory death sentences invalid because society rejects identical

punishments for every convicted felon).
34. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing international standards to find the death penalty for
rape barred by the Eighth Amendment).
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976).
36. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
37. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
38. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295-96 (1976).
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point out that as in the case of substantive due process, none of these
bench-marks, except a count of state legislatures, embodies a moral
element that can be defined without reference to the subjective perceptions
of the Justices of the Court.

3. Conclusion
Thus, the case for prohibition or regulation of capital punishment
in the constitutional scheme is a morally neutral one. There are passages
which could potentially bar or regulate the process. However, these
passages, unlike the Jewish law on mercy, have no explicit moral force.
Rather, they are neutral and depend on subjective indicia for their moral
composition. Thus, any potential effect of these passages upon capital
punishment would depend upon the Justices' subjective definitions and
assessments of these guideposts.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A.

The Jewish law
From the brief overview conducted above, one would conjecture
that capital punishment would be a common event under Jewish law. This
is not the case. Executions in ancient Israel were a rarity. This was due to
the procedures which the Jewish law and Sanhedrin required for the
implementation of death. The Sanhedrin's interpretation of the scriptures
and their methods made for a body of procedure that was so "weighted as
to make execution a virtual impossibility.""9
At the outset, the Bible required a set number of witnesses in a
capital case. Numbers 35:30 states: "Who so killeth any person, the
murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses: but one witness
shall not testify against any person to cause him to die. "4
This passage is repeated without a capital context in Deuteronomy
19:15: "[a] case can be valid only on the testimony of two witnesses or
more. "14
The Biblical requirement of two witnesses is a strict one.
However, in their implementation of these passages, the Sanhedrin
construed them to require further procedural structure. Thus, these
passages were read broadly and employed to eliminate the use of

39.
Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment - The Classic Jewish Discussion, in
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICs 310, 317 (Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1979).
40. See Numbers 35:30. See also Deuteronomy 17:6.
41. See Tosephta Sanhedrin 11:1.
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circumstantial evidence to convict an accused. The Gemara states: "[The
judge] says to them; perhaps you saw them running after his fellow into a
ruin, you pursued him, and found him sword in hand with blood dripping
from it, while the murdered man was writhing: If this is what ye saw, ye
2
saw nothing."
The Sanhedrin also interpreted the necessity of two witnesses to
exclude the testimony of the murderer himself. Thus, a murderer's own
confession, no matter the probity, was inadmissible in a capital crime.
This was a strictly guarded rule and all statements which could arguably
imply guilt were construed not to.41
The testimony of these witnesses was also required to be
uncontroverted as to any fact. If there was afty discrepancy between their
testimony it was excluded.
The Sanhedrin employed this rule to
effectively exclude the testimony of witnesses who would testify to the
defendant's guilt." They separately interrogated the witnesses, and then
questioned them concerning the most minute details of the crime. If they
contradicted each other as to any fact whatsoever, their testimony was
excluded. The pervasiveness and intensity of the Sanhedrin's questioning
was illustrated by Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai who interrogated witnesses
about the number of figs growing on the tree underneath which the crime
was committed.'5
The Sanhedrin also required the defendant be forewarned. Only if
the defendant had been made ante facto aware of the consequences of his
crime by two witnesses could he be sentenced to die. 6 The accused must
also have acknowledged this penalty before proceeding."
This
requirement was applicable only to cases where capital punishment, not
imprisonment, was at issue.4u

42. Babylonian Tabnud, Sanhedrin 37b.
43.

See generally AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 36-37

(1970).
44. Talmud 81b.
45. Sanhedrin 41a. See also Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a (stating that Rabbi Johanan and
Rabbi Elezar would prevent witnesses from testifying by questioning them about intimate details
such as "Did you take note whether the victim was suffering from some fatal affection or was he
perfectly healthy?" Rabbi Ashi elaborated on this by stating that should the reply be perfectly

healthy, they might further be embarrassed by asking, maybe the sword only severed an internal
lesion).
46. The Code of Mainonedes, 14 Judges 34. ch. 12, §1, 2.
47. Id.

48. Id.
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The accused was also required to be convicted by a qualified lower
court of twenty-three.' 9 If, upon hearing the evidence, all twenty-three of
these men voted to convict the accused, he was acquitted. The accused
could only be convicted if some of the members voted to acquit."
The Sanhedrin also did not recognize capital punishment for felony
murder. Thus, an accessory was not subject to the death penalty.' The
individual sentenced to die had to be the one who directly caused the
death. 2
Finally, when none of these procedures could stop the
implementation of capital punishment, there was an escape clause in
Jewish law. The lower courts, composed of twenty-three judges, could
implement capital punishment only if the Great Sanhedrin met within the
precincts of the Temple.5' Some forty years before the destruction of the
Second Temple the Great Sanhedrin moved their deliberations from the
Temple to prevent the use of capital punishment.14
Thus, capital punishment under the Jewish law was a rare event.
The exact frequency is the subject of speculation, but there have been
suggestions in the commentaries that executions in excess of one instance
every seven years or even one execution every seventy years were viewed
as unacceptable.55 However, whatever the raw numbers were, and they
are unknown, 6 the Jewish procedural laws on the implementation of capital
punishment and their interpretation and use made executions a very rare
thing indeed. This is undisputed.
B. The ConstitutionalLaw
Despite the obvious potential for widespread employment of
capital punishment in the Jewish law, procedural requirements made this
In contrast, the United States constitutional
punishment a rarity.
experience with capital punishment has been almost an exact opposite of
the Jewish experience. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has structured
49. In order to judge a capital case, a judge was required to be a recipient of semikhah.
See Bleich, supra note 11, at 342 n.2.
50. The Code ofMainonedes, 14 Judges 28.
51. An accessory could, however, be tried under non-capital procedures and imprisoned.
Sanhedrin 24:26. However, if-an accessory was tried under capital strictures he was adjudged
innocent and released. Sanhedrin 18:8.
52. Sanhedrin 78b.
53. Hilkhot Sanhedrin 14:11.
54. Gemara Sanhedrin 41a.
55. Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a.
56. Id.
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its constitutional jurisprudence of capital punishment to lessen procedural
structures and reduce judicial appellate supervision, thereby causing both
death sentences and their implementation to be a more frequent event.
The first modern-day, relevant Supreme Court encounter with
capital punishment occurred in McGautha v. California.1' The question at
issue was whether the due process clause prohibited the standardless death
sentencing of an individual." However, behind this narrow question was
the broader one of the constitutionality of the death penalty. This was,
therefore, an opportunity for the Court, through the due process clause, to
regulate or abolish capital punishment. This, the Court declined to do. In
Mcgautha, the Court, per Justice Harlan, rejected the notion the due
process clause required any regulation of, or bar upon, the implementation
of capital punishment. 9
Despite its holding in McGautha, only two years later, the Court
took up the related question of whether the Eighth Amendment had any
bearing upon capital punishment. The case was Furman v. Georgia,60 and
the Court badly splintered.
Two Justices wrote that the Eighth
Amendment barred the death penalty in all circumstances.6 1 Four Justices
held that the Eighth Amendment had no effect on the procedures or
existence of capital punishment.62 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision
concerning this question was governed by the remaining three justices,
Douglas, Stewart, and White, who each wrote their own individual
opinions. 3 The opinion of Douglas is unimportant, for he retired the next
year and his viewpoint did not influence future Court decisions on capital
punishment." However, the opinions of Stewart and White are of supreme
importance for they marked the two divergent ideologies that would shape
the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the requirements
of a constitutional system of capital punishment. In Furman, Justice White
57. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
58. Id. at 185.
59. Id. at 204.
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
61. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, ., dissenting); id. at 414
(Powell, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurring),
64. Douglas' opinion, which was based upon a system-wide Eighth Amendment equal
protection rationale was explicitly rejected by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). It has, however, seen fits of resurgence
in the preceding years. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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wrote: "But when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of
infrequency . . . [it] would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment . . . [capital punishment] is

so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be
of substantial service to criminal justice."', In contrast, Justice Stewart
wrote:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual...
[Tihe petitioner's are among a capriciously selected
random handful

. .

. I simply conclude that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed."
Thus, Justice White held that the death penalty, as imposed at the
time, was given so infrequently as to be violative of the Eighth
Amendment. In contrast, Justice Stewart, who did not join Justice White's
opinion, found that the death penalty was violative of the Eighth
Amendment because it was distributed with no rational basis as to who was
sentenced to death. In future opinions, this view would translate into a
position that strict procedures be drawn to ensure that only a core group of
people, the worst killers, got the death penalty.
Drawing any singular holding out of Furman is almost an
impossibility. However, the Court has done so by consistently stating that
Furman held the death penalty, as implemented pre-1972, was violative of
the Eighth Amendment because it was imposed "arbitrarily and
capriciously."6"

Though, while the Court has spelled out a holding in

Furman, the Justices have clashed on the composition of state legislative
statutes necessary to conduct this punishment under the Furman decision.
The source of this clash has been the divergent views of Justice White and
Justice Stewart and their attempts to implement different constitutional
requirements in a system of death."
65. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-13.
66. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Callins, 510 U.S. at 1148 (Blackmun, J.,.dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(stating "Furman demanded that the sentencer's discretion be directed and limited ... to minimize
the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentences. . . ."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-59
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
68. Compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-30 (1980) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, 3J., plurality opinion) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion) with Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 444-57 (White, J., dissenting) and Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See generally Jim
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This conflict began four years later when the Court considered the
validity of a quintet of capital statutes enacted post-Furman.6 These five
opinions, which inter alia held that the Eighth Amendment did not bar
Icapital punishment in all circumstances, constituted
a victory by Justice
Stewart over Justice White. Justice Stewart partially succeeded in his goal
of limiting the death penalty to only a select few, mandatory death
sentences were held unconstitutional in two of the opinions. 0
In the other three opinions, the Court approved the sentencing
schemes of Georgia, Texas, and Florida.7 ' The most important opinion in
this latter trio is Gregg v. Georgia, which provided approval of the
Georgia sentencing scheme." In Gregg, Justice Stewart spelled out his
vision of a constitutional death penalty system. He repeatedly referred to
the capital statute contained in the Model Penal Code (MPC).73 He praised
the guidance given a jury through this statute - that aggravators and
mitigators are provided and the jury is furnished concrete instructions on
how to consider these." Justice Stewart also expressed his satisfaction with
the bifurcation of the trial both in the MPC and the Georgia statute.7 3
Finally, Justice Stewart extolled the virtues of proportionality and strict
appellate review.76 The Stewart model was therefore laid out: a strict set
of procedures at both the trial and appellate level for the imposition of
capital punishment, and a limitation on the applicability of capital
punishment to only a select few - designed to ensure that only the most
deserving, the worst killers, receive the death penalty.
The next major decision in the Supreme Court's capital
jurisprudence was Coker v. Georgia." This was another victory for the
Stewart viewpoint. In Coker, a plurality held that the death penalty for the
crime of rape of an adult was violative of the Eighth Amendment.'7 Thus,

Liebman and Adam Haven-Weiss, Fatal Distortion: Judicial Oversight of the Death Penalty 19721992 (unpublished).

69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas. 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
70. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325.
71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Profin, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262.
72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
74. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 198, 206.
77. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

78. Id.
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Coker restricted the death penalty, with only certain hedges, to murder. 9
This was another step in Justice Stewart's goal of limiting the death penalty
to only the most deserving.
Despite these initial victories, a capital system commensurate to
Justice Stewart's vision was not created. The Supreme Court rejected the
Stewart view and adopted the capital ideology of Justice White. Justice
White's system, spelled out in Furman, required that a constitutional
capital punishment system distribute and implement death sentences with
frequency so as to avoid arbitrary imposition.1° This necessitated a
constitutional system which encouraged both death sentences and their
execution. The Court, under the leadership of Justice White, took four
paths to accomplish this goal.
First, the Supreme Court focused on the unique aspect of the
capital trial - the penalty phase. From 1978 to 1993 the Court, again
under the ideological leadership of Justice White, succeeded in stripping
the capital sentencing trial of almost any constitutional requirement of
procedure.' The Court, under Justice White's lead, successively held: a
jury is free to consider any piece of evidence of aggravating circumstances
during the trial's guilt phase; 2 weighing state non-statutory aggravators can
be employed in the consideration of imposing death;"' mitigating evidence
can be virtually ignored;" a judge could overrule a jury's verdict of life for
death;' and finally, the definition of aggravators could be broadly
construed into meaninglessness. 6 This diminishment of procedural criteria
only made it easier for prosecutors to procure a death sentence.
The Court's second line of cases expanded the number of
individuals who could receive a death sentence. The Court drew a broad
category of those co-conspirators who could be sentenced to death.'1 The
79. Coker did leave open the possibility of adeath sentence for rape of a child. Id. at 597.
80. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Liebman & Haven-Weiss, supra note 68; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305. See also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
82. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
83. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
84. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (holding that a state does not have to provide full
effect to potentially mitigating evidence).
85. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
86. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)
(applying a lenient standard for constitutional review of the construction of aggravators); Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 137, 147 (1994).
87. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147 (1987) (adopting reckless indifference to human life
to satisfy culpability requirements for death penalty of co-conspirators).
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Court held that youths as young as sixteen years of age, and possibly even
fifteen years of age, could be executed,u and the mentally retarded could
also be executed. 89
These two lines of decisions, however, were not the sole marks of
the Court's deregulation of capital punishment. Justice White's ideology
of widespread capital punishment, to fulfill the view espoused in Furman,
mandated that not only the number of death sentences increase, but that the
number of executions increase. Justice White's ideology required that,
inter alia, the hands of the judiciary, particularly the federal one, be
confined in their ability to overturn death convictions. This mandate
resulted in two lines of decisions.
The first string of cases repudiated any constitutional requirement
that state appellate review in capital cases was to be a searching
inspection.90 The Court successively held: proportionality review of
capital sentences was not constitutionally mandated;' a state appellate court
has the discretion to reweigh the evidence if an error was made at a capital
sentencing trial; 92 the Constitution did not require a system wide appellate
analysis for racism in the implementation of capital punishment; 9 the
constitutional standard for appellate analysis of ineffective assistance of
counsel for those facing capital punishment was a low one;94 and that the
Constitution set an incredibly high standard for appellate analysis of a
wrongful death-sentence. 9'
The second line of decisions was a circumscription of the lower
federal court's ability to overturn state convictions on habeas corpus.96 To
accomplish this task the Court set up a system of draconian procedural

88. Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
90. See generally Weisberg, supra note 81.
91. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
92. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
93. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
94. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993) (White J., concurring) (stating that a
persuasive showing of innocence would find relief under the Constitution).
96. For a fuller chronicle of this event see Testimony of George Kendall, NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, House Judiciary, Habeas Corpus Reform (Oct. 22, 1993). See also Emanuel
Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557 (1994); Michele M.
Jochner, 'Til Habeas Do Us Part: Recent Supreme Court Habeas Corpus Rulings, 81 ILL. B.J. 250
(1993); Lisa S. Spickler, Brecht v. Abramson, Another Step Toward Evisceration of Habeas, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 546 (1993); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro* the Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537

(1990).
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default rules." The Court, inter alia placed strict standards for successor
petitions and abuse of the writ analysis," implemented a harsh rule of
retroactivity which denied habeas petitioners the benefits of new rules,"
applied the standard of Kotteakos to state habeas corpus petitions,'"

enacted strict procedures for default upon non-presentment of all claims in
state habeas,'0 ' and denied that effective assistance of counsel was required
for habeas petitioners.'"1

A picture is therefore painted of a Court which willingly erected a
system to increase the number and speed up the implementation of death
sentences. However, this conclusion is not a deduction. Beyond Justice
White's explicit statement in Furman, over the past ten years various
members of the Court have admitted that much of the reasoning behind

their decision making has been to increase the number of executions. 0
Justice Scalia last year, complained during an oral argument that the Texas
Resource Center, the organization which handles all Texas death row
appeals, was too dilatory in their filings and consequently there were not a
sufficient number of executions."01 Justice Kennedy, in a Georgia speech

ruminated on how he hated death penalty attorneys and their repeated
attempts to slow down executions.'°0
The end result of these attitudes and the resultant case law has

been a sharp rise in the number of death sentences and executions. At the
time of Furman, there had been no executions for the previous five
97. These rules are so harsh that today the typical result is that even if a constitutional error is
found on habeas, relief is usually barred due to procedural strictures. See Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1158 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting this fact).
98. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Adopting a cause and prejudice standard for
successor petitions); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (adopting a cause and prejudice
standard for abuse of the writ).
99. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992)
(adopting a low threshold for ascertainment of new rules).
100. Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
101. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
102. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
103. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311-13 (1972) (White, J.concurring).
104. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Confronting Results of Limiting Death Row Appeals, N.Y..
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at Al.
105. See also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (stating that the pace and number of executions is too slow); Schiro v.
Indiana, 493 U.S.. 910 (1989) (Stevens, J.,respectfully concurring to denial of certiorari) (stating
that the pace of executions are too slow); Autry v. McKaskley, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the Court, in its haste to speed up executions,
is not devoting sufficient time to the merits of death row habeas petitions); Fast Track for
Erecutions, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1989, at A14 (detailing Justice Rehnquist's formation of a
committee to speed up and increase the number of executions).
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years. 10 And before that, there had been a serious downward trend in the
rates of execution.10 Last year there were fifty-six executions.1u° There
have been over 313 executions since the death of Gary Gilmore.0'9 There
are now over 3000 individuals on death row throughout the nation."10
These are compelling statistics, and their numbers are on the rise."'
V. THE HOW AND THE WHY

A. Introduction
So why did this happen? At the beginning of this paper the
conjecture would have been that the use of capital punishment would be
widespread in the Jewish law. The Constitution, in contrast, had little or
nothing to say concerning its use. However, as delineated, the two
systems have enacted procedures designed to produce very different
results. In the case of the Jewish law, it is the rarity of execution. In the
constitutional experience, it has been a conscious effort by the Court to
increase the number of executions. So again, why did this happen?
B. The Jewish Law
In Jewish law there is a juxtaposition between moral value and
law. In the Jewish law the religion is the law. A moral force in the
religion and populace will be given, and indeed must be given, explicit
effect in the law by the Sanhedrin. In Jewish law there are two moral
forces which could plausibly be responsible for the Sanhedrin's aversion to
structuring their capital system to forestall executions. The first of these
was discussed above, the Biblical requirement of mercy.
The second possible basis is the value the Jewish religion has
placed upon individual life. In Judaism, the person is viewed as created in
God's image. This is true regardless of the position of the killed. The fact
he might be a sinner is apparently of no consequence. This viewpoint was
stated expressly by Rabbi Meir, a student of Rabbi Akiba who states that
the sight of an executed criminal hanging from a tree in Deuteronomy
106. BEDEAU, supra note 2, at 23. 25.
107. Id. (For the years of 1960-67, the number of executions were 56, 42, 47, 21, 15, 7, 1, 2,
respectively).
108. Executions on the Rise; Capricious Penalty: With More People on Death Row, More
Chances of Error,BALTIMORE SUN, Jan., 7, 1996, at 2E.
109. As of January 1, 1996, the exact number of executions is 313. Id.
110. d.
111. Id.
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21:22-3, provokes the thought that "the King [or as Kellner phrases it G-d]
2
himself is hung."1
This respect for the individual is reinforced through the Biblical
language on killing. In the Bible there are no words that distinguish
between, of kill, criminal homicide, justifiable homicide, and execution.
They are all described through the same word; Kill (razach). This usage is
also reflected in the language of the Rabbinate. Passages in the Jerusalem
Talmud and the Mekhilta employ the same typology as the Biblical
language. Thus, the language of ancient Israel made no distinction
between types of killings. No matter their posture, justified or criminal,
they are all described by the same word with the equal moral imprint,
kill." ,
This moral conviction and perception expressed itself through a
call for respect of the person and a sparing use of capital punishment. The
Mishnah states that a Sanhedrin which implements the death penalty once
every seven years is a violent court. Rabbi Eleazer B. Azariah says this is
true of a court which passes such a sentence once in seventy years. And
finally, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba say, "Were we in the Sanhedrin
[during that period when it possessed capital jurisdiction], no man would
ever have been killed."'
While these statements were made after the Sanhedrin had lost
capital jurisdiction, they are an illumination of the perceptions of that
time.1" They express the moral force that the Jewish law gave to the value
of life during the period of the Sanhedrin's existence. The existence of
this sanctity was borne out by the requirement that the judges fast on the
day of execution.

112. Blidstein, supra note 39.
113. Id.
114. Mishnah, Makkoth 7a.
115. Another example of the Talmudic respect for life is illustrated in the treatment which
these scholars gave to the four methods of capital punishment mandated by the Bible. Justice Haim
H. Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISR. L. REV. 53 (1970), thoroughly details how the
Talmudic scholars reinterpreted the Biblical texts so that these punishments became less brutal.
Thus, stoning was transformed from death by public stoning into the a procedure where the
convicted was thrown off a two story high stoning house. Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:4. Even more
remarkably, burning became death by strangulation. B Sanhedrin 52a. And strangulation by
hanging was rejected for a more secretive death of two men pulling ties around the convict's neck
until he suffocated. M. Sanhedrin VI 3. These lengths which the Talmudic scholars obviously went
to, to lessen the violence of these punishments, is a sure signal of their abhorrence of capital
punishment itself. See Moshe Sokol, Some Tensions in the Jewish Attitude Toward the Taking of
Jewish Life, 7 JEW. L. ANN. 97, 102 (1988) (noting the "dimension of wrong" in even justified
killing).
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Thus, the Jewish value of life and mercy is a plausible explanation
for the strict procedures erected around capital punishment. These
procedures were designed to limit its use and give expression to this moral
concern, and they succeeded. Executions were a rarity in ancient Israel.
This was due to the merger of morality and religion in the Jewish law.
These were directly incorporated into the law, for in Judaism the religion
(moral values) is law. Thus, the explicit religious values of life and mercy
were easily required to be considered in the erection of procedures
concerning the use of capital punishment. The result has just been
delineated, a set of procedures designed to employ capital punishment as
infrequently as possible.
C. The ConstitutionalLaw
In contrast, the Supreme Court has never imposed a moral
imprimatur upon its constitutional regulation of capital punishment. This
is due to a number of factors, but primarily because of the Justices'
perception of the nature of the Court's role in the constitutional scheme.
In Furman, the Supreme Court, in its development of the constitutional
procedure of capital punishment, became concerned solely with the content
of the text, its interpretation and its holding in Furman. The Justices
never addressed whether what they were doing was en toto moral. This
resulted in a conscious effort by the Court to increase the number of
executions in order to fulfill a judicial theory.
In the constitutional scheme, the role of the judiciary has been the
subject of vicious ideological debate. The differing viewpoints can be
rendered into simplistic shorthand as a battle between judicial
conservatives and judicial activists. The judicial conservatives, led most
recently by Justice Scalia, believe the Court's constitutional role is a
limited one. The Court should confine itself to strict interpretation of the
constitutional text, with reference to the traditions at the time of
ratification. The Court should also defer to the legislative will." '6 In
contrast, the judicial activists believe a judge should take on a socially
progressive mantra. They believe a judge should view the Constitution as

116. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW (Free Press 1990); Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of wv Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justice's Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the
Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1
(1993).
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an evolving document to be interpreted broadly and independent of the
legislative will."'
The strength of the judicial activists has declined in the last few
decades as the Court has grown more conservative."' The effect of this
development, and an example of the conservative viewpoint's influence
upon capital punishment, was illustrated in a statement by Justice Scalia
last year. This was a response to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Callins v.
Collins,"' asserting capital punishment in its present form was
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia wrote:
That explanation [Blackmun's assertion that capital
punishment is unconstitutional] often refers to 'intellectual,
moral and personal' perceptions, but never to the text and
tradition of the Constitution. It is the latter rather than the
former that ought to control. The Fifth Amendment
provides that '[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital . . . crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, . . . nor be deprived of life . . without

due process of law.' This clearly permits the death penalty
to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death
penalty is not one of the 'cruel and unusual punishments'
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.1,0
Thus, at the outset, the judicial conservatives have found that the
text cannot function as an absolute bar on the implementation of capital
punishment. However, the conservative viewpoint and the aggressiveness
of its proponents has not only succeeded in keeping the constitutionality of
the death penalty a closed question, it has also functioned as the main
guide in the Supreme Court's dismantling of the procedural requirements
for death. This result is largely a product of the conservative's view of
our federalist system. They believe that in most instances, particularly
when a moral judgment is made, the Court should defer to the will of the

117. See John Ely, Another Such Victory, Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts are No Different Than Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991).
118. For complete scholarly treatment of the conservative tide, see DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING
RIGHT:

THE MAKING OF THE SUPREME COURT (Wiley 1990): Herman Schwartz, Trends in the

Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 559 (1991); Mary Daly, Affirmative Action, EqualAccess and
the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057 (1990).
119. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari).
120. Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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legislature. 2 ' Thus, as the conservative wing of the Court strengthened,

the Court has come to view its role in capital punishment as subservient to
the states. Any moral context to this penalty should therefore be
considered in the legislature, not the Supreme Court.
The rise of this conservative viewpoint and the transformation it
has engendered is aptly illustrated in the development over the last twenty
years of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the most important
clause in the constitutional regulation of capital punishment. In Gregg v.
Georgia,'22 Justice Stewart, a sometime judicial activist, wrote of the
Court's role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: "It seems conceded by
all that the amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge
the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the
23
amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not."'
However, this view, which permitted the Court to place their own
moral gloss on the Eighth Amendment, quickly fell victim to a
conservative tide. Only a few years later, in Coker v. Georgia,12 the
Court rejected its subjective role. The Court, per Justice White, instead
advocated a more objective indicia for the development of the Eighth
Amendment, "Judgment should not be . . . [the] views of individual

justices, [in an Eighth Amendment analysis] attention should be given to
the public attitudes ... legislative attitudes, and the response of juries."2 '

Thus, the opinions of the individual members of the Court were
dropped for more objective measurements of the popular will. However,
this new test still contained some opportunity for the Court to impose a
moral judgment. The composition of public attitudes is always uncertain.
A judge's choice of the indicia to measure this feeling could reflect his
own morality.
However, in Stanford v. Kentucky' 26 the Court dispelled this
possibility by further limiting the elements contained in an Eighth
Amendment assessment. The role of juries and public attitude was
rejected. Instead, the Court adopted an Eighth Amendment analysis which
focused almost solely upon the legislature. As Justice Scalia wrote:

121. For a comment by a conservative idealogue on the illegitimacy of moral opinions by
Justices of the Supreme Court see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427 (1993) (Scalia J.,
concurring).
122. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123. Id. at 174.
124. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
125. Id. at 591.
126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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[P]etitioners seek to demonstrate [the public attitude]
through other indicia, including public opinion polls, the
views of interest groups and the positions adopted by
various Professional associations.
We decline the
invitation to rest constitutional law on such uncertain
foundations.

A revised national consensus

. .

.

must

appear in the operative acts (laws and application of laws)
27
that the people have approved. ,

Thus, the rise of the judicial conservatives has resulted in a
rejection of a judge's role in an Eighth Amendment analysis.", The Court
has reformed its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence so that any moral
judgment has been shifted completely to the state legislatures. They are
the ones who will decide what is moral and what is not. ,29
The broader consequence of this event has been an almost across-

the-board rejection by the Court of any system-wide moral role in their
Eighth amendment decision-making process."- This has led the Court to

take an amoral view of capital punishment. This the Court has admitted
numerous times."' However, the Court has taken this fact and gone even
further. They have decided that the en toto morality of capital punishment

127. Id. at 377.
128. This abdication of judicial capability for system wide moral analysis within the Eighth
Amendment has coincided with the Court's virtual rejection of any notion of proportionality for
individual sentences within that same Amendment. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991),
the Court held that a life sentence for the possession of 680 grams of cocaine was not violative of the
Eighth Amendment. Thus, the Court has essentially rejected for itself any moral role in any Eighth
Amendment analysis whatsoever; instead preferring to leave such responsibilities to the legislatures.
See Lisa Tatulli, Casenote Harmelin v. Michigan, 2 SErON HALL CONST. L.J. 409 (1991); Kelly
A. Patch, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992
WiS. L. REV. 1697 (1992).
129. For a fuller treatment of this development see Note, Wilkins v. Missouri: The Court
Searchesfor A Consensus to the Cruel and Unusual Question, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 125 (1990); Jane
Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death; Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
130. The Court still retains the ability to make direct moral judgments on an individual basis
through the traditional shocking to the conscience test embedded in the Due Process Clause.
However, recent cases have exposed a reluctance by the Court to invalidate a capital sentence upon
even this narrow, individual basis. See, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (stating
death sentence given where prosecutor in closing argument referred to previous death sentence later
overturned did not lessen responsibility of jury so as to violate due process).
131. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 286, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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is now the domain of the legislature, the morality of how it is implemented
2
and its frequency, will also be left to that body.1
The states have wholeheartedly, at least in concept, embraced
frequency and a procedural laxness in the implementation of capital
punishment. Therefore, the Court, under the guidance of Justice White's
Furman opinion and the conservative notion of the Court's role, has
consciously set out to increase the number of executions as a means to
implement the will of the state legislatures. Viewed through a broader
perspective, it began because the Eighth Amendment at its core is morally
neutral. It is for the Court to give it a moral context. However, the
Court, after initial steps in the other direction, abandoned a subjective role
for itself in this assessment and instead, transformed an Eighth Amendment
judgment into a counting game of the state legislatures. In doing this, the
Court absolved themselves of any duty to morally assess the development
of procedures for the death penalty.'" Thus, without a moral context, the
Court has concentrated solely on fulfilling Justice White's Furman opinion
and the perceived legislative will. However, the Court has never asked
itself whether what it was doing was moral.'3' This has led to the
development of a system that, encourages the execution of individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION

This essay has eschewed a moral position on the validity of the
death penalty. Instead, it has sought to find the basic factors that
influenced the development of these system's apparatus of capital
punishment through a comparison of two very different legal systems.
Thus, it is the inescapable conclusion that the role of morality is the key
difference in the development of the capital punishment systems of the
Jewish law and the Constitution. A subtext and root cause of this
difference is the structural role which is provided for in the text to the
Supreme Court and to the Sanhedrin.
In the Jewish law, the existence of moral guides which the
Sanhedrin could follow in the development of a system of capital
132. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that "this Court is eager to do away with any restriction on the States' power to execute
whomever and however they please").
133. The best example of this is Herrera,506 U.S. at 390, where the Court equivocated on
whether the Cohstitution, particularly the Eighth Amendment, protected the innocent from
execution.
134. The development of the death penalty system and how it has allowed all of the actors,
including the legislature, to absolve themselves of moral culpability is covered in Jack Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982).
See also Stephen Garvey,
Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187 (1991).
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punishment were explicit. Furthermore, as a religious source these guides
had to be considered and followed in the implementation of the death
penalty. Thus, the Sanhedrin employed the Jewish viewpoint on life and
mercy to develop a strict procedural system for the distribution of capital
punishment. This was readily accomplished because of the structural
posture of the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin was both the judicial and
legislative branch within the Jewish law. Thus, without hesitation, the
Sanhedrin could implement their interpretation of the composition of the
scriptures. They could also, through this intersection of law and morals,
examine the system-wide morality of capital punishment.
In contrast, the Supreme Court was a victim of its own position in
the constitutional scheme. The clauses through which it could have
mitigated the effect of capital punishment were clearly present. However,
these clauses themselves were morally neutral in tone. They had to be
given content and inner definition by the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court is only one of a number of players in the federal scheme.
Their exact role in the interpretation and implementation of the laws is a
continuing debate. The ideological viewpoint of a majority of the Court
on this debate led it to eventually define the Eighth Amendment as an
assessment of factors beyond the control of its subjective perceptions.
Thus, the Court destroyed its own capability to examine on a
system-wide basis, the moral outcome of an Eighth Amendment analysis.
However, this is the clause which the Court chose to regulate the death
penalty."
In this moral vacuum, the effect of Justice White's Furman
opinion was a wholly rational act which jibed with conservative notions
embodied within the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As a
result, the Court consciously set out to increase the number of executions.

135. The Court was largely denied utilization of the Due Process Clause. McGautha had

ruled that this clause had no bearing on the processes employed in the distribution of capital
punishment.
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COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST

LAW
In the model of perfect competition, the market is so populated by
sellers and buyers that no one individual can influence the market price
through' the manipulation of input or output. "All relevant prices are
known to each producer, who also knows of all input combinations
technically capable of producing any specific combination of outputs and
who makes input-output decisions solely to maximize profits."' All
individuals are price takers. Producers maximize their profits by
producing at a level where their marginal cost equals their average market
cost.
However, markets fail. Markets have imperfections. Individuals
do not always know whether the price of an item at the store on the corner
is the same as the one next door. In fact, the price of an item is usually
lower at a megastore due to economies of scale. There are also social
costs for certain activities and different government tax rates. Products are
not really homogenous, and advertisements make a difference.
Government protectionism and artificial barriers exist.
Firms accumulate market power because "[m]arket forces are [not]
sufficiently strong, self correcting and well directed to guarantee the
results that perfect competition would bring." 2 This type of market failure
is due to a monopoly or to an oligopoly. A monopoly or oligopoly exists
when a single firm or just a few firms produce a product with no close
substitutes. These firms are no longer price takers. Rather, they
maximize their profits by looking for the most convenient price. Firms
which produce at a level where marginal revenue and marginal cost equal
average cost are able to sell their products at a higher price than where the
market offer intersects the demand curve.
Correspondingly, governments intervene in the market using
antitrust laws and agencies to correct the above mentioned market failures.
These competition laws address two problems arising from too much
market power, "the inefficient allocation of resources and the unfair
distribution of the gains from exchange."1

1. PHILIP AREEDA & LOUiS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES
8 (4 ' ed. 1981).

2. Id.at 13.
3. Louis De Alesi, The Public-Choice Model of Antitrust Enforcement, in THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST:

McChesney et al. eds., 1995).

THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

192 (Fred S.,
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Countries like Costa Rica have just enacted competition laws'.
Based on the experience of the United States, this article tries to explain
how certain parts of Costa Rican competition law should be interpreted and
provide reasons for the suggested interpretation.
This article follows the path of the United States Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts and the ensuing case law. The judicial decisions
which will be cited correspond to those studied in the 1995-1996 fall
Antitrust Law course taught at Harvard Law School by Professor Louis
Kaplow. Currently, only two cases have been filed with the Costa Rican
Commission. They have not yet been decided, and the Commission has not
initiated any investigations ex-officio. Thus, no Costa Rican judicial or
administrative decision has been produced.
II. ARTICLE 11: ABSOLUTE MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES
Absolute monopolistic practices consist of those actions, contracts,
agreements, arrangements, or combinations among economic competitors
whose purposes are the following:
a) fixing, raising, and manipulating the selling or purchasing price of
goods or services in the market, or exchanging information with the
same purpose or consequence [hereinafter referred to as the price
provision].
b) establishing the obligation to produce, process, distribute, or
commercialize only a restricted or limited quantity of goods or
rendering a number, volume, or a restricted or limited frequency of
services [hereinafter referred to as the quota provision].
c) dividing, distributing, allocating, or imposing parts of present or future
markets of goods and services through customers, suppliers, space, or
time [hereinafter referred to as the allocation of markets provision].
d) establishing, or coordinating the participation in bids, auction sales, or
the abstention thereof. In the application of this provision, the
Commission shall control ex-officio or per request those markets with
few suppliers. The practices referred to in this provision shall be null
and void and the economic agents participating in those practices shall
be sanctioned in conformity with this law [hereinafter referred to as
the cooperation of bids provision].'

4. Ley de Promoci6n de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor [P.C.D.E.C.],
no. 7472, 19 Dec. 1994, art. 10 (Costa Rica) ( translation to English by the writer).
5. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rico).
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A. The Scope of Monopolistic Practices
Although article 11 of the P.C.D.E.C. refers to monopolistic
practices, it does not regulate monopolies or the acts of monopolies., It
does not regulate individual conduct, regardless of whether it causes an
All the activities described in
undue restraint on competition.
subparagraphs (a) through (d) of article 11 require the cooperation of a
minimum of two parties. The party's actions should be the product of
"actions, contracts, agreements, arrangements or combinations among
economic competitors.", (emphasis added).
Article 11 regulates oligopolies which cause an undue restraint on
competition, as does section 1 of the United States Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination..
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal

...

.

Neither article 11 nor section 1 expressly refer to oligopolies.
However, in order to cause an undue restraint of competition, the activities
must be taken by oligopolies under both provisions.10
An oligopoly is simply defined as a monopoly shared by relatively
few firms which recognize their interdependence and act in accordance
Areeda and Kaplow mention four key
with such interdependence."
elements for an oligopoly to be successful., For the purposes of this
paper, these elements will be deemed to be the core of acting in
accordance with such interdependence. The four elements are as follows:
1) A consensus on price needs to be reached. Differences in costs have
to be disregarded. A floor price will be set by the least efficient firm.
In any case, since the level of production will be set at the point
where marginal revenue and marginal cost equal average cost, firms
will be able to sell at a price higher than where the market offer and
demand curves intersect each other. In order for a consensus on
6. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
7. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
8. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
9. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
10.

(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).

P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1

(1980).
11.

See generally 6 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST

PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1985); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refisals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655
(1962); Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969).
12. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 278.
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prices to be reached, channels of communications must be available
and used. Communication may be formal or informal.
2) Firms must be able to compare their own prices vis-a-vis other firms
prices, quality, and promotions.
3) Cheating must be detectable and punishable.
4) Lastly, but of great importance, producers must collectively enjoy
market power.
Correspondingly, article 11 is only applicable to oligopolies which
enter into contracts which unduly restrict competition. Under Costa Rican
law, if an action is brought against a party which is not an oligopoly, or
against an oligopoly which is not cooperating with another oligopoly to
restrict competition, then the action should be dismissed. In order to
determine whether a firm is a part of an oligopoly, the above elements
need to be jointly taken into account."
B. Meaning of Agreement
Article 11 deals with actions, contracts, agreements, arrangements,
or combinations among economic competitors." Its wording is similar to
that of section 1.15 A written agreement among competitors to unduly
restrain competition for their own benefit is clearly illegal under United
States and Costa Rican law."
However, problems do arise when
establishing the existence of a tacit or inferred agreement.
United States case law has concluded that mere parallelism in
competitive behavior is not an antitrust violation. In Theater Enterprises
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., common conduct among the
respondents was found to exist. They uniformly rebuffed Petitioner's
request to obtain first-run features for its theater." Did Respondent's
refusals to Petitioner's request stem from independent decision or from a
tacit agreement? The court answered that:
[B]usiness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which the fact finder may infer agreement. .

.

. But

this Court has never held that a proof of parallel business
behavior establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that
such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior
13. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
14.
15.
16.
17.

P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
Theater Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy, but 'conscious parallelism' has
not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely. 8
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to charge unduly low
prices. Even in the presence of a reason to conspire, the Court could not
establish the existence of an agreement without an inference of actual
conspiracy." Thus, parallel conduct and some other factors would be
required in the United States to determine whether a tacit or inferred
agreement exists."°

For instance, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States the
parallel behavior was accompanied by evidence that the related price
increase occurred in spite of decreasing input prices. Additionally,
Respondents could not offer any explanation as to why prices across the
industry increased while costs decreased. 2'
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States, the Court held that:
[C]onspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct
testimony and may be inferred from the things actually
done, and when in this case by concerted action the names
of wholesalers who were reported as having made sales to
consumers were periodically reported to the other
members of the association, the conspiracy to accomplish
that which was the natural consequence of such action may
be readily inferred.Y
Thus, the retailer's decision not to purchase was not independent; it was
the product of agreement materialized in the circulated list of offenders.
The factors required in order to determine whether an agreement
exists have not been clearly defined by United States courts. However, the
decisions cited above provide some guidance. Some considerations that
may be taken into account are as follows:
a. Sudden across-the-industry unexpected change of behavior.
b. "a" is not reasonably explained by other factors.

18. Id.at 541.
19. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1946).
20 "The other facts that serve to transform parallelism into conspiracy . . . are often
characterized as 'plus factors.'" AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 308.
21. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
22. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609, 612 (1914).
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c. "a" involves risk.

d. A benefit (and hence a motive) would be derived from "a." (as long as
it is across-the industry).
e. All the four elements required for the existence of an oligopoly detailed
under "1." above are present.
Hence, under United States law, given the above circumstances in
a degree which may allow a reasonable inference, it is possible for a fact
finder to determine that an agreement exists even though there is no
written agreement, proof of conversations, or exchange of documents.
Nevertheless, for such a determination to be made certain
economic conditions of the relevant market should exist. Since the
potential gains from collusion are determined by the elasticity of demand,"3
[in] cases of alleged or suspected [tacit] collusion, it will
be possible to make a threshold judgment as to whether the
conditions in the market indicate that the elasticity of
demand at the competitive price is probably so high that
collusive pricing would be an unprofitable strategy to
follow even if it were costless to collude. Such a judgment
will help the enforcement agencies to allocate their
resources intelligently and avoid the pursuit of shadows
and chimeras, which unfortunately is a very large part of
the antitrust enforcement today.,
Posner lists the economic conditions favorable to monopolistic collusion: a
market concentrated with few sellers; there are no sellers on the fringe of
the market; inelastic demand at a competitive price; entry into the market
is very difficult; product standardization; the principal firms sell at the
same level in the chain of distribution; price is more important than other
forms of competition; a high ratio of fixed to variable costs; and whether
demand is static or declining over time. "5
The burden of proof, of course, lies with the plaintiff.
Additionally, in accordance with Matsushita Electronic Indus. Co., the
plaintiff must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility that
the alleged conspirators acted independently. "26 Therefore, the plaintiff
23. The elasticity of demand may be defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded
as a result of a one percent change in price.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 50 (1976).

25. Id. at 55. The less standardized a product is, the more difficult it will be for the sellers
of the product to collude effectively.
26.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1946) (citing

Monsanto Co. v. Spry-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
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must first submit evidence on the existence of an inferred agreement
relying on the factors above, and then exclude the possibility of non-.
conspiratorial action.
Under Costa Rican law, the threshold would be stricter. Article
11 encompasses express and tacit agreements, although it does not
encompass inferred agreements."1 Agreements do not need to be written
down in order to meet the threshold.2 However, sufficient proof as to the
actual existence of the agreement would be required, such as minutes of
meetings, telephone conversations, exchange of documents to the effect,
etc.
Additionally, economic conditions favorable for the existence of
such agreement should exist because in their absence the existence of an
agreement to collude is very unlikely. It would just not be profitable.
Finally, as in the United States, the burden of proof would lie with the
plaintiff."
C. The price provision of article 11
The price provision of article 11 of the Costa Rican competition
law prohibits the following two practices:"
1) fixing, raising,
manipulating the selling or purchasing price of goods or services in the
market [hereinafter generally referred to as price fixing]," and 2)
exchanging information with the same purpose or consequence."
Each prohibition deserves a separate and independent analysis
which follows.
1. Price fixing
Price fixing may be beneficial not only for the parties engaging in
it, but also for other groups, society and the free market. An ensuing
conclusion from the above statement is that price fixing is not always
detrimental and should not always be illegal.
Legal and notary fees in Costa Rica are set by a statute.1 A top of
the line attorney should charge the same for a two million colones law suit

27. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
28. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
29. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
30.
31.
32.
33.

P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.

art.
art.
art.
art.

II(Costa
II(Costa
II(Costa
II(Costa

Rica).
Rica).
Rica).
Rica).

34. P.C.D.E.C. art. II(Costa Rica).
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as a freshman attorney who has just graduated from law school. Would
such a statute be illegal?
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the United States Supreme
Court found a county bar association's legal services scheduling of
minimum fees to be illegal." Although, it did so only because the state
court had not specifically required it." Had the schedule been required by
the state, it would have likely been found to be legal. However, the Court
did hold although a bar association's rule prescribing minimum fees for
legal services violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, certain
practices by members of a learned profession might survive scrutiny under
the rule of reason even though those practices would be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in another context.
Correspondingly, in general, safety or ethical standards may
provide an acceptable justification for fixing prices." A code of ethics of a
learned profession may impose reasonable standards.19 In certain cases,
blunt competition among professionals (engineers, doctors, etc.) may be
contrary to the public interest.'4 Without such standards, professionals
may opt for cheaper and inefficient instruments or methods of operating.
These competitive pressures to offer services at the lowest price would
adversely affect quality.
Awarding contracts to the lowest bidder,
regardless of quality, could be dangerous to public health, safety, and
welfare.4" In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,
the Court held that:
[w]e adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by
their nature, professional services may differ significantly
from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature
of the competition in such services may vary. Ethical
norms may serve to regulate and promote this competition,
and thus fall within the Rule of Reason., 2
The Court further acknowledged in footnote twenty-two that:

35. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
36. Id.at 790.
37. Id. at 792.

38. National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (extracted from
arguments unsuccessfully put forth by petitioners).
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 696.
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Courts have, for instance, upheld marketing restraints
related to the safety of a product, provided that they have
no anticompetitive effect and that they are reasonably
ancillary to the seller's main purpose of protecting the
public from harm or itself from product liability. (See,
e.g. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F. 2d. 932 (3d Cir.
1970) (en banc).41
Likewise, joint ventures and strategic alliances entered into by
competitors are not necessarily illegal. In United States v. Joint Traffic
Assn., the Court decided that the formation of corporations and
partnerships and appointments of joint sales agents and leases have never
been understood to be a restraint of trade as that term is legally defined."
In Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, the Court stated
that joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually
unlawful, at least not as price fixing schemes where the agreement on price
is necessary to market the product at all.' Other possible, reasonable, and
judicially accepted justifications for agreements fixing prices are "the
integration of sales, monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized
copyright use," the improvement of efficiency, the reduction of costs, and
the consequential creation of a new product or of a new market."
In Broadcast Music, the question was whether the issuance of
blanket licenses to copyright musical compositions at fees negotiated by
them was per se illegal under the antitrust laws.,, The Court found that the
alleged practices were reasonable and that a careful analysis of the facts
was appropriate in order to determine their legality (or their lack thereof)."
It is interesting to note that the District Court, though denying
summary judgment to certain defendants, had ruled that the practices did
not fall under the per se rule, and second, after an eight-week trial the
Music
dismissal of the complaint inasmuch as negotiation of Broadcast
9
with individual copy right owners was available and feasible.

43. Id. at 696 n.22.
44. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
'4" Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See generally United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 179 (1964); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
46. BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 20.
47. Id.at 4.
48. Id.at 2.
49. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737
(1975).
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The Supreme Court itself justified price fixing by accepting an
efficiencies argument,
But even for television network licenses, . . . [ASCAP]

reduces costs absolutely by creating a blanket license that
is sold only a few, instead of thousands, of times, and that
obviates the need for closely monitoring the networks to
see that they do not use more than they paid for.
[ASCAP] . . . also provides the necessary resources for

blanket sales and enforcement, resources unavailable to the
vast majority of composers and publishing houses..
Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a necessary
consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these
efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license is that its price must be established. .

.

. This

substantial lowering of costs, which is of course potentially
beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates the
blanket license from individual use licenses. The blanket
license is composed of the individual compositions plus the
aggregating service. Here the whole is truly greater than
the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different
product.

.

.[BroadcastMusic], in short, made a market in

which individual composers are inherently unable to
compete fully effectively.Furthermore, the Court in note forty of its opinion stated that, "because of
the nature of the product . . . a composition can be simultaneously,
consumed, by many users . . . composers have numerous incentives to

produce, so the blanket license is unlikely to cause decreased output, one
of the normal undesirable effects of a cartel.",
Correspondingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for
further proceedings to consider any unresolved issues that CBS may have
properly brought to the Court of Appeals. 2 More important, however, is
the fact that on remand the original district court decision was affirmed,
thereby concluding that the analyzed price fixing was justified, and,
therefore, legal."

50. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21.
51. Id. at 22 n.40.
52. Id. at 25.
53. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 970 (1981).
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After the Broadcast Music decision, the Supreme Court confirmed
that not every price fixing agreement is necessarily illegal.-" In National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, the Court reviewed a plan adopted in 1981 for the
1982-1985 seasons intended to reduce the adverse effects of live television
upon football game attendance. ss Also in 1981, the College Football
Association (CFA) obtained an alternate plan from National Broadcasting
Co. (NBC), "which would have allowed more liberal number of
appearances for each college [part of the CFA], and would have increased
the overall revenues realized by CFA members. In response the NCAA
publicly announced that it would take disciplinary action against any CFA
member that complied with CFA-NBC contract. "-1
In fact, the NCAA created a, horizontal restraint an agreement among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has
often been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.
Because it places a ceiling on the number of games
member institutions may televise, the horizontal agreement
places an artificial limit on the quantity of televised
football games that is available to broadcasters and
consumers. By restraining the quantity of televisi6n rights
available for sale, the challenged practices create a
limitation on output .... 1
Nevertheless, the NCAA put forth a series of explanations to its
plan. After a careful analysis of all of them, the Court verified that
justifications may be invoked and, if applicable, in due course accepted:
"[Broadcast Music] squarely holds that a joint selling arrangement may be
so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and thus be
procompetitive. Similarly, as we indicated in Sylvania, a restraint in a
limited aspect of a market may actually enhance marketwide
competition. "I
Finally, the Court concluded that

54. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.

55. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
56. Id. at 95.
57. Id. at 99.
58. Id. at 103.
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[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There
can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play
that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in
higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the
goals of the Sherman Act.59

Most recently a price fixing agreement among Ivy League
Universities was held to be legal. In United States v. Brown, the Court
applying a rule of reason analysis, and for social welfare reasons, found an
agreement among the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and eight
other Ivy League schools to be legal.6°
.In short, price fixing arrangements may be legal. Under United
States law, justifications put forth by defendants should be heard and
carefully analyzed by the competent administrative agencies and courts.
So should they be under Costa Rican competition law. The price provision
of article 11 is not a blunt statement which accepts no tests.6 In general
terms, the dicta in the landmark case of Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States"z ought to be followed: "The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed merely regulates and perhaps promotes competition or
whether it may suppress or even destroy competition. '"
2. The Exchange of Information Provision:
Under Costa Rican competition law, in order for an exchange of
information among competitors to be illegal, it must have the purpose or
consequence of fixing prices."
In other words, the exchange of

59. Id. at 120.
60. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (1993).

The eight Ivy League schools

include Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College,
Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.
61. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
62. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
63. Id. at 238. The case also provides guidance in' specific terms:
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history

of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
d.
64. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
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information would be the instrument materializing or facilitating an
agreement to fix prices or intending to do so.
United States treatment of this issue coincides with the Costa Rican
approach, that is, exchanges of information which materialize or facilitate
an agreement are illegal.63 However, an important caveat is required here:
United States treatment of this issue is more ample than Costa Rican
competition law inasmuch as it is not restricted to price fixing
agreements.66
. a. Exchanges of Information MaterializingAgreements.
In both Eastern States and Cement Manufacturers Protective
Association v. United States, the issue was whether the analyzed
circulation of information was illegal or whether it, in fact, constituted an
agreement not to deal. Although neither case deals with price fixing, the
analyses made could be helpful in determining whether the exchange of
information was material to the illegality.
In Eastern States, by concerted action, the names of wholesalers
who were reported as having made sales to consumers were periodically
reported to the other members of the association." A retailer's decision
not to purchase was not independent; it was the product of an agreement
materialized in the circulated list of offenders." Hence, the list was not
illegal. The agreement not to deal derived from its circulation."0
On the other hand, in Cement Manufacturers, the trade association
members exchanged information on the credit of purchasers and on
specific job contracts.7 The information simply indicated whose accounts
were overdue.', Here, the information circulated was not illegal; neither
was the refusal of the association members to deal with delinquent
purchasers." In short, the exchange of information did not create an
74
illegal agreement.

65. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
66. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
67. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 601 (1914).
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
68. Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 608.
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id.
71. Cement Mfrs., 268 U.S. at 591.
72. Id. at 599.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id.
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b. Exchanges of Information FacilitatingAgreements
Exchanging of information in itself is not illegal.75 In Maple
Flooring Manufactures Association v. United States, the Supreme Court
examined the gathering, computation, and distribution among the members
of the association of the average cost to association members of all
dimensions and grades of flooring, freight rates for flooring, as well as
quantities and quality of flooring sold and prices received.'
The Court held that the evidence did not establish price uniformity
across the industry or that substantial uniformity had resulted from the
activities of the association." Furthermore, the Court held that, "[n]or was
there any direct proof that the activities of the Association had affected
prices adversely to consumers . .

.,,"

In order for an exchange of information to be illegal, that is, to
facilitate an agreement, an effect on output and prices is required.'

9

In

American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, the Court analyzed
petitioners' entering upon an "Open Competition Plan. "1 The plan
allowed, "extensive interchange of reports, supplemented as it was by
monthly meetings at which an opportunity was afforded for discussion "of
all subjects of interest to the members ....
The Court found that the members of the Plan began actively to
cooperate, . through meetings, to suppress competition by restricting
production. Read. The minutes of a meeting held by the Plan's members.
"If there is no increase in production, particularly in oak, there is going to
0981

be good business .

. .

. No man is safe in increasing his production. If he

does, he will be in bad shape, as demand won't come." 2 Thus, the Plan
did affect output and prices.
In United States v. Container Corp. of America, there was not
much controversy among the Justices regarding the interpretation of
applicable law to the facts, the burden of proof rested with the plaintiffs.
7'- P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
76. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).

Id. at 567.
Id. at 567.
79. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (Holmes,
Brandeis, and Mckenna, JU., dissenting).
'o. Id. at 393. The plan stated: "Knowledge regarding prices actually made is all that is
"

7.

necessary to keep prices at reasonably stable and normal levels .

. .

. There is no agreement to

follow the practice of others, although members do naturally follow their most intelligent
competitors, if they know what these competitors have been actually doing .... " Id.
81. Id.

82.

id. at 402.
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Therefore, two conclusions may now be reached:' under both United
States and Costa Rican law, exchanges of information, are not illegal."
Plaintiffs must provide evidence to establish that the actual exchange of
information materialized, facilitated, or was intended to materialize or to
facilitate an agreement, thereby having an effect on production and prices.
Under Costa Rican law, however, as established under part "b" above, the
materialized agreement being a tacit one, the antitrust enforcement
authorities would additionally: a) require proof as to its actual existence
(minutes of meetings, telephone conversations, exchange of documents to
the effect, etc.); and b) need to establish that economic conditions
favorable for the existence of such an agreement existed (because in their
absence, the existence of an agreement to collude is very unlikely)."
Under Costa Rican competition law article 11, only exchanges of
information materializing or facilitating (or intending to do so) price fixing
agreements are illegal. Exchanges of information directed to any other
type of agreement among competitors are excluded .16
III. ARTICLE TEN: HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS ARE ALWAYS SUBJECT
TO THE RULE OF REASON DOCTRINE

Article ten general prohibitions: public, private monopolies and
monopolistic practices that hinder or limit competition or the access of
competitors to the market or that exclude competitors from the market are
prohibited and must be sanctioned according to articles twenty-four,
twenty-five and twenty-six of this law, with the exceptions set forth under
article nine of this law" (emphasis added).
The discussion of which restrictive business practices should be
analyzed under the so-called rule of reason or, on the contrary, which
practices are a per se violation of the antitrust laws, have filled up a

83. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
84. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
85. POSNER, supra note 24, at 140, considers that in American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), from an economic standpoint, there was no evidence of a
price fixing agreement because there were no economic conditions favorable for the existence of
such agreement. In fact he considers that the circumstances - a very low level of concentration in
the industry -were extraordinarily unpropitious for collusion and that it was very unlikely that
the hardware manufacturers could collude effectively without explicit price fixing. Possible
explanations for the exchange of information were provided by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting
opinion. Posner finds those explanations convincing. The dissenters in this decision dominated
the Maple Flooringdicta four years later.
86. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
87. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
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substantial amount of pages of the more than one hundred year old case
law history in the United States.
In general, in order for conduct to be illegal it has to be
unauthorized or against the law.88 Specifically, per se violations of the
antitrust law are considered inherently anti-competitive and injurious to the
public without any need to determine if it actually injured market
competition. 9 In accordance with the per se doctrine, courts need not
inquire into the reasonablenessof a conduct before determining that it is a
violation of the antitrust laws.90 Thus, for instance, in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. ," regarding per se price fixing the Supreme Court
stated:
The reasonableness of prices has no constancy due to the
dynamic quality of the business facts underlying price
structures. Those who fixed reasonable prices today
would perpetuate unreasonable prices tomorrow, since
those price would not be subject to continuous
administrative supervision and readjustment in light of
changed conditions. .

.

. Congress has not left us the

determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive ...
[P]rice-fixing combinations which lack Congressional
sanction are illegal per se; they are evaluated in terms of
their purpose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called
competitive evils.9
Therefore, if a conduct is per se illegal, no analysis should be required as
to whether it is reasonable, justified, or injurious. Contrario sensu, a
conduct is not per se illegal and subject to the rule of reason, if an analysis
is indeed required.
Nevertheless, from the actual analyses made by the Supreme Court
during the 1970s and 1980s, one draws the conclusion that a rule of reason
analysis is always required. Courts actually analyze whether justifications
exist an agreement among competitors who fix prices; they determine
whether price fixing agreements are reasonable or ancillary; and they
examine whether competition is enhanced rather than restricted.93 This
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the word illegal).
89. Id. at 1142.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
92. Id. at 218, 221, 228.

93. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1979).

136

ILSA Journalof Int'l & Comparative Law

[Vol. 3:119

conclusion is expressly confirmed by the landmark Broadcast Music case.9 '
In the specific case of Costa Rican competition law, article 10, General
Prohibitions, provides the general threshold requirement.
Article 10
directs a rule of reasoned analysis in all cases reviewed under Costa Rican
competition law, whether a complaint is filed by a private party or is
brought ex officio; whether it is an absolute monopolistic practice
(horizontal restraints of trade) under article 11 or a relative monopolistic
practice (vertical restraints of trade) under article 12; or whether it is a
merger or acquisition under article 16.91
9
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 6
the Court reviewed and summarized the rule of reason doctrine.' The
Court analyzed the facts in light of the doctrine and concluded that the
doctrine did not apply to the facts." Thus, the Court did not decide that
the conduct was illegal until it had analyzed the doctrine alad the facts.
Furthermore, in both Broadcast Music and NCAA, the Court found
price fixing to exist, yet exempted it from antitrust per se liability." If
price fixing, the most condemned horizontal restraint of trade could be
reasonably justified, then the inevitable conclusion is that horizontal
restraints are no longer per se illegal.
In Broadcast Music, the Court expressly stated:
"Not all
arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on
price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable
restraints."'10 Additionally, Judge Bork in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, established that, "[i]n [Broadcast Music], [NCAA], and
Pacific Stationary, the Supreme Court returned to the law to the
formulation of [Addyston Pipe & Steel] and thus effectively overruled
[Topco] and [Sealy] as to the per se illegality of all horizontal restraints."
(emphasis added). 0'
94. Id.

P.C.D.E.C. arts. 11, 12, 16 (Costa Rica).
9"
National Soc'y of Prof'l Engr's v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
' The Court traces the following path: Mitchel v. Reynolds 1 P. Wins 181, 24 Eng. Rep.
347 (1711); Joint Traffic Assn. (direct/indirect test), 171 U.S; then Circuit Judge William H.
Taft's United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (ancillary test), 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affirmed, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Standard Oil (naming the doctrine), 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65, 68
(1911); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, (pro-competitive effects test).
9 . National Soc'y of Prof'l Engr's, 435 U.S at 696.
"9 Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979); National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
'0". Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.

'o

1986).

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 277, 229 (D.C. Cir.
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Hence, not all horizontal restraints are per se illegal.
The
syllogism is very straight forward: under the per se doctrine, no analysis
is required as to the reasonableness or justifiability of the conduct in order
to determine its illegality; and under a rule of reason, such analysis is
indeed required.
Courts need to determine (and actually do) the
[un]reasonableness of a horizontal restraint before establishing its legality
or illegality. Then, horizontal restraints are not per se illegal and, hence,
are subject to the rule of reason doctrine.
Furthermore, in the case of the Costa Rican law, every restraint of
trade examined under the competition statute has to comply with the above
quoted general threshold of article 10 and is subject to a rule of reason
analysis.'°2
When examining the factual circumstances, article 10 requires the
determination that certain results exist: hindering or limiting competition;
the access of competitors to the market; or excluding competitors from the
market.' 3 This requirement amounts to a test of reasonableness which is
more strict than the one required in the United States, and, hence, to a full
rule of reason.
IV. ARTICLE SIXTEEN: MERGERS
Article 16: Concentration is understood as the merger, acquisition
of control, or any other action in virtue of which corporations, stock,
trusts, or assets in general are concentrated, as long as it occurs among
competitors, suppliers, clients, or other economic agents with the purpose
or consequence of diminishing, damaging, or hindering competition or the
free availability of similar goods and services or others substantially
related.
In the investigation of concentrations, the criteria for measuring
the substantial power over a relevant market shall be taken into account, as
determined by this law. Article 16 of the Costa Rican law, the letter and
application of section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 (as reformed in 1950
and in 1980) and the 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the Guidelines) will be the
legal provisions reviewed under this section.
Although in many respects in the United States the treatment of
mergers has differed from the 1960s to the 1990s, the issues involved in
such treatment have not: definition of relevant market, definition and the

102. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
103. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
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verification of market power, ease of entry to a market, and interpretation
of the effects clause.
The Warren Court defined the rules in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States (Brown Shoe),1 4 in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
(Philadelphia Bank),"'5 and in United States v. Von's Grocery Company
(Von's).' °0 In all three cases, the Court ruled for the plaintiffs. However,
in 1974 the approach radically changed with United States v. General
Dynamics Corporation (GeneralDynamics).'Article 16, which must be read in conjunction with articles 14
(relevant market) and 15 (market power), though lacking the most
fortunate Spanish syntactic, takes a very adequate approach. A substantial
market power is required.'10 For the determination of market and market
power, all criteria deemed conducive to such determination is allowed.
Substantial market is not sufficient for an article 16 illegality; intent to
monopolize is also required. No presumption of intent or of "likeliness to
substantially lessen competition" may be drawn from sole market power.',
Article 16 applies only to competitors acting among themselves. Only
corporations are covered by the statute. That is, physical persons are
excluded from its scope"0° and joint ventures are excluded from its scope."'
The following is a summary of the most important issues regarding
the examination of mergers under United States and Costa Rican
competition law. In general, Costa Rican law is consistent with the more
lenient trend that the United States has more recently experienced.
A. The Definition of Market
The narrower the market is defined, the stronger the market power
any single company has in the market. Plaintiffs want to define market
narrowly, while defendants want to define market broadly. To measure a
market, two elements need be taken into account: the product market and
the geographic market.

104. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

105. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
106. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Stewart, J. strongly
dissented).
107. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The opinion was
written by Justice Stewart, the strong dissenter in Von's Grocery Co.
108. P.C.D.E.C. art. 15 (Costa Rica).
109. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).

110. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
111. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
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In Brown Shoe the two above mentioned elements were
examined." 2 Product market was defined as men's, women's, and
children's shoes." 3 Geographic markets were delineated as "cities with a
population exceeding 10,000 and the environs in which [the merging
parties] retailed shoes through their own outlets.""' The Guidelines refer
to both elements. Although neither article 16 nor 14 expressly draw this
distinction between product and geographic markets, the distinction may
prove useful and available.
Regarding the product market, product substitution is an essential
concept. In United States v. E.L du Pont De Nemours & Co.,," the Court
specifically addressed the issue.
The Court found that a "very
considerable degree of functional interchangebility" existed between
cellophane and other products."' It took into consideration the "crosselasticity of demand."", Thus, it defined the product market as the
"flexible packaging material market," rather than limiting it to the
cellophane market, strictu sensu, as the government had advanced." 8
Article 14 includes the element of product substitution."19
In addition, probable supply responses should be considered in
defining the product market. Firms not currently producing or selling the
relevant product that are likely to respond and enter the relevant market
"within one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs of
entry and exit in response to a small but significant and nontransitory price
increase"'20 should be included when calculating product substitution.
Article 14 allows the reading of probable supply responses into the
determination of the relevant market. 2'
Regarding the geographic market, supply from imports is crucial.
In United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa), the outcome of the
case shifted because of imports (production abroad) being included in the
relevant geographic market definition.12 The Court stated: "The case at
bar is however different, because, for ought that appears there may well
112. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id. at 339.
115. United States v. E.l. du Pont De Nemours, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
116. Id. at 399.
117. Id. at 400.
118. Id. at 400.
119. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
120. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
121. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
122. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

140

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:119

have been a practically unlimited supply of imports as the price of ingot
rose. . . . [H]ad [Alcoa] . . .raised its prices, more ingot would have
been imported.",23 The possibility of including supply from imports may

be validly read into article 14 of the Costa Rican competition law.
In general, all elements included in United States statutory and
case law for the determination of the relevant market may be found in
Costa Rican competition law.
B. The Existence of Market Power
Merger cases ask whether combining two firms will create new
market power. "But one must remember that market power does not itself
create liability; it is, at most, a threshold requirement that must be satisfied
before liability can be imposed."' 2 In General Dynamics,in the Supreme
Court reached back to Brown Shoe't for the proposition that while marketshare percentages are "the primary indexes of market power - its structure,
setting for
history and probable future - can provide the appropriate
27
judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."'
Power to control prices or to exclude competition is the sort of
market power that Courts are after. The following factors should be
considered in determining whether two merging firms will acquire market
power as to control prices or to exclude competition:
a. Market share: It is only one basis for inferring market power.
Market share is a proportion: the denominator is the market which is
determined as stated previously and expressed in dollars of sales; the
numerator is the sales volume in that market. However, the ability to
charge more than the competitive price still has to be determined. In
b. Direct measurement: If costs plus profits equal price, then profits
equal price minus costs. By determining profits it may be determined
whether they exceed the normal competitive equilibrium industry

123. Id.
124. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 582.
125. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, (1974).

126. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
127. Id. at 322 n.38.
128. POSNER, supra note 24, at 112, considers that "[t]he revisions in our thinking about
mergers calls for conservative rules of liability." He further contends that "[tihere is little basis
in current thinking for automatic intervention in markets in which the four largest firms have a
combined market share less than 60 percent." Id.
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return.' 9 Nevertheless, the calculation of costs is often a very difficult
one.
c. Conduct of the merging parties: For example, sustained below-cost
pricing that cannot be otherwise explained.'"
d. Elasticity of demand: The responsiveness of consumers to changes in a
product's price. If it is inelastic, it is likely that there is market
power. "'
e. Supply substitution and entry: This element is complementary to the
concept of elasticity of demand. It is not sufficient to know whether
consumers will respond to changes in price, it is also necessary to
know whether competitors (currently producing the item or who may
shortly enter the market) can respond to changes in price, that is,
whether they are able to expand their output in response to a price
2
increase by a competitor with a high market share.
Article 15 of the Costa Rican competition law allows the use of all
of the above mentioned elements.
C. The Effects Clause
Plain raw market power to unduly restrain competition is not
illegal under United States or Costa Rican competition law. Section 7 of
the Clayton Act forbids only those mergers that may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.'" Article 16 prohibits mergers
and acquisitions which have "the purpose or consequence of diminishing,
damaging or hindering competition or the free availability of similar goods
and services or others substantially related. "'uWhile United States law requires a substantial possibility that the
merger restricts competition, Costa Rican law's threshold is whether the
merger actually restricts competition or has the intention to do so. The
Warren Court cases cited above were rather severe in favor of plaintiffs
and against mergers, thereby admitting assumptions on the existence of
undue restraints to competition. In PhiladelphiaBank, for instance, the
Court found that:

129.
analysis is
130.
131.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945). A profit
used there.
Id.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
132. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-96 (1974).
133. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), as amended Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1936).
134. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
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a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effect .... "I
No assumptions can be read into Costa Rican law for two reasons.
Firstly, the language of article 16, as opposed to section 7 of the Clayton
Act, requires a specific result or intent, which has to be proven
accordingly. No possibilities of undue restraints, as opposed to section 7
meet the threshold. 3" Second, the trends shown in the cases examined by
the Court in the 1970s and in the Guidelines and in its application by the
Federal Trade Commission'" indicates that the operation of such
assumptions was not positive.'
Moreover, New York University's Professor of Law, Eleanor
Fox, applied the guidelines, as promulgated in 1982, before the 1984 and
1992 amendments made them even more hospitable to mergers. She
reached the conclusion that the government probably would not have sued
in Brown Shoe, Alcoa, Von's, and General Dynamics.'39 Furthermore, in
general, the mergers challenged by the government between 1963 and
1978 were not anti-competitive. 0 Finally, after the 1992 Guidelines,
merger values in 1994 and in 1995 were record highs, with $ 347.1 billion
and $ 363.00 billion, respectively."'
In sum, article 16 requires that an undue restraint of competition
be caused or intended. Recent application of the Guidelines may provide
clarity in the interpretation of article 16.12 In addition, the application of
United States competition law in the 1960s, a practice of being too strict

135. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
136. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
137. The Federal Trade Commission enforces the antitrust laws.
138. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
139. Eleanor Fox, The New Merger Guidelines: A Blue Print for Microeconomic Analysis,
27 ANTITRUST 519, 590-91 (1982). See also AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 877.

140. Espen B. Ekbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-RodinoAct: A
Reexamination of the Market-Power Hypothesis, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 147 ( Fred McChesney et al.).
141.
142.
mergers.

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at DI.
The Guidelines were promulgated by the Justice Department and used in analyzing
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on mergers and too lenient on plaintiffs, should not be used as guiding
principles.
D. Mergers and Acquisitions Covered Under Article 16
Section 7, Clayton Act provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly.... ,43

After comparing the texts of section 7 and article 16, the following
conclusions may be reached regarding the types of mergers and
acquisitions included in article 16:
a. Article 16 includes acquisitions by physical persons. Before the 1950
amendment, section 7 referred only to corporations.
b. Article 16 includes the acquisition of assets. Before the 1950
amendment, section 7 referred only to stock.
c. Article 16 excludes the acquisition of assets by an economic agent from
a non-economic agent. For instance, the owner of a mine may legally
purchase a cattle ranch which is rich in minerals.
d. Article 16 does not provide for a pre-merger notification and approval
procedure similar to one required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of
1976. Such a procedure would be very convenient and advisable.
e. The wording of article 16 does not include the idea that eliminating a
potential competitor may be a basis of antitrust violation. The
potential-competition doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in
Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox).'"
Richard Posner is correct in considering that, in any case, the Court
has not applied the concept of potential competition very well and that
the essential problem is the impossibility of developing workable rules
of illegality in this area:
143. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), as amended Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1936).
144. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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There is no practical method of ranking even crudely, the
potential competitors in a market for the purpose of
identifying a set of most likely or most feared entrants.
And even if one could identify such a set through the
methods of litigation, one would not know how to evaluate
the elimination of one of its members . .

.

. The doctrine

of potential competition was introduced into antitrust law
by the Supreme Court, and the Court can abandon it - and
should do so . . .. [Tihe elimination of an individual

potential competitor can be expected to have no
competitive significance at all, since there are presumably
a number of equally potential competitors - firms that
could enter the market at a cost no higher than that of the
eliminated firm and would do so if the market price were
appreciably higher than the competitive level. There may
be cases in which this presumption could be rebutted if
only we knew how to measure the entry costs of different
firms or to determine reliably the perceptions of the firms
in the market. We can do neither of this things, so that if
the government were required to prove as a matter of fact
that the elimination of a given competitor altered the
structure of competition, it would always fail."5
V. MONOPOLY AND MONOPOLIZATION

Under both United States and Costa Rican competition law, not
every oligopoly and by extension, not every monopoly is illegal. Not
every oligopoly monopoly unduly restricts competition. Neither law
sanctions oligopolies monopolies solely for the reason that they are
oligopolies monopolies.
While section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that
"[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .

. .

."16

Costa Rican

competition law does not even have a similar provision forbidding
monopolization or the attempt to monopolize.

145. POSNER, supra note 24, at 122.
146. Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
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Costa Rican competition law, however, does have the general
threshold requirement of article 10."7 In accordance with that provision,
only oligopolies that hinder or limit competition, that hinder or limit the
entry of competitors, or that force the exit of competitors from the market
8
are to be sanctioned.1
In virtue of the lack of a similar provision to section 2, Costa
Rican law does not forbid monopolies or monopolization. Nevertheless,
even if Costa Rican competition law provided a regulation such as section
2 of the Sherman Act, due to the sine qua non requirements of article 10,
it would not sanction monopolies that do not unduly restrict competition.
That is, it would not sanction oligopolies and monopolies solely for the
reason that they are oligopolies (monopolies).
The following is a brief analysis of the interpretation and
application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Its purpose is to establish
that in general antitrust theory monopolies that do not unduly restrain
competition are not illegal.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,' United States v. American
Tobacco Co.'"' and United States v. American Can Co.-ss represent the
early landmark cases in monopolization. In each of these cases the Court
found that, in addition to market power, reprehensible conduct in attaining
or keeping such power was also required." 2
In Standard Oil, the Court! ruled that the defendant's many
acquisitions and mergers gave rise
in the absence of countervailing circumstances .

to the

prima facie presumption of intent and purpose to maintain
the dominance over the oil industry, not as a result of
normal methods of industrial development, but by new
means of combination

. . .

with the purpose of excluding

others from the trade and thus centralizing in the
combination a perpetual control of the movements of

147. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
148. Id.
149. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55, 61-62, 75 (1911).

150. American Tobacco Co: v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
151. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901-902 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
152.

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 61-62, 75; American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781;

American Can, 230 F. at 901-902.
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petroleum and its products in the channels of interstate
commerce .... 53

In American Tobacco, the Court found that
the acts ensued justify the inference that the intention
existed to use the power of the combination as a vantage
ground to further monopolize the trade in tobacco by
means of trade conflicts designed to injure others, either
by driving competition out of the business or compelling
them to become parties to a combination. . . . 1
In American Can, the Court specifically addressed the issue of size
vis a vis illegality:
[Congress] has not accepted the suggestion of some
influential men that the control of a certain percentage of
industry should be penalized. It has not yet been willing to
go far in the way of regulating and controlling
corporations merely because they are large and powerful,
perhaps because many people have always felt that
government control is in itself an evil, and to be avoided
whenever it is not absolutely required for the prevention of
a greater wrong."'
However, the 1945 Alcoa decisionl-* unnecessarily created
confusion by enlarging the scope of "exclusionary acts."' The decision
suggests, using the words of District Court Judge Wyzanski in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,"' "that one who has acquired an
overwhelming share of the market monopolizes whenever he does
business, apparently even if there is no showing that his business involves
153. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75.
154. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781.
155. American Can, 230 F. at 902.
156. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945).
157. The confusion was unnecessary because, first, the Court verified that
size does not determine guilt; that there must be some 'exclusion' of competitors; that
the growth must be something else than "natural" or 'normal', that there must be a
"wrongful intent", or some other specific intent; or that some 'unduly' coercive means
must be used", and, second, because the Court found that Alcoa's "size not only
offered it an 'opportunity for abuse', but it utilized its size for abuse.
Id.
158. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

19961

Muloz

any exclusionary practice."1s9 The Alcoa Court ruled that there "is no
more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
advantage of
already geared into a great organization, having the
'
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel." 60
District Court Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe who clarified
Justice Hand's dicta in Alcoa by reiterating that, in accordance with Justice
Hand himself, there is antitrust liability if the monopoly is not owed to
superior skill, superior products, natural advantages (including
accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or technological
efficiency (including scientific research), low margins of profit maintained
permanently and without discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and
used within, the limits of law (including patents on one's own inventions,
or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a public authority).",
Thus, a line should be drawn between business acts which are
exclusionary and business acts which are just aggressive business acts.
Good competition does not mean soft competition. Good competition
entails aggressive acts which are not exclusionary, which, for instance, do
not meet the criteria of article 10 of the Costa Rican competition law'62 or
are not of the nature of the acts included under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
Hence, section 2 of the Sherman Act requires the presence of
monopoly in the form of market power and the exercise of such market
power with the purpose of attaining or maintaining monopoly. Costa
Rican competition law does not forbid the existence of monopoly even if
coupled with exclusionary acts. If it did, the generally required threshold
of article 10 would have to be met. That is, exclusionary acts would have
to be present.

159. Id. at 295.
160. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 416.
161. Id. at 416.
162. Article 10 sanctions acts which hinder or limit competition, those which hinder or
limit the entry of competitors, or those that force their exit from the market.
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I. PREMISE
Assume that you are the dictator of a small country
adjacent to a prosperous first world nation. You have little
interaction with this nation because it objects to the manner
in which you maintain control of the dissidents in your
country. However, there are internal policies of the
prosperous nation that, if changed, could bring an
economic windfall to your country. The policies could be
as mundane as a tariff or as expansive as an embargo.
Since this prosperous nation refuses to negotiate (at least
until you stop jailing and torturing dissidents), and since
using military force would surely result in your own
destruction, you are in a bit of a bind. But wait!
As with many dictatorships, yours has engendered
its share of political refugees. It is hard not to when you
torture and jail people for their political beliefs.
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War dried up the
superpower largesse, and your country is economically
bereft; another motivator for your fleeing citizens.
Perhaps the state of affairs is not all bad! Perhaps
you could harness these refugees. Perhaps they could
J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 1996; B.A., The American University School of
International Service, 1992. The author would like to thank Professors Geoff Watson, Chris
Rideout, Ramona Writt, Dean James E. Bond and law librarian Bob Menanteaux for their
comments and suggestions.
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unwittingly be used to serve your policy goals. They
could be used to influence other nations just as surely as
those old tanks you've got that are beginning to fall apart.
Yes, I think you're on to something. You will
encourage refugees to cross the border. Instead of jailing
them for trying to leave, you will open the gates. Sure,
you know you will lose a lot of people (including, perhaps,
many of those damn dissidents), but you cannot be
expected to guarantee another country's borders, can you?
Once the problem reaches crisis status in the
bordering nation, you can offer to assist them by restoring
previous measures to prevent escapes. Of course, there
would have to be some sort of quid pro quo. You cannot
be expected to guard another nation's borders for nothing.
If only the prosperous nation would change those
policies that have been vexing you so. Lower that tariff.
Stop building settlements. Offer some aid. You are sure it
can all be worked out.
The arguments have been increasing for humanitarian intervention
in states which violate international law regarding human rights abuses.'
Such human rights abuses are abhorrent, and states responsible for them
should be held accountable. But there is an even greater threat than the
senseless abuse taking place because of internal power struggles or
political differences.
In today's post-Cold War world, small totalitarian nations no
longer have the bargaining chips to convince the larger, more prosperous
nations to adopt policies that would provide these smaller nations with

1. Two excellent aricles confirming the legality of recent humanitarian interventions by the
U.N. in Somalia and the Balkans are Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The Legality of U.N. Forcible
Humanitarian Intervention, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138 (1994) and David M.
Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing' in the Balkans: The Legal Foundationsof Foreign Intervention, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1994). Another excellent survey article is by Richard Lillich, The
Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1995).
For interesting articles on the extreme edge of humanitarian intervention, including intervention
to restore the right of self-determination as expressed through democratic government, and the
intriguing view that humanitarian interventions constitute war see Lois E. Fielding, Taking the
Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian
Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995); W. Michael
Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794
(1995); and Byron F. Burmester, On HumanitarianIntervention: The New World Order and
Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269 (1994).
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needed benefits.2 Having seen that refugees are one of the prime problems
vexing the more prosperous nations,' totalitarian nations have found ways
to exploit the refugee situation. Using the refugees as tools of foreign
policy gives nations back a measure of the leverage they lost with the end
of the Cold War.
Unfortunately, such actions are not clearly prohibited by
international law. Yet, by using multilateral treaties and resolutions an
argument can be made that such actions are already prohibited under
international law. This article will suggest ways in which the world
community might prevent such situations from occurring in the future.
As a case study for the proposals, we shall look at the actions
taken by Cuba during August 1994. During that time, Cuba, a repressive
dictatorship with a long record of human rights abuses and refugees,
opened its borders. This permitted a flood of refugees to spill into its
economically prosperous neighbor, the United States. In return for halting
the exodus, Cuba insisted that the United States lift the embargo of goods
to and from Cuba. Even though Cuba did not succeed, its actions did win
some concessions, namely a revised immigration policy in the United
States. The danger is that this limited success might spur other nations in
Cuba's situation, such as North Korea or Iraq, to attempt similar coercive
acts. Cuba should be held accountable under international law for using
refugees as tools of foreign policy.
By doing nothing, the world
encourages repressive states to cultivate refugees, if only to be utilized in
achieving foreign policy goals. The world may not be ready to step in and
remedy human rights violations for their own sake, but the world should at
least recognize a self-defense interest in a nation which is being purposely
flooded by refugees from another state as part of that state's conduct of its
foreign affairs.

2. While Egypt is probably the most obvious example of a nation that played the
superpowers against each other, states such as Israel, Nicaragua, Cuba, the former Eastern
European Soviet satellite states and, in fact, just about every state in the world, used the
superpower rivalry to reap monetary benefits.
3. For example, Germany has been dealing with more than 400,000 refugees from the
Balkan crisis. Germany has had problems in the past with integrating refugees into its society,
including Kurdish and East European refugees. For a breakdown of states that have accepted
Balkan refugees, see Mary Williams Walsh. Germany May Repatriate Bosnian Refugees, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at AI0. For information on how refugees have forced changes in German
laws, and how revised refugee policies have had a domino affect on other nations see [gal
Avidan, Refugees-Germany: Facts, Figures, and Costs Behind Policy, INTER PRESS SERV.
GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, July 20, 1993, and Germany Pulls Welcome Mat From Refugees; In a
Domino Effect, Other Countries Are PreparingTheir Own Restrictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July
1, 1993.
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II. FACTS
The origin of the Cuban refugee crisis can be traced to 1959, when

a totalitarian regime took power. Since 1959, over 800,000 Cubans have
left Cuba for the United States. Many Cubans opposed to the government
left Cuba when the revolution occurred. Yet, many stayed behind.
However, as the harshness of the new regime became apparent, many
more tried to escape. Since the United States is so close to Cuba, it was
the destination of choice for those trying to escape.
Two boatlifts preceded the events of 1994; the Camarioca Boatlift
of 1965 and the well known Mariel Boatlift of 1980. The former was
small, in a relative sense; only 5000 refugees arrived in the United States
before the Cuban government agreed to an airlift that permitted 268,000
Cubans into the United States between 1965 and 1973.1 The Mariel

Boatlift brought over 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States before
anything happened.4 Following an incident in which 10,000 people took
refuge in the Peruvian Embassy, Castro announced that any Cuban who
wished to leave the country could do so through the port of Mariel.. The
Cuban government controlled the exodus directly. They determined who
departed on which boats. They even added criminals and the mentally ill
to the ranks of those departing.
It is against this background that 1994s Cuban refugee flight can
be measured. The flash point for this latest mass exodus was the sinking
of the tugboat, the "13' of March," on July 13, 1994.' The Cuban
government claimed that the sinking was accidental and that they were just
using the water cannons to try and stop the boat's engines. However,
survivors claim that the boat was pummeled by the water cannons from
three of the governments tugs and then rammed by one of the vessels. The
115 year old wooden boat sunk with sixty-eight passengers aboard.'
Thirty-seven of the passengers drowned, while thirty-one were picked up
by Cuban gunboats which observed the events.9 In the three weeks
following this incident, three passenger ferries were hijacked, along with
an airplane and a military vessel.' 0
4. Exodus From Cuba, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1980, at 80.
5. Ronald Copeland, The Cuban Boatlifi of 1980: Strategies in Crisis Management, 467
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 138, 140 (1983).

6. Id. at 139.
7. Tod Robberson, Story of Tug's Sinking Incited Cubans; Drownings That Launched
Exodus of Rafters May Be Portent, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at Al.
8. Id.
9. Id.

10. Id.
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These events led to a riot in Havana on August 5, 1994." Rumors
that a ferry boat was going to be hijacked to Florida drew more than five
hundred people to the Havana docks, and the first anti-government riot
since Castro assumed power occurred. Two police officials were killed, a
third injured, and several hotels and dollars-only shops were damaged."
Castro answered the riot by declaring, through the government
news agency Prensa Latina, that "we will stop blocking the departure of
those who want to leave the country,"" and that "we cannot continue to
4
guard the coasts of the United States. "
With those words the spigot opened. Flight from Cuba, an activity
formally punishable by a prison sentence, morphed into one condoned by
the Cuban government. By August 24, 1994, rafters were departing from
the Havana waterfront, "in full view of government office buildings and
large crowds of onlookers. "' In all, more than 32,000 would depart."
The United States responded by sending Coast Guard ships to pick
up many of the rafters at sea. But as the number of refugees climbed into
the thousands arriving daily, 7 the United States reversed a thirty year old
policy of granting Cuban refugees asylum." The Clinton Administration
first barred direct entry into the United States on August 19, 1994, stating
that refugees picked up at sea would be detained at Guantanamo Naval
Base located, ironically enough, in Cuba." Then, on September 1, 1994,
Clinton began talks which culminated in a revised United States
immigration policy.Y This policy was altered even further in a Joint
Statement on May 2, 1995.2' With fears of another summer exodus
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. John Rice, Castro Threatens to Allow Refugees to Flood Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 5, 1994.
14. Id.
15. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1994, at A24.
16. For a daily breakdown of the number of refugees picked up at sea, see Daniel
Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on Castro Dropping Trade Demands, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994,
at A34.
17. Id.
18. Michael Dobbs, Lawmakers Assail New Policy On Returning Cuban Refugees, WASH.
POST, May 19, 1995, at AS.
19. President Clinton's Press Conference Remarks, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 35 (1994).
20. U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 37 (1994).
21. Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, 31 WKLY
COMP. PRESIDENTIAL DOC. 752, May 2, 1995 [hereinafter Joint Statement with the Republic of

Cuba].
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growing, the Clinton Administration announced that refugees would
henceforth be returned to Cuba.22 These announcements were met by large
scale demonstrations by the Cuban exile population, as well as causing
considerable strife amongst United States Congressional Representatives."
Yet, on Wednesday, May 10, 1995, the Coast Guard followed the new
policy as thirteen Cubans picked up at sea were returned to the island.
The costs of this crisis were enormous. The Pentagon estimated it
will have spent 52 million dollars in physical improvements to the
Guantanamo base, 10 million dollars a month to provide food and sundries
for the refugees, 93 thousand dollars a day to charter a ship where extra
military personnel reside, and 1.3 million for extra security patrols. Add
those costs to the 44 million dollars the United States spent in temporarily
transferring an overflow of 7450 refugees to Panama, and the United
States spent a total of well over 100 million dollars, not including costs
incurred by the Coast Guard for the rescue operation itself or 24by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service for processing the refugees.
From these facts two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Cuban
government knew its actions would trigger a massive departure to the
United States. The Cuban government used this tactic before to serve its
political goals, such as ridding itself of political "undesirables," and
exporting its criminals and mentally ill to the United States. Now, the
Cuban government had a different agenda, but it stuck with a proven
tactic.
The second conclusion is that the actions taken by Cuba had large
scale political and economic repercussions within the United States. When
we turn to an examination of the relevant multinational documents, we
must bear these costs in mind.
III. CUBA'S POSITION
During the 1994 crisis, high ranking members of the Cuban
government made explicit demands for an end to the United States trade
embargo "5 and for an alteration of United States immigration policies as

22. See U.S.-Cuba, Joint Communique on Migration, supra note 20.

23. Dobbs, supra note 18, at A8.
24. Douglas Farah, U.S. Begins Flying Cuban Refugees in Panama to Guantanamo Naval
Base, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1995, at A18; Dana Priest, Pentagon May Employ Others to Watch
Refugees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at A9.
25. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1994, at A24.
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precursors to halting the flow of refugees.2'

Such demands took many

forms.

As early in the crisis as the August 5, 1994 riots, Fidel Castro
stated the Cuban government would "stop guarding the coast of the United
States," 7 unless the United States ceased provocations.'2
On August 23, 1994, Jose Cabanas, a senior Cuban Foreign
Ministry official who heads a department dealing with Cuban migrant
communities in other nations, indicated that "the fundamental cause [of the
exodus] is the blockade against Cuba."' Cabanas was referring, in more
accurate parlance, to the United States embargo, and that Cuba was
waiting for "agile and clear measures"" from the United States.' Castro
acknowledged in an August 24th speech that as early as August l1th he
had stated, "[to] go to the bottom of the problem means to discuss the
blockade. "I2
During the official negotiations, which began September 1, 1994,
Ricardo Alarcon, a Cuban diplomat and former foreign minister, was
interviewed on Nightline.3 ' He stated that while Cuba was willing to
discuss immigration issues, the uncontrolled migration to the United States
would not end without talks of a broader political scope. 4 Referring to the
United States negotiating position (dealing only with immigration issues),
Alarcon stated, "[I] am not convinced by the promises [on migration]. It
should be part of a strategic change, a foreign policy change."" Alarcon
went on to talk about the benefits to be gained in Cuba if the embargo by
the United States was discontinued.? During these talks, Alarcon also
pressed for the United States to force private radio stations in Florida to
cease broadcasting to Cuba.37 Finally, the Cuban government demanded

26. Id.
27. John Rice, Castro Threats Over Emigration Brings New Cuban Crisis to the U.S.,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 7,1994, at A70.
28. Id.
29. Suro, supra note 15.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CNN News Live Report, (CNN,Aug. 24, 1994), available in1994 WL 3678276.
33. Daniel Williams, Diplomat Encourages Talk About Embargo, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
1994, at A44.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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that the United States change its immigration policy., These demands
included granting entry to a "backlog" 39 of 140,000 Cubans, who Cuba
claimed should have been permitted to enter the United States under a
1984 joint agreement.40
IV. CONCESSIONS GRANTED

The Cuban government succeeded in its attempts to alter United
States policies. Although Cuba did not achieve the elimination of the
The most obvious
embargo, it gained other valuable concessions.
concession was the revised United States immigration policy. Yet, perhaps
the most important concession was that Cuba established a new pattern of
threats and coercive acts, which were followed by conciliation and
negotiation through which it might attain future goals.
Under the December 14, 1984 Joint Communique on
Immigration,"l the United States agreed to issue up to 20,000 preference
visas to Cuban nationals residing in Cuba. In return, Cuba agreed to
accept "excludables' 2 from the Mariel immigrants. This group consisted
of those individuals who normally would have not been allowed to
immigrate to the United States because of their criminal records.43 This
Joint Communique was the Act which Cuba accused the United States of
violating because, although the agreement provided for up to 20,000
Cubans to be admitted yearly, only 11,000 visas were issued under the
program."
Under the September 9, 1994 United States-Cuba Joint
Communique on Migration,'5 that ceiling of 20,000 visas was changed into
a floor." A minimum of 20,000 visas would be issued to Cuban nationals,
but this figure would not include immediate relatives of United States
38. Daniel Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on Castro Dropping Trade Demands. Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at A34.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Joint Communique Between The United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 14, 1984,
U.S.-Cuba, T.I.A.S. No. 11,057 [hereinafter Joint Communique Between the United States and
Cubal.
42. Id.
43. Individuals who had only committed "offenses against the Security of the State" were
not included in this "excludable" category. See Joint Communique Between The United States
and Cuba, supra note 41.
44. Daniel Williams, Cuban Response to U.S. Immigration Offer "Outlandish", WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1994, at A34.
45. U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, supra note 20.
46. Id.
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citizens."' As an additional measure, the United States agreed to a one
year period during which it would issue permits to all qualified Cuban
nationals who were then on the immigrant visa waiting list."
In addition to these changes in immigration policy, the September
9, 1994 Agreement contained a reversal of the thirty year old American
policy of automatically paroling Cuban refugees into the United States.
The agreement set forth this policy change in two prongs. First, the
United States provided that all "migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter
the United States will not be permitted to enter the United States, but
instead will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States.""
The second prong "discontinued the [United States] practice of granting
parole to all Cuban migrants who reach U.S. territory in irregular ways."'
In return, the Cuban government promised to take effective measures in
every way possible to prevent unsafe departures, using mainly persuasive
methods.'
In the May 2, 1995 Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on
Normalization of Migration, 2 the Cuban government obtained more
concessions. The United States agreed to parole the refugees ensconced at
Guantanamo into the United States." The United States also agreed that
"Cuban migrants intercepted at sea by the United States and attempting to
enter the United States will be taken to Cuba."14 Though it might be of
scant comfort to those forcibly repatriated, the two governments also
agreed to inform returnees of the official procedures by which Cubans
might apply for admission to the United States at the United States
Interests Section in Havana." Cuba's concession in this agreement was to
"ensure that no action is taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally."

47. Id.
48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Williams, supra note 33.
Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba, supra note 21.
53. d.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
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V. CUBA'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Cuba's actions violated two distinct categories of international law.
The first can be described as violating the right of a sovereign state. Cuba
violated these rights by deliberately attempting to influence the internal
policies of the United States through coercive measures, specifically by
flooding the United States with refugees.
The second body of international law which Cuba violated through
its actions involved the rights of individuals, commonly known as human
rights. Cuba has a long history of such violations; yet, its actions in
promoting and dealing with refugees constitute clear violations of major
multinational and regional human rights accords. Each of these violations
will be discussed in turn.
United Nations Charter article 2(4) provides that all Member
States "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. "51 Cuba's attempts to influence a range of internal United States
policies, including the embargo, radio broadcasting, and immigration,
certainly constitutes a threat to the political independence of the United
States. A nation which is being coerced into policy shifts can hardly be
said to be politically independent.
The territory of the United States was also violated. Thousands of
Cubans streamed toward the United States in an attempt to enter. Only the
use of United States military forces prevented the violation of its borders
en masse; and those refugees who did reach the United States on their rafts
violated the nation's territorial integrity. This exodus was at least tacitly,
if not actively, encouraged by the government of Cuba.
The only question appears to be whether or not there was the
threat or use of force. Is it farfetched to analogize the promotion of a
large number of refugees to an invasion force? Both can cause great
damage and costs within the country targeted. Both can be used for the
same ends: the alteration of another nation's internal policies. The only
difference appears to be the potential for the loss of human life, and in this
Cuban scenario, this holds true only for the invading nation. The Cuban
force of refugees certainly had the greatest potential for the loss of their
lives during their perilous raft crossing of the Straits of Florida.
The U.N. Charter was written at a time when the use of force was,
if not accepted, at the least not clearly outlawed. The Charter's purpose

57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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was to outlaw war and the violent acts which might lead to war.- To a
degree, it has been successful. Yet, the Charter suffers from the learning
curve, as does any statute. Clever lawbreakers will find new methods to
achieve the same goals. (Especially since the use of force was thwarted,
and roundly condemned by the example the world set in reversing Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait.) Yet when an invasion of refugees is used to
accomplish the same ends as an invasion of soldiers, and in fact can be
more successful because of the absence of the possibility of military defeat,
it is only logical to hold such states to the same standards of international
conduct.
The rights of states to be free of the external influence of other
states is stated even more directly in the Charter of the Organization of
American States (O.A.S. Charter)." Among the principles espoused by
the document is that "every state . . . has the duty to abstain from
intervening in the affairs of another state."' 0 No means limitation is
6
included; any form of intervention is deplored. 1
The chapter on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of States
further declares:
Article 14. The right of each State to protect itself and live
its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts
against another State.
Article 18. No State or group of States has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also
any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against the political,
economic, and cultural elements.
Article 19. No State may use or encourage the use of
coercive measures of an economic or political character in
order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Joint Communique Between The United States and Cuba, supra note 41.
O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
Id.
Id.
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Article 20. The territory of another State is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
occupation or of other measures of force taken by another
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No
territorial advantages or special acquisitions obtained either
by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.62

Each article is specific in its prohibition against intervention by
another state. This is a more expansive view than the U.N. Charter, 3 yet
one which the American States, including Cuba, opted for in signing the
O.A.S. Charter in 1951." The norms which this document promotes are
those of negotiation and mediation. States in the O.A.S. system are duty
bound to discuss their disagreements and to try to gain the alteration of
another state's policies through diplomacy rather than coercion. 6
Cuba's actions clearly violated a number of the listed precepts.
First, though it is surely understated, Cuba's promotion of a vast exodus of
refugees by opening its borders is an unjust act within the meaning of
article 14." Any violations of the articles which follow would, a priori,
violate the prohibition on unjust acts.61
Articles 18 and 19 are more explicit. The right to intervene is
prohibited, not only in terms of armed force, but in any other form of
interference. Any subornation of another state's sovereign will, any
pressure applied in a coercive fashion that brings about an alteration of
another state's policies by interference in that state's internal affairs, is
prohibited.6a

62. Id. at arts. 14-20.
63. U.N. CHARTER an. 2, para. 4.
64. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
65. Id.

66. Id. at art. 14.
67. Id.
68. The obvious reply would be that the United States itself is violating the O.A.S. Charter
in sustaining its embargo against Cuba, and thus has forfeited a defense against Cuba's violations.

While this line of argument is beyond the scope of this article, several points are worthy of note.
In general, internal embargoes of a country's goods and services would not seem to
violate international law as sovereign states have the power (as an element of their sovereignty) to
exclude the entry of any material from their territory. While the effects of an embargo will
certainly vary from country to country, especially in light of a difference in size of the economy
to which a country is denied access, such variations alone should not alter the nature of state
sovereignty. Thus, while an embargo by the United Sates would certainly have a greater effect
on Cuba's economy than an embargo by Jamaica, the effect of the embargo alone should not
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Cuba's violation of such precepts is distinct. When one acts with
the knowledge that one's actions will lead to a certain result, one is as
much responsible for that result as for the initial acts. Cuba opened its
borders knowing that a mass exodus would ensue. It successfully used this
result as a bargaining chip to force the United States to alter its
immigration policies. This was an "advantage gained"69 within the
meaning of article 19, and the act itself fits easily within the broad scope
of article 18.0
Article 20 deals with territorial violations. This section also refers
to territorial violations not caused merely by the use of force, but by any
"other means of coercion."' , Under this language, using refugees is as
sure a violation as using an army. The section does not limit the illegality
of territorial violations merely to those bent on acquiring land, but extends
such condemnation to any "special advantage"" gained by the territorial
violation. Would anyone seriously claim that the alteration of another
state's immigration policy (or any other political policy) is not an
advantage?
Lest we think that these two documents are isolated post-war
relics, and that the community of nations has since been less concerned
with intervention, let us examine more recent materials.
Fourteen years after the signing of the O.A.S. Charter, the
principle of non intervention was reinforced by the 1965 United Nations
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty." This declaration recognized "that full observance of the
principle of non intervention in the internal or external affairs of other
states is essential to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations."" The document declared that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and
determine its legality. For a concise discussion of this topic, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-67 (1995).
19.
69. O.A.S. CHARTER art.

70. Id. at art. 18.
71. Id. at art. 20.
72. Id.
73. Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, Dec. 21,
1965 (hereinafter Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention].

74. Id.
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all other forms of interference or attempted threats against
the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are condemned."
Drawing on language almost identical to the O.A.S Charter, 6 the
Declaration" prohibits direct or indirect intervention to obtain advantages
of any kind.'"
As an even more recent example, the World Court cited the
principle of non intervention in its 1986 ruling against the United States for
the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 9 Citing the principle as an element of
customary international law, the court defined the principle as follows:
A prohibited intervention must be bearing on matters in
which each state is permitted, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely (for example the choice of a
political, economic, social and cultural system, and
formulation of foreign policy). Intervention is wrongful
when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of
coercion ....

The principle of non intervention remains the norm in international
law. It matters little whether the tool used is an invasion force, the
dropping of leaflets from planes, or the flooding of a nation with refugees.
If such measures are used in an attempt to influence another nation's
policies, then such measures are condemned by international law. Yet the
use of refugees as a tool of foreign influence is hardly reprehensible
merely because of the alteration of a nation's immigration quotas. What is
truly unfortunate is the human cost of such a ploy. The second segment of
international law violated when states use refugees in this manner is the
violation of the rights of the refugees themselves under various human
rights accords.
Once again, one must begin with the Charter of the United
Nations.' One of the purposes of the Organization, set out in article 1,.
section 3, is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for

75. Id.

76. O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 18-20.
77. Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention, supra note 73.
78. Id.

79. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 4 (June 27) (separate
opinion of Judge Ago).
80. Id.
81. U.N. CHARTER.
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion." 2
This language is used yet again in article 55, section c, of the
Charter. This section declares that "the United Nations shall promote...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."83 This section converts the mere purpose" of article 1 into an
affirmative duty on the part of the Organization to promote3 human rights.
Although these statements are written in terms of the Organization,
individual Member States have pledged, in article 56, to "take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55."86

These passages establish a duty on the part of Cuba to promote
human rights. One must now determine what those rights are. The
starting point is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in
conjunction with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."8
At the time of its adoption, the Universal Declaration was
technically a non binding statement of principles. Yet, few today would
consider a deviation from the precepts espoused in this document as
anything other than a violation of international law. The Universal
Declaration is viewed either as the authoritative interpretation of the rather
open ended human rights clauses in the U.N. Charter, 9 or as a codification
which through consistent citation, espousal, and adherence over the past
forty-seven years has attained the status of customary international law.' °
Cuba is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)." Thus, the ICCPR binds Cuba only to the
extent that its provisions have become customary law through the practice

82. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para.(c).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
87. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3,

U.N. Doc. A/1810 (1948).
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6, para. 1 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRJ.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
90.
For a fine, concise discussion of this topic see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INA NUTSHELL 29-33 (1988).
91. ICCPR, supra note 88.
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of states. 9 As the provisions in this document mirror, to a large extent,
those in the Universal Declaration, the relevant articles of the ICCPR are
included for reference.
The most basic right set out in both the Universal Declaration and
the ICCPR is the right to life. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration states
that "everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person."93
The covenant is even more explicit, stating in article 6, section 1, that
"every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."9' Can
one seriously argue that in encouraging refugees to take to the sea in
makeshift rafts, Cuba demonstrated any concern for the sanctity of life?
Indeed, it is the depraved indifference Cuba demonstrated for those lost at
sea that constitutes the most serious violation of the human rights of those
who fled.
The next provision with potential applicability to the use of
refugees as foreign policy instruments is article 9 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. This article states that "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile." 9 While arbitrary arrests
and detentions are commonplace in Cuba and have definitely contributed to
the development of refugees, it is the final clause which concerns us here.
An individual faced with an array of human rights abuses, who seeks
refuge in a nation other than his own, is forced out of the nation of origin
as surely as if he were escorted to the dock at gunpoint. In fact, one might
see a ruthless nation in the future doing exactly that, marching refugees
over the border at gunpoint." We have already seen glimpses of such a
scenario in the acts of ethnic cleansing that have occurred in Bosnia, where
thousands of Muslim refugees have been forced out of Serb held territory.
While these actions have not been taken in order to influence another
nation's internal agenda, one could easily see such tactics, proven viable in
the current conflict, applied to such a purpose in the future.
Two further articles in these documents concern the freedom of
movement and residency in a state, article 13 of the Universal
Declaration'" and article 12 of the Covenant." Article 13 of the Universal
92.

The ICCPR has over 114 States Parties, thus a good case may be made for its

provisions to have passed into the customary law of nations. Id.
93. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 3.
94. ICCPPk, supra note 88, at art. 6.
95. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 9.
96. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 20.
97. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.
98. ICCPR., supra note 88, at art. 12. See Mbitiru, infra note 127.
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Declaration states that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state,"" and that "everyone has
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his

country."'0
Article 12 of the Convention tracks the same rights. Section 1
provides for the rights of freedom of movement and freedom to choose
one's residence, and section 4 declares that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter one's own country.10'
The repressive
These rights have been violated by Cuba.
rights
abuses
causes
refugees to
government which commits daily human
leave their homes or suffer oppression. Given the opportunity to live in a
Cuba which did not repress individual liberties, most Cuban refugees
would do so.. Yet, this choice is denied to them. They may not live in
peace where they choose, they can only leave by taking life threatening
measures, and once they have departed they are denied the ability even to
visit their homeland, let alone resettle there.
The Universal Declaration provides, in article 15, that "everyone
has the right to a nationality,'10 and that "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality.",'
The use of refugees, including the intentional creation of
conditions which generate refugees and the subsequent capitalization of
such a resource, causes those used in such a manner to lose their
nationality. In being forced to seek refuge in a foreign land, individuals
are deprived of their citizenship, their heritage, and in some cases their
ethno-cultural identity. Living in Miami's Little Havana may imitate
aspects of Cuban culture, but it is not Cuba.
In addition to violating the human rights norms of the United
Nations, Cuba has violated the human rights provisions in the primary
regional instruments. These include the Charter of the Organization of
American States,'0 ' the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man,' and the American Convention on Human Rights.9 0 Cuba is a party

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.
Id.
ICCPR, supra note 88, at art. 12, para. 1, 4.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 15, §§ 1, 2.
Id.

104. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
105. American Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX, Final Act of
the Ninth International Conference of American States, art. 23 (1948), reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN
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to both the O.A.S. Charter and the 1967 Protocol' °' which amended the
Charter. The Charter itself includes two distinct human rights provisions.
In article 3, section K, "the American States proclaim the fundamental
rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or
sex." "' The second provision is article 16, which guarantees each state the
right to "develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and
naturally,"'1' so long as "in this free development, the State shall respect
the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality."" 0
These clauses establish the normative requirement that member states
respect human rights; yet, definitional content must be given to the rights
of the individual which are to be protected.
In order to define these rights, one may look to the two primary
sources of American human rights law: the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man,"' and the American Convention on Human
Rights.- The American Declaration was originally adopted as a nonbinding statement of principles." 3 Yet, as with the Universal Declaration
in the U.N. system, constant citation of the document has rendered it the
authoritative interpretation of the Human Rights provisions in the O.A.S.
Charter.", This argument is even more firmly buttressed than its U.N.
system parallel, for the American Declaration is the legal code which the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights applies in determining
whether member states have violated the O.A.S. Charter." 5
The Commission is a charter organ,' an arm of the O.A.S.
system, made thus by the Protocol of Buenos Aires"' which amended the
Charter in 1967. The charter governing the operations of the Commission
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 18 OEA/Ser. L.V./ 11. 82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992) [hereinafter

American Declaration].
106. American Convention on Human Rights an. 4, para. 1, opened for signatureNov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
107. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States
("Protocol of Buenos Aires"), opened for signature Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (entered into
force Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol].
108. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (k),
109. Id.at art. 16.
110. Id.
111. American Declaration,supra note 105.
112. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106.
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. Protocol, supra note 107.
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defines human rights, in article 1, section 2, as follows: "1. The rights
set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to the
States Parties thereto; 2. The rights set forth in the American Declaration
of the rights and Duties of Man, in relation to the other member states."',
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights acknowledged the
normative status of the American Declaration when it declared "for the
member states of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines
the human rights referred to in the Charter. .

.

.The Declaration is for

those States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of
the Organization. ""9 In the same opinion, the court found the normative
character of the Declaration supported by the practice of the Member
States of the Organization.'"
Cuba is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights.
Its provisions are thus binding on Cuba only to the extent that they have,
through the practice of a vast majority of the states in the region, become
customary international law. Since the provisions of the convention which
concern us in this instance mirror similar provisions in the American
Declaration, 21 which as demonstrated above are binding on Cuba, they will
be included for reference. The rights proclaimed in the American system
match those rights guaranteed in the United Nations system.
The first of these rights is the right to life. Both article I of the
American Declaration, and article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention
expound this fundamental principle.'

Both documents track the right of

an individual to fix his residence, the right to move about a state freely,
and the right not to be forced to leave a state. '12 The Convention adds an
additional clause to the latter right, guaranteeing that "no one can be
expelled from the territory of a state of which he is a national or deprived
of the right to enter it."'" Both the American Declaration and the

118. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 1, sec. 2.

119. Advisory Opinion No. OC-10/89, Interpretation of American Declaration of Rights
and Duties of Man Within Framework of Article 64 of American Convention on Human Rights,
1989 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser.A) No. 10, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 379.
120. Id. at art. 1; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 4, para.
1.
121. American Declaration,supra note 105.
122. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
123. Id. at art. 8; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 22, para.
124. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 22, para. 5.
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American Convention grant the right to a nationality, in articles XIX and
20, respectively. 2,

All of the above rights have been violated by Cuba's use of
refugees in the same manner as Cuba violated the corresponding
provisions in the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR.
The foregoing lists of rights are merely those implicated by the
political use of refugees as foreign policy tools. In individual cases, such
as the sinking of the tugboat "13"' of March," broader and more direct
violations occur. Indeed, while the scope of review here must be limited
to those rights directly violated by the political use of refugees, the catalog
of violations responsible for creating a large enough group of refugees to
have an impact on another state's policies would inherently be much
greater than those violations implicated by the process itself.'12
VI. SECURITY CONCERNS
A nation inundated by refugees must deal with the economic and
political ramifications of their presence.
These are obviously quite
formidable, and the major source of leverage for the state using refugees
as a foreign policy tool. Yet another, possibly overlooked, concern for the
receiving state involves the possibility of foreign agents entering its
borders, either among an uncontrolled population of refugees or posing as
refugees themselves.
Ask any Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) officer who
has processed large groups of refugees, and he or she will admit to a
modicum of confusion in the process. Identity documents are often non
existent, and the past history of many refugees cannot be checked reliably.
This is the perfect situation for planting human intelligence operatives in a
nation. One could even plant refugees whose sole purpose would be to
arouse the anger of the local populace in order to create greater political
pressure to end a refugee crisis. Such action could give the government
who must deal with this pressure greater incentive to capitulate to the
nation that can alleviate such problems by halting the refugee flow.
Agents might raise the level of pressure by committing criminal
acts. As one can see from the outcry in the United States over the crime
rate among some of the Marielito population, criminal acts by refugees
125. American Declaration, supra note 105, at art. XIX; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 106, at art. 20.
126. For examples of such violations, see Cuba's Human Rights Abuses Under the U.N.
Spotlight, U.S. DEPT. ST. DISPATCH 54 (1989); Human Rights Situation in Cuba, U.S. DEPT.
ST. DISPATCH 41 (1989); and various Amnesty International, America's Watch, and InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights Country reports on Cuba.
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create major concern in the nation which harbors them. One could even
envision a nation dealing with such criminal actors by returning the
criminals to their country of origin. The criminals, in reality agents,
would be welcomed home to a vacation instead of a jail sentence.
Agents installed in a nation through refugee infiltration might also
gather valuable information on the expatriate population, which often
contains elements working for the end of the totalitarian regime. In a
multicultural society, with the attending ethnic groups, agent agitators
could stir up racial or ethnic tensions. The use of refugee politics offers
totalitarian nations many opportunities to sow dissension in neighboring
countries above and beyond the inherent strain caused by the actual
refugees.
VII. CONCLUSION

Imagine a scenario in which the totalitarian government of North
Korea announces, with great fanfare and to much acclaim, that it is
dismantling its fortifications along the Demilitarized Zone and withdrawing
its troops stationed there. South Korea and the United States, though
suspicious, follow suit. A great victory for peace is proclaimed, though
the border is still guarded and free movement between the two nations is
nonexistent.
North Korea then begins trade and development talks with its
southern neighbor while maintaining strict control of its internal
population. At some point an impasse is reached, whether it be over the
access to nuclear technology or over development assistance. The North
expresses its disappointment and opens its borders. A large number of
refugees spill into South Korea, causing immense political and economic
difficulties. South Korea quickly capitulates, and the North Korean border
guards return to their posts.
Does such a scenario sound far fetched? Admittedly, such
coercive measures would only be effective if a large enough stockpile of
potential refugees were present in a state, and then such techniques would
only be effective against nations which the refugees could reach. Thus,
the use of refugees as a foreign policy tool by Iraq might have
considerable impact on Kuwait, Jordan, or Turkey, but could hardly
coerce the United States into concessions.
Such scenarios are gruesome. Yet countries such as Cuba, North
Korea, Iraq, or Myanmar (Burma), ruled by self interested totalitarian
regimes, might resort to such measures to attain specific policy alterations
from neighboring states. This is especially true when the neighboring
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states are either wealthy or democratic. It is in such states that refugee
tactics would have the greatest impact.
It is unlikely that flooding an adjacent totalitarian regime would
have the desired effect. First, the likelihood of an armed response is much
greater from such outlaw nations than from democratic states, in which
political outrage to such a response would generate internal debate.
Second, it is quite possible that a neighboring totalitarian nation might
merely round up refugees and march them back across the border at gun
point, 2'. Third, there is always the possibility of such a state using its own
refugees in the same manner to achieve its foreign policy objectives.
Does the world really need to see such tactics become a repeated
reality before taking action? Of course not. There are several measures
the United Nations, or appropriate regional bodies, could take in order to
prevent the future use of refugees as foreign policy tools.
The first step might be a United Nations General Assembly (or
regional assembly) resolution declaring such actions unlawful. Public
condemnation of this sort is not legally binding, but can still be effective.
Such a declaration should be worded strongly and should encourage
Member States to consider a state's use of refugee politics when setting
their own foreign aid agendas.
A more concrete, yet more difficult measure would be the
negotiation and adoption of a separate convention aimed at eliminating the
use of refugees as foreign policy tools. The difficulty with this course of
action is that it is highly unlikely that a problem state would become a
party to such a treaty, and would thus escape any enforcement mechanisms
such a treaty might contain. The positive aspect of such a treaty is that it
would begin the process of condemnation required to outlaw the political
use of refugees under customary international law.
A more controversial proposal would be for the use of refugees to
be included in the Definition of Aggression expounded by the United
Nations General Assembly.Iu By including the use of refugees in the
definition of physical aggression, a right of self-defense under article 51 of
the U.N. Charter would vest in the state thus invaded.' 29 This would make
the threat of military retribution by such states both legal and viable. The
127.

The August 1995 expulsion/repatriation of thousands of Rwandan refugees by the

government of Zaire, carried out by its military, stands as evidence that such actions occur. See
Chege Mbitiru, Zaire Expels Rwanda Refugees, TACOMA MORNING NEWS TRIB., Aug. 23, 1995.
at A18.
128. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710

(1974).
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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ability to respond using military force might deter the active use of
refugees in the first place, though admittedly the practice of such a military
response would be horrific.
Along the same lines, were the United Nations Security Council to
authorize global intervention or sanctions to prevent a totalitarian regime
from using refugees as foreign policy tools, perhaps that example might
discourage similar tactics by other governments. Given the political nature
of the United Nations security body, this is highly unlikely to occur, unless
the humanitarian nature of the crisis were of extreme proportions, or
unless the national interests of the Member States on the Security Council
were somehow threatened.
Finally, perhaps the solution with the greatest long term chance of
success, and with the least destructive application, is simply to continue to
promote democracy and human rights on a worldwide scale, so that outlaw
nations with large populations of potential refugees cease to exist. This
may seem simple, obvious, and unlikely to show immediate results. Yet,
who would have thought in the mid-1980s that a decade later, many
totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southern
Africa would have crumbled and consequently millions of people would
begin to enjoy freedom and democracy.

CREDIT INSURANCE FOR EXPORTS AND THE

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
Rafael E. Cafias"
Eric Scharf T. ""
By the end of World War II, increased efforts have been made to
limit the enforcement of certain trade barriers which affect international
trade, hinder the competition between countries, and prevents the
globalization of a free-market system. It is in this light, that endeavors
have taken place to avoid export credit subsidies from becoming a
competitive element in international transactions.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' [hereinafter GATT],
which was opened for subscription as of October 30, 1947, is one of the
most important international judicial instruments that regulates and seeks
the elimination of export credit subsidies. As will be discussed later, there
are cases when export credit insurance could be considered as a credit
subsidy for exports which would be prohibited by GATT.
Due to the fact that Costa Rica is one of GATT's signatory
countries, and since GATT is recognized as part of the law of our
country,' it is necessary to study the regulations established in relation to
export credit insurance through subsidies. Thus, we should first analyze
the types of financing for exports that are generally used, then analyze the
reasons for considering some of those financing systems for exports as
subsidies, and finally an analysis to determine if credit insurance for
exports is prohibited by GATT.
. University of Costa Rica (Attorney at Law and Notary Public, Honors, 1994). Degree
Exams Jury, Autonomous University of Central America, 1994. Member: Costa Rican Bar
Association; Philip C. Jessup Costa Rican International Law Association.
.. University of Costa Rica (Attorney at Law and Notary Public, Honors, 1994). Professor
Roman Law, University of Costa Rica Law School, 1995 - Member Costa Rican Bar Association;
Philip C. Jessup Costa Rican International Law Association.
1. General Agreement on Tariff & Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. Public treaties, international agreements, and concordats, duly approved by the
Legislative Assembly, will have from their promulgation or from the day that they designate,
authority superior to the laws. LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 7.
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In the first place, we should indicate that the liberalization of the
markets in the past years has caused international transactions to acquire
greater relevancy and importance, not only for exporters that carry them
out, but also for the countries in which such exports originate.
Accordingly, governments have increased the application of policies which
tend to increase exports, including the creation of financial systems for
such operations.
Some of the most important forms of financing for exports, can be
cited as follows:
1) Grants of credit for exporters, constituted by loans given by the
government or by private banks, in favor of foreign importers or
national exporters, which permit the final buyer to defer payment of
the price of goods or products imported.'
2) The possibility of acquiring credit insurance for exports, usually
guaranteed by governmental insurance agencies, in order to transfer
the assumption of risks that may be created by defaults on payment of
the export operation's price which may or may not have been
financed through credit for exports.
3) General governmental assistance which tends to facilitate the
development of operations for exporters, and consequently acts as an
incentive for these to increase.
In spite of the great importance that these financing systems
represent for exports, such mechanisms should not be converted into key
elements for the development of competition in the international market.
In other words, the effect of financing the credit for exports should be
neutral, and such a mechanism should not have an effect on determining
the conclusion of an international sale or purchase.'
On the other hand, financing exports could be used as subsidies for
exports, something which could effect the competition between countries
and impede the operation of a free-market system. In fact, to the extent in
which governments have increased their support for the financing of credit

3. See Filip Abraham, The Effects of Intra-Community Competition of Export you Subsidize
to Third Countries: The case of export credits, export insurance and official development
assistance, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Lux. 1 (1990).
4. See Andrew M. Moravacsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit
Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173, 176 n. 1 (1989).
5. "The effect of export credit financing on a sale should be neutral, and such financing
should not be used to provide an enticement to conclude a sale." Orit Frenkel & Claude G. B.
Fontheim, Export Credits: An International and Legal Domestic Analysis, 13 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 1069, 1085 (1981).
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and insurance for exports, it has intensified competition between countries
to offer buyers the most attractive incentives at the least possible cost.'
The following instances are examples of financing systems which
could be considered as subsidies: where credit is given at interest rates
much lower than the rates available on the domestic market; or where
credit insurance is acquired for exports with premiums inadequate to cover
the contingent losses caused by the default of credit conferred to the
importers.
In order to avoid the aforementioned situations, GATT, like other
international instruments, has regulated the utilization of subsidies for
exports. Originally, article XVI of GATT compelled signatory countries
to report all of the subsidies they give for the purpose of increasing exports
or reducing imports.7
During the sessions held in 1954 and 1955, article XVI of GATT
was amended to include the following two prohibitions:' 1) Signatory
countries were prohibited from utilizing subsidies for the exportation of
primary product exports when they considerably distorted the international
marketing of those products, and 2) Prohibition the utilization of subsidies
for non-primary export products if they permitted the export of goods at a
lesser price than that established within the exporting country.
As a result, in the 1960s a special commission presented a report which
listed practices that should be considered subsidies (under article XVI). In
April 1979 the Code of Subsidies [hereinafter the Code] was approved. It
consisted of an agreement on the interpretation and application of article
XVI of GATT, as well as other provisions.9 The Code prohibited policies
of governments (or special institutions controlled by the State) which
insure and guarantee credit for exports that protect against the increase in
the costs of products of exportation or exchange risks, thereby, eliminating
them as subsidies.' 0

6. "As governments have turned increasingly to support export credit and
insurance/guarantee financing, competition among nations to provide the most attractive
inducements or features at the lowest cost to the buyer have intensified." Id. at 1070.
7. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XVI.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments)
concerning export credit guarantees or insurance for programs against increases in the costs of
exported products or of exchange risk programs, at premium rates, manifestly inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programs. Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr.
12, 1979. GATT supra note 1, at arts. VI, XVI, XXIII.
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Credit insurance for exports is mentioned specifically as one of the
subsidies for exports prohibited by the Code of Subsidies interpreting
GATT. However, this version of the Code is not the most appropriate
because some scholars have interpreted this prohibition and have come to
the following conclusions:
1) The article only prohibits insurance against risk of change or an
increase of price in the exported product. It could be interpreted that
such prohibition is not applicable to other types of risks.
2) Only credit insurance programs are prohibited for exports in which
.the premium is insufficient. First of all, the distinction between long
and short term does not remain clear. Aside from this, based on the
foregoing, we can interpret the following:
a) It is possible to insure all types of exports if the tariff of the
premiums is well calculated and is equivalent to the contingent costs
and losses that could be caused by default in payment of the
operation.
b) Long-term operations are not insurable if the premium is
inadequate to cover its contingent costs and losses. However, it may
be possible to insure short term operations whose premiums retain
those characteristics.
3) Only credit programs and credit insurance for exports that are funded
by the government of the exporting country or by the institutions
controlled by that government are prohibited. We can interpret that
to mean that GATT does not prohibit any type of insurance that is
acquired from private insurance companies.
In conclusion, and analyzing the case of Costa Rica, GATT, and
the respective Code of Subsidies, specifically prohibit the implementation
of credit insurance for exports. However, such prohibition is not
applicable to the credit insurance for exports offered by the National
Insurance Institute for the following reasons: 1) The types of exchange
risk currently protected by the credit insurance for exports offered in Costa
Rica are not found to be included within the prohibition of the Code of
Subsidies, and 2) Such prohibition will not be applicable to the case of the
National Insurance Institute; since, according to officials and ex - officials
of the institution, the calculation of premiums is carried out through a very
complex procedure that assures the proportionality and correspondence
between the amount of the premium and the contingent damages and losses
that could be. suffered by the exporter in case of credit default on the part
of the importer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under a global economy, countries around the world trade with
each other. International trade is essential to achieving a global economy.
As the world moves toward a global economy, the need for international
trade of goods and services is increasing. Numerous agreements between
countries have been passed to facilitate international trade. The North
American Free Trade Agreement' (NAFTA) signed by Canada, Mexico,
and the United States, is the most recent trade agreement. It was signed

B.S., cur laude, Finance, Economics, Criminal Justice, 1994, University of Florida;
candidate for Juris Doctor, 1997, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
This paper won 2nd place in the 1996 Writing for Reality Competition sponsored by The
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 12, 1992, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. 297, Hein's No.
KAV 3417 at 297 [hereinafter NAFrA].
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by each party with the intention of increasing trade through the elimination
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.'
This paper is intended to be a guide for practicing lawyers. The
paper is divided into ten sections'. The first section is the introduction to
the paper. The second section covers the history behind the passage of
NAFTA. The third section outlines the objectives of NAFTA. After the
general objectives of NAFTA are explained, the fourth section covers the
requirements to be a foreign legal consultant in a NAFTA Party. The fifth
section covers NAFTA dispute resolution procedures if there is a dispute
between Party governments. The sixth section explores arbitration and
litigation in Mexico.
The seventh section explains the Canadian
International Trade Tribunal (CITT). The eighth section covers the
possibility of Chile becoming the next Latin American country to have a
Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The ninth section covers
the economic benefits NAFTA produces for each NAFTA Party. The
tenth section is the conclusion.
II. HISTORY BEHIND PASSAGE OF NAFTA
The concept for the North American Free Trade Agreement began
with the trade agreement between the United States and Canada. In 1986,
Canada, the largest trading partner of the United States, asked the United
States to negotiate a free trade agreement.' The United States and Canada
created the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988.1
CUFTA was intended to promote trade between Canada and the United
States. In 1988, Mexico was growing economically and became the third
largest trading partner with the United States., Mexico now wanted a trade
6
agreement with the United States.
Canada, Mexico, and the United States had economic incentives to
adopt a tri-lateral trade agreement. The single most important goal of each
country was to increase trade.7 The United States believed the removal of
tariff and non-tariff barriers between the United States and Mexico would
create new trade and investment opportunities.' The United States wanted to
2.

Ellen G. Yost, The United States Perspective On Negotiations For A North American

Free Trade Agreement, 5 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 67 (1992).
3. Id.
4. BARRY APPELTON, NAVIGATING NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 (1994).
5. Yost, supra note 2, at 67.

6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 68.
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increase exports to Canada and Mexico. 9 Canada wanted to gain access for
Canadian goods, services, and capital to Mexico.' ° Mexico wanted an
agreement with the United States to seek new market opportunities for its
rapidly emerging market."
The 1980s were marked by the creation of regional trade blocks
because strong regional trade blocks enable countries to become less
dependent on international trade. They are cost-efficient and beneficial to
member countries.'2 For example, prices on both imports and exports can
be reduced because shipping costs among adjacent countries is lower than
shipping costs among distant countries. With lower prices, individuals
within a regional trade block can benefit by the decrease of cost in
consumption.
These trade blocks pose serious threats to non-members. Members
have an incentive to provide favorable treatment to each other and grow
strong as a trading block. Non-member countries are disadvantaged by
increased tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-member exports to
regional trade blocks shrink because of their higher prices which are
caused by the trade barriers.
Trade among European nations became more united in the 1980s.'
The strength of the European Union (EU) poses serious threats to the
United States future position in the world market place. 4 All three of the
North American countries wanted a tri-lateral agreement because of the
single market in the European Community." Several of the principal
members of the EU are the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 6 The North American countries
wanted to strengthen their economies to compete with the EU, which is the
largest trading block in the world." NAFTA was partly conceived to

9. Id. at 67.
10. RONALD J. WONNACOTIT, Canada's Role in NAFTA: To What Degree Has It Been
Defensive, in MEXICO AND NAFTA: WHO WILL BENEFIT 163, 165 (1995).
11. RONALD H. BROWN, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., U.S. GLOBAL TRADE OUTLOOK 1995-2000:
TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. BROWN, supra note 11, at 32.
15. GABRIEL SZEKELY, The Consequences of NAFTA for European and Japanese Trade and
Investment, in MEXICO AND NAFTA: WHO WILL BENEFIT 149 (1994).
16. BROWN, supra note 11, at 30-31.
17. Id. at 32.
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provide a safety valve for North American trade should the European
Community begin to exclude non-member countries."
Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed that a regional free
trade agreement would sustain each country's economic position in the
world market place. 9 Nations enter into free trade agreements for other
reasons.0 First, a candidate country may choose to pursue a free trade
arrangement in order to maintain access to its prospective partner's
market.' Second, a free trade agreement can improve current bilateral
trade and investment relations.2 Finally, nations who lower trade barriers
can promote trade diversion, and ultimately equalize their bilateral trade
balance.23
Since 1980, the United States has undergone a transition in its
exports.
Because of the tremendous economic growth in Asia and
Mexico and the moderate growth in Europe, the United States has
increased exports to Asia and Mexico.u The United States moved away
from traditional European markets and moved toward the Asian and
Mexican markets because markets for United States products in Mexico
and Asia expanded and increasing foreign investment in Mexico produced
a rapid increase in the trade of capital and intermediate goods. 26 NAFTA
was viewed as a tool in furthering the United States transition from the
European to the Mexican markets.
III. OBJECTIVES OF NAFTA
The goal of NAFTA is to establish a free trade area. Article 101
of NAFTA establishes the free trade area consistent with article XXIV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).u Under article
103(1) of NAFTA, the Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations
18. SZEKELY, supra note 15, at 149.
19.

BRENDA M. MCPHAIL, NAFTA Now!

THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF

NORTH AMERICA vii (1995).
20.

KENT S. FOSTER & DEAN C. ALEXANDER, PROSPECTS OF A U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE

AGREEMENT 32 (1994).

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 33.
24. BROWN, supra note 11, at 23.

25. Id. at 24.
26. Id. at 23. Intermediate goods are goods not yet in final form. They are goods to be used
in further manufacturing processes.
27. NAFTA, supra note 1.
28. Id. at art. 101.

1996]

Chrusch

under GATT and under any other agreements to which such Parties are a
party. 9
The GATT agreement was signed in 1947 by twenty-four nations 0
The objectives of GATT are raising the standard of living, ensuring full
employment, attaining a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the
world, and expanding the production and exchange of goods." Each
signatory party wanted to eliminate discriminatory treatment in
2
international commerce as well.
NAFTA does not eliminate GATT's provisions.
NAFTA
recognizes GATT and allows the Parties to maintain their rights and
obligations under GATT. GATT and NAFTA are similar because each
agreement seeks to promote international trade by eliminating tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade." However, if there is a conflict between two
NAFTA Parties and NAFTA and GATT have different resolutions,
NAFTA will prevail to the extent of the particular conflict, except as
otherwise provided in NAFTA.Y
Free trade agreements allow countries to strengthen their economic
relationships through the elimination of trade barriers."3 All three NAFTA
Parties committed themselves to strengthening their economic
relationships. The preamble of NAFTA established the commitment
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico to work together. The
governments resolved to strengthen their friendship and cooperation,
contribute to the development and expansion of world trade, and provide a
6
catalyst to broader international cooperation.
The governments wanted to create an expanded and secure market
for the goods and services produced in their territories, reduce distortions
to trade, and establish clear and mutually beneficial rules governing their
trade." The governments also wanted to ensure a predictable commercial
framework for business planning and investment." Each country desired
29. Id.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 639
[hereinafter GAIT].
31. Id.at 641.
32. Id.

33. Id.
34. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 103(2), at 297.
35. FOsTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 23.

36. NAFrA, supra note 1, at pmbl., at297.
37. Id.

38. Id.
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to build on their respective rights and obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral
instruments of cooperation."
The preamble of NAFTA includes each country's desire to
enhance the competitiveness of their firms in global markets, foster
creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are
the subject of intellectual property rights.'4 The preamble states that each
country has to implement NAFTA with the same ideals. In implementing
NAFTA each country is to protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers'
rights." Implementation must be consistent with environmental protection
and conservation policies of the NAFTA Parties.'2 Finally, the purpose of
NAFTA is to create new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards in each country's respective territory.,,
The preamble and chapter one objectives apply to all twenty-two
chapters. The objectives under chapter one include the facilitation of
cross-border movement of goods and services through the elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade." Each country wanted to promote
fair competition in the free trade area to increase investment opportunities
in the territories of the Parties.' NAFTA is to provide adequate and
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each
Party's territory." The objectives also include the Party's desire to create
effective procedures for the implementation and application of NAFTA,
and establish a joint administration for the resolution of disputes.
Similar to the preamble and chapter one, chapter three of NAFTA
is also applicable to all twenty-two chapters of the trade agreement. Under
article 301(1) of chapter three, "[e]ach Party shall accord national
treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance

. . .

with GATT.""

According to article 301(2), national treatment means treatment at least
equal to that accorded similar domestically produced goods. Article 302
covers tariff elimination. Under article 302, no Party may increase any
existing customs duty, or adopt any customs duty, on an originating good,
and each party shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
NAFMA, supra note 1, at pmbl., at 297.

43. Id.
44. Id. atart. 102(t)(a), at 297.
45. Id. at art.
102(1)(c), at 297.
46. Id. atart.
102(i)(d), at297.
47. Id. at art.
301(1), at 299.
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originating goods." On the request of any Party, the Parties shall consult
to consider accelerating the elimination of customs duties. 9
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR A FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANT TO A

NAFTA PARTY
NAFTA covers both trade of goods and services. Cross-Border
trade in services is covered in chapter twelve of NAFTA." Annex 1210.5
section B of chapter twelve covers foreign legal consultants." "Each Party
shall allow a national of another Party to practice or advise on the law of
any country in which that national is authorized to practice as a lawyer.""2
NAFTA has guidelines that each country must follow to license a
lawyer to practice or advise in another Party's territory. NAFTA requires
each party to consult with and obtain advice from their professional bodies
on what type of association a domestic lawyer and a, foreign consultant
need to create." In addition, the professional bodies of each country are to
recommend standards and criteria that foreign legal consultants must
follow in order to be authorized to consult in the other party's territory.
NAFTA allows the professional bodies to recommend standards and
criteria for any matter connected to foreign legal services."
Each signatory Party to NAFTA agrees to consult with each other
in the area of foreign legal consultation." NAFTA requires each party to
establish national programs to create common procedures for the
authorization of foreign legal consultants.m If a Party recommends a
course of action, the other party should implement the recommendation
through its authorities within one year from the date of such
recommendation."7
Article 1210 sets forth licensing and certification requirements for
foreign legal consultants.
Article 1210 is in NAFTA to ensure

48. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 302(1), (2), at 300.
49. Id. at art. 302(3), at 300.
50. Id. at ch. 12, at 649.
51. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B), at 652.
52. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(1). at 652.
53. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(a), at 652.
54. NAFrA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(b)&(c), at 652.
55. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(3), at 652.
56. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(4), at 652.
57. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(5), at 652.
58. Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(b), at 652.
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unnecessary barriers to trade are not created." Under article 1210(1)(a)
"each party shall ensure that any such measure is based on objective and
transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to provide a
service, and is not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality
of a service."60 In addition, "each measure should not constitute a
disguised restriction on the cross-border provision of a service."1
Any citizenship or permanent residency requirement is scheduled
to be eliminated by the year 1996.62 Thus, an individual does not need to
live or be a citizen of a Party country to be a foreign legal consultant in
that country. A Party may mandate a permanent residency requirement if
another Party continues to enforce a permanent residency requirement.
Such residency requirement may be maintained as long as the other Party
maintains its residency requirement. 3 A Party may reinstate any such
requirement at the federal, state, or provincial level. The Party reinstating
such requirement should give notice to the non-complying Party of such
reinstatement action."
Measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to the
licensing or certification of professional service providers must conform to
Annex 1210.5.6
Section A of Annex 1210.5 discusses the general
provisions of professional services including the processing of applications
for licenses and certifications." The granting of a license or certification
shall be within a reasonable time after an application for a license or
certificate has been completed. 1 Authorities will inform the applicant if
additional information is needed."
Each NAFTA Party encourages its relevant professional bodies in
their respective territories to develop standards and criteria for licensing
and certification of professional services." Standards and criteria may be
developed concerning education, academic programs, and continuing
education to maintain professional certification.' 0 Examination standards
59. Id. at art.
1210(1), at 650.
60. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1210(l)(a)&(b), at 650.
61. Id. at art. 1210(1)(c), at 650.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at art.
1210(3), at 650.
id.
Id. at art. 1210(3)(a)&(b), at 650-51.
Id.at art. 1210(5), at 651.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

NAFMA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(A), at 651-52.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(1)(a), at 651.
id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(1)(b), at 651.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(2), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(a)&(e), at 652.
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may be established by each country for licensing qualification. An
applicant may be interviewed and may have to take an oral examination.
In addition, each country may require a certain amount of experience
before an applicant can be granted a license.,,
NAFTA permits the establishment of other standards. A Party
may limit the scope of practice on permissible activities.7 A Party may
mandate local knowledge requirements for such areas as local laws,
regulations, language, geography or climate." A Party is also allowed to
create standards for consumer protection."1
Each party may set standards and criteria on conduct and ethics to
be followed by foreign legal consultants. These standards can include
professional conduct and the nature of disciplinary action for nonconformity with those standards." The International Bar Association
created a guide on ethics applicable for international lawyers in the
International Code of Ethics in 1956.76 According to the International
Code of Ethics "a lawyer who undertakes professional work in a
jurisdiction where he is not a full member of the local profession shall
adhere to the standards of professional ethics in the jurisdiction in which
he has been admitted."" The lawyer is subject to the same ethical
standards as lawyers in the country where he is working."
The American Bar Association amended its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in August 1993 to provide in rule 8.5 that a lawyer
may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and
another jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct."
Lawyers who practice or consult in foreign jurisdictions may be subject to
the ethical rules of more than just one jurisdiction.0
The Free Trade Commission was created under NAFTA to be
responsible for supervising implementation of the Agreement.' The Trade
71. Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(b)&(c), at 652.
72. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(f), at 652.
73. Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(g), at 652.
74. Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)h), at 652.
75. Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(d), at 652.
76. Helena M. Tavares, The United States Perspectiveon Traveling With The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Checked or Carry-On Baggage, 7 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 9 (1994).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. HAMILTON LOEB, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS 100 (1993).
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Commission agreed to meet within one year of the date of entry into force
of this Agreement "with a view to assessing the overall progress of section
twelve, amending or removing reservations on foreign legal consultant
services, and assessing further work that may be appropriate regarding
foreign legal consultant services." 3
V. NAFTA DISPUTE PROCEDURES
In the event of a governmental dispute between Parties the foreign
legal consultant must know the dispute resolution methods. NAFTA has
procedures for dispute resolution. Chapter twenty of NAFTA provides for
the dispute settlement procedures. 3 NAFTA dispute resolution begins with
consultations, which are to be the primary means of settling disputes. If
consultation fails to yield a resolution within thirty to forty-five days after
initiation, a consulting Party may request a meeting of the Free Trade
Commission, which is also responsible for resolving disputes regarding the
interpretation or application of a NAFTA chapter. The Commission may
rely on technical advisors, convene working groups or experts, or seek
conciliation, mediation or other dispute resolution procedures in an effort
to resolve the dispute promptly.
If consultation is not successful then a Party can request an arbitral
panel. A third Party with a substantial interest can join as a complaining
party before the panel. The arbitral panel consists of five members
ordinarily chosen from a roster of experienced experts in the fields of law,
trade, or other matters covered under the Agreement. The disputing
Parties first agree on the Chair of the panel. Each then selects two
additional members, who are citizens of the other disputing Party."
The panel will issue an initial and final report evaluating the
3
dispute." If the panel determines that a measure taken by a Party is
inconsistent with obligations of NAFTA or impairs specified benefits
provided under the Agreement, and the Parties have not reached a
mutually satisfactory resolution, the complaining Party may suspend the
application of the equivalent benefits to the other Party until they have
reached an agreement."

82.
83.
84.
85.

NAFMA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(B)(7), at 652.
LOEB, supra note 81, at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.

86. Id.
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VI. ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION INMEXICO
A United States business entity may agree with its Mexican
business partner to submit disputes to binding arbitration.'7 Mexico has
passed legislation that facilitates the enforcement of arbitration awards by
its courts. u However, if the parties have not provided a procedure for the
selection of an arbitrator, a Mexican court will appoint one. The court
will choose two arbitrators when a three person panel is required; and
those two chosen arbitrators will select a third. There generally is no right
to appeal the court's appointment.
Unless an entity included suitable dispute resolution clauses in its
contracts, the entity may find itself litigating in Mexican courts.'
Litigation against a Mexican entity cannot proceed in a United States court
unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction or has contacts with the
forum. Rather than rely on judicial precedent, Mexican courts primarily
look to constitutional, statutory or administrative provisions as sources of
law. Discovery for lawsuits in Mexico is limited. The law does not
provide parties with the right to conduct written interrogatories or
depositions out of court. The production of documents and most other
discovery occurs during trial.
Limited discovery typically may be
undertaken only in connection with efforts to obtain a court order
preserving the status quo or prohibiting certain conduct-relief comparable
to a temporary restraining order or injunction
Besides limited discovery, litigation in Mexico may pose other
problems. Mexican courts allow criminal sanctions in civil disputes if
The most
fraudulent conduct was committed in a business context.
common provisions utilized are those pertaining to criminal fraud, which
effectively criminalizes any fraudulent conduct committed in a business
context. Such a charge is not difficult for an opponent to raise and once
fraud proceedings are initiated, a court has discretion to place the accused
in jail until the charges are resolved.
After a judgment is entered, the client is faced with enforcing the
judgment. Enforcement may be difficult unless proper procedures are
followed. In order to maximize the likelihood any United States judgment
will be enforced against the Mexican entity, service must be accomplished
via a method recognized as proper both in the United States and Mexico.

87. Emesto Cordero, How U.S. Firms Can Stay Out of Trouble, CAL. L. BUS., May 15,

1995, at 19.
88. Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 19.
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Service of process is accomplished through the transmission of legal
papers between the pertinent United States and Mexican courts.
The method of service all parties should utilize is set forth in the
Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and Additional Protocol
(the Inter-American Convention), signed by both the United States and
Mexico. A Mexican court will not likely enforce a judgment obtained in a
suit not served in accordance with the Inter-American Convention.
Generally, the State Department assists in the transmission of legal papers.
However, the Mexican court takes charge of serving the defendant, and
proof of service is transmitted to the plaintiff or the United States court.
Once a United States judgment is obtained Mexican courts will
enforce it subject to limitations. The obligation to be enforced must not
contravene Mexican public policy or law. The judgment must also create
a personal liability, as opposed to one declaring rights to property.
Personal service of process must have been made on the Mexican
defendant pursuant to the Inter-American Convention, and the court
issuing the judgment must be deemed competent under international
standards.9
VII. CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRIBUNAL
Doing business in Canada requires the foreign legal consultant to
be familiar with institutions that are involved with Canadian trade issues.
Canada has a judiciary/advisory institution responsible for trade remedies
and inquiries.Y Under its judicial functions, the Canadian International
Trade Tribunal (CITT) acts as an administrative court and is responsible
for all appeals from customs and excise decisions.3 In its advisory
capacity, the CITT is responsible for inquiring and reporting to the
Governor in Council on any trade matter relating to the economic, trade or
commercial interests of Canada with respect to any goods or services.
There are several ways that a case may be submitted to the CITT.
The Canadian Deputy Minister of Revenue, any domestic producer of
goods, or an association of producers may initiate the case.
The
preliminary determination of material injury is made by the same
department that is examining the issue." A decision on the case must be

90. Id.
at29.
91. Id.
92. ANDREW D.M. ANDERSON, SEEKING COMMON GROUND:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN THE NINETIES 51 (1995).

93. Id.at52.
94. Id.at55.
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made between 255 and 300 days after the commencement of the case."
Unless otherwise specified in the contract, an entity doing business with
Canada may be subject to a CITT ruling.
VIII. PROSPECTS OF CHILE BECOMING A NAFTA PARTY
Canada, Mexico, and the United States are the original Parties to
NAFTA. NAFTA does not prohibit any Party from entering into Free
Trade Agreements with other countries. Chile is most likely the next Latin
American country to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United
States." In 1990, the United States and Chile established the United
States-Chile Council on Trade and Investment.9" The objective of the
Council is to monitor trade and investment relations, including
identification of areas where liberalization is needed. 9" President Clinton
and Trade Representative Mickey Kantor expressed a desire to further
United States trade relations with Chile and enter into a free trade
agreement with Chile."
In addition to the general reasons for entering into free trade
agreements, other reasons exist for a United States-Chile Free Trade
Agreement (FTA).'" First, the FTA would be a partial fulfillment of the
EAI's goal of subsequent United States free trade agreements with Latin
American and Caribbean nations.' 0 ' Second, Chile has one of the most
advanced and open economies in Latin America.'1 Third, United States
interests are served as other Latin American countries would observe the
benefits of Chile's democratic traditions and free market reforms.1' 3
Fourth, the United States stated that Chile is the only nation to enter into a
FTA. '10Fifth, United States firms would gain greater access to the Chilean
market.

95. Id.
96. FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 30.
97. Id. at 29.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31-32.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. President Bush established the long term goal of a hemispheric free trade area
stretching from Anchorage, Alaska to Argentina. This is known as the Enterprise For The Americas
Initiative [hereinafter EArU. Id.
102. FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 34.
103. ld. at 34-35.
104. Id. at 35.
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IX. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF NAFTA
Each country has realized tremendous economic benefits as a
result of NAFTA. The distribution of United States manufactured exports
to Canada and Mexico has increased since the early 1980s to present day.
In 1983, the United States exported 21.1 percent of its manufactured
exports to Canada and 4.4 percent to Mexico., 5 United States exports to
Mexico have increased substantially over the past ten years and in 1992
Mexico became the second largest market for United States manufactured
goods."'° In 1994, the United States exported twenty-four percent of its
manufactured exports to Canada and 8.9 percent to Mexico.'0 ' With lower
tariffs on exported Mexican goods, Mexican imports into the United States
are expected to grow from seven percent to ten percent by the year 2000.,'
In anticipation of NAFTA, Mexico realized five billion dollars in foreign
investment in the first quarter of 1992. 09
NAFTA provides advantages for United States investors to
establish businesses in Mexico by requiring that United States or Canadian
companies be treated the same as Mexican businesses."'' Under article 301
of chapter three, NAFTA provides that each Party shall accord national
treatment to the goods of the another Party."' According to Commerce
Department data for 1994, United States exports to Mexico leaped to 50.8
billion dollars from 41.6 billion dollars in 1993, an increase of twenty-two
percent." ' Mexican exports to the United States have increased from 39.9
billion dollars in 1993 to 49.5 billion dollars in 1994.' Investment in
factories and equipment has grown as a result of NAFTA.' United States
and Canadian companies invested 2.4 billion dollars in Mexico during the
first eight months of 1994.'" Asia and Europe have also increased their
investment in Mexico.'

105. BROWN, supra note 11, at 24.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. MCPHAIL, supra note 19, at90.

109. Id.
110. Nina Schuyler, The Mexican Connection: U.S. Business South of The Border Creates
Legal Problems as Two Different Cultures Blend Together, CAL. L. BUS., May 15, 1995, at 18.
Ill. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art.
301, at 299.
112. Schuyler, supra note 110, at 18.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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X. CONCLUSION

Free trade agreements are generally passed to increase trade
between countries and operate to decrease or eliminate trade barriers.
Countries want the increase in trade to outweigh tariff income and the
economic benefits of protecting local businesses from foreign competition.
Since NAFTA was passed, trade among Mexico, Canada, and the United
States has grown significantly. With increasing trade among the NAFTA
Parties, the need for foreign legal consultants should expand. To consult
or advise in a foreign Party's territory should be facilitated by the licensing
requirements enumerated within chapter twelve of NAFTA.
Chapter twelve of NAFTA lists the procedures and requirements to
become a licensed foreign consultant or lawyer in a NAFTA country. An
individual must first apply for a license. Then a determination must be
made within a reasonable time after completion of the application. The
application may entail a written as well as an oral examination.
Continuing education may be required to maintain the license.
NAFTA provisions may be extended to Chile. Chile is well
positioned to become a Party to NAFTA. If Chile becomes a NAFTA
member it is likely the same or similar licensing requirement will apply to
consultants or lawyers who wish to practice in Chile. First, it is practical
to apply already existing provisions to a new country.
Second,
negotiations for new or different license requirements could delay Chile
from becoming a NAFTA Party. Third, each country would need to agree
on new or different license requirements.
A contract between NAFTA parties should always contain a
dispute resolution clause. Litigation in Mexico is different from litigation
in the United States. A foreign legal consultant should be familiar with the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal's role in trade disputes involving
Canadian business. Local counsel should be attained if litigating in
Mexico or Canada. Local counsel should be able to offer valuable
information on local customs that are to be followed inside and outside of
court.

There are several measures an individual can take to become an
effective foreign legal consultant or lawyer. First, a consultant should
know and understand the language and customs of the city and country that
the consultant is doing business with. Second, a consultant should know
the local officials of the city in case of any problems. Third, a consultant
should know local counsel for general advice or information. These
measures, if taken, will facilitate transactions between different countries
and issues will not be as foreign to understand.
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This article is a description of the general principles and rules of

international environmental law that have emerged from international
treaties, agreements, and customs.' The significance of the generality of
these principles is that they can be applied to the international community
for the protection of the environment.,
Under traditional views, public international law derives from one
of four sources: international conventions; international customs; general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and judicial decisions

Candidate for graduation at law from University of Costa Rica, 1996.
1. For the difference between general principles of law and general principles of
international law, the latter discussed in here. see M. Virally, The Sources of InternationalLaw,
in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (1968). General principles of international
environmental law may refer to rules of customary international law, to rules derived from
treaties, to general principles of law as stated in article 38(I)(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 38(1). See also G. Fitzmaurice, 2
General PrinciplesLaw, 92 HAGUE RECUEIL (1957).
2. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNAL 376 (1953).
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international environmental law is developing from the aforementioned
sources, as well as from less traditional and binding sources.
There is no international instrument of global application which
defines the rights and duties of the countries in environmental matters.
Nevertheless, resolutions and declarations of international agencies in

charge of the environmental controls, such as the Atomic Energy Agency,
state the practices and decisions of international tribunals which have
played important roles in the development of rules. From the large body
of international instruments dealing with environmental issues, it is

possible to point out seven principles. The consistency and acceptance is
not the same for each, as will be shown.
I.

SOVEREIGNTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

International environmental law has developed between two
apparently contradicting principles. First, states' have sovereign rights
over their natural resources. Second, states should not cause damage to
the environment. Although the concept of a state's sovereignty over its
natural resources is rooted in the old principle of territorial sovereignty,
the United Nations General Assembly has further encouraged it declaring,
inter alia, that the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty

over their natural resources and wealth must be exercised in the interest of
their national development, and of the well-being of the people of the
state.4 This resolution reflects the right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources as an international right, and has been accepted by
tribunals as a reflection of international customs.' National sovereignty
over natural resources has been affirmed in international agreements. 6
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1. See also L. HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1986).
4. Declarationon Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources Pe1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14,
1962); see also Declarationof the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 4,1986).
5. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 87
(Mar. 24, 1982); Kuwait v. Independent Am. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976.
6. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, art. 15, 11 I.L.M.
1358,1363 [hereinafter UNESCO on Heritage]; United Nations Conference on Environmental
Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, princ. 2, 31 I.L.M. 818
[hereinafter U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity); Convention Relative to the Preservation
of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933, art. 9(6), 172 L.N.T.S. 241; Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2,
1971, art. 2(3), 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Rasmar Convention on Wetlands]; International
Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, art. 1, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/ 11 Rev. 1 (1984);
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
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The concept of sovereignty is not absolute, and is subject to a
general duty not to cause environmental damage to the environment of
other states, or to areas beyond a state's national jurisdiction. As stated in
the 1992 Rio Declaration:
states have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.'
This is a derivation from the general maxim that the possession of rights
involves the performance of corresponding obligations.'
The responsibility not to cause environmental damage precedes the
Rio Declaration. There is an obligation of all states to protect the rights of
other states, as elaborated in Trail Smelter,9 a case which stated that:
under principles of international law . . . no state has the
right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another of the properties or persons therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence."°
This principle was further developed in 1961 when the United
Nations General Assembly declared that "[T]he fundamental principles of
international law impose a responsibility on all states concerning actions
which might have harmful biological consequences for the existing and
future generations of peoples of other states, by increasing the levels of
radioactive fallout."" The duty to avoid environmental damage also has
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 12, 28 I.L.M. 649, 668; United Nations Conference on
Environmental Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 14,
31 I.L.M. 849, 867 [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Climate Change].
7. See United Nations Convention on the Rio Declaration of Environment and
Development, June 15, 1992, princ. 2, 31 I.L.M. 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
8. See Advisory Opinion Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
9.

Trail Smelter, REPORT OF THE UNITED

NATIONS

CONFERENCE

ON THE HUMAN

ENVIRONMENT, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
10. United States v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941). See also Nuclear Tests (Austl. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 389 (dissenting opinion of Judge de Castro).
II. G.A. Res. 1629 (XVI) (1961). See also G.A. Res. 2849 (XXVI), para. 4(a) (1972).
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been accepted in international treaties" as well as in other international
practices. 13

Moreover, in the case of shared resources, this is a resource which
does not fall as a whole within the jurisdiction of one state; the primary
concept is the obligation for equitable and harmonious utilization of the
resource."1 This obligation is primarily related to cooperation on the basis
of a system of information and prior consultation and notification in order
to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the
legitimate interests of other states."
In those areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, such as the
high seas, the applicable concept is not one of sovereignty, but is one of
common heritage of humanity. Simply stated, global property is open and
its wealth cannot be appropriated by states. 'States are only administrators
of the property's wealth and benefits.

6

States must cooperate in the

conservation and share the economic benefits of those areas." Recently,

12. Food and Agriculture Organization International Plant Protection Convention, Dec. 6,
1951, pmbl., 150 U.N.T.S. 68; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. I(l)(b), 480 U.N.T.S. 43; African Convention
on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource, Sept. 15, 1968, 4 U.N.T.S. 1001;
UNESCO on Heritage, supra note 6, at art. 16(l)(b); Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation, July
3, 1978, art. IV, 17 I.L.M. 1045; Convention for the Protection of the Maritime Environment
and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Nov. 12, 1981, art. 3(5), International Environmental
Legal Materials and Treaties 337; Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 1985, art. 20, 24 I.L.M. 1142; United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 193, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter
Law of the Sea]. This last convention states that the obligation to prevent environmental harm is
not only a negative obligatioh; there should also be positive action towards environmental
protection.
13. See generally G.A. Res. 2996 (XXVII) (1972); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, G.A. Res. 3281, art. 30 (1974); 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
14. See, e.g., Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Aug. 1966,
in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 484

(1967).
15. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 13, at ch. I1, art. 3.
16. See generally A. KISS, Droit International de V"environnement, Paris, 1989; Nouvelles
tendences en Droit Internationel de I environnement, Y.B. INT'L L. (Dunker and Humboldt,
Berlin eds., 1990).
17. See Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at arts. 136, 137, 140, 21 I.L.M. 1261; Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
Treaty on Exploration and Use of Space].
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the concept of common heritage of humankind has been applied to the
protection of Antarctica.1
II.

PRINCIPLES OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION

The principle of good neighborliness places on states a
responsibility not to damage the environment.
The principle of
international cooperation places an obligation on states to prohibit activities
within the state's territory that are contrary to the rights of other states and
which could harm other states or their inhabitants. 11 This is considered to
be an application of the maxim sic utere tuo, et alienum non laedas.2o
The principle of good neighborliness is closely related to the duty
to cooperate in investigating, identifying, and avoiding environmental
harm. Most international environmental treaties have provisions requiring
cooperation in the generation and exchange of scientific, technical,
socioeconomic, and commercial information.2'
This obligation to
cooperate is not absolute. Instead, it is limited by municipal conditions
such as the protection of patents.2

18. Protocol to the Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1990, 30
I.L.M. 1461 (1991) (not in force). The concept of common heritage of humankind has been
useful. Nevertheless, it provides a less compelling conceptual background for regulating such
issues as the greenhouse effect and biodiversity protection. Therefore, another concept has
evolved, the one of common concern of humankind. It has not been defined yet, and I believe it
will never be defined. It is its vacuity which has made possible international regulation for
activities that otherwise would fall under the internal jurisdiction of states.
19. International cooperation was dictated by the International Court of Justice in Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. (April 22). See also Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.),
12 R.I.A.A. 285 (Arbitral Tribunal affirmed "France is entitled to exercise her rights; she cannot
ignore the Spanish interests."). Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 11 R.I.A.A. 829; Alabama
Claims Arbitration, 7; J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1059-67; AMERICAN
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, TEXAS CA"TLE CLAIMS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF

STATE 51; United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96, 205-06 (1966).
20. The maxim was invoked as a rule by Hungary in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1992 I.C.J. 32. Hungary supported its submission in Corfu Channel;
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 9; Rio Declaration, supra note 7, and the INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1990).

21. See Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 200; U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 17; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary

Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1312; Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, art. 4, 26 I.L.M 1517 [hereinafter Ozone
Protection Convention].
22. See Ozone Protection Convention, supra note 21, at art. 4; 26 I.L.M. at 1530-32; Law
of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 17.
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The exchange of general information is critical in monitoring the

domestic implementation of international obligations. For example, a
cooperative exchange of information regarding the trade of endangered
wildlife is critical in tracing the population flow of animals." The same
occurs with greenhouse effect emissions. 2'

Due io the importance of

exchanging information, some conventions have created separate
international bodies with information generating and distribution
functions." Additionally, many conventions contain provisions dealing
with scientific knowledge, 26 atmospheric changes,27 marine pollution,U and

cultural preservation. 9
Other subprinciples embodied in good neighborliness and
international cooperation are the principles of prior notification and
consultation. Prior notification obligates acting states to provide prior,
timely notification and relevant information to every state that may be
adversely affected by its environmental activities.0 Of course, states shall
immediately notify other states of any natural disasters or other

23. See Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Life and
Flora, Mar.3, 1973, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
24. See U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at art. 12.
25. See id. at art. 9 (discussing the Conference of Parties created to advise on scientific and
technological matters).
26. See generally Stockholm Declaration, supra note 9, at princ. 20; United Nations
Environment Programme Governing Council Decision: Principles of Conduct in the Field of the
Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, May 19, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1091 [hereinafter
U.N. Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources].
27. See U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at art. 15; Ozone Protection
Convention, supra note 21, at art. 3. The Ozone Layer Convention is an important model for
rapid reaction to environmental problems. An annex elaborates in great detail those areas
needing coordinated scientific research. For example, the potential consequences of increased
ultraviolet radiation on human health aid the environment. This is a major reason for the success
of the parties in the combat against ozone depletion.
28. See Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 200.
29. See UNESCO on Heritage, supra note 6.
30. See Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 19; Montreal Rules of International Law
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Sept. 1982, Report of the Sixtieth Conference of the Int'l L
Comm'n 1-3 [hereinafter Montreal Rules on Transfrontier Pollution); U.N. Convention on
Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ. 6; Law of the Sea, supra note 12,
at art. 206. Special provisions can protect the disclosure of information as part of the notification
requirement. See, e.g., Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Council
Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Nov. 14, 1974, Annex, 14
I.L.M. 242 [hereinafter OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution); United Nations
Environment Programme Governing Council Decision: Guidelines for the Exchange of
Information on Chemicals in International Trade, May 1989, art. 11.
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emergencies that are likely to produce transboundary effects.'

199
Also,

notification is particularly important
when there is an oil spill,2 industrial
4
accident.
nuclear
or
mishap,"
Moreover, upon request, the acting state is bound to enter into a
good faith consultation with potentially affected states over a reasonable

period of time." However, the acting state is not bound by the opinions of
the consulted states, but should take them into account. Finally, when one
state is acting in the territory of another, notification and consultation is
not enough. Prior informed consent is required. This consent is
mandatory in activities such as transporting hazardous wastes through a
state,3' lending emergency assistance after an accident," and prospecting
for genetic resources."
III. PRINCIPLE OF PREVENTIVE ACTION
The pollution prevention principle should be differentiated from
the duty to avoid environmental harm. Under this new rule, a state may
be under the obligation to prevent damage within its own jurisdiction."

Therefore, the discharge of toxic substances in such quantities or
concentrations which exceed the capacity of the environment's degradation
capacity, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible
31. Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ! 18.
32. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1319, 1434 (not in force).
33. Council Directive 82/501, art. 5, 1982 O.J.
34. United Nations Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents, Sept. 26, 1986,
25 I.L.M. 1377.
35. See Montreal Rules on Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 30, at art. 8; U.N.
Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ. 6-7; OECD
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 30, at princ. 7; Nordic Convention on
the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 511.
36. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 1989, art. 6(4), 28 I.L.M. 649; Organization of African Unity: Bamako
Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. 773, 785.
37. There is not an affirmative general obligation to provide emergency assistance if the
helping state is not responsible 'for the damage. Nevertheless, assistance to the territory of the
affected state has been stated in international instruments. See, e.g., Convention in Assistance in
the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, art. 2, 25 I.L.M.
1377; Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 18; Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 199;
U.N. Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ. 9(3).
38. U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 15(5).
39. See JUDGE N. SINGH, ForewordTOENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS xi-Xii (1986).
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damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems.'* Action should be taken at an
early stage to reduce pollution, rather than waiting to restore contaminated
areas.
To ensure this principle, states have established authorization
procedures, commitments to environmental standards, ways to access
information, the use of penalties, and the need to carry out environmental
impact 'assessments."
For example, environmental impact assessments
have been incorporated as a decision-making instrument by international
organizations42 as well as in many conventions . 3 The preventive principle
has been supported by international instruments preventing the introduction
of pollutants," and also by agreements in the field of international
economic law." Finally, it has also been endorsed by international case
law."

40. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 6. The preventive principle can be
traced to 1933 with the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their
Natural State, supra note 6, which was framed to prevent the extinction of species of fauna and
flora.
41. The environmental impact assessment is a procedure for examining, analyzing, and
assessing proposed activities, prior to a decision, in order to minimize adverse effects. It
involves governmental authorities, and when appropriate, public participation in the procedures.
42.
See also World Bank Operational Directive 4.01 (1991); 1 WORLD BANK
ENVIRONMENTAL SOUPCEBOOK 1990.

43. Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 17; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities, Jan. 29, 1988, arts. 37(7)(d)-(e), 39(2)(c), 54(3)(b), 27 I.L.M. 68,
princ. 11(c) [hereinafter Convention on Antarctic Minerals]; U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 14.
44. See generally Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, Mar. 22, 1974, 13 1.L.M. 546; Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, Feb. 15, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 290; Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, supra note 21; Convention on the
Protection of the Alps, Nov. 7, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 767 (not in force). See also International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3,
pmbl.; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 25; Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb. 15, 1972, 932
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1; Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 194(1); Convention Concerning
Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S. 23, at art. 7; Treaty Banning
Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, supra note 12, at art. 1(1);
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442, art. 2;
Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific
Region, Nov. 25: 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38, art. 5(1).
45. African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Fourth Lom6
Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783, art. 35 (not in force); Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, art. 130r(2), 31 I.L.M. 247.
46. See Certain. Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aus.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 244.
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IV. PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
This rule, although still evolving, is reflected in principle fifteen of
the Rio Declaration, which states that where there are warnings of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation. 7 Since scientific certainty often comes too late for politicians
and lawyers to protect against environmental danger, the burden of proof
is switched. To wait for scientific proof regarding the impact of pollutants
discharged into the environment could result in irreversible damage to the
environment and human suffering. Traditionally, states wishing to adopt
certain protective measures had to prove beyond a doubt the hazard and
the urgency of the desired action.48
Fortunately, because of the

precautionary principle, this traditional view of burden of proof was
reversed so that a state would not have to wait for proof of harm before
taking action. Another possible interpretation of the shift in the burden of
proof is that states wishing to undertake certain activities will have to
4
prove that the activities will not cause harm to the environment. 9
The first treaty to embody this principle is the 1985 Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer." Subsequently, the
precautionary approach for the protection of the environment has been

widely addressed.-

Regrettably, there exists no precision as to the

principle's requirements, and its formulations vary.
What remains
ambiguous is the level at which the lack of scientific evidence can not be
claimed as an argument to postpone measures.

47. Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 15.
48. See, e.g., Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
supra note 44, at art. 4(4).
49. This interpretation has been adopted in the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069, Annex II, art. 3(3)(c).
Under this agreement, the parties have to report the results of scientific studies which show that
any dumping operations of radioactive wastes would not result in hazards to humans, living
resources, and other uses of the sea. Id.
50. See Ozone Protection Convention, supra note 21, at pmbl.
51. See id. at art. 2(2)(a); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 1992, 30 I.L.M. (1992) (not in force); Ministerial Declaration of the
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Bremen, Nov. 1, 1984; Ministerial
Deciaration of the Second North Sea Conference, London, Nov. 25, 1987; Third North Sea
Conference, The Hague, Mar. 8, 1990; Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in
the European Economic Community Region, Bergen, May 16, 1990; Convention on the Ban of
Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within Africa, supra note 36, at art. 4(3)(f.
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When can a preventive action be legally required? While the 1991
Bamako Convention" links the preventive and precautionary principles and
does not require the possibility of damage to be serious (lowering the level
at which the lack of scientific evidence launches action)," the 1992
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlanticm increases the threshold needed to implement preventive

measures," requiring more than a mere possibility of damage.
V.

THE DUTY To COMPENSATE FOR HARM

States are responsible to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. Injuries
result from violations of this generally
responsible for a violation of international
conduct and re-establish the condition that
conduct. If it is impossible to re-establish
state should provide compensation." An

accepted rule.1
Any state
law has to stop the wrongful
existed prior to the wrongful
the pre-existing condition, the
illegal or wrongful act exists

where: a) conduct consists of an action or omission imputed to a state
under international law; and b) such conduct constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the state."

This definition poses three problems

52. Organization of African Unity: Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and. Management of Hazardous Waste
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
53. According to the art. 4(3)(f) of the Bamako Convention, parties have to adopt and
implement "the preventive, precautionary approach to pollution which entails, inter alia,
preventing the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to humans or
the environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm." Id. This formulation
also links the preventive and precautionary approaches.
54. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North - East Atlantic,
supra note 49.
55. According to art. 2(2)(a) of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North - East Atlantic, preventive measures are to be taken when there are
"reasonable grounds for concern . . . even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal
relationship between the inputs and the effects." Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North East Atlantic, supra note 49. This Agreement also links the preventive
and precautionary approaches.
56. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21; Rio Declaration, supra note 7,
at princ. 2.
57. R. Wolfrum, Reparation for International Wrongful Acts, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 352; See also Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (the so called Factory at Chorzow case) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 377 (Sept.
13); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901
(1986).
58. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1980 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 30-4.
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in relation to international environmental law. First, what is the criteria
for imputing liability to a state? Second, what is the definition of
environmental damage? Third, what is the appropriate form of reparation?
With regards to the first question, there are three options: fault
(negligence), strict liability (there is a presumption of responsibility but
defenses are available), 9 and absolute liability (no cause of justification is
possible, and a state would be liable even for an act of God). While fault
is based on due diligence, strict and absolute liability impose responsibility
for acts not prohibited under international law. Strict liability emphasizes
the harm rather than the conduct.
It is a widespread opinion that international law lacks absolute or
strict liability as a general rule.60 There is no single basis of international
responsibility applicable in all circumstances, but rather several, the nature
of which depends upon the particular obligation in question." Therefore,
international law is not conclusive on the standard of care to be shown in
the fulfillment of environmental obligations. For example, strict liability
for ultra-hazardous activities can be considered a general principle of law
since it is found in municipal legislation worldwide.' 2 Some treaties even
support absolute liability for these activities.' 3 However, strict or absolute
liability is more difficult to impute for activities that are not ultrahazardous." It should also be considered that the damage can be produced
directly by state organs, by private individuals within the territory, 5 or in
the execution of lawful measures."6

59. 1. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility, Part 1, at 44 (1983).
See also, The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 85-86 (April 9) (Azevedo, J.,dissenting).
60. M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 539 (1968).
61. 1 L. OPPENHEEM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (1955).

62. 11 A. TUNC, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW chap. V.
63. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, art II.
64. Some conventions contain exculpatory provisions for force majeure (a state is
involuntarily placed in a situation which makes it materially impossible to adopt a conduct in
conformity with international obligations) and distress (conformity with the obligation is possible
but would result in loss of life). See, e.g., Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 18(2), 39(1)(e);
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, supra note 44, at art.
V.
65. See British Property in Spanish Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 642 (1925), where the arbitrator
Max Huber, on the damage caused by private individuals to British property in Spanish Morocco,
declared that "a state is obliged to exercise certain vigilance . . ..
66. For example, Italian property was sequestered in Tunisia by the French Government
after Italy's defeat in World War II: Case Comment, In re Rizzo, 22 INT'L L. REV. 322 (1955).
The Conciliation Commission said: "the act contrary to international law is not the measure of
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As to the second question,, environmental damage should be
defined as a result of a violation of international law. This presents a
dilemma since customary international law is still emerging and some
environmental treaties rely heavily on voluntary cooperation. In addition,
environmental damage has been defined as any injury to natural resources
as well as6' degradation of natural resources, property," landscape, and
environmental amenities.19
Finally, focusing on reparation, the Permanent Court of Justice
declared:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act

. . .

is that reparation must, as far as possible,

wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in
kind, or if it is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the values which a restitution in kind
would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in
kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles
which should serve to determine the amount of
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.70
The problem is that at the environmental level, an identical
reconstruction may not be possible. An extinct species cannot be replaced.
However, at the very least, the goal should be to clean-up the environment
and restore it so that it may serve its primary functions. But, even if
restoration is physically possible, it may not be economically feasible.
Moreover, restoring an environment to the state it was in before the
damage could involve costs disproportionate to the desired results. Such
elements, combined with the lack of legal precedent and the insufficiency
of the traditional state's inability to assess environmental damage, makes
the panorama difficult.7
sequestration, but an alleged lack of diligence on the part of the French State . . . in the execution
of the said measure." Id.
67. See generally Convention on Antarctic Minerals, supra note 43.
68. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 58, at art. 24.
69. See generally Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228.
70. See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(set. A) No. 17, at 377 (Sept. 13).
71. See Communication from the European Community Commission to the European
Community Council and European Parliament on Environmental Liability, p. 32 (1993).
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PRINCIPLE OF COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY

The protection of the environment is a common challenge to all
countries. Due to different development paths and the need to share in the
responsibility for ecological degradation, some countries may be asked to
carry more of the burden of conservation. The idea is that states should
comply with international obligations for the conservation of the
environment on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities. This principle
was acknowledged in the Rio Declarationat principles four and seven.
This principle includes two constituent elements. The first is the
common responsibility of states for the protection of the environment.72
This signifies that states should participate in the world effort for
conservation. The. second element is the elucidation of the different
circumstances of states." For example, industrialized countries have
contributed more to the global warming than underdeveloped countries.
On the other hand, the capacities of developing countries to prevent
damage may be less advanced. Also, the environmental policies of states
should enhance and not affect the present and future development of
developing countries.7' While all states are bound to participate in the
environmental solution, the adoption of national standards and international
obligations can differ. For example, the time period for the national
implementation of preventive measures can vary from country to country."
VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The principle of sustainable development was defined by the 1987
Brundtland Report' as a development that meets the needs (in particular
the essential needs of the world's poor) of the present without
72. See Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
May 31, 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 72, at pmbl.; Rasmar Convention on Wetlands, supra note 6, at
pmbl.; UNESCO on Heritage, supra note 6, at pmbl.; Treaty on Exploration and Use of Space,
supra note 17, at art. 1; G.A. Res. 43/53 (1988), 44/207 (1989), 45/212 (1990).
73. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 9, at princ. 23; Rio Declaration, supra note 7,
at princs. 11, 6; Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region (Abidjan), March 28, 1981,
art. 4(1), 20 I.L.M. 746; U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at pmbl.; Ozone
Protection Convention, supra note 21, at art. 2(2); Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 207.
74. See G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 13, at art. 30.
75. See Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. 5(1), 26
I.L.M. 1541 (which entitles the developing countries to delay their compliance with control
measures if some requirements are met).
76. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland
Report).
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compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It
imposes the idea of limitations on the environment's capacity to meet
present and futures needs."
Sustainable development prompts that the primary focus of
environmental protection efforts is to improve the human condition."
According to the anthropocentric approach, the protection of wildlife and
natural resources is not a goal in itself, but is a necessity for ensuring a

higher quality of life for humans.
Sustainable development, as reflected in international agreements,
encompasses at least three elements:

A. IntergenerationalEquity.
Intergenerational equity is each generation's responsibility to leave
an inheritance of wealth no less than what they themselves have inherited.
The present generation holds the natural resources in trust for future

generations." Early" and recent' treaties have referred to this principle.
B. Sustainable Use of Natural Resources.
The primary roots of the principle of sustainable use of natural
resources can be traced to 1893, when the United States proclaimed a right
to ensure the proper use of seals in order to save them from destruction.,2
The term has been used in conservation conventions.'"
While attempts to define the principle of sustainable use of natural

resources have been made, no general definition exists.

Terms such as

77. Id.; Our Common Future, 43 (1987).
78. See Rio Declaration, supra note 7,at print. 1.
79.
E. Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J.INT'L L. 198 (1990).
80. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, pmbl.; African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource,
supra note 12, at pmbl.
81. Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, pmbl.; U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at
art. 3(1); U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at pmbl.
82. Bering Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), reprinted in J. MOORE.,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 755 (1893); see also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974
I.C.J. 34-35, where the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and sustainable utilization of
global commons, including living resources on the high seas, was upheld.
83. Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the
Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1109, pmbl.; U.N. Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at arts. 1. 8, 11, 12, 16-18; U.N. Convention on Climate
Change, supra note 6, at art. 3(4).
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C. Integration of environment and development.
"In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and
cannot be considered in isolation from it.""
Therefore, when

implementing

environmental

obligations,

economical

and

social

development should be taken into consideration, and vice versa.
Although traditionally international organizations such as the

World Bank or the World Trade Organization never addressed
environmental protection, a change is slowly coming. ° Regarding
macroeconomics, the move towards sustainable development requires, for
example, new accounting systems to evaluate a country's progress. The
accounting system would include pollution control efforts and
environmental damage when calculating the gross national product (GNP).
Mining extraction, for example, would not simply reflect an increase in the
GNP, but also a reduction in natural resources." ' In microeconomics,
sustainable development would require, for example, imposition of the
costs of environmental damage on the state which caused the damage. 2

84. FAO Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the
Mediterranean, Sept. 24, 1949, 126 U.N.T.S. 237, art. IV(a).
85. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 22, 1979,
pmbl., 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980).
86. Act Regarding Navigation .and Economic Co-operation between the States of the Niger
Basin, Oct. 1963, pmbl., 587 U.N.T.S. 9.
87. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, art. 4(1), 22 I.L.M. 221.
88. UN/ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17,
1992, art.2(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. 1333.
89. See Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 4.
90. See E. Iglesias, El papel de los organismos multilaterales de cooperaci6n en el
desarrollo sostenible: el caso de BID, 20 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES IBEROAMERICANAS
DE LA ASOCIACi6N DE INVESTIGACI6N Y ESPECIALIZACI6N SOBRE TEMAS IBEROAMERICANOS
147-57 (1993).
91. See generally STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DRAFT HANDBOOK ON
INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING (1992).
92. This is the polluter pays principle, which implies that the polluter should bear the
expenses of carrying out pollution prevention measures or paying for damage caused because the
environmental costs of production were not internalized.
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The integration of environment and development can be traced to
the 1949 United Nations Conference on Conservation and Utilization of
Resources," which recognized the need for "continuous development and
wide-spread application of the techniques of resource conservation and
utilization. "" Regional" and global' treaties are also taken into
consideration under this approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The legal meaning and consequences of the above stated principles
remain open. Some have evolved over a short period of time and
sometimes in different contexts. Additionally, state practice is also
evolving. Another element which complicates the environmental field is
that some of the principles have no definite meaning. There is also no
agreement concerning the legal consequences of these rules. Together,
this makes it difficult to compel the international community to protect the
environment.
The rules of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the
responsibility to prevent environmental damage, good neighborliness, and
cooperation in relation to environmental protection are well established and
rooted in state practice and international instruments. Even more,
permanent sovereignty can be regarded as customary international law.
On the other hand, the duty to compensate for environmental harm
can be considered a corollary of the general duty to compensate for
damages provoked by international wrongful acts. Nevertheless, the
difficulty to assess the environmental damage within the existing liability
rules makes the application of the rules problematic. Also, there is no
agreement as to the applicable type of responsibility (subjective or
objective). Notwithstanding, the trend is to avoid these vague notions and
define the state-required conduct necessary to prevent harm to other states.
Therefore, the obligation to avoid environmental harm would be stated as
an obligation to take certain measures to ensure that activities within the
control of the state conform to international environmental protection

93. United Nations Conference on Conservation and Utilization of Resources.
94. U.N. Res. 32(IV), Environmental and Social Council, pmbl. (1947).
95. See Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133; Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 12.
96. U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6; Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at pmbl.
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standards. These rules of conduct will be the rules used to decide whether
an agreement has been violated."
Preventive action and precautionary and sustainable development
principles are more difficult to uphold, since they are rather new and
vague concepts.
However, they deserve attention, since they will
undoubtedly shape the future development of international law. For
example, if the principle of sustainable development quickly takes root in
the international law regime, all developmental decisions could be
subjected to environmental inquiry.
Finally, the influence of international litigation should not be
underestimated."
The decision of international tribunals such as the
European Court of Justice (granted supra national adjudicative power
within the European Community)" and the International Court of Justice",
on environmental matters, will contribute to the codification of these
principles.

97. See L. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 529.

98. But see Z. PLATER

ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:

NATURE, LAW AND

SOCIETY 1007 (1992).
99. P. SANDS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGISLATION AND THE

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1991) (noting several recent cases strongly affirming
environmental principles in interpretations of European legislation).
100. In July 1993, the court decided to establish a seven member Chamber on
Environmental Matters in view of the developments in the field of environmental law and
protection which had taken place in the past few years.
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I. INTRODUCCION
Siguiendo el rechazo de los Estados Unidos para participar en el
caso de Nicaragua', y su retiro subsiguiente de la Ilamada cldusula
* Ph.D., 1973 University of Washington; M.A., 1970, University of Washington; B.A.,
1968, University of Washington.
** M.A., 1995 Portland State University.
SM.A., 1995 Portland State University.
1. Las Actividades militates y Paramilitares en y en contra Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Declaraci6n Sobre el Retiro de los Estados Unidos de las Actuaciones
Iniciadas por Nicaragua en la Corte Internacional de Justicia, DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (1985),
reprintedin 24 1.L.M. 246 (1985).

214

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:213

opcional,2 un gran ambiente de pesimismo rode6 el futuro de la Corte
Internacional de Justicia.3 Menos de una d6cada despu6s, y solamente por

la mitad de la Dicadade la ley internacional, apareceria, para parafrasear
a Marc Twain, los reportes de la defunci6n de la corte fueron grandemente
exagerado. 4 Reciente literatura sobre la corte, y sobre la ley internacional
en general, muestra un optimismo renovado sobre la adjudicaci6n
internacional, frecuentemente lindando idealismo.
Algunos autores
expresan un inter6s renovado en la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la corte y
los otros simplemente discuten el futuro brillante de la corte en un mundo
mandado por la ley internacional. s
2. Para el texto del la declaraci6n de los Estados Unidos Agosto 26, 1946 yea Declaration
on the Part of the United States of America, Aug. 26, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218; United States
Declaration Recognizing Jurisdiction, 1983-1984. I.C.J.Y.B. 90-91 (1984). Para el aviso que
termina la declaraci6n de los Estados Unidos, yea United States: Department of State Letter and
Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M.
1742-45 (1985); yea tambign Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
Court, 1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 60 (1986); y U.S. Terminates Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory
Jurisdiction, 86 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 67 (1986)
3. Anthony Guistini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The Past, The
Present, and Prospectsfor the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1986). Para una discusi6n de
ambas vistas optimistas y pesimistas sobre el recibimiento de los Estados Unidos de Jurisdicci6n
Obligatoria de la corte Internacional de Justicia, yea Jeffrey P. Bialos ET AL., Should the United
States Reconsider Its Acceptance of World Court Jurisdiction?,79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95
(1985).
4. Cambios de temperamento porla corte Mundial no son un nuevo fen6meno. Hace ms de
veinte afios, Coplin y Rochester observaron que "[a]mbos optimismo y pesimismo sobre el papel
de las instituciones internacionales se ha expresado durante los pasados cincuenta aflos, con el
pesimismo, predominando sobre la corrida larga." William D. Coplin & J. Martin Rochester,
The Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, the InternationalCourt of Justice, the League of
Nations, and the United Nations: A Comparative EmpiricalSurvey, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 529
(1972); vea tambien William D. Coplin, Current Studies of the Functions of InternationalLaw:
Assessments and Suggestions, 2 POL. Sdl. ANN. 149 (1970) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingls).
Los sentimientos similares han sido expresado recientemente por Frank y Lehrman, que
caracterizaron el compromiso de los Estados Unidos hacia ]a adjudicaci6n internacional como
el producto de una lucha inconclusa entre dos tendencias contradictorias nacionales: el
messianic y el chauvinist." Thomas M. Frank & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and
Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace Through Law, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 3, 6 (L. Damrosch ed., 1987) (nota editorial: traducido de
Ingl6s).
S. Vea en ejemplo, Robert Y. Jennings, The InternationalCourt of Justice after Fifty Years,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 493 (1995); Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The Wortd Court in
Business Again?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646 (1991); Peter H. F. Bekker, Correspondence, 87 AM.
I. INT'L L. 429 (1993); Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The
United States and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J., 267-99 (1989); Geoffrey
R. Watson, Constitutionalism,JudicialReview, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1-45
(1993); Jose Maria Ruda, Some of the Contributions of the International Court of Justice to the
Development of International Law, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35-68 (1991); Jonathan
Charney, Progress in InternationalMaritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
227-56 (1994); Edward McWhinney, Acceptance, Withdrawal or Denial of World Court
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Cual es la raz6n por este dramitico cambio de vistas sobre la corte?
Mucha de la literatura actual parece ser generada en respuesta a el gran
volumen de casos trafdo antes la corte en los pocos afios pasados. 6 El
consentimiento evidente de los Estados para recurrirse a la corte
Internacional de Justicia (I.C.J.) recientemente ha mantenido esperanza por

parte de sus proponentes y, por lo menos temporalmente, ha callado a los
oponentes. Esto es, quizis, un resultado natural del cambio de un periodo
de negocio decaido en la corte y un nivel elevado de desafio contra la

corte, a un periodo elevado de negocio y de poco o ningfin desafio.
Para no vernos envueltos en una posici6n con tendencias a
terminas largas con sucesos de corto plazos, deberfamos dar alguna
perspectiva a la actividad actual del I.C.J. Los periodos de actividad
elevada para la corte Mundial no son nuevos. Ambas la corte Permanente
de Justicia Internacional (P.C.I.J.), y el I.C.J., demostraron periodos de
extrema actividad en sus primeros afios.
No parecido al periodo
contempor.neo, estos dos periodos de actividad elevada sobre ]a corte

tambi~n fueron acompafiados por la literatura optimista con respecto a la
adjudicaci6n internacional. 7 En cada instancia, sin embargo, estos
periodos de actividad elevada de la corte fueron seguidos por una
declinaci6n en el negocio de la corte y, en el caso de la I.C.J., un periodo

de desaffo problemitico por los estados traido antes de la corte bajo la
Jurisdiction: Some Recent Trends as to Jurisdiction, 20 ISR. L. REV. 148-66 (1985); Anthony
D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory
Jurisdictionof the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, Modifying
U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385
(1985); Louis B. Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdictionof the
InternationalCourt of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1988); Fred
L. Morrison, Reconsidering United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 148 WORLD AFF. 63 (1985); Richard Gardner, U.S. Termination
of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 421 (1986); J. Patrick Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 342 (1987); Robert E. Lutz, The World Court in a Changing World. An
Agenda for Expanding the Court's Role from a U.S. Perspective, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 265-343
(1991); Keith Wier, The International Court of Justice: Is it Time for a Change?, 8 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 175 (1985); Douglas Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International
Court of Justice: A Proposalfor a New United States Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145
(1986); Valerie Epps, Reinstating the United States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof
the InternationalCourt of Justice, 34 BOSTON BAR J. 8 (Jan./Feb. 1990).
6. Vea en ejemplo, Highet, supra note 5.
7. Para ]a literatura sobre la jurisdicci6n internacional vea, Manley 0. Hudson, The
Eleventh Year of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 11 (1933);
Manley 0. Hudson, The Twenty-Second Year of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1950). Vea tambien, SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1934); SIR
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958).
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clusula opcional de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria. 8 Con el fin de evaluar si
este periodo reciente de la actividad elevada indica una tendencia mis
duradera, o solamente otro ciclo en la historia de la corte, nosotros
debemos determinar cuales factores acompafian esta reciente fase que
pudiera indicar una direcci6n mis permanente por los estados hacia una
disputa pacifica por la adjudicaci6n.
El prop6sito de este articulo es analizar la reciente actividad de la
corte dentro de un contexto de historia entera de la Corte Mundial y para
poder ponerlo en una perspectiva politica mis ancha. De esta ventaja,
nosotros esperamos evaluar las perspectivas futuras para la confianza sobre
la corte por los estados disputadores. Tambi6n esperamos determinar si el
negocio actual antes de la corte da cualquier esperanza para la aceptaci6n
del papel de jurisdicci6n compulsaria.
1I.

LA ASCENDENCIA DEL LEGALISMO

Se ha notado frecuentemente, aunque no siempre con gran efecto,
que cualquier sistema legal debe ser reflexivo del sistema politico que le da
nacimiento. Esto es cierto en la ley internacional, como tambi6n es cierto
en la ley dom6stica.9 Por eso es que cualquier confianza aumentada sobre
la ley internacional, y por extensi6n, la Corte Mundial, debiera ser
acompafiada por una atm6sfera politica que permite que los estados sean
dispuesto a conceptualizar sus disputas como disputas legales y para
permitir adjudicaci6n de terceros de esas disputas. Sin tal atm6sfera,
cualquier intento de imponer soluciones legales sobre estados sin su
aquiescencia serdn condenados al fracaso. Cualquier intento de apretar la
corte o empujarla ms alli de las tolerancias del sistema politico crear, una
ilusi6n de legalidad, seguramente para ser destrozada el momento en que
la adjudicaci6n internacional se enreda con las realidades del sistema
politico internacional.
Se ha sugerido que la atm6sfera politica normal del sistema
internacional est, lejos de ser conducida por la promoci6n de la

8. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The I.C.J. and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for
Closing the Clause. 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).

9.

Como Martin A. Rogoff ha anotado que la "Icy Internacional e instituciones

internacionales, como ley domestica e instituci6n domestica, requiere apoyo politico para su
eficacia." Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The United States and
the International Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.i. 267, 291 (1989) (nota editorial: traducido
de Ingl6s). Vea, Scott & Carr, supra note 8; Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The International
Court of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347, 354-59 (1981).
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adjudicaci6n internacional. 0 Asi, hay que haber un incentivo extra para
que los estados recurran a la adjudicaci6n internacional, m.s bien que la
confianza propia, para el arreglo de las disputas. La consecuencia de los
periodos de alta inestabilidad internacional, como esas creadas por las
guerras, parecieran haber proveido tal incentivo. Desafortunadamente, en
el pasado, estos picos de predominio legal internacional han sido todos
ficilmente gastados como unas memorias de conflagraciones pasadas.
Las dos guerras mundiales fueron seguidas por un periodo de
idealismo legal que nosotros anteriormente nombramos "la euforia legal de
la posguerra. " " No es sorprendente que durante cada de estos periodos el
negocio de la corte estuvo a su pico.' 2 En un corto tiempo, desde el fin de
la guerra fria, el I.C.J. ha sido sitiado con un influjo de casos que
aproxima los (Inmerosantes de la corte al final de cada de las dos guerras
mundiales. Parece poca la duda que en el periodo siguiendo el fin de la
guerra fria, los eruditos legales y los estados han encontrado interes
renovado en la adjudicaci6n internacional. Esto no es sorprendente, por
que la guerra fria fue probablemente tan disruptiva al funcionamiento del
sistema internacional como las dos guerras previas, y su fin naturalmente
le dio el origen a la regla de ley como lo hicieron anteriormente las dos
guerras calientes.
Mientras nosotros reconocemos que el fin de la guerra fria es un
acontecimiento significativamente mas diferente desde el fin de las dos
conflagraciones globales, hay algunas razones para pensar que ha tenido
un efecto similar sobre el pensar de los estadistas y los eruditos hacia la ley
Como Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley ha anotado, "El
internacional.
resurgimiento de reglas y los procedimientos en el servicio de una orden
organizada internacional es el legado de todas las guerras, calientes o
fras. "I3
Hay, por supuesto, diferencias importantes entre el fin de las dos
guerras mundiales y el fin de la guerra frfa. Quizis la distinci6n mnis
importante, para el prop6sito de relacionarlo a nuestra estructura analitica,
es que los fines de las dos guerras mundiales pueden ser atadas a fechas
especificas - Noviembre 11, 1918, la firma del Armisticio Alemnin que
termin6 la primera guerra mundial; y Agosto 15, 1945, la fecha de la
10. Gary L. Scott & Karen D. Csajko, Compulsory Jurisdiction and Defiance in the World
Court: A Comparison of the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J., 16 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 377-87
passim (1988).
11. Id. at 386 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
12. Id. at 387.
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A
DualAgenda, 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993) (nota editorial: traducido del Inglds).
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rendici6n japon6s que termin6 la segunda guerra mundial. Fijando una
fecha para el fin de la guerra fria es algo mis problemitico.
La desintegraci6n de la Uni6n Sovidtica en el 19921" trajo el obvio
capitulo final del fin de la guerra fria, pero la defunci6n de la guerra fria
realmente lo precedi6 considerablemente. En Noviembre 20, 1990, el
Presidente George Bush anuncio que "la guerra fria se ha terminado."' 5
La cumbre de 1990 entre el Presidente Sovidtico, Mikhail Gorbachev, y el
Presidente Bush probablemente provey6 el impetu para que Bush hiciera
ese comentario. El desmenuzo de la pared de Berlin, por largo tiempo el
simbolo de la guerra fria, vino antes en Noviembre 9, 1989.16 Antes de
eso vino el predominio del Presidente Sovidtico Gorbachev, "cuyos
'nuevos pensamientos' esencialmente desecharon las reglas viejas de la
guerra fria."' v Perestroikay Glasnost, los nuevos programas de reforma
de Gorbachev fueron anunciados formalmente en febrero 25, 1986,18 y
probablemente formaron la base para el fin de la politica internacional de
la guerra fria.
Hay adn otra diferencia importante que distingue actividad legal
que siguiendo los fines de las dos guerras mundiales y el fin de la guerra
fria. Nosotros podriamos Ilamar esa diferencia la gufa en tiempo. Antes
del fin de las dos guerras mundiales, en el tiempo en el cual era claro que
cada guerra alcanzaria un fin y tambi~n quienes serian los vencedores, los
vencedores comenzaron a planificar actividades pacificas y licitas en el
periodo despues de la guerra. Por ejemplo, en la Conferencia Dumbarton
Oaks en Octubre 1944, los Estados Unidos, Gran Bretafia, China, y la
Uni6n Sovi6tica prepararon una conscripci6n b'sica de la Organizaci6n de
Naciones Unidas,' 9 basado en los acuerdos hechos anteriores en las
Conferencias de Mosc( y de Teherin en 1943.20 En otras palabras, se

14. Fred Hiatt, Minsk is No Moscow, and That's the Point for New Grouping, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9, 1991, at A16.
15.

R.W. Apple, Jr., 34 Leaders Adopt Pact Proclaiminga United Europe, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 22, 1990, at Al (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
16. Ferdinand Protzman, East Berliners Explore Land Long Forbidden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1989, at Al.
17.

MEL GURTOV, GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE HUMAN INTEREST 2, 3 (2d ed. 1991).

Gorbachev fue apuntado como Secretario General de el CPSU en Marzo 1985 (nota editorial:
traducido del Ingl s).

18. Mikhail Gorbachev, The PoliticalReport of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, IZVESTIIA, Feb. 26, 1986, at 2-10 in 38
THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 8, at 4.

19. GEORG SCHILD, BRETTON WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS 168-72 (1995).
20. Id. at 42-47; 2 LESTER BRUNE, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS 823 (1985).
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puede ver como el periodo despuds de la guerra afecto el pensamiento
profesional polftico y legal, por 1o menos en las etapas planificadoras,
antes del fin de la guerra. Tal fen6meno tambi6n sucedi6 al final de la
guerra fria. Uno puede ver los efectos de la posguerra en ambas escrituras
de los eruditos y los pianos de los profesionales, precedente al fin de la
guerra, cualquiera fecha que uno prefiera usar para determinar su fin. El
INF (Tratado Intermedio de Fuerzas Nucleares)2" entre la Uni6n Sovi~tica
y los Estados Unidos en diciembre 1987 es solamente uno de estos pianos.
La diferencia b6sica es que al final de las dos guerras mundiales, los
estados solamente pueden planear el fin de la guerra mientras la actividad,
como la formaci6n de las Naciones Unidas o la creaci6n de la Corte, tuvo
que esperar la cesaci6n de las hostilidades.
Sin embargo, diferente que el fin de las dos guerras mundiales, la
ausencia de la guerra abierta entre los participantes mayores de la guerra
fria permiti6 que los estados comenzaran acciones que podrian proceder
aprisa mientras la guerra frfa se disminuia y eventualmente se terminaria.
Ademis, los estados le pudieron tomar ventaja inmediata a la corte,
mientras que la guerra frfa se disminufa, porque la corte estaba establecida
para que no requeria ningtin tiempo para arrancar como fue necesario al
fin de las dos guerras mundiales. Asi, parece razonable argumentar que el
aument6 de la confianza en la ley internacional, y la creciente confianza en
el I.C.J. como un mecanismo del arreglo de las disputa, pudo haber sido
chispeado por el previsto, pero sin embargo obvio, conclusi6n de la guerra
fria. Para el prop6sito de nuestro anglisis, nosotros hemos elegido 1986
como el comienzo de la fase actual de la actividad de la I.C.J.
III. EL P.C.I.J. Y EL I.C.J. EN LA PERSPECTIVA HISTORICA
Hay similitudes distintas en los primeros afilos del P.C.I.J. y el
I.C.J. con respecto al comportamiento estatal hacia la Corte. Durante el
periodo que sigui6 las dos guerras mundiales, cuando el optimismo legal
abund6, cada corte estuvo sumamente activa. Para el P.C.I.J., este fue el
mis ocupado de su corta existencia. Para el I.C.J., este periodo fue
insuperable, hasta el crecimiento reciente de litigaci6n antes ]a corte.
Cada Corte similarmente experienio una declinaci6n en la actividad
durante su segunda ddcada. Para ambas cortes, la declinaci6n en la
actividad se at6 al aumento en tensiones internacionales. La declinaci6n en
la actividad para el P.C.I.J. parece estar en conjunto a la crisis financiera
internacional comenzada en 1929, y la subida de Socialismo Nacional
21. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8,
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., DEP'T ST. PUBLICATION 9555 (1987).
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Alemin despu6s de 1933.n La declinaci6n en la actividad de la I.C.J.
parece estar atada a la magnitud de la guerra fria y la proliferaci6n de los
nuevos estados que siguieron el periodo de rpida decolonizacion.

El

6nfasis en la guerra fria probablemente creo una disminuci6n de los
estados para conceptuar sus disputas como disputas legales.
La
proliferaci6n de los nuevos estados, en su mayor parte las colonias
anteriores, podrian haber tenido tambidn un efecto tardfo sobre las
actividades de la Corte, porque durante este periodo la Corte todavia
estabadominadadel Occidente, delante los cuales los nuevos estados eran
poco dispuestos de aparecer en frente de ellos.
y

Mis all, del oleaje inicial de la litigaci6n antes de las ambas cortes
su declinaci6n subsiguiente que fue seguida por hostilidades

internacionales aumentadas, las similitudes en los ciclos de la vida de las
dos cortes terminarian. Mis ficilmente dicho, la vida del P.C.I.J., para
todos los prop6sitos prcticos, dur6 nadamfis que veinte afios mientras que
el I.C.J. celebr6 su aniversario quincuagdsimo. La actividad del P.C.I.J.

fue terminada por la iniciaci6n de la segunda guerra mundial, mientras que
el I.C.J. fue capaz de continuar su pr6xima fase. Desafortunadamente
para el I.C.J., esta pr6xima fase resulto ser su periodo mis obscuro. La
d6cada de sierra de los 60s vio muy pocos casos traidos antes la Corte.

Pero comenzando en el principio de 1970 y continuando mediante los 80s
hubo un periodo de desafio serio a la corte.'
22. Scott & Csajko, supranote 10, at 387.
23. Los siguientes casos son de desaffo registrados durante el periodo bajo consideraci6n:
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24);
Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.; F.R.G. v. lee.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 175 (July 25). Es argumentativo, pero dos otros
ejemplos del desaflo menor ocurrieron durante este periodo en el Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of
War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 347 (Dec. 15), la India no quiso aparecer, aunque comunic6 con
la cone, a lo largo, de las actuaciones hasta que PakistAn decidi6 tener las actuaciones
interrumpidas. En Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19), la
Turqufa rehuso aparecer en la fase inicial del caso, pero como la corte encontr6 en el favor de ]a
Turqufa durante las objeciones preliminares, ningun desaflo adicional ocurri6.
Como Scott ha anotado. en otra pane, "[I]os ejemplos de desaflo de la cone se han
documentado bien y se han dado bastante atenci6n erudita." Ver H.W.A. THIRLWAY, NONAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3-20 (1985) (nota editorial:
traducido de Inglds). Vea tambiin Keith Highet, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal
from the NicaraguaCase, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1985). Hay algtin desacuerdo con respecto a
que constituye desaflo y que debe ser observada como modo normal provefdo en el estatuto.
THIRLWAY, supra, note 23, at 1-20. Mas bien que discutir los m~ritos de las diversas
perspectivas, nosotros clasificaremos desaflo como cualquier comportamiento donde un estado
esta legalmente obligado a la jurisdicci6n de la corte pero desatiende las ordenes de ]a corte en un
manera intencional. Los fallos sobre actitudes de estados, como sean visto en sus respuestas a la
cone, Ilega a ser un criterio importante para nuestra determinaci6n. Nuestra definici6n de
desaflo incluye ambos no apariencia y no ejecuci6n. El no pagamiento por ia Albania de los
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A. P.C.LJ. IeJLC.J. I
En periodos hist6ricos aproximadamente equivalentes, uno puede
comparar los modelos de sumisiones a la corte Mundial que sigue las dos
guerras mundiales. Liamaremos estos periodos de tiempo, P.C.I.J. I e
I.C.J.I. Estos representan los periodos mis concurridos en el calendario
de la corte hasta el periodo contemporineo. Durante P.C.I.J. I (1923 a
1936) hubieron veinte y siete casos contenciosos sometidos al P.C.I.J.

Tambidn hubieron veinte y ocho casos sometidos para opiniones
consultivas. Durante un periodo similar en la vida del I.C.J. I (1946 a
1962,) treinta y un casos contenciosos se sometieron a la corte. Tambi~n
hubieron doce sumisiones para opiniones consultivas durante este periodo.
Los modelos de estas tempranas sumisiones a ambas cortes reflejan
un interds genuino en administrar conflicto mediante la adjudicaci6n
internacional.

Con ]a excepci6n de varias sumisiones politicas al I.C.J.

por los Estados Unidos contra la Uni6n Sovi~tica y otros estados
Comunistas, todas las sumisiones parecen aut~nticas con el prop6sito de
alcanzar un arreglo legal.2 4 Durante P.C.I.J. I, hubieron tres casos
sometidos bajo la cliusula opcional' en la cual no hubo objeciones
preliminares por el respondedor,"6 y hubo diez sumisiones conjuntas."

dafios evaluados en el caso Corfu Channel es un ejemplo del anterior; El comportamiento de
Francia en los casos de pruebas nucleates es un ejemplo del posterior, y el comportarniento de los
Estados Unidos en el caso Nicaragua, Actividades Militares y Paramilitares en y contra
Nicaragua Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (es un ejemplo de arnbos no aparencia y no ejecuci6n). Scott & Csajko, supra
note 10, at 377 n.2.
24. Para una discusi6n de diversos tipos de sumisiones, ambos politicos y legal, yea Scott
& Csajko, supra note 10, at 389-91. Scott y Csajko categorizan sumisiones a la cone, en
sumisiones legales y sumisiones pollticas. Sumisiones legales son divididos en sumisiones
adjudicadora y las sumisiones de negociaci6n, dependiendo del resultado deseado por los
partidos. Las sumisiones polfticas son adicionalmente subdivididas en sumisiones simb6licas, en
donde el intento del estado de alistar simbolismo de la corte contra otro estado, y las sumisiones
de apalancamiento, en donde el intento estatal sometido alista ]a corte como un "alar" contra el
respondedor. Los casos en que los Estados Unidos usaron la corte para el apalancaniento
politico contra los estados del Warsaw Pact son como se indica a continuaci6n: Treatment in
Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of U.S.A. (U.S. v. Hung.; U. S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. 99
(July 12); Aerial Incident of 10 Mar. 1953 (U.S. v. Czech.)" 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); Aerial
Incident of 7 Oct. 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7 Nov.
1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 I.C.J. 276 (Oct. 7).
25. Los tres casos fueron: Memorial of Denmark, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland(Den.
v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (set. C) No. 62 (Oct. 31, 1931); Legal Status of the South-Eastern
Territory of Greenland(Nor. v. Den.; Den. v. Nor.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48 (Aug. 2);
y Appeal from Czechoslovak-HungarianMixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Royal Hungarian Peter
Pazmany University) (Czech. v. Hung.). 1933 P.C1.J. (ser. A/B) No. 61 (Dec. 15).
26. Supra note 25. Vea nuestra discusi6n de estos tipos de sumisiones que nosotros
Ilamamos categorfa I sumisiones, infra note at 9.
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Cada uno de estos tipos de sumisiones indica un consentimiento por parte
de ambos partidos a Ilegar a una resoluci6n legal. No hubo instancias de
desaffo de la corte en P.C.I.J. I.
El modelo de sumisiones en I.C.J. I es parecido. Hubieron cuatro
casos sometidos bajo la clusula opcional sin objeciones preliminares 28 y
seis sumisiones conjuntas.2 9 Con la excepci6n discutible de la repulsa de
Albania para pagar dafios en el Caso del Canal de Corfu, 30 no hay
ejemplos de desafio durante I.C.J. I, duplicando el registro del
cumplimiento de P.C.I.J. I.
Ambos P.C.I.J. I y I.C.J. I reflejan el consentimiento de los
estados en el periodo despuds de la guerra para tener sus conflictos

radicados por la adjudicaci6n de terceros. Como se mostrari en nuestra
discusi6n mis adelante de I.C.J. III, hay muchas similitudes en ambos
tipos de sumisiones y en la carencia de desafto que la corte exhibi6 durante
el periodo contemporineo despu6s de la guerra fria.

27. Interprete de Article 179, Annex Paragraph 4, del Convenio de Neuilly (Bulg. &
Greece), 1924 P.C.i.J. (ser. A) No. 3 (Sept. 12); SS Lotus (Fr. & Turk.), 927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (Sept. 7); Pagamiento de varias prestamos a Serbia por Francia (Fr. & the Serb-CroatSolvene State), 1929 P.C.I.J. (set. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12); Pagamiento en oro de prestamos a
Brasil prestado por Francia (Braz. & Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (seT. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12); Territorio
jurisdiccional de la Comisi6n Intemacional de la Orden Rio (Czech., Den., Fr., Ger., Gr. Brit.,
Swed., & Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23 (Sept. 10); La tres zonas libre de Savoy y el
Distrito de Gex (Fr. & Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 (Aug. 19); La quita de
limitaciones sobre las aguas territoriales entre Castellorizo y Anatolia (Italy & Turk.), 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 51 (Jan. 26); El caso del faro entre Francia y Greece (Fr. & Greece),
1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Mar. 17); Oscar Chinn (BeIg. & Gr. Brit.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12); El faro entre Crete y Samos (Fr. & Greece), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No.71 (Oct. 8).
28. Vea, Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Rights of Nationals of the
United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27); Application of
the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Swed. v. Neth.), 1958 I.C.J. 55
(Nov. 28); Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 Dec. 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960
I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18).
29. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 395 (Nov. 27); Haya De La Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951
I.C.J. 71 (June 13); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty
Over Certain Frontier Lands (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209 (June 20). Anota que el numero
de sumisiones conjuntas un poco extravia, porque tres de los casos involucra el misma incidencia
entre Columbia y Per.i.
30. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 1.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15). Para una discusi6n
indicando que esto no podrd precisamente se describirg como el desaffo de la corte vea en
ejemplo THIRLWAY, Yea supra 23, at 6-7; GENEVIEVE GUYOMAR, LE D9FAUT DES PARTIES A
UN DIFFIREND DEVANT JURISDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES 30, 201-3 (1960), citado en Highet,

supra note 23, at 994.
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B. P..ILJ.lMy LC.J. II
En los periodos inmediatamente siguiente estos tiempos ms bien
ocupadas, ambos el P.C.I.J. y el I.C.J. tuvieron una declinaci6n dramtica
en el numero de casos sometidos. Referimos a estos dos periodos como
P.C.I.J. II e I.C.J. II. Desde 1937 hasta que P.C.I.J. defunci6n a la
creaci6n del I.C.J.,3I solamente han habido siete casos contenciosos y no
ha habido ningin pedido consultivo sometido a la corte. Esto fue, bastante
obvio, por causa de la erupci6n de la segunda guerra mundial.
Interesantemente, sin embargo, durante I.C.J. II hubo una declinaci6n
similar en el ndimero de sumisiones, probablemente explicado por la
intensificaci6n de las hostilidad de la guerra fria. En muchas maneras la
declinaci6n durante I.C.J. II fue aun mds dramitica que durante P.C.I.J.
II.
Durante el periodo de 1963 a 1985, hubieron solamente doce
sumisiones de casos contenciosos al I.C.J. y seis sumisiones.para opiniones
consultivas. Ademds, varios de estos casos resultaron en completo desafto
de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la corte.3 2
Aunque hay similitudes en la segunda fase de ambas cortes, quizds
las diferencias en estos periodos son mfis importantes. El P.C.I.J. era
obviamente incapaz de operar durante las hostilidades abiertas de ia
segunda guerra mundial, y la declinaci6n en el negocio de la corte
prefiguro, por poco tiempo, el comienzo de la lucha en Europa. De
hecho, asombrosamente en 1937 y 1938 hubieron realmente dos casos
someti6 a la corte cada afio.33 Esto a pesar del hecho que Alemania habia
invadido y anexado a Austria en Marzo 1938. 34 Ademds, a pesar de
tiempos inquietos sobre el continente Europeo, no habian ejemplos de
3
desaffo en la corte durante P.C.I.J. II. 5
Durante I.C.J. II, un periodo significativamente mds largo que
P.C.I.J. II, la corte tuvo un promedio de un caso por cada dos afios. El
31. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8, U.N.
Sales No. E.90.V.6. (1990).
32. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.

33. Interesantemente, Bdlgica envuelto metido en tres los cuatro de casos como el estado
solicitante. Vea, Borchgrave (Belg. v. Spain), 1937 P.C.I.J. (set. C) No. 83 (May 13); Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 88 (Mo. Day);
Socidtd Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), 1938 P.C.I.J. (set. C) No. 87 (May 4). La
otra sumisi6n estuvo por la Estonia, Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, (Est. v. Lith.), 1937 P.C.I.J.
(set. C) No. 86 (Oct. 25).

34. BRUNE, supra note 20, at 738.
35. El representante de Bulgaria fracas6 para aparecer en en el caso de Electricidad Co. de
Sofia y Bulgaria, pero era porque habfa una guerra. Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg.
v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77 (Apr. 4).
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periodo de 1963 al 1970 vio la declinaci6n mis sorprendente en el negocio
de la corte. Un caso solamente se someti6, que en 1967, siguiendo cuatro
afios de hiato de en sumisiones y precediendo otro periodo de tres anos de
ningunas sumisiones. Este periodo marco el nadir de actividad en la corte
Mundial en tiempo de paz. Porque este periodo de calma vino durante el
periodo mis intensivo de hostilidades en la guerra fria, siguiendo en
Octubre 1962 la Crisis Cubana de Proyectil, parece razonable argumentar
que la guerra fria tuvo un impacto significante sobre la corte como las
hostilidades abiertas de la segunda guerra mundial.
Durante el remanente de I.C.J. II, la corte tuvo sumisiones un
poco mis frecuentes (un total de once - un promedio de todavia menos de
uno al afio), pero hubieron tambi6n cuatro instancias de completo desafto
de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la corte durante este tiempo.36 No hay
periodo equivalente de desafio durante la historia de P.C.I.J.37 En el
tiempo cuando I.C.J. II termino en 1985 y siguiendo el desaffo de los
Estados Unidos de la corte en el caso de Nicaragua,38 la perspectiva para
el futuro de la adjudicaci6n internacional se veia bastante desierta. Habia
poco para pronosticar el auge en el negocio de la cone que surgi6 en el
periodo siguiente, 1986 al presente.
IV. LA CORTE CONTEMPORANEA - I.C.J. III

A. La Jurisdicci6n Compulsaria- La Cidusula Opcional
Varias cosas permanecen fuera la actividad de la corte en el
periodo de 1986 al presente. La primera y mis destacada diferenciaci6n
desde el periodo anterior es la carencia del desafio por los estados en casos
traidos unilateralmente bajo la jurisdicci6n compulsara de la corte
conferido por el articulo 36 (2) del Estatuto del I.C.J.3 9 Hasta ahora,
durante el periodo mas reciente de actividad de la corte, siete casos se han
traido debajo la cliusula opcional.' 4 Hasta ahora, ninguno de estos casos
36. Vea Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 377 n.2.
37. Para una discusi6n llena de comparaciones de desaffo de jurisdicci6n compulsaria sobre
el P.C.I.J. e I.C.J. yea Scott & Csajko, supra note 10.
38. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
39. Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
40. Los siete casos sobmitido bajo el articulo 36(2) del Estatuto del I.C.J. son como se
indica a continuaci6n: Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 12); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.),
1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J.
53 (Nov. 12); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 32 (May 19); East Timor (Port. v.
Austi.), 1995, I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/19bis (June 30); PassageThrough the Great Belt (Fin.
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han resultado en desaffo de la jurisdicci6n de la corte. 4 ' Mientras, esto
puede parecer alentador para la instituci6n de jurisdicci6n compulsarfa
bajo la cliusula opcional, una mirada mis cercana de los casos revela que
nosotros deberiamos ser cauto de inferir demasiado del poder de la
jurisdicci6n compulsaria basado en estos casos.
Para determinar la importancia de jurisdicci6n compulsarfa en
traer ciertos estados antes de la corte, confiaremos en un anilisis anterior
de casos compulsorios de jurisdicci6n."2 Para analizar el efecto de
jurisdicci6n compulsarfa sobre el resultado de casos I.C.J., el universo de
los casos de cliusula opcional pueden dividirse en cuatro categorias:
Categoria I, consiste de casos en donde el estado respondedor no hizo
objeciones preliminares; Categorfa II, consiste de casos en donde hubieron
objeciones preliminares que fueron sostenidas por la corte; Categoria III,
constituye casos en cual las objeciones preliminares fueron rechazadas por
la corte, pero donde la decisi6n sobre los m6ritos apoy6 las surnisiones del
estado respondedor; y Categoria IV, incluye casos en donde la corte
sostuvo el caso del estado solicitante sobre ambos objeciones y mdritos.4 3
Desde esta categoria de casos compulsorios de jurisdicci6n bajo el
artfculo 36(2), debe ser evidente que ia jurisdicci6n compulsarfa hace poco
para mejorar el papel de la corte en casos de Categorfa I, que
probablemente habian sido sometidos a la corte eventualmente sin la
jurisdicci6n compulsaria. '
En otras palabras, parece que hay un
consentimiento por parte del los estados respondedores para participar en
este caso que es implicado por la carencia de objeciones preliminares.
Casos de Categoria I son duros de distinguir de sumisiones conjuntas desde
el punto de vista del consentimiento de los estados disputadores para
conceptuar su disputa en t~rminos legales. 45
v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16); FisheriesJurisdiction (Spain v. Can.),
1995 I.C.J. 87 (May 2). Aunque el que Artfculo 36(2) se uso como la base para la jurisdicci6n

de la corte en la sumisi6n de Nicaragua contra Honduras, la corte encontr6 su jurisdicci6n en el
articulo XXXI del Pacto de BogotA. Por Io tanto nosotros hemos contado este caso como un
caso optativo de chdusula. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J.
69 (Dec. 20). Nos hemos, por supuestamente, contado este caso como una que es en contra de
clausuras opcionales. DeclarationRecognizing as Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International
Court of Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
41. Hay todavia dos casos pendiente, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16); y FisheriesJurisdiction (Spain v. Can.),
1995 I.C.J. 87 (May 2).

42. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 60; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
43. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 378.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 379-81.
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Casos de Categoria II no dan a conocer mucho sobre el
consentiniento de un estado para ser limitado por la decisi6n de la corte,
porque en este caso la corte simplemente encuentra que carece
jurisdicci6n. 4' El estado respondedor, entonces, nunca es forzado a hacer
lo que puede ser una elecci6n dificil entre el interds propio a corto plazo y
el interds a largo plazo de hacerse ver como una ley permanente de estado.
Asi solamente casos de Categoria III y IV proveen una prueba de
consentimiento de estados para atener la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la
corte.47 Aunque nuestro anlisis anterior fue de casos completos, y aunque
dos de los casos en el periodo actual estin todavia pendiente, nosotros
pensamos que esta categoria es itil en proveer alguna perspectiva sobre
este punto.
De los siete casos traido bajo la cllusula opcional durante este
periodo ultimo, tres no tuvieron objeciones preliminares y por lo tanto
caen bajo la .Categoria .48 En el Caso Maritime Delimitation"' entre
Dinamarca y Ngruega, el caso fue decidido a favor del respondedor,
Noruega. A pesar de negociaciones desde 1980, Dinanarca no habia
podido encontrar una soluci6n a una disputa en lo que concierne la
delimitaci6n fuera Dinamarca y zonas pescadoras de Noruega y Areas de
plataforma submarino en las aguas entre la costa oriental de Groenlandia y
la Isla Noruega, Maya de Ene. Dinamarca inicio acciones contra
Noruega, pidiendo que la corte adjudique y declare las zonas pescadoras
de los partidos y Areas de plataforma submarino. Noruega no izo ninguna
objeci6n preliminar a la jurisdicci6n de la cone. La corte entrego una
decisi6n que saca una linea de delinitaci6n que divide las zonas de
plataforma submarino y zonas pesquera del Reino de Dinamarca y el
Reino de Noruega. 5°
Similarmente, sin objeciones preliminares, el caso Arbitral " se
someti6 a la corte por Guinea Bissau contra el Senegal, basada en el
artfculo 36(2) del Estatuto de la corte.52 Esta disputa provino sobre la

46. Id. at 378.
47. Id.
48. El Premio Arbitral de 31 Julio 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12);
Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June
14).
49. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
50. Id. at 46-47, paras. 91-92.
51. El Premio Arbitral de 31 Julio 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
52. Id. at 55.
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delimitaci6n de linderos marftimos que se habian fijado en el 1960 por un
acuerdo entre Portugal y FranciaP y reafirmados por un tribunal de
arbitraje en 1989.-" Antes del I.C.J., Guinea - Bissau sostuvo que el
premio arbitral de Julio 31, 1989, debe declararse inexistente. Guinea
Bissau tambidn sostuvo que Senegal no era justificado en la bfisqueda de la
aplicaci6n del null and void award." La corte uninimemente rechaz6 la
sumisi6n de Guinea - Bissaus y encontr6 el premio vlido y comprometido.
56
Los partidos asi son obligados a atener por el arbitraje anterior.
En los casos ya mencionados, los estados envuelto parecen ser
dispuesto a conceptuar su disputa en tdrminos legales. Ademis, como los
casos fueron decididos en favor del respondedor, hay poca prueba si este
consentimiento para perseguir remedios legales inicialmente hubiese
continuado en la cara de una decisi6n negativa de la corte. No hay
ninguna raz6n para suponer que no. Casos pasados de la Categorfa I no
han resultado en desafio de las decisiones de la corte. 7
El tercer caso en que no hubo objeciones preliminares a la
jurisdicci6n de la corte bajo el articulo 36(2)58 es el caso entre Finlandia y
Dinamarca, Passage through the Great Belt. 9 Como resultado de un
acuerdo Ilegado entre los dos partidos, el caso fue discontinuado por la
solicitaci6n de Finlandia.' Una vez mis, parece que los partidos eran
originalmente dispuestos a conceptuar su disputa en tdrminos legales. En
este instante, sin embargo, el sefluelo de un arreglo politico aparentemente
gan6 fuera un remedio judicial. 6'
En el primer caso de la clhusula opcional donde habian objeciones
preliminares, la corte rechaz6 las objeciones que fueron basados sobre
terrenos jurisdiccionales.
En Certain Phosphate Lands in Naura,62
Australia dio seis objeciones preliminares a la jurisdicci6n de la cone, pero
53. Id. at 57.
54. Id. at 59-61.
55. id. at 56.
56. Id. at 75-76.
57 Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 61-62; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 379-81.
58 Supra note 31.
59. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 l.C.J. 12 (July 29).
60. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
61. El arreglo de la disputa era ayudada, sin ninguna duda, por el consentimiento de
Dinamarca pague a la Finlandia la suma de 90 millones Danish kroner. Passage Through the
Great Belt (Fin. V. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10); International Court of Justice: Orden de
Discontinuar el caso de Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M.
101, 103 (1993) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles). Esto resultado en acuerdo de Finlandia
para retirar el caso.
62. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
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solamente la primera aplic6 directamente al articulo 36(2).63 Australia
tambi6n albergo una objeci6n sdptima que perteneci6 mds al alcance de la
materia dentro del caso.M6 Mientras la corte rechaz6 las objeciones basadas
sobre la jurisdicci6n, sostuvo la objeci6n de Australia que excluy6 el
capital extranjero de los Comisionados Britinicos de Fosfato de
consideraci6n en el caso instantneo.6s Mientras la corte encontr6 que
habia jurisdicci6n basado sobre la aceptaci6n de los partidos a las clusulas
opcionales, excluyo la parte de Nauru's reclamo que aparentemente
provey6 e la rais6n d'etre para su caso.6 6 Quizis como resultado de esa
exclusi6n durante el afio siguiente, los partidos entraron en negociaciones
que resultaron en un acuerdo entre ellos67 y Nauru pidi6 una
descontinuacion del caso.68 Con tal resultado, es dificil concluir mucho
sobre el papel jugado por la jurisdicci6n compulsaria en este caso.
El segundo caso en que habia objeciones preliminares a la
jurisdicci6n de la corte fue el caso de East Timor entre Portugal y
Australia, en donde, "Portugal refiri6, en su aplicaci6n, a las
Declaraciones hecha por los dos Estados debajo el articulo 36, pfirrafo 2,
del Estatuto de la corte." 69 En este caso, Portugal sostuvo que el acuerdo
de 1989 de Australia con Indonesia, "relacionado a la exploraci6n y
explotaci6n de la plataforma submarina en el ,rea del 'Timor Gap,'...
habia ocasionado dafios, legales y al moral de la gente de East Timor y de
Portugal, particularmente serios." 7° Portugal reclamo dafios materiales si
la explotaci6n de los recursos de hidrocarburo comenzara. 7 '
63. La objeci6n preliminar de Australia se basa sobre su reserva a su aceptaci6n de la
cliusula opcional deposita con el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas sobre 17 Marzo
1975. La corte, por voto de nueve a cuatro, encontraron jurisdicci6n basado en el articulo 36(d).
Id. at 269. La reserva Australiana lee, "El Gobierno de Australia en adicional declara que esta
su declaraci6n no aplica a ninguna disputa con respecto a que los partidos han acordado o
acordari tener recursos a algin otro mediante de paz." Austr., 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 69 (Mar.
13, 1975) (nota editorial: traducido de lngl6s).
64. La objeci6n sdptima de Australia constatare, inter alfa, "que los demandados de Naru
sobre los fondos extranjero de los Comisionados Britinicos de Fosfato es inadmisible y que la
corte no tiene ningin jurisdicci6n, en la relaci6n que reclamo, porque: el reclanmo es uno nuevo.
. . Certain
. Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 264 (June 26) (nota
editorial: traducido de lngl~s).
65. Id. at 268.
66. Id. at 268-69.
67. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
68. Id.
69. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1991-1992 I.C.J.Y.B. 179 (May 3, 1991) (nota editorial:
traducido de lngl(s).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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La objeci6n principal de Australia en este caso era que la corte no
podia adjudicar una disputa sobre el tratado en cuesti6n sin primero
determinar la legalidad de la entrada a Indonesia y la presencia continuada
en East Timor. Ademls, la corte no podia hacerlo sin la aquiescencia de
Indonesia, porque Indonesia no es un partido a la cl~usula opcional. La
corte, por un voto de diez a cinco, sostuvo ia objeci6n principal de
Australia. 72 Este caso entonces, callo bajo la Categorfa II y ofrece poco
sobre el impacto de jurisdicci6n compulsarfa.
En Land and Maritime Boundary73 entre Camerdn y Nigeria,74
objeciones preliminares de que concieme la jurisdicci6n de la corte y la
admisibilidad de los reclamos por Camertin fueron archivadas por Nigeria
en el 13 de diciembre, 1995." El respondedor, sin embargo, habfa
nombrado un juez ad hoc a la corte, aparentemente indicando su
consentimiento para participar en el caso. Este es otro caso serio que
envuelve hostilidades abiertas sobre tierra y delimitaci6n marftima, pero
uno en cual partidos buscan un arreglo judicial. En el 15 de Marzo, 1996,
por la petici6n de Canerin y siguiendo audiencias sobre la materia, la
corte emiti6 una orden sobre medidas provisionales disefiada parar el m~s
brote reciente de pelea en esta disputa.76
En el 28. de Marzo, 1995, Espafia instituyo procesos contra
Canadj1" usando aceptaciones mutuas de la c1usula opcional como la base
de jurisdicci6n de la corte.78 Esta disputa provino generalmente sobre
provisiones del Acto de la Protecci6n Canadiense de Pesqueros en las
Costeras Canadienses, enmendado en el 12 de mayo, 19 9 4 ,"9 y
especfficamente sobre el abordaje sobre los mares altos de un barco
pescador que volaba la bandera Espafiol.80 La Canada considero que la
72. Id.
73. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), l.C.. Communiqu6 No. 95/19bis, June 30, 1995.
74. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
1994 I.C.J. 105 (June 16).
75. Id.; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/1, Jan. 11, 1996.
76. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.),
I.C.J. Communiqud No. 96/13, Mar. 15, 1996.
77. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1995 I.C.i. 87 (May 2).
78. Peter H. F. Bekker, Recent Developments in the World Court, AM. Soc. INT'L L.
NEWSL., June-Aug. 1995, at 4; Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; Fisheries
Jursdiction (Spain v. Can.), I.C.J. Communiqud No. 95/12, May 2, 1995.
79. Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, Mar. 29, 1995; vea tambiln Bekker, supra note 78, at 4.
80. Id.
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corte no tenia jurisdicci6n sobre esta materia a causa de la reserva a su
aceptaci6n de la clusula opcional que excluye "disputas que provienen
fuera de o en lo que concierne a las medidas de gesti6n y conservaci6n
tomadas por Canadi con el respecto a las embarcaciones pescando en la
[North Atlantic Fisheries Organization] Area Reguladora .

.

.

y la

aplicaci6n de tales medidas."B' A partir de esta escritura los partidos no
han sometido sus argumentos escritos sobre la jurisdicci6n de la corte. Es
asi demasiado temprano para hacer cualquiera decisi6n s'obre el impacto de
este caso sobre la instituci6n de jurisdicci6n compulsarfa.
Nuestra revisi6n de los casos de la clusula opcional sugiere que
hay poca raz6n para ser optimista o pesimista en el 6xito de la jurisdicci6n
compulsaria de la Corte con base en la cl~usula opcional. Pareceria que no
hay raz6n de diferencial nuestros andlisis anteriores de la experiencias de
P.C.I.J. y I.C.J. bajo la cl~usula opcional. 82 Eso es, cuando los estados
estin dispuestos a conceptuar sus disputas en t6rminos legales, ellos lo
harin, y ellos seguirin mediante la adherencia a las decisiones de la corte.
Esto parece cierto con o sin la jurisdicci6n compulsaria bajo el artfculo 36
(2).83 No hay nada en el registro actual para sugerir, sin embargo, que si
un estado encontr6 propio intereses para desafiar jurisdicci6n compulsaria.
Ademds, el registro de desaffo estatal en I.C.J. II dramticamente apoya
esta conclusi6n. Entonces, para el periodo actual, la evidencia sobre la
jurisdicci6n compulsaria bajo la cliusula opcional es inconclusa. Nosotros
deberiamos, sin embargo, agregar una calificaci6n a esto.
Uno de los casos mfs recientes traidos debajo la clusula opcional,
Camerzin v. Nigeria," tiene la potencialidad para proveer alguna evidencia
en la eficacia de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la corte. Hay varios
elementos sobre este caso que se ha asociado en el pasado con ejemplos de
desafio. Han habido hostilidades abiertas en esta disputa particular (un
punto de seguridad), hay una materia econ6mica seria en juego, es una
disputa sobre fronteriza y delimitaciones maritima,85 y el poder diferencial

81. Bekker, supra note 78, at 4 (nota editorial: traducido de lngl-s).
82. Scott & Carr, supra note 78, at 74-76; Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 391-92. Pero
yea tambiin RENATA SZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE (1993).

83.

Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of

Justice under art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court, supra note 31.
84. Cameroon brings a case against Nigeria, I.C.J. Communiqud 94/12, Mar. 30, 1994.
85. "En la Aplicaci6n Camenin refiere a 'un agresi6n por la Reptiblica Federal de Nigeria,
cuyas tropas ocupan varios Cameroonian de localidades sobre el Bakassi de penfnsula,' resultante
'in grande prejuicio a la Repdblica de Camerdn.'" Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
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entre los dos estados es grande. 6 En vista de estos factores, esta disputa,
debe ser resuelta contra el respondedor, Nigeria, y ser6 una prueba seria
de un compromiso a la legalidad en el periodo de la guerra fria. Los
sefiales preliminares estin Ilenos de esperanza. Nigeria reconoci6 la
jurisdicci6n compulsarfa de la corte bajo el articulo 36 (2) en 1965 sin
reservas.8 7 Habia un juez Nigeriano en la corte continuamente desde 1967
hasta 1994,88 asi estableciendo ]a participaci6n Nigeriana en el proceso
legal internacional despu6s de su independencia.89
Adicionalmente,
Nigeria ha indicado un consentimiento de participar en este caso por la cita
de un juez ad hoc. 9 Ha indicado tambi~n su consentimiento para atener
las medidas provisionales de orden de la corte que se emitieron en el 15 de
Marzo, 1996. 9'

B. Udusulas Compromisarios
Ahora tocamos el tema de la jurisdicci6n compulsarfa concedido a
la corte bajo de cldusulas compromisarios.Y Durante este periodo de
I.C.J. la actividad han habido varios casos sometidos a la corte en base de
clAusulas compromisarios en tratos. Nuestro andlisis de estos casos, sin
embargo, serAn limitados, como al tiempo de esta escritura solamente
habia Ilegado a decisi6n uno de estos casos. 93 Dos casos se discontinuaron
al pedido de los partidos 94 y el resto estaban todavfa pendientes.
El primero de los casos de la cliusula compromisario era entre
Nicaragua y Honduras.95 Aunque Nicaragua present6 dos bases para la
86. Scott y Csajko encontr6 que, "el mejor indicador de la probabilidad de desaflo aparece
ser 'la diferencia en poder' desde lo mas reciente casos de desaflo ha ocurrido entre estados de
grande disparidad de poder." Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 392 (nora editorial: traducido de
Ingles).
87. Nigeria, 1990-1991 I.C.J.Y.B. 93-94 (Aug. 14, 1965).
88. Los Jueces Nigeriaflos eran, C.D. Onyeama, 1967-1976 y T.O. Elias, 1976-1994.
89. El Nigeria logro independencia dentro del Estado Libre Asociado sobre octubre 1,
1960.
90. "La Reptblica Federal de Nigeria notifico la corte de su intenci6n para escoger Sr.
Bola Ajibola para sentarse como juzgar ad hoc en el caso; . . ." Aterrizar y Linde marftimo
entre Camerin y Nigeria, (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1994 l.C.J. 106 (June 16) (nota editorial:
traducido de Ingl6s).
91. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (broadcast Mar. 18, 1996).
92. Para tina discusi6n 6ptima de cl~usula compromisorios y la jurisdicci6n de I.C.J. yea,
Jonathan 1. Chamey, Compromissory Clauses and The Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987).
93. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
94. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
95. Id.
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jurisdicci6n de Ia corte, incluyendo el articulo 36 (2) del Estatuto, la corte6
encontr6 su jurisdicci6n en el articulo XXXI del Pacto de Bogot.
Despu6s de una decisi6n sobre las objeciones preliminares, sin embargo,
este caso nunca vino a decisi6n sobre sus m ritos. Aunque Ia. decisi6n
sobre las objeciones preliminares se dio el 20 de diciembre, 19889', el caso
continuo sobre los pr6ximos tres afios y medio a causa de extensiones
pedidas por los partidos.98 Estas extensiones se dieron porque los partidos
estaban, "dentro de un marco de arreglos apuntadas a lograr un extra judicial arreglo de la disputa. . . ."99
Como resultado de estas
negociaciones, Nicaragua pidi6 en el 11 de Mayo, 1992, que la corte
discontinuara los procedimientos."
El efecto de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de Ia corte en este caso
puede haber ocasionado a los partidos a buscar un arreglo en cual de otra
manera no podrian haber buscado. Mejor dicho, una vez enfrentados con
Ia perspectiva de ir a Ia corte, Honduras podia haber sido mfs dispuesto
para radicar la disputa en un proceso en el que tuviera mis control,
(negociaci6n) mis bien que arriesgar un arreglo judicial, sobre el cual no
tuviera control. Una vez que Ia corte mando contra las objeciones
preliminares hondurefias y encontrando que tuvo jurisdicci6n, las inicas
otras alternativas a Ia negociaci6n, para Honduras, eran proceder con Ia
litigaci6n indeseable o desafiar Ia corte. La posterior no parece ser una
perspectiva que la mayoria de los estados emprenden ligeramente,
especialmente cuando Ia jurisdicci6n se basa sobre una cIusula
compromisario.'O'
El segundo caso sometido a Ia corte en base de una cliusula
compromisario, era Electr6nica (ELSI),'02 entre los Estados Unidos e
Italia. La jurisdicci6n de Ia corte fue basada en la cliusula de arreglo de
disputa en el Tratado de Amistad y Comercio y Navegaci6n entre los
Estados Unidos y Italia.'03 Aunque esta era una aplicaci6n unilateral por

96. Id. at 107,
97. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 l.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20).
98. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 l.C.J. 222, 223 (Dec.
20).
99. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 174, 175 (Dec.
20) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
100. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 222, 223
(Dec. 20).
101. Scott & Carr, supra note 8, at 67.
102. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
103. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-ltaly, arts. 16,
63 Stat. 2255 (en efuerzo Julio 26, 1949).
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los Estados Unidos, no hubo objeci6n a la jurisdicci6n de la corte por el
estado respondedor. °4 De hecho, la respuesta de Italia en aceptar la
propuesta de los Estados Unidos fue tan ripida que el caso tiene el parecer
de una sumisi6n conjunta. "5 Un aspecto particularmente interesante de
este caso es que era el primer (hasta ahora el dinico) caso oido en cknaras
adonde se sometieron unilateralmente en base de una chdusula
compromisario.'06
El tercer caso sometido a la corte basado sobre su jurisdicci6n
conferido por el tratado es el caso Aerial Incident'°7 entre Irn y los
Estados Unidos.
Este caso es un quintaenciado ejemplo de una
adjudicaci6n terminado en un arreglo negociado. Provino la destrucci6n
de una aeronave Irania, y la matanza de sus 290 pasajeros y tripulantes, el
3 de Julio, 1988, sobre la interpretaci6n y aplicabilidad de la Convenci6n
sobre la Aviaci6n Civil Internacional'"8 en 1944 y la 1971 Convenci6n y
Supresi6n de Actos Ilegales Contra la Seguridad de Aviaci6n Civil.'" No
solamente los Estados Unidos requirieron extender el limite del tiempo
para archivar su Memorial con anterioridad a albergar objeciones
preliminares, pero tambi6n solicito a la corte mis tiempo para poder
separar sus objeciones. Al tiempo de esta escritura, el caso, se habia
extendido varias veces, se ha descontentado a solicitud de los partidos que
han negociado "un acuerdo en el arreglo lleno y final de todas las disputas,
diferencias, reclamos, contrademanda y materias directamente o
indirectamente levantadas por o capaces de provenir fuera de, o

directamente o indirectamente relativo a o conectadas con, este caso."110

104. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 41 (July 20) (nota
editorial: traducido de Ingl.s.
Es piso commun entre las partes que la corte tiene jurrisdicion en el caso presente. bajo
elArticulo 36, parrafo 1 de su estata, y el Articulo XXVI del Trato de Amistad,
Commercio de su estatua, y el Articulo XXVI del Trato de Amistad, Commercio y
Navigacion, de 2 Junio 1948 ('the FCN Treaty') entre Italia y los Estados Unidos ....
Id.
105. Los Estados Unidos sometieron su aplicaci6n y pidieron que elcaso se de audiencia en
Clmnaras a la corte, sobre Febrero 6, 1987, una respuesta Italiana que acepta lapropuesta de
Estados Unidos se someti6 a lacorte por eltelegrama sobre Febrero 13, 1987. Id. at 17-18.
106. Highet, 'supranote 6, at 647 n.l1.
107. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
108. Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15

U.N.T.S. 215.
109. Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
110. Aerial Incident of 3 July (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/6, Feb. 23, 1996
(nora editorial: traducido de Inglfs).
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Han habido dos casos sometido a la corte por la aplicaci6n
unilateral, basado sobre unos acuerdos anteriores para someter la disputa a
la corte que fracasa una resoluci6n por otros medios."'
En el TerritorialDispute entre Libia y Chad," 2 la Corte tomo su
jurisdicci6n desde un acuerdo especial entre los dos partidos que
confirieron jurisdicci6n sobre la Corte con el respecto al arreglo de la
disputa territorial entre ellos.1 3 El Articulo 1 del acuerdo declaro, "Los
dos partidos emprenden a radicar su disputa territorial primero por todos
los medios politicos, incluyendo la conciliaci6n, dentro de un afto, a menos
que los Jefes de Estado determinen otro periodo de tiempo."" 4 El articulo
2 declara, inter alia "en la ausencia de un arreglo politico de su disputa
territorial, los dos partidos emprenden: A) someter la disputa para una
decisi6n por la Corte Internacional de Justicia. ""s Este era un caso saliente
que involucra una disputa territorial y habia hostilidades armadas sobre el
Area en cuesti6n. A lo largo de los procedimientos los ambos partidos
parecieron dispuestos atenerse a la decisi6n de la corte y, siguiendo la
decisi6n de la cone, negociaron un acuerdo sobre la implementaron de la
decisi6n. 16 Aunque habia algunos opportunidades que este caso podria
haber terminado en el desafio de la decisi6n de la Corte, esta probabilidad
disminuyo apreciablemente por la decisi6n de la Corte en favor del
respondedor.
En el caso Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Behrain,"' Qatar trajo una aplicaci6n unilateral a la
corte basado sobre acuerdos anteriores entre los dos partidos. Bahrein
objeto a la jurisdicci6n de la Corte, pero la Corte en su decisi6n del 15
Febrero, 1995, sostuvo que tenia jurisdicci6n sobre la disputa. "8 Tambidn
11. Los dos de casos son: TerritorialDispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 1.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3); y
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Quatar and Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112
(July 1).
112. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 3).
113. Id.
114. Agreement On The Peaceful Settlement Of The Territorial Dispute Between The
Republic Of Chad and Libya, Aug. 31,

1989, Chad-Libya,

29 I.L.M. 15, 16 (1990) (nota

editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
115. Id. at 16.

116. Agreement Between The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Republic Of Chad Concerning The Practical Modalities For The Implementation
Judgement Delivered By The International Court Of Justice On Feb. 3, 1994, Apr.
Chad-Libyan Ardo Jarrahirya, U.N. Doc. S/1994/402 (1994).
117. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, May 1, 1995.
118. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/11, May 1, 1995.

and The
Of The
4, 1994,
(Qatar v.
(Qatar v.
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encontr6 la aplicaci6n de Qatar admisible y se asirg de la totalidad de la
disputa." 9 Al tiempo de esta escritura la corte habia extendido al 30 de
Septiembre, 1996, el tiempo limitado para el archivo de memoriales sobre
los m ritos del caso.' 20
Durante I.C.J. III entonces, la corte ha tenido un registro bueno
sobre los casos compulsorios de jurisdicci6n tratados bajo las chiusulas
compromisarios. Este no es inesperado. Como hemos anotado antes, los
estados parecen mis obligados a Ilevar casos traidos bajo cliusulas
Esto es
compromisarios en yes de bajo la clusula opcional.
probablemente porque la relaci6n del tratado tiene lugar de ser ms
importante a ellos que la clusula opcional. En otras palabras, el tratado
crea una relaci6n social entre los partidos, con base en su propio interns
mutuo que engendra comportamiento cooperativo en procedimientos de
arreglo de disputas. Esta relaci6n es o acreciente, o mucho mis d6bil,
entre partidos a la clAusula opcional.
C. Despacho del Juez
I.C.J. III ha visto tres casos decidido en el despacho del juez.' 2 ,
Este aumento de confianza sobre el despacho del juez siguiente el del caso
en 1984, Gulf of Maine," era la causa de algtin interns entre alumnos y
practicantes de ley internacional." Mientras puede haber algunos puntos
genuinos levantados sobre confianza sobre la instituci6n de los despachos
de Juez,'" puede aumentar tambi~n el deseo de los estados para someter
disputas antes de la corte. Esto es, despu~s de todo, la raz6n principal
detris del cambio en la edici6n de 1978 de las Reglas de la corte disefilada
para hacer la instituci6n de despacho del juez mis accesibles a los
119. Id.
120. Maritime Delimitations and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/2, Feb. 5, 1996.
121. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22); Elettronica Siclua
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 89 I.C.J. 15 (July 20); Land, Island And Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 .C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
122. Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf Of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
123. Vea Highet, supra note 5, at 649. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 28) (opini6n disidente de Juez Shahabuddeen). Vea
tambi~n Jennings, supra note 5, at 496-97.
124. Jennings atrae atenci6n al problema de alto numero de casos que la Corte tiene que
resolver. Los miembros del chamber casi siempre son miembros de la entera corte. Si el
chamber de la corte se encuentra con un trabajo muy fuerte - como el chamber en el caso de Gulf
Maine, y especfficamente el caso de Land, Island and Maritime Frontier- no se puede negar que
la corte debe marcar su tiempo para permitir que los miembros del Chamber que hagan su
trabajo. Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.
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disputantes. ' 2 Ademis, si nosotros miramos el prop6sito de la corte como
siendo el arreglo de disputas legales, entonces m6todos exitosos de la
resoluci6n de disputa, incluyendo los despachos del juez, deberian ser
fomentados. Durante un periodo de extremamente baja de actividad de la
cone, facilitando el despacho del juez pareci6 una idea buena. En un
periodo de actividad elevada de la corte puede parecer menos usable. Sin
embargo, los despachos del juez han resultado exitosos en resolver algunas
disputas serias. Como el Juez Jennings indica, "Claramente no son las
disputas menores donde partidos han preferido una cita en el despacho de
juez." 126
Dos casos muy serios que involucran disputas territoriales se
establecieron adentro del despacho del juez. El primero caso fue el
Frontier Dispute127 entre Burkina Faso y Mali, sometido a la corte por el
acuerdo especial entre los dos partidos. Este caso, referido como una
"disputa peligrosa" por el Juez Jennings," 8 involucro hostilidades armadas
en la regi6n fronteriza entre los dos estados. 1 9 Desde medidas
provisionales indicadas mediante la decisi6n final de la corte jugo un papel
muy exitoso en la resoluci6n de esta disputa. Cuando la decisi6n lleg6,
ambos lados estaban de acuerdo en retirar sus tropas del area disputado y
regresar a sus territorios respectivos. 3 0
La segunda disputa territorial establecida en el despacho del juez
durante I.C.J. III fue Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Este caso muy
Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua interviniendo).'
complicado consumi6 dos meses de audiencias y era, "el tinico caso mds
largo desde los astrosos casos de 'meritos' fase del Sur Oeste de Africa en
Ademis, este caso, segfin Highet, fue, "realmente cuatro, si no
1965.
cinco, casos de forma y tamafio normal enrollado en uno. .

.

.","'

El Juez

Jos6 Sette-Camara, presidiendo juez del despacho, llamo el caso el mis
complicado en la historia de la corte. 3' Desde luego, los puntos eran el
125. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
126. Id.
127. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
128. Id..
129. Jennings, supra note 5, at 496.
130. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
131. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992
l.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
132. Highet, supra note 5, at 648. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),
Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18), citado en Highet, supra note 5.
133. Highet, supra note 5, at 648.
134. World Court Settles a Latin BorderDispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at A10.
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conflictos abiertos, complejo, e implicando los partidos, con anterioridad a
la litigaci6n.'" Sin embargo, la corte fue capaz de resolver esta disputa
territorial elevadamente explosiva en una cita en el despacho del juez con
cinco jueces. 3 6 La decisi6n, que favoreci6 a Honduras, era dificil para El
Salvador por varias razones, pero ellos aparentemente atenderdn por los
t6rminos de ia decisi6n de la corte. 37
El tercer caso triado antes del despacho de juez involucraba puntos
econ6micos. En el 1987 ELSI caso, 3 ' los Estados Unidos reclamo que
Italia habia violado su tratado bilateral de 1948 de Amistad, Comercio, y
Navegaci6n,' 39 y el Acuerdo Suplementario,'4 por ejecutar una bancarrota
involuntaria injustificada de una compaffia Italiana.' 4' La corte encontr6
por el Respondedor y sostuvo que el Gobierno de Italia no era responsable
para pagar compensaci6n a los Estados Unidos.' 42
D. Los Casos Discontinuados
Un desarrollo interesante durante I.C.J. III es el numero de casos
que se han discontinuado como el resultado de los estados que deciden
resolver sus disputas antes de la decisi6n por la cone. Esta corriente de
mejoramiento es recordativa de terminaciones por partidos bajo los
auspicios de la corte Permanente de la Justicia Internacional.' 4' Durante el
verano de 1992, Dinamarca y Finlandia negociaron una resoluci6n de su
disputa de 1991, Concerning Passage through the Great Belt.'" Ambos
lados sintieron que sus relaciones laterales habian sufrido como resultado
del conflicto, y en el 3 de septiembre, 1992, Dinamarca convenio pagar 90
millones de Kroners Daneses si Finlandia acordaba retirar su aplicaci6n. '45
135. El plieto sobre el territorio empenzo mas de dos siglos, y la violencia anfojo en [a que
se llama la guerra de soccer en 1969. Shirley Christian, In Land Lost To Honduras, Hearts Are
Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1992, at A4.

136. Los jueces en el chamber fueron: Sir Robert Jennings (Pres. of the court), Sigeru Oda
(Vice Pres. of the court), Jose Sette-Camara (Presiding over the chamber), Santiago Torres

BernArdez (Judge ad hoc for Hond.), y Nicolds Valticos (Judge ad hoc for El Sal.). Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
137. Id. Vea tambien Christian, supra note 135, at 4.
138. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 41 (July 20).

139. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 103.
140. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
141. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
142. Id. at 70.
143. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385-86.

144. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10).
145. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 32 I.L.M. 101, 103 (1993).
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En el caso de Nicaragua"s a pesar del hecho que la corte entrego
su decisi6n contra los Estados Unidos el 27 de Junio, 1986, a partir del 7
de Septiembre, 1987, ningin acuerdo se habia alcanzado entre los partidos
con respecto a la forma y cantidad de los saneamientos adjudicados. En
vista de esta carencia de progreso, Nicaragua pidi6 que el I.C.J. hiciera las
ordenes necesarias para la revisi6n adicional del caso. Sin embargo, desde
Septiembre de 1991, Nicaragua le inform6 a la corte que ellos no deseaban
continuar con las actuaciones y renunciaron a todos los derechos
adicionales en el caso. Consiguientemente, ia corte entrego una Orden de
Discontinuar, que removi6 la disputa de su calendario, el 26 de
Septiembre, 1991.'47

Nicaragua tambi~n pidi6 la descontinuacion de su reclamo contra
el Gobierno de Honduras en el 1986 caso Concerning Border and
Transborder Armed Actions. 4
Nicaragua tambi~n anuncio "que los
Partidos habian alcanzado un acuerdo fuera de la corte apuntado a mejorar
sus buenas relaciones sociables .... ."49

Similarmente, en el caso Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru, entre
Nauru y Australia,' 50 con respecto al derecho legal sobre la distribuci6n
Australiana para bienes asignar al extranjero de los Comisionados
Britinicos de Fosfato, los partidos alcanzaron un acuerdo afuera de la
corte y acordaron terminar su caso. Esto vino despuds de la decisi6n de la
corte sobre objeciones preliminares de Australia, pero antes de la decisi6n
sobre los mdritos.15 1
El caso mds reciente que serd discontinuado por un resultado de un
arreglo amigable entre los partidos es el caso Aerial Incident'52 entre Irn y
los Estados Unidos.' 3 Despuds de varias extensiones de plazos limitado
cedidas por la corte, los partidos alcanzaron un acuerdo final. El tiempo
permitido por la corte a la solicitud de los partidos sin ninguna duda ayud6
que la capacidad de los partidos fueran a alcanzar un acuerdo negociado.

146. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
147. 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 322, (Orden de Sept. 13).
148. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222 (May 27).
149. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
150. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
151. Id. at 323.
152. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/6, Feb. 23,
1996.
153. Id.
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Estos casos apoyan la contenci6n que los estados considerarin la
corte como una de varias alternativas para resolver la disputa. 54 Aunque
discontinuaciones representan una adjudicaci6n ausente una soluci6n, en
este caso la corte parece haber actuado como un catalizador para Ilegar a
un acuerdo negociado. Como indicado en otra parte, los casos terminados
representan un sincero "deseo para el acuerdo de la disputa mds bien que
una resoluci6n especfficamente judicial. "155
E. Otros Casos
Hay otros casos que no han sido discutido pero todavfa estln
pendientes. Aunque ellos no puedan ser incluidos en nuestro anglisis, ellos
merecen menci6n a causa de la importancia de su materia. En el caso
Concerning Oil Platforns,'5 6 Irn y los Estados Unidos pidieron una
extensi6n de tiempo - antes de archivar las objeciones preliminares por el
respondedor. 57 Este caso fue trafdo por IrAn contra los Estados Unidos
sobre la destrucci6n de las plataformas de petr6leo supuestamente
ocasionados por las tropas de los Estados Unidos, durante la guerra entre
Irin y Irak en 1987 y 1988.158 Las audiencias sobre las objeciones
preliminares serin arbitradas el 16 de Septiembre, 1996. "'
Otra actuaci6n envuelve los casos Conerning Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie.' ° Este caso resulto sobre
incidencias que siguieron la destrucci6n del vuelo de Pan Am 103 sobre
Lockerbie, Escocia en Diciembre 21, 1988. Los Estados Unidos y el
Reino Unido consecutivamente procesaron a dos nacionales de Libia por
haber bombardeado la aeronave y el Consejo de Seguridad de ONU exigi6
su extradici6n de Libia. Los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido tambidn
instituyeron boicotees econ6micos contra Libia. Libia sostuvo que ambos
estados infringieron la ley international por sus acciones las cuales eran en
154. Para una discucion sobre ia corte actuando como un negociante yea William Coplin,
The World Court in the International Bargaining Process, in THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
AND ITS FUNCTIONS 317 (R. Gregg & M. Barkun eds., 1968).
155. Scott & Csajko, supra note 10, at 385.
156. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U. S.), 1994 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 18).
157. Id.
158. Vea, Iran Sues U.S. Over Gulf Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at A6.
159. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 96/4, Feb. 6, 1996.
160. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14); Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 .C.J. 3 (Apr. 14).
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contra de las provisiones de la Convenci6n de Montreal, la cual rige los
asuntos de aviaci6n entre los partidos.' 6 ' Libia inicialnente pidi6 que la
corte les otorgara medidas interinas de protecci6n hacia las acciones de los
Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido, pero estos fueron negados por la
corte.162 Al mismo tiempo de esta escritura, el caso procede hacia su fase
de mdritos.
Ademis de los casos conjuntamente sometidos por los partidos a
los despacho del juez, solo ha habido una sumisi6n conjunta durante I.C.J.
III.
En el Gab Civico-Nagymaros Project," Htingara y Slovakia
conjuntamente trajeron a la corte una disputa sobre la implementacion y la
terminaci6n por Hfingara del Tratado sobre la Construcci6n y Operaci6n
del GabCiovo-Nagymaros, el cual fue firmado en Budapest el 16 de
Septiembre, 1977.(' Este caso empez6 sobre el edificio de un dique el
Danubio, es de inter6s porque involucra ambas preguntas de la ley del
tratado y preguntas internacionales de la ley ambiental.'" En el momento
de esta escritura, el caso estaba en la etapa de los alegatos escritos.
En el caso Concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, !" habian dos
aplicaciones para medidas provisionales hecha por Bosnia y Herzegovma
contra Yugoslavia. La corte ordeno medidas provisionales en la primera
aplicaci6n pero se encontr6 incapaz de ordenar mis medidas provisionales
en el segundo a causa de preguntas jurisdiccionales. 67 Al mismo tiempo
de esta escritura, Yugoslavia habia archivado objeciones preliminares en
este caso y la corte habia fijado el 14 de Noviembre, 1995, para las
presentaciones de las declaraciones escritas por Bosnia y Herzegovina en

161. Montreal Convention for the Suspension of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565; 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
162. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr.
14).
163. Gabtkovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1993 I.C.J. 319 (July 14).
164. Id.
165. Vea, Dispute Over Danube Dam Threatens Hungarian Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1993, at A10.
166. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
167. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8); Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13). Vea tambitn Jennings, supra note 5,
at 502.

1996]

Scott

lo que concierne a esas objeciones preliminares. "8 Las audiencias sobre.
las objeciones preliminares fuerori abiertas el 29 de Abril, 1996.169
V. CONCLUSI6N
Los resultados de los casos sometidos durante el periodo actual del
I.C.J. alienta hacia la adjudicaci6n internacional.
Sin embargo,
inspeccionando el periodo actual como una tendencia en el arreglo de
disputas internacionales deberia acercarse con el optimismo precavido; hay
alguna probabilidad que podria ser meramente otro ciclo de actividad
aumentada de la corte.
Nuestras comparaciones de la corte
inmediatamente despu~s de la guerra fria con la corte en los periodos
inmediatos (I.C.J. III), indican un consentimiento similar de los estados de
depender en la adjudicaci6n internacional para resolver sus disputas en
periodos en los cuales siguiere serias interrupciones internacionales.
El I.C.J., en el periodo actual, ha sido usado por los estados en
distintas maneras para resolver sus disputas. Ellos lo han usado para
ganar arreglos judiciales, y ellos lo utilizan como un elemento en el
proceso internacional de negociaci6n. Esto es evidente en el ndimero de

casos que se terminaron a causa de soluciones alcanzadas con anterioridad
a la decisi6n del juez. Esto es una barrena para la legalidad internacional
y para la corte. No es necesario que una disputa tenga una resoluci6n

judicial, sino que se pueda sellar. Si la corte puede jugar un papel como
agente de negociaci6n en el proceso de arreglos de disputas, entonces ha
cumplido una funci6n ditil.
Una seial mfs alentadora es que los estados no han usado la corte
durante I.C.J. III como el dinico medio para ganar palanca politica contra

los otros estados, como tan frecuentemente sucedieron durante I.C.J. I y
particularmente en los casos de desafto durante I.C.J. 11.'70 Probablemente
por esto no se han habido mfs instancias en el periodo actual de desaflo

estatal de la autoridad de la corte. Sin embargo esto merece una nota de
cauci6n tambi6n.

En muchos de los casos que exponen elementos que

estaban presente en ejemplos anteriores de desafto, los casos se resolvieron
en favor del estado respondedor, de este modo quitando cualquiera raz6n
para que el estado desaffe a la corte.
168. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 95/21, July
19, 1995.
169. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.; Serbia & Montenegro), I.C.J. Communique No. 96/3, Feb.
6, 1996.
170. Vea generalnente, supra note 23.
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Similarmente, la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de la corte no se ha
puesto a ninguna prueba severa. Ha servido en ambas jurisdicciones
opcional de cliusulas y en jurisdicci6n compromisario de clusula cuando
los estados parecen predisponerse hacia el arreglo de la disputa y cuando
el arreglo deseado es legal. Mientras no hay una raz6n particular para el
pesimismo sobre la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de ia corte, como habia
durante el periodo del I.C.J. II, no hay raz6n tampoco para el optimismo
extremo. La corte simplemente no ha visto casos donde un estado intenta
de forzar otra litigaci6n mediante el uso de la jurisdicci6n compulsaria
opcional de ]a corte. Los casos recientes seguramente no dan ninguna
raz6n para tratar de aumentar la jurisdicci6n compulsaria de poder de la
corte. Jurisdicci6n compulsaria marcha lo suficiente bien en su forma
opcional actual, y probablemente no trabajara si intentos fueron hechos
para instituir la jurisdicci6n compulsaria mandatario.
Por razones que pueden tener que ver con el fin de la guerra fria y
acompafiando un sentido de idealismo legal, el periodo actual del I.C.J. ha
sido uno en donde los estados han expuesto un interds para el arreglo legal
de las disputas. Ademis, las disputas han sido saliente, involucrando
como anteriormente, materias que frecuentemente han sido el tema de
hostilidades abiertas. En las materias presentadas, ambos los despachos
del juez y en toda la corte , la corte ha sido bastante exitosa en desempefiar
su papel de arreglo de disputas. No hay manera de saber en este momento
si el sentido actual de legalidad entre los estados sobreviva el periodo de la
guerra fria del idealismo legal, o si vendr, el fin como a tales periodos del
legalismo que seguirin las dos guerras mundiales. Nosotros solo podemos
tener la esperanza que estamos viviendo en un periodo de tendencia hacia
la legalidad internacional y no meramente viviendo otro ciclo en la historia
de la corte Mundial.
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I. INTRODUCCION

El arbitraje comercial es un m6todo de procedimientos para
resolver disputas sin litigo alternativo de conflictos (RAC) que ha sido
usado mundialmente para evitar los extensos y costosos de procedimientos
ante autoridades judiciales. "En el arbitraje, las partes voluntariamente se
acuerdan a someter sus diferencias actuales y futuras a una tercera parte un drbitro - para su soluci6n, y ellas se acuerdan a previamente aceptar la
decisi6n como conclusiva y obligatoria."' Organizaciones y asociaciones
nacionales e internacionales han reconocido el arbitraje como un m6todo
de procedimientos para resolver disputas sin litigio, incluyendo a la
Comisi6n de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo del Derecho del

1. Zhaodong Jiang, Federal ArbitrationLaw and State Court Proceedings, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 473, 474 (1990) (nota editorial: traducido del lngl6s).
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Comercio Internacional (UNCITRAL), 2 la Cdmara de Comercio
Internacional (ICC),, la Comisi6n Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial,
la Comisi6n Econ6mica de las Naciones Unidas para Europa,4 y la
Asociaci6n Americana de Arbitraje (AAA).' La importancia del arbitraje
comercial ha sido reconocida por muchos paises alrededor del mundo
mediante la aprobaci6n y ratificaci6n de convenciones internacionales
sobre el arbitraje. Una de esas convenciones' es la Convenci6n de las
Naciones Unidas sobre el Reconocimiento y Ejecuci6n de las Sentencias
Arbitrales Extranjeras (Convenci6n Sobre Arbitraje de Nueva York, 1958)
y la otra es la Convenci6n Interamericana sobre Arbitraje Comercial
Internacional (Convenci6n Interamericana, 30 de Enero de 1975).
Costa Rica se encuentra en un proceso de aceptaci6n del arbitraje
como un mdtodo importante de procedimientos para resolver disputas sin
litigio.8 A pesar de que Costa Rica ha ratificado las convenciones de

2. UNCITRAL fue establecida en 1966 por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas
para promover la armonizaci6n del derecho del comercio internacional, y en 1985, 61 pafses,
incluyendo a los Estados Unidos, aprobaron y ratificaron la Ley Modelo del Arbitraje Comercial
Internacional propuesta por UNCITRAL. La Ley Modelo fue disefiada para establecer un
procedimiento y pr~cticas uniformes de arbitraje en las transacciones comerciales internacionales.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 1 (1985).
3. La Comisi6n Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial (CIAC) fue creada segdn la
resoluci6n XIII de la VII conferencia de la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos (O.E.A.)
realizada en Montevideo, Uruguay en 1933.
4. La Comisi6n particip6 en ia formaci6n de la Convenci6n Europea sobre el Arbitraje
Comercial Internacional del 21 de Abil de 1961; la Convenci6n se ha venido aplicando desde el
dia 7 de Enero de 1964.
5. La Asociaci6n Americana de Arbitraje tiene sus oficinas centrales en Nueva York y es
una instituci6n que facilita Arbitros para la soluci6n de conflictos; la Asociaci6n tiene sus propias
reglas de arbitraje.
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [de aquf adelante New York Arbitration Convention]. Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3 [de aquf adelante Inter-American Convention]. Otra convenci6n, pero que tiene
relaci6n dnicamente para ]a soluci6n de conflictos Sobre inversi6n Entre un estado y los
Ciudadanos de otro estado, es la Convenci6n sobre la Soluci6n de Conflictos sobre Inversi6n
entre un Estado y los Ciudadanos de Otto Estado de 1966, la cual fue ratificada por los Estados
Unidos e implementada mediante 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650-1650a (1966).
7. Vea New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6.
8. Todos los conflictos sobre seguros en los cual es parte el Instituto Nacional de Seguros
de Costa Rica, excepto por los casos de riesgos profesionales, se solucionan por medio del
arbitraje compulsorio; los seguros son el Irea en la que mis se utiliza el arbitraje.
La empresa realizadora de encuestas, CID-GALLUP, realiz6 en Julio de 1994 una
encuesta y lleg6 a la conclusi6n de que en Costa Rica el arbitraje no es considerado por los
costarricenses como m~todo de procedimientos para resolver disputas sin litigio; dinicamente el
5% de los que participaron en la encuesta aceptaron resolver sus conflictos por un mediador y el
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Nueva York e Interamericana y de que tiene sus propias normativa sobre

el arbitraje, los procesos arbitrales y la jurisprudencia sobre el arbitraje en
Costa Rica son muy escasos. 9 Existen diferentes propuestas para crear en
Costa Rica centros de procedimientos para resolver disputas sin litigo con
el prop6sito de promover el arbitraje, y otros m6todos de procedimientos
para resolver disputas sin litigio.o Nuevas regulaciones sobre el arbitraje

esttn siendo preparadas por distintas autoridades, incluyendo un proyecto
de ley sobre el arbitraje comercial que se encuentra en trnite de discusi6n

y anilisis en la Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica.
Los Estados Unidos de Amdrica tambi~n han reconocido la
importancia del arbitraje como un m6todo de procedimientos para resolver
disputas sin litigio." En 1925 se aprob6 en los Estados Unidos la Ley
Federal sobre el Arbitraje'2 con el prop6sito de establecer que los acuerdos
arbitrales son vilidos, irrevocables y ejecutables, y tambi6n los Estados
Unidos han aprobado las convenciones de Nueva York e Interamericana

2% indicaron otros metodos, ninguno de los cuales fue el arbitraje. Hernando Paris R.,
Resoluci6n Alternativa de Disputas, 91 IVSTITIA 5, 8 (1994).
En elmes de Abril de 1995, CID-GALLUP realiz6 una segunda encuesta y concluy6
que el38% de los que participaron en la encuesta aceptaron la conciliaci6n como un m6todo de
procedimientos para resolver disputas sin litigios el 31% aceptaron lamediaci6n, el 16%
aceptaron el arbitraje, y el27% prefirieron acudir a los tribunales de justicia. Hernando Paris
R., Resoluci6n Alternativa de Conflictos, 100 IVSTITIA 8, 11 (1995).
El Lic. Hernando Paris R. es el Director del P'ograma Costarricense sobre Resoluci6n
Alternativa de Conflictos.
9. Una de las propuestas es el Centro de Arbitraje de [a Cdmara de Comercio de Costa
Rica, que iniciarfa sus operaciones en el mes de Mayo de 1996 pero hasta lafecha no lo ha
hecho. La Cone Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, laCAmnara de Comercio de Bogota,
Colombia, y laAgencia Internacional para elDesarrollo de los Estados Unidos de America
(A.I.D.), han contribuido en lacreaci6n del Centro de Arbitraje, asi como en la creaci6n de un
centro de arbitraje para materia de familia (e]cual inici6 sus operaciones recientemente). Vea
New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6..
10. La Cone Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, elColegio de Abogados, ]a Cdmara de
Comercio de Costa Rica, y laCAmara de Comercio de BogotA, Colombia, estlin preparando un
proyecto de Icy que deberia ser discutido y analizado por laAsamblea Legislativa en los
pr6ximos meses. Un proyecto de ley propuesto por elDiputado Rodolfo Brenes G6mez y
publicado en LA GACETA, eldia lunes 12 de Febrero de 1996, estA siendo discutido y analizado
por elCongreso Nacional. Brenes Gomez, LA GACETA, Feb. 12, 1996.
11. Ley Federal sobre Arbitraje, en ingles "Federal Arbitration Act." Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1996).
12. La Convenci6n de Nueva York se encuentra vigente desde eldia 29 de Diciembre de
1970. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6. Para realizar un estudio mds profundo
sobre elhistorial legislativa y su prop6sito, yea Pub. L. 91-338; Pub. L. No. 91-338, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601. La Convenci6n Interamericana se encuentra vigente en los Estados Unidos
desde eldia 27 de Octubre de 1990; y el historial legislativo y elprop6sito podrin ser estudiados
en Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990).

1996]

Koberg

247

sobre el arbitraje. Cada estado de los Estados Unidos tiene sus propias
reglas sobre arbitraje.
El prop6sito de este ensayo es estudiar las normas de arbitraje en
Costa Rica desde el C6digo Procesal Civil y proponer algunas reformas
que se consideran necesarias. La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje de los
Estados Unidos" ser, utilizada como una gufa para proponer reformas
sobre la confirmaci6n, anulaci6n, correcci6n, modificaci6n y ejecuci6n de
laudos arbitrales. Otros temas y reglas de arbitraje entre Costa Rica y los
estados individuales en los Estados Unidos serfin estudiadas en futuras
oportunidades.

II. MARCO LEGAL DEL ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL EN COSTA RICA
La Constituci6n (Constituci6n), el C6digo Civil, el C6digo
Procesal Civil, la Convenci6n de Nueva York, y la Convenci6n
Interamericana, reconocen y regulan el arbitraje comercial en Costa Rica."1
5
A. La Constituci6nl
La Constituci6n es el documento mis importante del sistema
jurfdico costarricense. Entre otras cosas, la Constituci6n explica c6mo
esti organizado el gobierno; incluyendo la divisi6n entre lastras ramas de
poder, ]a Ejecutiva, Legislativa y Judicial; indica ademls cuiles son los
derechos y obligaciones de los costarricenses, y de los extranjeros, y
qui6nes son los ciudadanos costarricenses. '
La Constituci6n reconoce el derecho de los ciudadanos
costarricenses y extranjeros de solucionar sus disputas mediante la
cooperaci6n del poder judicial o de un irbitro." El articulo 43 de la
Constituci6n indica que toda persona tiene el derecho de solucionar sus

13. George A. Davidson, A Report of the New York State Bar Association International
Litigation Committee, Commercial and Federal Litigation Section: The Uncitral Model Law on
International CommercialArbitration, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 94 (1990).
14. LA CONSTITUCION POLrICA DE COSTA RICA [de aquf adelante CONSTrrUC16N
POLmCA]; CODIGO CIVIL (Costa Rica); CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [C.P.C.] (Costa Rica); New
York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6; Inter-American Convention, supra note 6. Costa
Rica tambidn ha firmado tratados sobre arbitraje con Suiza (15 de Junio de 1965), Italia ( 8 de
Febrero de 1910), Nicaragua (28 de Junio de 1989), Portugal (Mayo de 1914), y Reino de Italia
(31 de Octubre de 1931). Fernando Bolafios Cspedes, Arbitraje Comercial en Costa Rica, 48
Revista Judicial 71, 87 (1989).
15. La Constituci6n Polftica de Costa Rica entr6 en vigencia el dfa 8 de Noviembre de
1949.
16. CONSTITUCIN POLITICA.

17. Id. at art 43.
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diferencias econ6micas por medio de ,rbitros, incluyendo los casos en los
que existe un procedimiento judicial pendiente.
B. C6digo Civil"
El C6digo Civil contiene las regulaciones bsicas del derecho
privado en Costa Rica. El C6digo reconoce y establece reglas sobre:
obligaciones, contratos, bienes raices, propiedad movible, derechos de
acreedores y deudores, limitaciones, y otros. 10
La Constituci6n predomina sobre cualquier ley o c6digo. Segdn el
ordenamiento juridico costarricense, la Constituci6n, los tratados y
concordados aprobados y ratificados por la Asamblea Legislativa, tienen
2
valor superior al C6digo Civil. '

En el Libro IV, Titulo XII, Capitulo II, articulo 1386 del C6digo
Civil, se hace referencia al compromiso, este articulo autoriza a las partes
de una disputa en solicitar irbitros para resolver sus conflictos actuales.2
El articulo 1392 indica que las regulaciones referentes al acuerdo de

18. CONSTITUCION POLIT1CA, art. 43 (Costa Rica). Segfn el C6digo Procesal Civil [de
aqui adelante C.P.C.], articulo 507, el compromiso puede ser pactado par las partes de previo al
inicio de un proceso judicial o durante su transmitaci6n, pero un compromiso no tiene validez
cuando en el proceso judicial se ha dictado sentencia de primera instancia. Literalmente, parece
que el artfculo 507 del C6digo Procesal Civil es contrario al artfculo 43 de la Constituci6n
Polltica porque limita o restringe el arbitraje como un mdtodo de soluci6n alternativa de
conflictos econ6micos. No podemos observar ningdin problema si las panes en conflicto solicitan
a un irbitro para dirimir su conflicto a pesar de que un juez ya ha dictado sentencia de primera
instancia. Las panes deben tener libertad de contrataci6n para escoger las formas de dirimir sus
diferencias. Ademds, el C6digo Procesal Civil no indica en forma expresa que un laudo arbitral
es nulo e invilido si es producto de un compromiso acordado luego de dictada una sentencia de
primera instancia. CONSTITUCI6N POLrITCA art. 43 (Costa Rica); C.P.C. art. 507 (Costa Rica).
El artlculo 1386 del C6digo Civil no incluye una restricci6n similar a la del C6digo Procesal
Civil, pero podria interpretarse que la regulaci6n del C6digo Civil fue reformada tAcitamente par
el C6digo Procesal Civil por ser 6ste Oltimo una ley posterior. C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1386 (Costa
Rica); C-P.C. art. 507 (Costa Rica).
19. El C6digo Civil de Costa Rica estA vigente desde el dla 1 de Enero de 1888.
20. C6DIGO CIVIL (Costa Rica).
21. CONsTrruCiN POLITICA arts. 7, 10.
22. El C~digo Civil se refiere especfficamente al contrato de compromiso en el artlculo
1386. En lngl6s, se podria denominar coma "arbitration agreement", en el que las partes
acuerdan los tdrminos del procedimiento arbitral, indican los puntos en que existe un acuerdo y
en los que no existe un acuerdo, e indican cuales asuntos deberfan ser resueltos par los Arbitros.
En la clausula compromisoria o "arbitration clause" o "agreement to arbitrate", las panes
acuerdan de someter sus disputas presentes y futuras a un Arbitro. Vea C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1386
(Costa Rica).
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transacci6n serias aplicables al acuerdo de arbitraje, con la condici6n de
que no contradigan la naturaleza del acuerdo del arbitraje. 14

C. C6digo Procesal Civil"
El C6digo del procedimiento civil [de aquf adelante C6digo]
contiene regulaciones para diferentes procesos judiciales, incluyendo el
arbitraje. 26 Las reglas sobre el arbitraje est~n ubicadas en distintas partes
del C6digo27, aunque la mayoria de las regulaciones se encuentran en los
articulos 507 al 529, Capftulo III del Titulo IV del Libro II; este Capftulo
III se refiere especificamente al proceso arbitral y define el proceso arbitral
como un Proceso Especial distinto de cualquier otro proceso regulado por
el C6digo.Y La tercera Secci6n del Capitulo I del Titulo I del Libro II,

23. En el contrato de transacci6n, las partes logran un acuerdo final en el que solucionan
sus conflictos. Los trminos y las condiciones del acuerdo se fijan por escrito y usualmente
ambas pares renuncian parcialmente a to que elias consideran que les corresponde. Seglin el Dr.
Walter Niehaus Bonilla, el contrato de transacci6n serA utilizado para ejecutar los laudos
arbitrales dictados, por el Centro de Arbitraje de ia Cimara de Comercio de Costa Rica mientras
las rcgulaciones actuales sobre el arbitraje son reformadas para permitir que los laudos dictados
por la C mara sean vdlidos y ejecutables. Una vez que los laudos, son dictados, las partes
firmarian un documento en el que manifiestan aceptar los t6rminos del arbitraje y cumplir con to
dictado. Este documento serd el contrato de transacci6n. Si una de las partes no cumple con to
indicado en el contrato de transacci6n, la otra parte podrA acudir a los tribunales de justicia para
solicitar la ejecuci6n del contrato. Entrevista realizada en San Jos6, Costa Rica, el dfa 18 de
Marzo de 1996, al Dr. Walter Niehaus Bonilla, k'bitro nombrado por la Ctmara de Comercio de
Costa Rica.
24. CODIGO CIVIL art. 1392 (Costa Rica).
25. El C6digo Procesal Civil fue promulgado por la Asarnblea Legislativa de Costa Rica el
dfa 21 de Julio de 1989, fue ratificado por el Presidente el dfa 16 de Agosto de 1989, y fue
publicado en La Gaceta, en Noviembre 3, 1989. LA GACETA, Nov. 3, 1989. Se encuentra
vigente desde el dfa 3 de Mayo de 1989.
26. El arbitraje es considerado por el C6digo Procesal Civil como un proceso judicial, lo
que significa que un juez tendrfa una amplia participaci6n en todo el proceso arbitral. . C.P.C.
Libro IV, Capflulo III (Costa Rica).
27. Los artfculos 11 y 12, ubicados en el Capftulo I del Tltulo I del Libro I, se refieren a la
jurisdicci6n y a ia participaci6n judicial para la ejecuci6n de laudos arbitrales y otros resoluciones
arbitrales. C.P.C. arts. 11, 12 (Costa Rica). El Capftulo IV del Tftulo I del Libro I se refiere a
las recusaciones, excusas y responsabilidad es civil y es de los jueces, incluyendo a los Arbitros;
la segunda pane de la secci6n II d el Capftulo IV, artfculos 76 a 78, se refieren especificamente a
la recusaci6n de los drbitros. C.P.C. arts. 76-78 (Costa Rica). Los Tftulo I, II, y del Libro III,
se refieren a ]a ejecuci6n de laudos arbitrales. El Tftulo IV del Libro III se refiere a la ejecuci6n
de laudos arbitrales extranjeros
28. C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
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artfculo 298 pirrafo 5, se refiere a la clusula compromisoria o de
compromiso como excepci6n procesal. I
D. Las Convenciones de Nueva York y de la Interamericana°
La Convenci6n de Nueva York se refiere al "reconociniento y
ejecuci6n de laudos arbitrales dictados en el territorio de un Estado que no
sea el Estado en el cual se pretende reconocer y ejecutar el laudo arbitral,

y que sean producto de las diferencias entre personas, ya sea fisicas o
juridicas." 1, La Convenci6n incluye normas sobre los motivos para el
rechazo de la aplicaci6n de la ley y cliusulas compromisorias. 32
Entre otros temas, la Convenci6n Interamericana reconoce la
validez de las cliusulas compromisorias entre las partes con respecto a las

diferencias que puedan surgir o hayan surgido entre ellas con respecto a
las operaciones comerciales.,
III. EL MARCO LEGAL DEL ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL EN Los
ESTADOS UNIDOS
El arbitraje comercial en los Estados Unidos est, legalmente
regulado por la Ley Federal del Arbitrajel', la Convenci6n de Nueva York,
la Convenci6n Interamericana, y por las leyes estatales.
29. C.P.C. art. 298 (Costa Rica). La utilizaci6n de la cliusula compromisoria podrfa causar
una confusi6n si se interpreta que laclusula compromisoria no es independiente de las otras
partes del contrato principal.
Segdn el artfculo 299 de lamisma secci6n, cuando una defensa procesal ha sido
opuesta por el demandado, el juez, antes de informar al demandante sobre ia respuesta del
demandado, debe decidir sobre Ia validez de ladefensa. Si ladefensa procesal es aceptada, el
demandante tiene el derecho de apelar laresoluci6n respectiva y elprocedimiento serd suspendido
hasta que la apelaci6n sea resuelta. Si elJuez no acepta ia defensa, eldemandado tendrA el
derecho de apelar laresoluci6n respectiva, pero el procedimiento no serd suspendido. C.P.C.
art. 299 (Costa Rica).
30. La Convenci6n de Nueva York rue ratificada por Costa Rica mediante la Ley ntimero
6157 del 1 de Diciembre de 1977. La Convenci6n interamericana Cue ratificada mediante laLey
ndimero 6165 del 2 de Diciembre de 1977. A pesar de que [a Convenci6n de Nueva York Cue
firmada en 1958, no fue sino hasta el 1 de Diciembre de 1977 que fue ratificada (dnicamente un
dfa despu6s fue ratificada laConvenci6n Interamericana). Costa Rica ratific6 las convenciones
sin realizar ningunas reservas. Estas situaciones demuestran uno de los problemas mis grandes
de laAsamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica: las Convenciones son aprobadas y ratificadas mucho
tiempo despu6s de que son firmadas y solamente cuando existen varias convenciones pendientes
sobre el mismo tema. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6. Inter-American
Convention, supra note 6.
31. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
32. Id. at arts. 2, 5.
33. Inter-American Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
34. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1996).
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A. La Ley Federal Sobre el Arbitraje
La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje fue promulgada en 1925. La
Ley contiene tres capftulos: el primero se refiere al arbitraje en general, el
segundo con respecto a la promulgaci6n de la Convenci6n de Nueva York,
y el tercero con respecto de la implementaci6n de la Convenci6n
Interamericana. ,1
El primer capitulo de la ley contiene 16 secciones. Cada secci6n
se refiere a un tema especifico de arbitraje, incluyendo el Mnbito, la
validez de los acuerdos, la suspensi6n de procedimientos judiciales, la
negaci6n de arbitrar, el nombramiento de los Arbitros, las solicitudes
judiciales, las citaciones de testigos, los procedimientos en materia del
derecho maritimo, el embargo de buques u otras propiedades, la
confirmaci6n, la modificaci6n, la correcci6n, la anulaci6n de los laudos
arbitrales, las notificaciones, la imperfecci6n de la Teoria del Acto del
Estado, y las apelaciones del arbitraje.
Como se indic6, la ejecuci6n de la Convenci6n de Nueva York se
encuentra en el segundo capitulo de la Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje. El
segundo capitulo se inicia con ia secci6n 201 y Ilega hasta la secci6n 208.
Esta secciones: regula la ejecuci6n de la convenci6n, el imbito de su
aplicaci6n, jurisdicci6n y competencia, el traslado de los casos a cortes
estatales, las 6rdenes para obligar al arbitraje y el nombramiento de
irbitros, la jurisdicci6n y el procedimiento para la confirmaci6n de un
laudo arbitral, y la aplicaci6n subsidiaria. del primer Capitulo de la Ley.
La ejecuci6n de la Convenci6n Interamericana se encuentra en el
tercer capftulo de la ley, secci6n 301. Cuando los Estados Unidos de
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3. Segdn el artfculo 510 del C6digo Procesal Civil, el compromiso
arbitral debe ser firmado por las partes como contrato privado o escritura pt~blica. El
compromiso debe ser dirigido al Juez competente y debe ser firmado por un abogado. El
compromiso arbitral debe incluir lo siguiente:
1. Exposici6n y enumeraci6n de los hechos en lo cual las panes esthn de acuerdo y
desacuerdo, con toda claridad y precisi6n. 2. Indicaci6n de las pretensiones. 3.
Determinaci6n precisa de las cuestiones que se someten al arbitraje. 4. Nombres y
apellidos, profesi6n y oficio y el domicilio de los Arbitros, o en su caso, el
procedimiento para nombrarlos. 5. El plazo dentro del cual los Arbitros deben dictar
el laudo. 6. Si el valor estimado es de mayor 0 menor cuantfa, segn la fijaci6n
realizada por Ia-Corte Suprema de la Justicia. 7. Honorarios de los Arbitros y de sus
ayudantes, incluyendo una estimaci6n de gastos. En caso de que el ,rbitro o los
drbitros sean funcionarios o tribunales de justicia investidos de atribuciones arbitrales,
estos no tendrtn derecho a cobro de los honorarios. 8. Si las partes depositaran
compensaci6n y por qu6 monto. 9. El procedimiento arbitral serl escogido por las
partes. Si las panes no indican un procedimiento, se aplicard entonces el establecido
en los artfculos 521 al 524. 10. Si el arbitraje es de equidad o derecho; si no hay
indicaci6n, se presume que el arbitraje es de derecho.
C.P.C. arts. 507-529 (Costa Rica).
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America ratific6 la Convenci6n Interamericana, se realizaron importantes
observaciones.
B. RegulacionesEstatales
Cada uno de los cincuenta Estados tiene regulaciones sobre el
arbitraje comercial aplicable a disputas entre estados. Basado en la
Ch~usula de la Supremacia de la Constituci6n, la Ley Federal sobre el
Arbitraje tiene valor superior y suplanta las leyes estatales si estas estin
contrarias a aquellas.
IV. LAS REGULACIONES SOBRE EL ARBITRAJE EN EL CODIGO
PROCESAL CIVIL DE COSTA RICA

Como se ha demostrado, el arbitraje ha sido permitido y aceptado
por la Constituci6n Polftica de Costa Rica, el C6digo Civil, y el C6digo
Procesal Civil. Las regulaciones principales del C6digo Procesal Civil se
encuentran incluidas en los articulos 507 al 529.6 En las siguientes
secciones estudiaremos las reglas sobre el arbitraje que se encuentran en el
C6digo Procesal Civil, el procedimiento arbitral, el reconocimiento y
ejecuci6n de los laudos arbitrales, y la participaci6n judicial en el
procedimiento arbitral.
A. ProcedimientoArbitral
Entre otras regulaciones, el C6digo Procesal Civil hace referencias
a: los acuerdos de arbitraje, la renuncia al derecho de acudir al sistema
judicial, ia aprobaci6n judicial de compromisos arbitrales, el
nombramiento de los ,rbitros, y los honorarios profesionales de los
irbitros. El C6digo ademis establece un procedimiento arbitral en
aquellos casos donde las partes no han acordado con ellos.
1. La Clusula Compromisoria y El Compromiso Arbitral
El C6digo Procesal Civil indica que una cliusula compromisoria
otorga a cada una de las partes del acuerdo el derecho de pedir a la otra
parte la firma de un compromiso arbitral. Si la otra parte no cumple con
la solicitud, esa parte seri responsable del pago de los dafios y perjuicios
causados y el juez redactar, el compromiso arbitral que fue rechazado por
una parte.
3
El compromiso arbitral se extingue por las siguientes causales: 1

36. C.P.C. arts. 507-539 (Costa Rica)
37. C.P.C. art. 518 (Costa Rica).
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Primero, falta de aceptaci6n del cargo por parte de los drbitros
nombrados,38 excepto si las partes han previamente nombrado a un

sustituto o han acordado un procedimiento para nombrar al sustituto.
Literalmente, el C6digo indica que el nombramiento previo de un Arbitro

sustituto, o el establecer previamente el procedimiento para nombrar un
sustituto, son necesarios para evitar ]a extinci6n del compromiso arbitral.
Consideramos que , no deberia existir ningfin problema con el

procedimiento arbitral si las panes posteriormente nombran un sustituto o
tienen un acuerdo sobre un procedimiento para nombrarlo. La ley es muy
clara al requerir un acuerdo previo, y tinicamente el sistema judicial podrA
determinar si se debe realizar una interpretaci6n literal o no para no exigir
acuerdos previos sobre nombramientos de sustitutos.
Segundo, el acuerdo de las partes.
Esta causal reconoce la

importancia del principio de la libertad de las partes para contratar.
Tercero, el vencimiento del plazo de los irbitros para dictar un
laudo arbitral, excepto los casos en cual los irbitros son jueces u otros
miembros del sistema judicial. El compromiso arbitral no debe ser
extinguido si el plazo para dictar el laudo arbitral se ha vencido y las
partes han acordado a extender o renovar el plazo. Literalmente, el

pirrafo 5 del artfculo 518 no permite pr6rrogas del plazo, pero el articulo
519 le provee a las pares a extender el plazo si dste no ha vencido.19
.38.
Cuando la Convenci6n fue ratificada, los Estados Unidos hizo las siguientes
observaciones:
Los Estados Unidos aplicard la Convenci6n sobre la base de la reciprocidad. al
reconocimiento y ejecuci6n de tInicamente aquellos laudos arbitrales dictados en el
territorio de otros Estados contratantes... Los Estados Unidos aplicarg la Convenci6n
tinicamente a aquellas diferencias que surJan de relaciones jurfdicas, ya sean
contractuales o no, que sean consideradas como comerciales segtin la Ley nacional de
los Estados Unidos ....
La Convenci6n se aplica a todos los territorios para las
relaciones internacionales de las cuales los Estados Unidos son responsables.
9 U.S.C. § 201. El articulo 512 del C6digo Procesal Civil indica que el tribunal arbitral
podrA ser t1nicamente de uno o dos Arbitros, excepto en los casos en to cual los Arbitros son de ia
Corte de Casaci6n. C.P.C. art. 512 (Costa Rica). Esto ha sido aceptado por el Poder Judicial.
Sentencia dictada el 25 de Junio de 1993, Sala Primera de la C.S.J. (Corte Suprema de Justicia de
Costa Rica)
El escritor no aprueba esta regulaci6n porque las panes deben estar libres de escoger el
ntmero de Arbitros que deseen para no limitar su libertad contractual. Las panes deben tener la
libenad contractual para escoger tribunales arbitrales los cuales consisten de mls de 3 personas,
aunque siempre deberfa haber un ndmero impar de Arbitros.
39. Las observaciones realizadas son las siguientes:
A menos de que exista un acuerdo expreso entre las panes en contra de una cllusula
compromisoria, existiendo el requisito para aplicar la Convenci6n Interamericana sobre
Arbitraje Comercial Internacional y ]a Convenci6n sobre el Reconocimiento y
Ejecuci6n de las Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras, si una mayorfa de las dichas panes
son ciudadanos de un Estado o Estados que han ratificado la Convenci6n
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Cuarto, la muerte o incapacidad de un Arbitro para votar un laudo,
excepto cuando las partes han nombrado a un sustituto o han acordado un
procedimiento para realizar la sustituci6n. Al contrario del caso cuando
no haya aceptaci6n por parte de un irbitro de su nombramiento, esta
clhusula no exige un nombramiento previo de un sustituto o un acuerdo
previo sobre c6mo se deber realizar ese nombramiento.
Quinto, el no oponer la excepci6n de compromiso en un proceso
judicial.40 Est, clfusula hace referencia al articulo 298, que se refiere a las
excepciones que el demandado puede hacer al inicio de un proceso
judicial. Es muy extraflo que el C6digo no incluya una norma al respecto
de la extinci6n de la cliusula compromisoria. No estA claro qud sucede
cuando un demandado no opone ia excepci6n de la cl~usula compromisoria
iQuiere eso decir que la cliusula
durante un proceso judicial.
compromisoria deja de existir? Considerando que el ptrrafo 5 del articulo
518 del C6digo establece que cuando no se aleja la excepci6n del
compromiso arbitral, esto significa que el compromiso arbitral queda
extinguido. La clusula compromisoria no se extingue si ia excepci6n de
Iacliusula compromisoria no se opuesta. Sin embargo, si la excepci6n de
la clusula compromisoria y de compromiso no se opone, la chdusula
compromisoria y el compromiso arbitral quedan extinguidos.

Interamericana y que son miembros de la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, la
Convenci6n Interamericana ser' aplicable. En todos los otros casos, [a Convenci6n
sobre el Reconocmiento y Ejecuci6n de las Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras serf
aplicable . . . Los Estados Unidos aplicardn las reglas procesales de la Comisi6n
Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial que se encuentren vigentes en la fecha en que
los Estados Unidos de America deposite el instrumento de ratificaci6n, a menos de que
los Estados Unidos decida posteriornente adoptar y aplicar las reformas realizadas a
dichas reglas... Los Estados Unidos aplicard la Convenci6n sobre la base de
reciprocidad, al reconocimiento y la ejecuci6n de Linicamente aquellos laudos arbitrales
dictados en el territorio de otro Estado contratante.
9 U.S.C. §301; C.P.C. art. 519 (Costa Rica). El articulo indica adenus que si las panes no han
acordado un plazo para que los Arbitros dicten el laudo, el plazo serfa de 6 meses desde el inicio
del procedimiento arbitral hasta que el laudo sea dictado. El artfeulo incluye una norma muy
interesante sobre la interrupci6n o suspensi6n del plazo para dictar el laudo; el articulo permite
que el procedimiento sea suspendido en los mismos casos de procedimientos judiciales,
incluyendo la muerte o enfermedad seria de las partes o de sus representantes, procesos penales
pendientes que afecten el resultado del arbitraje, y por el acuerdo de las panes.
40. C.P.C. an. 1391 (Costa Rica).
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2. La Cliusula Compromisoria Significa la Renuncia al Derecho, de
la Asistencia de los Tribunales de Justicia4
El C6digo indica expresamente que el acuerdo de las partes de
someterse a un arbitraje implica una renuncia a su derecho de acudir a los
Tribunales de la Justicia para dirimir sus conflictos, e implica la aceptaci6n
del laudo arbitral como conclusivo y obligatorio.42
Durante el
procedimiento arbitral, no es posible presentar apelaciones a los jueces con
respecto a los asuntos relacionados con el arbitraje.", Esto no significa que
la participaci6n judicial estd completamente prohibida. En el arbitraje, el
juez es necesario para: ejecutar el laudo arbitral, para ordenar la
presentaci6n de pruebas," para embargar dineros y otros bienes, y incluso
para aprobar el compromiso arbitral.
3. Aprobaci6n Judicial del Compromiso Arbitral y la Llamada de

los Arbitros
El compromiso arbitral, una vez que ya ha sido firmado por las
panes y por un abogado, seri presentado ante un Juez competente.4" Si el
compromiso arbitral contiene errores, omisiones, o no esta ajusta al
formato establecido en el artfculo 510, el Juez esta obligado y facultado
para solicitar a las panes sus correcciones y modificaciones. 6 Cuando el
compromiso arbitral este aprobado por el Juez, el Juez pediri a los irbitros
escogidos por las panes que acepten o rechacen su nombramiento. Si las
partes no nombraron drbitros pero determinaron la forma o procedimiento
para nombrarlos, el Juez nombrarl a los Arbitros y les pedird que acepten
o rechacen el nombramiento.
Si las panes no nombraron irbitros y no establecieron el m6todo o
procedimiento para su nombramiento, o si el m6todo no es aceptado por el

41.
Osvaldo J. Marzorati, Derecho de los Negocios internacionales [Rights of the
InternationalBusinesses), 592 (1993).

42. C.P.C. art. 509 (Costa Rica).
43. Tribunal Superior I Civil [First Civil Superior Court), Enero 22, 1992 (Costa Rica).
44. C.P.C. art. 509 (Costa Rica).
45. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica).

46. Arbitraje de "Derecho" se refiere a los laudos dictados hechos con acuerdo de la ley, a]
contrario del arbitraje de "Equidad" en el cual los laudos son dictados con fundamento en lo que
los Arbitros consideran que es justo. C.P.C. art. 511 (Costa Rica).
El Juez competente serfa aquel que fuera competente para resolver el caso si fuera tranitado
judicialmente. El C6digo simplemente indica que los criterios, para determinar la competencia
de los Jueces que participan en el proceso arbitral, son los mismos que se aplican para la
competencia en general que se encuentran en los artfculos 7 a 45. C.P.C arts. 7, 45 (Costa Rica).
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Juez, el Juez tiene el poder de nombrar a los Arbitros." Si el arbitraje es
de "Derecho," los Arbitros sernn escogidos de una lista de 30 abogados
distinguidos." Si el arbitraje es de "Equidad," el Juez escogert a los
.rbitros de un grupo de personas honorables y capaces que puedan
conducir el procedimiento arbitral.
Una vez que los Arbitros hayan aceptado su nombramiento y una
vez que sus honorarios y costos anticipados hayan sido depositados ante el
Juez, ' 9 el Juez autorizara a los ,rbitros para iniciar el procedimiento
arbitral.
4. Honorarios de los Arbitros
Si las partes no tienen un acuerdo sobre los honorarios de los
irbitros, el ordenamiento juridico costarricense-1 brinda una soluci6n: 1)
para procedimientos arbitrales estimados en $100,000.00 o menos, los
honorarios sern 10% si se trata de solo un ,rbitro, y 5% si se trata de tres
irbitros, 2) si la estimaci6n es superior a $100,000.00, cada ,rbitro tiene
el derecho a un 3% adicional. Si no existe un acuerdo al contrario, cada
parte serA responsable de la mitad de los honorarios de los irbitros, y el
Juez no hard los pagos a los irbitros hasta que los Arbitros le hayan
entregado de nuevo el expediente junto con el laudo.5

47. C.P.C. art. 511 (Costa Rica).
48. Los 30 abogados son escogidos por laCone Suprema de laJusticia en su primera
reuni6n ordinaria de cada aflo. Uno de los requisitos de los abogados es elhaber practicado el
derecho durante 10 afios previo a su inclusi6n en lalista. Id.
49. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica). El dep6sito de los honorarios y gastos ante el Juez se
requiere inicamente si las panes han acordado de realizar dicho dep6sito, de conformidad con el
aniculo 510 inciso (9) del C6digo Procesal Civil. Id. A pesar de dicha regulaci6n, elartfculo
516 indica que elexpediente del caso serg entregado al tribunal arbitral una vez que los irbitros
hayan aceptado su nombramiento y una vez que las partes hayan depositado ante el Juez los
honorarios y los gastos. C.P.C. art. 516 (Costa Rica). Existe una clara contradicci6n entre estos
dos articulos. Ademr.s, un Arbitro podria condicionar su aceptaci6n del cargo a que sus
honorarios sean depositados ante elJuez, y por ello podrfa presentarse un conflicto si las partes
no acordaron realizar eldep6sito. Esta situaci6n obligarfa a las panes a realizar eldep6sito ante
elJuez con el prop6sito de no atrasar mns elprocedimiento y para evitar que su compromiso
arbitral se extinga, de conformidad con elarticulo 518 inciso 1. C.P.C. art. 518 (Costa Rica).
Para proteger ellabor de los irbitros, consideramos que to mros conveniente es que las partes
siempre depositen ante elJuez los honorarios de los irbitros y otros gastos del arbitraje.
La prdctica judicial ha sido siempre exigir a las panes eldep6sito de Jos honorarios y
gastos, segtn elDr. Walter Niehaus Bonilla. Vea, supra note 23.
50. C.P.C. art. 519 (Costa Rica).
51. El t6ltimo pirrafo del aniculo 517 deberfa ser reformado para indicar que los honorarios
de los drbitros no sean entregados a estos, hasta tanto ellaudo se encuentre firme y sin recurso
alguno. Segtin lainterpretaci6n literal del pfrrafo indicado, los Arbitros tendrfan derecho al pago
de sus honorarios a pesar de que no dicten el laudo, a pesar de que ellaudo no se ajuste al
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5. El Procedimiento Arbitral del C6digo Procesal Civil
El C6digo Procesal Civil le permite a las partes acordar sobre un
procedimiento que serd seguido por los ,rbitros para conducir el arbitraje
y para dictar el laudo arbitral. Si las panes no acordaron sobre un
procedimiento, el procedimiento establecido en los articulos 522 a 524
deberi ser utilizado.' El procedimiento es el siguiente:13
1. En casos en lo cual el tribunal arbitral estd compuesto por mis
de una persona, se deberg elegir un presidente.- Los procedimientos se
ejecutar,4n en el lugar designado para realizar el arbitraje.1' El tribunal
arbitral podrh nombrar un secretario, cuyos honorarios sern una cantidad
razonable y serin depositados ante el Juez.-6
2. Para presentar sus peticiones y ofrecer la prueba, las partes no
tendrin mls que un cuarto del plazo dado a los ,rbitros para que dicten el

compromiso arbitral, y a pesar de que el laudo contenga omisiones y errores, incluyendo aquellos
que sean causal de nulidad. C.P.C. art. 517 (Costa Rica).
52. C.P.C. arts. 522-524 (Costa Rica).
53. El procedimiento se encuentra en el artfculo 522, pero este procedimiento estA
especificado para el arbitraje del "Derecho." C.P.C. art. 522 (Cost Rica). Para el arbitraje de la
"Equidad," el procedimiento podrfa ser similar al del "Derecho," pero al menos deberfa otorgar
le a las partes la oportunidad para presentar sus alegatos y la prueba. C.P.C. art. 524 (Costa
Rica).
54. Segtin el artfculo 523 del C6digo Procesal Civil, en asuntos procesales en los cual no
existe un voto de mayorfa, el voto del presidente es el que decide: si el tribunal autoriza al
presidente para decidir sobre todos los asuntos procesales, su decisi6n es obligatoria. C.P.C. art.
523 (Costa Rica). No estA claro por qu6 el artlculo 523 menciona la posibilidad de que no exista
una decisi6n de mayorfa, ya que el tribunal puede estar compuesto tinicamente por uno o tres
personas, segtin el arttculo 512 del C6digo Procesal Civil. C.P.C. art. 512 (Costa Rica).
Ademis no esth claro quin elige al presidente del tribunal. El presidente deberfa ser
electo por los .rbitros o por las panes.
55. C.P.C. art. 522(1) (Costa Rica). No estA claro qui6n debe decidir cull seri el lugar del
arbitraje. No habrfa ningin problema si las panes previamente acordaron un lugar para realizar
el arbitraje. Se podrfa presentar un problema si los Arbitros deciden sobre un lugar para Ilevar a
cabo el arbitraje que es conveniente y accesible para ellos, pero no para las panes. El C6digo
deberfa contemplar una soluci6n a estos problemas. El lugar para realizar el arbitraje deberfa ser
uno de los requisitos del compromiso arbitral, y si no, al menos el Juez deberfa ser la persona
indicada para tomar la decisi6n. Consideramos que la mejor soluci6n podrfa ser permitir a los
Arbitros a decidir sobre el lugar del arbitraje y que esa decisi6n le sea inapelable y obligatoria.
56. No estS claro si el Secretario debe ser pane o no del tribunal arbitral. El secretario no
deberfa tener funciones de Arbitro, especialmente si toma decisiones que son Onicamente
competentes para los Arbitros. El secretario tiene la obligaci6n de notificar a las panes, los
testigos y las autoridades, siguiendo los procedimientos de notificaci6n establecidos en los
artfculos 173 a 185 del C6digo Procesal Civil. Entrevista con el Dr. WalterNiehaus Bonilla, ver
supra nota 23; C.P.C. arts. 173-185 (Costa Rica).
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laudo arbitral.
Se debe presentar una copia junto con todos los
documentos presentados."
3. Para presentar su contestaci6n y ofrecer la prueba pertinente,
las partes no tendrtn mas que un cuarto del plazo dado a los Arbitros para
dictar el laudo.
4. Una vez que las partes han respondido a los alegatos de la otra,

los ,rbitros ordenarn la recepci6n de prueba durante un plazo que no
podri ser mayor que un cuarto del plazo dado a los Arbitros para dictar el
laudo.
5. Para la recepci6n de pruebas y para notificaciones que no
pueden ser realizadas por los Arbitros, los Arbitros podrfin solicitar la ayuda
y la cooperaci6n necesaria del Juez del lugar donde se esta dando el

arbitraje.
6. Los Arbitros pueden otorgarles a las panes un plazo para
presentar sus conclusiones.
7. Los Arbitros, una vez que toda la prueba ha sido presentada y
las partes han hecho sus conclusiones, podrian solicitar pruebas adicionales
como se estime necesario"

B. El Laudo Arbitral y Apelaci6n"
1. Laudo Arbitral
El laudo deberd contener todas las alegaciones realizadas por
ambos partes y deberli ser dictado dentro el resto del plazo dado por las

partes.0
Segtin el articulo 525 del C6digo Procesal Civil, el laudo deberd
ser escrito y deberd ser dictado en forma unfinime o por mayoria.6' Los
votos salvados deberAn ser incluidos en el laudo arbitral. No existen otras

regulaciones formales sobre el laudo, especificamente si se debe contener

57. C.P.C. art. 522(2) (Costa Rica). No estA claro por qu6 el C6digo Procesal Civil le
exige a las partes alegar sus pretensiones en dos ocasiones, laprimera en el compromiso arbitral
y lasegunda durante el procedimiento arbitral. Esto podria permitirle a las partes laoportunidad
de modificar o rectificar sus intenciones y pretensiones, y esto no deberia ser permitido.
58. C.P.C. art. 522(7) (Costa Rica) (citando C.P.C. an. 331).
59. El C6digo Procesal Civil utiliza las causales de nulidad para referirse a los causales
para no convalidar o legalizar un laudo arbitral. El trmino "apelaci6n" se utilizarfa para indicar
una situaci6n en ]a cual la parte ha alegado un causal de nulidad. C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica).
60. C.P.C. art. 522 (Costa Rica).
61. El segundo prrafo del artlculo 525 da una soluci6n para los casos en los cuales los
,rbitros no pueden lograr una decisi6n de mayorfa. Considero que esta soluci6n no es relevante,
ya que el tribunal arbitral puede estar compuesto tinicamente por uno o tres personas, lo que evita
empates. C.P.C. art. 525 (Costa Rica).
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una descripci6n de los hechos y un fundamento legal, o si el laudo puede
ser tinicamente la conclusi6n de Jo que Ilegaron los irbitros.

2. Motivos Para Apelar y Dejar Sin Efecto el Laudo Arbitral
El dinico recurso contra el laudo es el de la nulidad, que no puede
ser renunciado por las partes.'2 La dnica excepci6n se presenta cuando el
tribunal arbitral es una Sala de la Corte Suprema de la Justicia, ya que el
laudo dictado por este tribunal no tiene recurso de nulidad.11
El laudo puede ser anulado fin'icamente por los siguientes
motivos:"
1. Si el laudo fue dictado fuera del plazo dado a los Arbitros, excepto
en casos en los cuales los Arbitros son parte del Poder Judicial.
2. Si el laudo incluy6 asuntos no sometidos al arbitraje.
3. Si el laudo no incluye asuntos sometidos por las partes al arbitraje.
4. Si el laudo fue dictado por un Arbitro contra quien se present6 una

solicitud de recusaci6n que fue denegada a pesar de que no debi6 ser
denegada.
5. Si el procedimiento arbitral no se realiz6 conforme al
procedimiento acordado por las panes, con evidente perjuicio para la
parte perdedora.
El vencimiento del plazo del procedimiento arbitral deberia ser un
motivo de nulidad solo si el laudo fue dictado despu6s del vencimiento del
plazo y las partes no lo extendieron. Adems, un laudo deberia ser vdlido
incluso si fue dictado luego del vencimiento del plazo y las partes no

extendieron el plazo, pero solo si las partes acordaron cuando el laudo fue
dictado que serfa vilido y obligatorio.
62. Vea C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica). Consideramos que las partes deberfan ser permitidos
a renunciar cualquier recurso contra el laudo arbitral. Si se les permite a las partes a solucionar
sus conflictos por medio de un Arbitro, deberla permitfrseles acordar que el laudo dictado sea
final y obligatorio y no sujeto a una apelaci6n. Adems, las panes podrfan renunciar a su
derecho de apelar simplemente alno presentar su apelaci6n dentro de los 15 dfas de plazo. Si se
considera que lanorma que no permite renunciar al derecho de apelaci6n es de orden ptiblico,
Lqud sucede entonces cuando laparte renuncia a su derecho alno presentar su apelaci6n? ,Se
puede obligar a las partes a apelar? Probablemente el espfritu del artfculo 526 prohibe la
oportunidad de las partes renunciar anticipadamente su derecho de apelaci6n. Id.
63. C.P.C. art. 527 (Costa Rica). El artfculo 527 del C6digo Procesal Civil indica cull
tribunal actuard como El Tribunal de las Apelaciones y que el recurso deberd ser presentado
dentro de los 15 dfas despuds de la notificaci6n a las panes del laudo arbitral. Id.
64. C.P.C. art. 526 (Costa Rica). Consideramos que el orden ptiblico deberfa ser un causal
para no legalizar o convalidar un laudo arbitral. Los sistemas de Francia, Espahia, la Ley Modelo
de Uncitral, la Convenci6n de Nueva York y la Convenci6n Interamericana, utilizan el orden
ptablico como un causal para no legalizar o convalidar un laudo arbitral. UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW art. 34 (1985); New York Arbitration Convention, supra nota 6; Inter-American
Convention, supra nota 6.
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Sobre el segundo motivo de nulidad, es evidente que la totalidad
del laudo es nulo si los ,rbitros laudaron sobre asuntos no sometidos al
arbitraje. Sin embargo, si el haber incluido esos asuntos en el laudo no
afecta el resultado de los asuntos sometidos al arbitraje, la totalidad del
laudo no deberia ser nulo e invilido. Unicamente la parte del laudo que se
refiere a los asuntos no sometidos al arbitraje deberia ser anulada. Si la
resoluci6n del arbitraje es afectada por la resoluci6n de los asuntos no
sometidos a arbitraje, el tribunal de las apelaciones deberia al menos
excluir la parte del laudo que se refiere a los asuntos no sometidos a
arbitraje o, por lo menos, enviar el laudo de nuevo a los ,rbitros para su
modificaci6n y correcci6n.'5
Si los irbitros no laudaron asuntos sometidos al arbitraje, la
totalidad del laudo no deberia ser nulo. Considere que los asuntos
laudados no deberian ser anulados a menos que afecten el eventual laudo
sobre todos los asuntos sometidos al arbitraje. Lo laudado sobre asuntos
sometidos al arbitraje debe ser obligatorio, a menos de que el laudo sobre
los asuntos no sometidos afecte el laudo de los asuntos inicialmente
laudados y sometidos al arbitraje.
La cuarta causa de nulidad deberia ser limitada a los casos en los
cuales haya evidente parcialidad y corrupci6n en los Arbitros. Este causal
de nulidad no deberia limitarse a los casos en lo cual un irbitro debi6
haberse excusado, y en los que una solicitud de recusaci6n fue presentada
pero fue denegada injustificadamente, ya que los {irbitros pueden ser
parciales o corruptos aunque no haya motivo de recusaci6n o excusa. La
causa de nulidad deberia existir si existe evidente parcialidad o corrupci6n
por parte de los ,rbitros.
Estamos de acuerdo con la quinta causal de nulidad; cuando no
existe evidente de perjuicio para las partes a pesar de que los Arbitros no
siguieron el procedimiento arbitral, el laudo no deberia ser anulado.
Una adicional causa para anular una laudo arbitral deberia ser si
este va al contra del orden ptblico. Los laudos contrarios al orden paiblico
no deberian ser obligatorio ni deberian ser ejecutados, incluso en casos en
los que ninguna de las panes hayan alegado ese causal." A pesar de que
es dificil definir el orden ptiblico, el Poder Judicial es el inico que puede
65. Articulo 617, parrafo 4, permite al Juez que resuelva elRecurso de laApelaci6n anular

los laudos dictados en arbitrajes de "Equidad," pero (nicamente respecto a los asuntos no
sometidos a arbitraje. C.P.C. art. 526(4) (Costa Rica). Una regulaci6n similar deberia
establecerse para los arbitrajes del "Derecho." C.P.C. art. 617 (Costa Rica).
66. La Convenci6n de Nueva York (artlculo V.2) y laConvenci6n Interamericana (anfculo
5.2) reconocen elorden ptiblico como una justificaci6n para que un pais no reconozca un laudo
arbitral.
New York Arbitration Convention, supra nota 6, en art. V.2; Inter-American
Convention, supra nota 6, en art. V.2.
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determinar cuAl es el orden pdtblico de Costa Rica. Asuntos que no pueden
ser sometidos a arbitraje podrian ser considerados como regulaciones del
orden ptiblico. Un laudo arbitral debe ser dejado sin valor ni efecto si va
en contra del orden pfiblico, aunque ninguna de las partes lo hayan
alegado.
El C6digo Procesal Civil, en su articulo 527, le permite a los
irbitros a modificar o a corregir el laudo sin alterar el resultado. Los
drbitros pueden modificar o corregir un laudo en cualquier momento antes
de que se le haya sido notificado a las panes, y las partes pueden solicitar
la correcci6n o modificaci6n de un laudo dentro de los siguientes 3 dias de
su notificaci6n." En casos en los cuales existen errores meramente
materiales de cilculos err6neos u otros errores materiales de cilculos, los
drbitros pueden corregir o modificar el laudo en cualquier momento.' Si
el laudo contiene una causal de nulidad, su modificaci6n o correcci6n no
podria ser permitida.

C. La Competencia Para Confirmaro DejarSin Efecto un Laudo
El C6digo no indica claramente cudl juez confirmard un laudo
arbitral y con qud fundamento.69 Segdin lo indicado por el C6digo, existen
tres posibles respuestas sobre este problema:
1. La Confirmaci6n por el Tribunal de Apelaciones
El tribunal de las apelaciones confirmari un laudo en los casos en
cual una de las partes ha alegado una causal de nulidad y el tribunal de las
apelaciones decide que el laudo no es nulo, pero si valido. La resoluci6n
del tribunal de las apelaciones que confirma el laudo haria que el laudo
fuera ejecutado. Si el tribunal decide que el laudo es nulo, ese tribunal
deja el laudo sin valor y efecto.
2. La Confirmaci6n por los Arbitros
En los casos en cual el laudo a sido dictado por una Sala de la
Corte Suprema de la Justicia en los fuinciones de la tribunal arbitral, el
laudo se considera como confirnado. Los drbitros estarian confirmando el

67. C.P.C. art. 158 (Costa Rica).
68. C.P.C. arts. 158, 526 (Costa Rica).

69. El C6digo Procesal Civil no utiliza expresamente los tdrminos de confirmacid6n o
legalizacidn ni otros t6rminos de significado similar. Consideramos que los ttrminos
confirmaci6n o legalizaci6n se encuentran thcitamente incluidos en el C6digo, ya que un laudo
arbitral no puede, o al menos, no debe ser ejecutado sin su confirmaci6n o legalizaci6n por parte
de un Juez. C.P.C. arts. 525-29 (Costa Rica).
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laudo al indicar que es vilido y ejecutable cuando se carece de recurso
alguno.
3. La Confirmaci6n por Parte del Juez Ejecutante
Si una Sala de la Corte Suprema de la Justicia no es el tribunal
arbitral, y no se aleg6 ninguna causal de nulidad, la confirmaci6n del
laudo podria realizarse tnicamente por el juez encargado de su ejecuci6n.
No esti claro bajo que causales podrfa el laudo ser confirmado o dejado
sin valor y efecto, o si se podria dejar sin valor y efecto. Debido a que la
tdnica forma de dejar sin valor y efecto a un laudo es por alegar un causal
de nulidad dentro del plazo de 15 dias, un juez competente para la
ejecuci6n del laudono podria anular un laudo si el plazo de 15 dias se ha
vencido cuando el juez recibe el laudo.70
El problema de la confirmaci6n de un laudo arbitral podria ser
evitado tnicamente mediante la reforma del C6digo Procesal Civil. La
mejor soluci6n seria otorgarle al Juez ejecutante los poderes para
confirmar y anular los laudos, solamente un juez estaria involucrado en el
proceso de la confirmaci6n y ia anulaci6n de un laudo y por ello la
confusi6n al respecto seria eliminada.
D. La Ejecuci6n de Laudo Arbitral
Un laudo puede ser ejecutado finicamente cuando ha sido
confirmado o legalizado por un juez, ya que es necesario que un juez sea
el que ejecute un laudo." Una vez que el laudo ha sido confirmado, ser,
ejecutado por el juez aplicando las normas y regulaciones en la ejecuci6n
normal de las sentencias.n El juez que ejecuta el laudo es el mismo juez

70. El C6digo no da una respuesta respecto a los plazos para la confirmaci6n y ejecuci6n de
un laudo arbitral; el C6digo no indica cukdo laparte ganadora tiene que solicitar laejecuci6n
del laudo (en casos en los que no se ha alegado ningfin causal de nulidad o cuando el Juez de las
Apelaciones ha determinado que no existe ninglin causal de nulidad). La (nica soluci6n posible
podria ser los plazos de prescripci6n del C6digo Civil y del C6digo de Comercio, que podrian ser
de 10 afios, 4 afios, o I aflo o menos, dependiendo del tipo de conflicto. El C6digo Procesal
Civil indica en su artlculo 214 inciso 6 que durante laejecuci6n de los laudos, si ia propiedad de
la parte perdedora ha sido embargada, y laejecuci6n se ha mantenido inactiva injustificadamente
por mds de 3 meses, elJuez ejecutante debe ordenar lacancelaci6n del embargo. C.P.C. art. 214
(Costa Rica).
71. Vea C.P.C. arts. 12, 529 (Costa Rica).
72. C.P.C. art. 529 (Costa Rica). Las reglas y las regulaciones para ia ejecuci6n de las
sentencias estin incluidas en el Titulo III
del Libro Ill del C6digo Procesal Civil, artlculos 692 a
704, aunque los otros articulos del Libro IIlpodrian aplicarse para casos o situaciones no
previstas por los artfculos 692 a 704. C.P.C. arts. 692-704 (Costa Rica). El Titulo IV del Libro
III, artfculos 705 a 708, se refiere a [a ejecuci6n de las sentencias y los laudos arbitrales
extranjeros. C.P.C. arts. 705-708 (Costa Rica).
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que podria haber tramitado el asunto si no se hubiera sometido al
arbitraje."
V. LA PROPUESTA DE LAS REFORMAS A LAS REGLAS
COSTARRICENSES DEL ARBITRAJE SEGON LA LEY FEDERAL SOBRE EL
ARBITRAJE
La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje, y la jurisprudencia de los
Estados Unidos proveen soluciones para los distintos problemas de las

reglas del arbitraje costarricenses, incluyendo la aprobaci6n judicial del
compromiso arbitral y la confirnaci6n y anulaci6n de los laudos
arbitrales.14
A. La Participaci6nJudicial para la Aprobaci6n del Compromiso
Arbitral
Una regulaci6n costarricense sobre el arbitraje que deberia ser
eliminada es el requisito de la aprobaci6n por parte de un Juez del

compromiso arbitral del articulo 510 del C6digo Procesal Civil. El
compromiso arbitral no deberia ser aprobado por un Juez cuando las partes
de un proceso arbitral han estado dispuestas a someter la soluci6n de sus
conflictos a un ,rbitro. La ley debe considerar que las partes de un
proceso arbitral tienen conocimiento de 1o que estAn realizando, y que si
no tienen ese conocimiento buscarian la asesoria legal de un abogado
capaz y preparado." La ley debe asumir que los ,rbitros son personas con
capacidad para conducir un procedimiento arbitral justo, y que tienen
suficiente conocimiento para determinar y aprobar el contenido de los

compromisos arbitrales.
compromiso arbitral.

Los Arbitros, no los jueces, deben aprobar el

73. Vea C.P.C. arts. 12, 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica).
74. La Ley Federal sobre elArbitraje y lajurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos pueden ser
utilizadas como gufa para otros temas de arbitraje, incluyendo los efectos excluidos, a la
violaci6n evidente de laley por parte de los Irbitros, los laudos contrarios al orden pfiblico, las
pruebas, las audiencias justas, lacorrupci6n y laparcialidad de los Arbitros, la ejecuci6n
provisional de los laudos, el nombramiento judicial de los firbitros, ia preferencia a los
ordenamientos jurfdicos extranjeros, la independencia de las clAusulas compromisorias, la
acumulaci6n de los procedimientos arbitrales, y los acuerdos sobre las clAusulas de compromisos.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996) (estas Areas no serAn cubiertas por esta
investigaci6n).
75. Creemos que es correcto que el C6digo Procesal Civil exija que tin abogado firmne el
compromiso arbitral. C.P.C. art. 510 (Costa Rica ). Las partes podrdn buscar el abogado que
mds les convenga a sus intereses, y elabogado asumirA laresponsabilidad profesional al firmar y
aprobar elcompromiso arbitral.
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Cuando existe una clusula compromisoria entre las partes, el
procedimiento arbitral deberia ser iniciado por las panes mediante la
notificaci6n expresa a la otra parte de un conflicto. La parte que realiza la
notificaci6n debe indicar a la otra parte las razones por el conflicto y su
pretensi6n. La parte notificada debe entonces aceptara ir al arbitraje
conforme a la cliusula compromisoria y deberia contestar los alegatos de
la parte notificada. Ambas partes entonces acordarian en un compromiso
arbitral, aunque el contenido de este compromiso arbitral pudiera haber
sido incluido en la clusula compromisoria o incorporado mediante el
escoger una ley procesal o en una instituci6n del arbitraje.
El Licenciado Victor Garita GonzAlez, un abogado costarricense,
considera" que la regulaci6n de la aprobaci6n judicial del compromiso
arbitral es excesiva. tl sugiere que las reglas costarricenses del arbitraje
deberfan reconocer la figura del arbitraje institucional, y que los poderes
de los jueces al respecto de la aprobaci6n de los compromisos arbitrales
deberian estar limitados a la legalizaci6n de las actuaciones de los
instituciones arbitrales, los cuales estAn encargados de aprobar los
compromisos arbitrales.
A pesar de que compartimos el criterio del Licenciado Garita,
consideramos que la aprobaci6n del compromiso arbitral no deberia estar
limitada a las instituciones arbitrales, nosotros permitiriamos a los Arbitros
ad-hoc que aprobaran los compromisos arbitrales y que condujeran el
procedimiento arbitral de conformidad con la voluntad de las partes.
La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje no contiene ninguna regulaci6n
con respecto al compromiso arbitral en los t6rminos del C6digo Procesal
Civil de Costa Rica. Creemos que la falta de regulaci6n de la Ley Federal
sobre el Arbitraje del compromiso arbitral significa que el compromiso
arbitral no debe ser revisado o aprobado por un Juez. Ademis, la Ley
Federal sobre el Arbitraje indica claramente que "un . . . acuerdo por
escrito en el cual se somete a arbitraje una controversia existente la cual se
produjo de ese contrato, transacci6n o rechazo, serA vilido, irrevocable y
ejecutable."" Esto demuestra la importancia otorgada a los acuerdos de
las partes, y no sujeta la validez de dichos acuerdos a una aprobaci6n
judicial. El compromiso arbitral puede ser aprobado por los mismos
76. VIctor Garita GonzAlez, Un Nuevo Horizonte para la Bisqueda de una Mejor Justicia
[A New Horizon for a Better Justice System], 1995 EL ARBITRAJE 10.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
Para informaci6n adicional, yea Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court
Proceedings, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 473 (1990); Janet Lee Harold, Federal Preemption, 54
Miss. L.J. 571 (1984); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.

1959); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483 (1987); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

1996]

Koberg

265

Irbitros, y no por un tribunal judicial. Si la idea del Congreso de los
Estados Unidos era que los jueces aprobaran los compromisos arbitrales de
las partes, el Congreso hubiera incluido esa intenci6n en la Ley Federal
sobre el Arbitraje.
La participaci6n judicial en el inicio de un procedimiento arbitral
deberia ser necesaria tinicarnente cuando: una de las partes no esthn
dispuesta a solucionar sus conflictos por medio de un Arbitro, las panes no

logran acordar un procedimiento arbitral e inclusiva, las panes han
acordado un procedimiento que evidentemente causa un perjuicio a una de
ellas. En los casos donde las partes han acordado someter sus conflictos al

arbitraje, y acordado un procedimiento arbitral, a participaci6n judicial no
seria necesaria. La idea no es de eliminar por completo la participaci6n
judicial durante los procedimientos arbitrales, .pero si de tratar que .el
control judicial sea eficiente y que no interfiera con el proceso de

arbitraje."'
B. La Confirmaci6ny la Anulaci6n del Laudo Arbitral
Las reglas para la confirmaci6n y la anulaci6n de un laudo arbitral
del

C6digo Procesal Civil de Costa Rica requiere una inrnediata

modificaci6n para evitar la confusi6n que en ese momento fue creada.7' La
Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje es una gufa con respecto a la confirmaci6n
y la anulaci6n de los laudos arbitrales 80
1. La Confirmaci6n del Laudo Arbitral
La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje indica que despuds de que un
laudo arbitral ha sido dictado, "cualquier parte del arbitraje puede

solicitarle a la cone especificada una orden para confirmar el laudo, y
dicha corte debe emitir dicha orden a menos de que el laudo sea anulado,
modificado, o corregido .... ,,sLa Ley Federal ademhs indica que las
78. Victor Manuel Garita, Conceptual Basis For a New Arbitral Statute for Costa Rica: A
New Approach in Latin America, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1633, 1653 (1991).
79. C.P.C. arts. 525-529 (Costa Rica).
80. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996). Para ]a jurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos con respecto a la
confirmaci6n ,[a anulaci6n de los laudos, yea First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, no. 94-560,
1995 U.S. LEXIS 3463 (May 22, 1995); Western Employees Ins. Co. v. Jeffries & Co.. 958
F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953);
Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Ruddell, 760 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1985); para informaci6n
adicional sobre lacompetencia para anular y confirmar los laudos arbitrales, yea Wing v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 678 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983); International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas S.A. Petrolera, 745 F.
Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
81. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
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partes tienen un plazo de 1 afio para solicitar la confirmaci6n del laudo
arbitral Y2
Costa Rica no tiene una norma clara sobre la confirmaci6n de un
laudo arbitral, excepto para los casos en los cuales el laudo fue hecho por
una Sala de ]a Corte Suprema de la Justicia y en los que el Juez declar6
que no existi6 ninguna causal de nulidad. Para evitar cualquier posible
confusi6n, el C6digo Procesal Civil deberia incluir una regla similar a la
secci6n 9 de la Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje 3 para otorgar a la parte
ganadora un mecanismo para confirmar un laudo si su anulaci6n no fue
solicitada por la parte perdedora. La confirmaci6n del laudo deberia ser
permitida dnicamente despu~s de que el plazo para solicitar la nulidad se
haya vencido." Esto asegura a la pane ganadora de que la ejecuci6n del
laudo no sufrir, ningiin retraso por alguna causal de nulidad del laudo
mismo.
El Juez competente para confirmar el laudo arbitral seria el mismo
Juez con jurisdicci6n competente para ejecutar una resoluci6n judicial, y
por lo tanto, seria el mismo juez que hubiera acudido a la via judicial para
solucionar el conflicto entre las partes.'
2. La Anulaci6n del Laudo Arbitral
La Ley Federal sobre el Arbitraje ademis contiene regulaciones
con respecto a la anulaci6n de un laudo arbitral. Cuando un laudo ha sido
dictado, una corte de los Estados Unidos puede dictar una resoluci6n
anulando el laudo sobre la aplicaci6n de la parte interesada para arbitra en
cuatro causales:16 cuando el laudo fue dictado en forma corrupta, el laudo
82. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1996). A pesar de que el plazo de un afio parece ser obligatorio, la
jurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos indica que el plazo es permisivo, es decir, que un laudo
arbitral puede ser confirmado incluso cuando ]a solicitud se presenta mis de un aflo despu6s de
que el laudo fue dictado, a menos de que ya haya sido anulado. Vea Kentucky River Mills, 206
F.2d at 111; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948);
Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Eng'g Co., 59 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
83. La pane perdedora deberfa set notificada de la resoluci6n mediante la confirmaci6n del
laudo y deberfa tener ]a oportunidad de set escuchada para cumplir con el debido proceso. 9
U.S.C. § 9 (1996).
84. El plazo para la confirmaci6n de un laudo arbitral debe ser razonable; consideramos
que un plazo de 3 meses deberfa satisfacer el inter6s de los procedimientos para resolver disputas
sin litigios mediante el arbitraje. Este plazo comenzarfa a correr al dia siguiente del vencimiento
del plazo para solicitar la anulaci6n del laudo.
Cuando una solicitud para anular un laudo arbitral ha sido presentada, surge un nuevo
problema. La pane ganadora deberfa set notificada de la solicitud de la anulaci6n del laudo y
deberfa tener la oportunidad para solicitar la confirmaci6n del laudo durante el procedimiento de
la anulaci6n. En este caso, el plazo de 3 meses para la confirmaci6n no serfa aplicable
85. Vea C.P.C. arts. 12, 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica).
86. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (1996).
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fue fraudulenta o con medios ilegales, y cuando el laudoexisti6 evidente de
parcialidad o corrupci6n de los irbitros.
A pesar de que aceptamos el plazo de 15 dias dado por el C6digo
Procesal Civil para solicitar de la nulidad de un laudo arbitral, dicho plazo
podria ser, incluso, mis corto. Consideramos que un plazo de 5 dias es
razonable, sobre todo porque es igual al dado por el C6digo para la
apelaci6n de sentencias comunes de los tribunales de la justicia.7 Debe
aclararse que si la parte perdedora no solicita la anulaci6n del laudo dentro
del plazo conferido, la parte perdedora quedard sin ninguna oportunidad
para evitar la anulaci6n del laudo, incluyendo el proceso de su ejecuci6n.
El Juez competente, para confirmar el laudo, debe ser el mismo juez
competente que hubiera ejecutado una resoluci6n judicial; por ello,
deberia ser el mismo que hubiera tenido competencia para solucionar el
caso si se le hubiese sido sometido a su conociniento."
C. La Modificaci6n o la Correcci6n del Laudo Arbitral
Un caso en el que se deberia permitir la correcci6n o la
modificaci6n de un laudo arbitral deberfa ser cuando se ha sido decidido
por los pronunciamientos de asuntos que no fueron sometidos a arbitraje.
A menos que esos pronunciamientos afecten o influyan sobre aquellos
asuntos sometidos a arbitraje, en cuyo caso el laudo si deberia ser nulo.
Esto no deberia ser una causal de nulidad; el hecho de que los Arbitros se
pronuncien sobre asuntos sometidos al arbitraje los asuntos no sometidos a
arbitraje no deberian implicar la nulidad del laudo completo. Si los
firbitros dictan un laudo sobre los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento y
por error u otra raz6n ellos pronuncian sobre asuntos no sometidos al
arbitraje sin que esos pronunciamientos afecten el resultado de lo sometido
a arbitraje, no vemos ninguna raz6n para la cual el laudo tendria que ser
nulo. Esta es la misma posici6n de la Ley Federal del Arbitrajel" y esa
debe ser la posici6n de las regulaciones costarricenses.
VI. CONCLUSI5N
La norma costarricense sobre el arbitraje debe ser reformada con
el prop6sito de ofrecer a las partes en conflicto una soluci6n segura para
acordar sus diferencias. El arbitraje debe ser visto como un medio
importante para evitar los extensos y costosos procesos judiciales. La Ley
costarricense debe reconocer la autonomia de la voluntad de las panes y
87. C.P.C. art. 559 (Costa Rica).
88. Vea C.P.C. arts. 515, 529, 629 (Costa Rica).
89. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C § 11(2) (1996).
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debe limitar la intervenci6n judicial durante los procedimientos arbitrales.
Si la intervenci6n judicial es permitida durante los procedimientos
arbitrales, el arbitraje no serd mls rpido y eficiente que el Poder Judicial.
Si las partes en conflicto sienten tranquilidad y seguridad a la hora de
acudir a un ,rbitro, el uso del arbitraje como un medio de solucionar
conflictos continuard siendo limitado.
Se debe dar atenci6n especial al proceso de confirmaci6n,
anulaci6n, correcci6n y modificaci6n de los laudos arbitrales. A pesar de
que las partes pueden estar interesadas en acudir al arbitraje, no siempre lo
estardn para cumplir con lo dispuesto por los laudos arbitrales. La norma
al respecto de la ejecuci6n de los laudos arbitrales debe ser clara y precisa
para que las partes puedan confiar en ella. La Ley Federal sobre el
Arbitraje de los Estados Unidos y su jurisprudencia pueden ser utilizados
como gula para muchos asuntos relacionados con el arbitraje, incluyendo
la fase de ejecuci6n.
El arbitraje debe ser expuesto a un debate abierto al pfiblico,
incluyendo abogados, jueces, y empresarios. La Corte Suprema de la
Justicia, el Colegio de los Abogados, la Cmara del Comercio de Costa
Rica, e incluso la Cimara del Comercio de Bogoti y la Agencia para el
Desarrollo Internacional de los Estados Unidos, estfn participando en estas
discusiones y andlisis del arbitraje. Esta investigaci6n contribuye al debate
sobre el arbitraje. La apertura del Centro del Arbitraje de la Cmara del
Comercio Costarricense y las nuevas propuestas para crear nuevas reglas
de arbitraje son ejemplos de la nueva era del arbitraje en Costa Rica.
Mientras las discusiones sobre el arbitraje continfian, se inician
operaciones en los centros de arbitraje, y se determina la importancia de
realizar nuevas reglas sobre el arbitraje en el Congreso, el publico en
general comenzar, a aceptar el arbitraje como un m6todo importante de
procedimientos para resolver disputas sin litigi6.
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Una causa del fracaso al trabajo de la misi6n es por que ]a
mayoria de los misioneros son sumamente ignorante sobre
nuestra historia - 'que nosotros cuidamos de registro
pagano?' - y consiguientemente enajenar su religi6n desde
los hibitos del pensamiento nuestro y de nuestros
antepasados que estin acostumbrados a siglos pasados.1
I. LA INTRODUCCION
A. Las Diferenciasen el Enfoque para Formarun Contrato
Generalmente, el enfoque japonds a la formaci6n de un contrato
difiere significativamente al enfoque estadounidense. Desde luego, sin
estas diferencias muchas disputas entre estos pafses no existirian. Sin
embargo, hoy en dia, el tipico Estadounidense dice que el enfoque japonds

1. INAZO NITOBE, BUSHIDO: THE SOUL OF JAPAN (1905) (noa editorial: traducido de
Ingles).
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en negociaciones pierde tiempo.2 Por otra parte, los Japon6s 3se quejan
sobre lo seco que es el enfoque estadounidense en negociaciones.
La importancia de un documento escrito en el sistema legal
estadounidense es tremenda. Por ejemplo, el Statute of Frauds (ley
indicando que ciertos contratos orales no son vdlidos), el Parol Evidence
Rule (regla que excluye acuerdos orales los cuales alteran un contrato
escrito), y otras teorias, dan 6nfasis a la importancia de un acuerdo por
escrito. Como resultado, el negociante estadounidense tiende a comenzar
la relaci6n despu6s de cerrar el negocio. A lo contrario, el tipico
negociante japon6s no enterraria inmediatamente a un acuerdo,
especialmente con una empresa extranjera. Esto podria ser el resultado del
escepticismo hist6rico hacia desconocidos en la sociedad japonds. 4 En todo
caso, la entidad japonesa negociante intenta establecer una relaci6n
confiable con sus socios potenciales antes que ellos finalmente entren en un
acuerdo. Este proceso lento, de conociere el uno al otro antes de entrar en
un acuerdo, aparenta ser un proceso irritante para los negociantes
estadounidenses.
El intento de establecer una relaci6n confiable antes de entrar en
un contrato va mis alli. En otras palabras, la entidad japonesa Ileva la
relaci6n establecida mis all del cierre del negocio. El corolario de esta
actitud es que el resultado final del negocio, cual es el contrato escrito
mismo, no es mis que un acuerdo firmado que probaria que una relaci6n
confiable se ha establecido. Consiguientemente, la entidad japonesa no
esperaria que una entidad con quien ellos tuviesen una relaci6n confiable
insista sobre un termino que resulte en un negocio muy malo, ni mencionar
un termino que inicie una demanda legal. s
2. Robert J. Walters, Now That 1Ate The Sushi, Do We Have a Deal?, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 335, 339 (1991).
3. Danian Zhang y Kenji Kuroda, Beware of JapaneseNegotition Style: How To Negotiate
With Japanies, 10 Nw. J. INTL. L. BUS. 195, 209 (1989).
4. El anflisis del escepticismo hist6rico de los Japoneses hacia desconocidos y extranjeros
es fuera del tema de este artfculo y, por lo tanto, no es discutido.
5. El Profesor Steven R. Salbu ha mencionado en su artfculo que:
[e]n los Estados Unidos, finamente articularon que la terminologia del contrato combinada
con una incidencia alta de litigaci6n tiende a crear un ambiente de contrataci6n desconfiada en
relaci6n a otras culturas. No obstante, ya que contratando en los Estados Unidos ha progresado
desde clAsico a neocldsica y hasta en variedades parejas correlativas, la cultura contratante
Americana puede estar movi6ndose hacia una mayor confianza y flexibilidad sobre alianzas
justificadamente confiables. En otros piases, tal como Jap6n, los contratos tradicionalmente han
sido pocas mas de declaraciones de buena fe y un comisen general para apoyar futuras
negociaciones con otras partes.
Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in InternationalJoint Ventures: The
Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
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A fin de reducir las posibilidades de demandas, es importante
identificar los problemas que pueden surgir en el curso de contratar. En
redactar un contrato, las partes deben prever dos aspectos importantes en
cuales problemas pueden surgir. Un aspecto concierne al uso de palabras.
El uso de palabras inciertas crea un problema de interpretaci6n. Este
problema es rnds destacado cuando dos partidos que usan diferentes
idiomas acuerdan a un documento escrito en uno de los idiomas. El
segundo problema surge cuando la importancia de un documento escrito,
como materia de ley, difiere significativamente. Esto es un problema
especialmente entre los negocios de empresa japonesa y los de empresa
estadounidense a causa de sus costumbre a sistemas legales en que uno
adjunta extrema importancia al documento escrito, y el otro no. Estos
temas sern discutidos separadamente en las secciones subsiguientes.
Este articulo describir, la diferencia en la actitud entre la entidad
de negocio japon6s y la entidad de negocio estadounidense hacia los
t~rminos de un contrato. La diferencia en la actitud hacia un documento
escrito en los Estados Unidos y en el Jap6n surge de las diferencias en la
misma ley de contratos. La diferencia mis importante es la ausencia de un
equivalente al Parol Evidence Rule o al Statute of Frauds en la ley de
contratos japonesa.
Este articulo destacara esta ausencia y otras
diferencias entre la ley de contrato japonesa y la ley de contrato
estadounidense aplicando la leyes de contrato japonesa a patr6n de hechos
de casos famosos estadounidenses. Finalmente, este articulo propone una
manera ideal de contratar con una entidad de una jurisdicci6n diferente.
B. Las Diferencias Entre el Derecho Estadounidense y el Derecho
Continental
Antes de discutir las diferencias entre las leyes de contrato japon~s
y las leyes de contrato estadounidense, uno debe comprender las
diferencias entre la ley estadounidense y la ley Continental en cual la ley
japonts esta basada. Generalmente, la ley Continental moderna esta
basado en la teorta de determinaci6n. En otras palabras, la ley enfoca en
el intento especifico del partido contratante. Por ejemplo, si un individuo
entra en un contrato, la "ley Continental moderna, aparte de ciertos

1221, 1232-33 n.52 (1993) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingls). En el mismo artfeulo, Profesor
Salbu afirma que los negociantes Japon6s frecuentemente descansan laconfianza mutua a ]a
exclusi6n de una contrataci6n formal, y que "[elilos ha visto tradicionalmente lanecesidad de
contratar como una carencia de buenafe, potencialmente injuria a futuras relaciones entre riesgos
de mayores empresas." Id. at 1260.
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requerimientos de prueba .
pregunte
solamente, [asi lIntento el
'6
atadura?
de
deber
un
crear
prometedor
El origen de ]a teorifa de determinaci6n, por lo tanto el origen de la
ley Continental, puede encontrarse en los pensamientos de los juristas del
decimos6ptimo siglo. En el decimosdptimo siglo, el elemento decisivo
para contratar, "era la idea de deducci6n desde la naturaleza del hombre
como una criatura moral y de las reglas legales y las instituciones legales
que expresaron este ideal de la naturaleza humana." 7 Ademis, en el
periodo en la cual la ley no era nada mis que una regla descriptiva de la
naturaleza de seres humanos, las cortes, "buscaban la conciencia del
demandado debajo de un examen bajo juramento, y creyeron que [ellos]
pudieran alcanzar datos subjetivos que estaban ms all, del conocimiento
de un jurado." 8 Consiguientemente, los orfgenes de la ley Continental se
basan en la existencia metafisica de la ley natural que se dedujo de la
moralidad humana. Como resultado, esto enfoca mds en el intento y la
moralidad del partido contratante ms bien que el efecto creado por ia
manifestaci6n de ese intento.
Por otra parte, "los juristas estadounidenses prestaron poca o
ninguna atenci6n a los sistemas de la escuela metafisica." 9 Como
resultado de la revoluci6n industrial, los juristas estadounidenses
reconocieron la necesidad de estabilidad y certeza en el vencimiento de ley
y en la importancia de los intereses sociales en la seguridad de
adquisiciones y seguridad de transacciones en una sociedad comercial y
industrial.' 0 Los fil6sofos de esta escuela pensaron que el origen de la
obligaci6n a un contrato esta en la misma forma." Consiguientemente, la
12
regla se coloco bajo; "por palabra de honor el partido no esta obligado."

6.

ROSCOE POUND,

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 238 (1921)

(nota

editorial: traducido de Inglks).
7. M. at 253.
8. Id. at 271.
9. ROSCOE POUND. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 238 (1921)
editorial: traducido de Inglds).

(nota

10. Id. at 148.

11. Vea generalmente Pound, supra note 9, se describe que:
en la ley estricta lafuente de obligaci6n esta en laforma misma.

Ya que en pensamientos

primitivos las formas tienen una eficacia intrfnseca. Esto ha frecuentemente indicado como la fe
en formas legales pertenece a mismo orden de pensamiento a lafe en formas de encantamiento y
que las formas legales son frecuentemente simbolos para clasificar, psicol6gicamente, a sfmbolos
de magia. Id.
12. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 232 (1881) (nota editorial:
de Ingl6s).

traducido
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Ademis, los fil6sofos describen que el sistema legal estadounidense "no da
efecto a promesas en base de la voluntad del prometedor, aunque las cortes
de equidad [estadounidense] hayan mostrado alguna tendencia para
3
avanzar en esa direcci6n."4
En resumen, los origenes de la ley estadounidense "insiste en la
uniformidad, la ley [Continental] sobre la moralidad; la anterior sobre la
forma, la posterior sobre la justicia en el sentido 6tico; los anterior sobre
remedios, los posteriores sobre deberes; la anterior sobre la regla, la
posterior sobre la raz6n." 1 4 Como resultado, estas nociones bisicas todavia
persisten sobre la influencia de la ley actual en naciones respectivas.
II. EL DESARROLLO HIsToRICO DEL PROBLEMA EN LA
INTERPRETACION E EL PAROL EVIDENCE RULE EN LOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS

A. La Criticasobre el ParolEvidence Rule
El Restatement (Second) of Contracts (obra del Instituto de
Derecho Americano que resume las diferentes dreas del derecho y sugiere
hacia donde se debe encaminar) detalla que el Parol Evidence Rule es una
regla sustantiva y no una regla de evidencia, y "clama que esta regla rinde
inoperante los acuerdos escritos anteriores y tambi6n acuerdos orales
anteriores."' 5 Consiguientemente, si la regla se aplica literalmente, cuando
una disputa surge, cualquier tipo de acuerdo o condici6n anteriormente
estipulado que no aparezca en el contrato escrito final, no puede
considerarse en un juicio.
Esta aplicaci6n rigida de la regla ha sido ampliamente criticada por
eruditos legales. Por ejemplo, profesor Arthur Corbin describe que, "la
prueba externa es siempre necesaria en la interpretaci6n de un instrumento
escrito." 1 6 Especificamente, el requerimiento que un contrato escrito debe
13.' POUND, supra note 6, at 270.
14. POUND, supra note 9, at 141.
15. Vea RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (1979). Secci6n 213 provee
que:
(1) Un acuerdo integrado obligatorio despide acuerdos anteriores que no son
consistente con ellos. (2) Que un acuerdo obligatorio completamnente integrado despide
cualquier acuerdo anterior dentro de su alcance. (3) Que acuerdo integrado que no
compromete o que es anulable y evitado no despide ningdn acuerdo anterior. Pero un
acuerdo integrado, aunque no obligatorio, puede ser efectivo para rendir inoperante un
ttrrnino que habrfa sido pane del acuerdo si no se hubiese integrado.
Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
16. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 188-89 (1965) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
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ser ambiguo en orden de introducir prueba externa para determinar la
intenci6n verdadera de los partidos ha sido criticada. Por ejemplo, el Juez
Posner observ6 que, "un documento con lenguaje claro puede rendirse
incierto - y hasta ver significado evidente invertido - por la manera en que
conecta, o fracasa en conectar, con los temas en que describe."" "La
discrepancia entre la palabra y su mundo es una fuente comfin de
problemas interpretativos por todos lados."" Ademlis, el critic6 la regla
por que presume una precisi6n en el idioma que no puede existir, y
requiere que el juez determine el intento verdadero de los partidos a una
transacci6n que estA distancien ambos el tiempo y la circunstancia."9
Es cierto que la ley de contratos estadounidense se parte desde la
rigidez de la regla. Por ejemplo, el Uniform Commercial Code (C6digo
Uniforme de Comercio) permite que al interpretar acuerdos comerciales,
el curso de comercio, el curso de ejecuci6n, y el curso de su desempeflo,
juega un papel importante. 20 Este requerimiento surge de la noci6n que los
comerciantes comerciales estAn mejores servido con las reglas reales de los
comerciantes ordinarios en el mundo verdadero comercial, que estar
obligados por las reglas de la corte que van mhs all, veces de ser practico
en un sentido comercial.11
B. El Significado de Interpretaci6n
En negociaciones internacionales, es casi imposible averiguar la
intenci6n verdadera de los partidos sin introducir prueba externa. Por lo
tanto, la finalidad de un acuerdo escrito podria causar dificultad en
ejecuci6n porque el significado puesto a una palabra esta influido, entre
17. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1995)
(nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
18. Id. at 577.
19. URS Corp. v. Ash, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (III. App. Ct. 1981).
20. U.C.C. §2-202 (1994). Esta secci6n provee que
[t]6rminos con respecto a los memorandums confirmatorios por los partidos acordados
o que se coloca de otra manera en una escritura destinada por los partidos como una
expresi6n final de su acuerdo con respecto a tales t~rminos se incluyen no pueden ser
contradicci6n por laevidencia de ningOn acuerdo anterior o de un acuerdo oral
contempor'neo, pero puede set explicado o complementado (a) por el curso de ia
negociaci6n o uso de comercio (Secciona 1-205) o por el curso de desempeflo
(Seccionada 2-208); y (b) por laevidencia de tirminos adicionales uniformes a menos
que lacorte encuentre la escritura para tener se destinado tambi~n como una
declaraci6n completa y privativa de los t6rminos del acuerdo.
Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
21. Vea generalmente Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B Preface: Meeting the Information
Age, V (UCC Discussion Draft, Dec. 1, 1995); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8
(1974).
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otras cosas, por la cultura, edad, y el ambiente del interprete. Por
ejemplo, una persona criada en Boston puede adjuntar un significado
diferente a una palabra particular comparado con una persona criada en
Los Angeles. Ademis, una persona que habla Japones y una persona que
habla Ingles adjuntaria diferencias tremendas en el significado de una
palabra tambi6n.
Aunque una aplicaci6n rigida de las reglas sean criticadas, la
importancia de un contrato escrito permanece bastante intacto. El contrato
escrito todavia esta "sefialado para finalizar y formalizar el acuerdo, y que
el uso de evidencia oral menos formalizada en determinar el significado es
22
considerado retrogrado."
La discusi6n de negociaciones internacionales trae a mente el
farnoso caso del polio.23 En este caso una disputa surgi6 de un contrato
entre un vendedor Estadounidense y un comprador Suizo por la venta de
un polio.u Los t6rminos del acuerdo proveyeron como se indica a
continuaci6n: "EU Polio Fresco Congelado, Grado A, Inspeccionado por
el Gobierno, Desengrasados 2 1/2 - 3 libras y 1 1/2 - 2 libras, cada uno,

todos los pollos individualmente envueltos en vacio, empaquetados en
cartones seguros de fibra, en cajas de madera, apropiadas para la
exportaci6n."" Cuando el polio lleg6 a Suiza, result6 que el polio no era
de sartenes o de parrillas como el comprador pens6, pero eran ayes y
pollos de guisar.1 La corte de Nueva York dijo que el punto en el caso
era ",que es polio?"2'
La corte retuvo que los poiios de guiso enviados por los
vendedores a los compradores coincidieron con uno de los significados del
diccionario a la palabra polio y que el comprador tenia el peso de probar
que, "definici6n para polio se uso en su mis estrecha via mis bien que en
el sentido mlis ancho," y finalmente retuvo que el comprador no podia
despedir la carga. 8 Como resultado, la corte retuvo que el polio de guiso
que el vendedor envio al comprador estaba dentro de la definici6n de un
22.

Salbu, supra note 5, at 1249.

El Profesor Salbu fomenta los estados que "parejos

cuando hay ambigiuedad, [el Estadounidensel inclinaci6n esta favorecer redactar intento sobre el

intento negociador. La [redactandol afirmaci6n de partido de intento en tdrminos elegir se
considerar generalmente mora el e obligando que unas [acordandol declaraciones de partido en lo
que concierne a su comprensi6n de intento al tiempo de negociaci6n." Id.
23. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.

1960).
24. Id.
25. id. at 117 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 121.
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polio, y, por lo tanto, decidi6 a favor del vendedor estadounidense." Un
comentarista not6 que la corte no resolvi6 la pregunta autoimpuesta de
"que es un pollo,"" pero solamente determin6 "si la mercancia que el
3
vendedor envio al comprador era polio o no." 1
Aquf, la corte no mir6 si la palabra polio, literalmente traducida al
Alemin, constituirfa el mismo significado en Ingles.3 2 Al igual, tal fallo
puede producir problemas cuando un negociante japon6s - contrate con
uno estadounidense. Por ejemplo, segtin el Shogakukan, Progressive:
English - Japanese Dictionary, la palabra polio tiene mis de seis
significados como un nombre.3 Su primer significado provee que es un
niwatori,34 un pollito (dentro de un aflo de edad); generalmente, un polio
joven. cf. una ave." Por siguiente el36pueblo Japon6s ordinariamente asocia
un polio tierno con la palabra polio.
Si la corte no considera prueba externa simplemente porque el juez
encuentra la palabra clara y inequivoca, algfin resultado injusto puede
resultar. Ademis, dado la jerarquia de los idiomas de negocios
internacionales, aquellos que tienen el Ingles como el idioma nativo
tendrian una ventaja sobre otros partidos a menos que las cortes estfin
dispuestas a considerar las diferentes culturas. Adems, resulta afin mis
problemitico que en el contexto de un idioma, algunas palabras Inglesas
son usadas como son aunque en el Japonds no tienen el mismo significado.
Por ejemplo, la palabra mansi6n en Ingles describe una casa enorme sobre
una colina donde una familia rica vive. Por otra parte, la palabra mansi6n
usada en el Japonds describe algo cercano a una casa de apartamento o una
casa de arrendamiento. 3 Si un contratista de bienes raices japon6s y una
29. FrigalimentImporting, 190 F. Supp. at 121.
30. Id.

31. MARVIN A. CHIRLESTIEN, CONTRACTS 78 (1990)
Ingl6s).
32. FrigalimentImporting, 190 F. Supp. at 116.

(nota editorial:

traducido de

33. OKANA KATSUJINO JITSUYO SHIN [SHOGAKUKAN, PROGRESSIVE: ENGLISH-JAPANESE
DICTIONARY] 625 (3d ed. 1985).
34. Niwatori, seggn el Jitsuyo Shin Kokugo Dictionary, es un pjaro domestico que
pertenece a lafamilia del faisdn, propia de los comestibles como los huevos. Id.
35. Id. (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
36. Debe notarse que lapalabra polio se usa taly como estA en elidioma Japon~s. En otra

palabra, una persona ordinaria sin ningfin conocimiento especial del idioma Ingles comprenderfa
el significado de ]a palabra polio si uno tuviese que usar Io.
37. Si ellector tiene dificultad en comprender esta noci6n, debe de pensar Io siguiente. La
palabra futon, que es una palabra japon~s describe una cubierta suave usada cuando se duerme en
los Estados Unidos. En Jap6n, sin embargo, la palabra incluye lacubierta, pero tambidn incluye
el colch6n que va abajo del cuerpo humano donde dormimos. Similarmente, lapalabra hibachi,
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compafifa estadounidense entraran en un contrato de arrendamiento para
una mansi6n, el resultado seria significativamente diferente en una corte
japonds y una corte estadounidense.
III. COMO LOS ACUERDOS LA VISION SOBRE LA INTREPETACION SE

DIVISA EN EL JAPON
La ley de contratos japon6s constituye una parte del C6digo Civil
Japonds. El C6digo Civil Japon6s adopto el C6digo Alemin en 1866.U
Los Japon6s adoptaron el C6digo Alemn en una esperanza de convertirse
en la Alemania de la Asia.: La Alemania, lo cual era mis bien un pais
pequeflo, estaba rodeado por los Franceses, los Britdnicos, los Rusos, y
otras naciones poderosas. Los Japoneses, despu6s de su revoluci6n civil,
desearon convertirse en una naci6n civilizada en el sentido occidental y,
por lo tanto, busc6 un personaje ejemplar en la civilizaci6n occidental.
Como resultado, ellos se encontraron en una situaci6n similar a los
Alemanes.
Adicionalmente, los Japonds sintieron un acercamiento a la manera
en que los Alemanes rigieron su pais adaptado a sus propias necesidades.40
Consiguientemente, el Japonds adopto la icy de ese pais. 4 1 Todavia, en
tiempos moderna, el c6digo civil emplea un papel importante en
transacciones de negocio aunque el C6digo Comercial tambi6n juegue un
papel importante.
A. El C6digo Civil Japonds en Relaci6n al Derecho Continental
La teoria bdsica detrds la ley Continental, como discutida
anteriormente, es la noci6n de la teoria de determinaci6n. Bajo la teoria
de determinaci6n, la ley enfoca en la intenci6n de los partidos, y da poca
atenci6n a los aspectos de la intenci6n.4 1 Por otra pane, la ley comtin

tambi6n una palabra japonesa describe cualquier cosa que tenga una parrilla con incendio

quemando debajo. Por otra parte, un Japonds tipico asociarfa lapalabra con un tipo especifico de
olla (que puede interpretarse como (b)hacht) hecho de cer;nica con incendio (que se interpreta
como hi) quemando desde una pila de carb6n.
38. Vea generalmente MINPO, Law No. 89 of 1896, Law No. 9 of 1898.
39.
1 RYOTARO SHIBA, TOBU GA GOTOKU 235 (1980).
Vea tambi~n ZENTARO
KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN

§ 3.01(4) (1990).

40. SHIBA, supra note 39, at 237. Vea tambitn KITAGAWA supra note 9, § 3.01(4).
41. Para una discusi6n mhs detallada sobre por que los Japoneses adoptaron costumbres
alemanas, yea Shiba, Tobu Ga Gotoku (Bunshun publicaciones) Describiendo la era despu~s de la
evoluci6n Civil Japon6s hasta cuando uno de los politicos destacados en esa era, Takamori Saigo,
conducto un golpe de estado). Vea tambi~n, 2 RYOTARO SHIBA TOBU GA GOTOKU 161 (1980).
42. Vea generalmente, GILMORE, supra note 1,at 17.
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estadounidense esta basada en ]a teoria de relaciones.43 Bajo esa teoria, la
ley enfoca la relaci6n objetiva entre los partidos y no en el intento
subjetivo de un partido."
Bajo la teoria de determinaci6n, el C6digo Civil Japon~s estableci6
la regla que un "contrato es un producto legal si es creado por la uni6n de
dos o mis voluntades conflictivas." 45 Esta regla general parece haber
operado hasta la revoluci6n industrial. Con el aumento de negocios
comerciales, el enfoco tinicamente sobre la intenci6n de un partido produjo
problemas a causa del efecto de un individuo sobre la confianza de
terceros sobre su expresi6n de la intenci6n." Como resultado, las reglas
un orden
como el requerimiento de honestidad y lealtad, etc., desarrollo
47
determinaci6n.
de
teorfa
la
sobre
que impone restricciones
2. Los Principios Fundamentales del C6digo Civil Japon6s y la Ley
de Contrato
Hay tres principios fundamentales del C6digo Civil que
constituyen el C6digo Civil Japon6s. Estas incluyen: 1) la libertad de
contrato, 2) la responsabilidad por negligencia, y 3) el principio de
La libertad de contrato consiste de cuatro aspectos
posesi6n.
importantes: 48 primero, la libertad de hacer un contrato; segundo, la
libertad de entrar en el contrato con un partido elegido; tercero, la libertad
para determinar los contenidos del contrato; y finalmente, libertad de
requerimientos formales.49
A causa del efecto practico del cuarto requerimiento, a saber,
libertad de requerimientos formales, los jueces japoneses se dan el lujo de
43. Esta teorade relacidn debe absolutamente distinguirse de la Ilamada teorta de contrato
correlativo. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 106 n.7.
44. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 41-45.
45.
SAKAE WAGATSUMA, SHIN-TEl MINPO SOUSOKU. 244 (1965); KIKUO ISHIDA,
KEIYAKUOUSOKURYOKU [THE BINDING EFFECT OF CONTRACTS], 1 MINPO KOGI 88 (nota

editorial: traducido de Japon~s).
46. POUND, supra note 9, at 148.
47. TsuYosHi KINOSHITA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW, 8 KEIYAKU-HO GAISETSU; CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL

TRANSACTIONS 1, 4.

48. 3.KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.02 (1).
49. Como el Profesor Kitagawa describe, "[e]n los C6digos Civil y Comercial, los
contratos son consensual y asf no necesitan cometerlo a escrito para ser efectivo. De hecho, los
requerimientos de ceremonia son ajenos a los C6digos Civil y Comercial e un contrato para
regalo con [a extensi6n puede concluirse oralmente." Id. Hay, sin embargo, cierto contratos
que requieren que el documento sea escrito sometido y archivado a una entidad gubernamental.
Este requerimiento, sin embargo, no impide partidos de crear un contrato y, ademis, esta en el
reino de [a ley administrativa. Consiguientemente, esta afuera del alcance de este articulo.
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considerar pruebas externas aun cuando el contrato se determina ser
integrado. 50 Consiguientemente, los negociantes acostumbran redactar
documentos con esta noci6n en mente. Ademis, porque los acuerdos
escritos son nada mis que un documento que emite confianza mutua, los
documentos contractuales tienden ser muy cortos.
El C6digo Civil, que incluye la ley de contratos, comienza con
provisiones generales. El articulo uno provee que: "1) los derechos
individuales estn sujetos a una politica publica; 2) El empleo de los
derechos y el desempefio de ia obligaci6n cumplirf con los requerimientos
de lealtad y serin cumplidos con honestidad; 3) Los abusos de derechos no
son tolerados." 51 En desempefiar las obligaciones del contrato, tiempo de
desempefio, lugar de desempefio, y otros detalles especfficos, pueden crear
un problema. La ley y el acuerdo mismo pueden ser capaz de proveer los
detalles, pero en resolver la mayorfa de los problemas "los partidos,
especialmente el prometedor que actden honestamente, a fin de resolver el
problema." 52 En otras palabras, la resoluci6n de un problema esta basada
sobre la honestidad del prometedor. Estos principios se def'mieron en el
C6digo Civil Franc6s 53 y el C6digo Civil Alemdn, 54 pero no
especfficamente en el C6digo Civil Japon6s. Los tratados y los casos, sin
55
embargo, han tornado la misma visi6n.
En interpretar el requerimiento de lealtad y honestidad el Saiko
Saibansho, la Corte Suprema del Jap6n, retuvo que el "principio de lealtad
y honestidad no solamente aplica al empleo de derechos y el desempefio de
50. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39. Profesor Kitagawa provee que hay numerosas razones
para las diferencias en resolver ambiguedades o incertidumbres.
[Plrimero, la mxima que un contrato serl interpretado como efectivo y valido:
segundo, los jueces japoneses, no estorbado por la regla de evidencia o por reglas
privativas de evidencia, pueden concentrar directamente en el prop6sito de los
partidos; y tercero, optativo provisiones que aclaran o complementan las intenciones de
los partidos frecuentemente dispensa con la reserva para redactar cliusulas detallados
en el contrato.
Id. § 1.09(4).
51. MINPO [CIVIL CODE) art. 1 (1886) (Japan) (nota editorial: traducido de Japon6s por el
escritor).
52. KIYOSHI IGARASHI, ET AL., RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, 1 MINPO KOGI (nota
editorial: traducido de Japonds por el escritor).
53. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
54. Birgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [CIVIL CODE] art. 242 (G.D.R.).
55. Porque la ley Japon s no es un sistema parecido a la ley comtin, la importancia de una
disposici6n anterior de una corte es algo menos del de un precedente en los Estados Unidos. Los
tratados, sin embargo, tienen una autoridad importante en determinar el resultado de los casos.
Vea generalmente Wean Khing Wong, Protecting American Software in Japan, 8 COMPUTER L.J.
111, 115-16 (1988); 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 3.02(a).
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obligaci6n, pero tambi6n constituye unos de los criterios en interpretar
contratos. " 56
Consiguientemente, en determinar los derechos y
obligaciones de los partidos al contrato, cualquier evidencia seri
considerada para determinar si los partidos actuaron en lealtad y
honestidadel uno hacia al otro.
IV. CASOS QUE DISCUTEN LOS PROBLEMAS DE LA INTERPRETACION Y
EL PAROL EVIDENCE RULE CON LA LEY JAPONES

Los casos siguientes describen el desarrollo del problema de
interpretaci6n y el Parol Evidence Rule. El primer caso proviene de la
Corte de las Apelaciones de Nueva York, de 1928, donde los jueces
Andrew, Kellog, y Cardozo fueron parte del tribunal.-' El segundo de los
tres casos viene desde la Corte Suprema de California, que fue dirigida por
el Juez Traynor.- El tercer caso viene de la Corte de las Apelaciones del
Sdptimo Circuito donde el Juez Posner regio como el juez principal."
A. Mitchill v. Lath6"
1. La Disposici6n por la Corte Original
Los hechos del caso son como se indica a continuaci6n. Los
demandados, los Laths; deseaban vender una parcela de tierra. Sobre el
otro lado del camino ellos poseian una hielera que se encontraba sobre la
propiedad de un tercero. La demandante, Sra. Mitchill, penso comprar la
tierra, pero ella pens6 que la hielera era desagradable. Posteriormente, los
Laths prometieron y acordaron oralmente que iban a quitar la dicha
hielera.1 Confiando en esa promesa, la Sra. Mitchill compro la propiedad
e hizo mejoramientos considerables sobre la propiedad, pero los Laths no
quitaron la hielera.

56. Judgment of July 5, 1957, Saikosai [Corte Suprema], II MINSHU 1193 (Japan) (nota
editorial: traducido de Japon6s por elescritor).
57. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
58. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968); Delta Dynamics, Inc. v.
Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
59. Briston v. Drake, Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic
Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995); Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d
1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646.
61. Id.
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La corte tuvo que determinar si la promesa oral, no incluida en el
contrato escrito final, deberia ser impuesta o no.'2 La corte describi6 que
se hace falta para que un acuerdo oral vare el contrato escrito, debe de
ser:
1) Que el acuerdo est6 en forma colateral; 2) no se deben
de contradecir provisiones expresas o implicadas dentro
del contrato escrito; 3) la promesa oral debe ser una en la
cual los partidos no hubieran esperado en personificar la
escritura o, poni~ndolo en otra manera, una inspecci6n del
contrato escrito, leido en la luz a las circunstancias, no
debe indicar que la escritura aparezca 'como contener
compromisos de los partidos y de definir el objeto y
medida del alcance de tales compromisos.' Y otra vez, no
debe ser tan claramente conectado con la transacci6n
principal para que sea parte del acuerdo escrito.63
La corte habia encontrado que el acuerdo no habia cumplido
ninguno de los requisitos." Consiguientemente, la corte encontr6 que el
acuerdo oral que los Laths habian hecho no era ejecutable.6 Por lo tanto,
la corte retuvo que los Laths no tenian ninguna obligaci6n de quitar la
hielera. 66
2. Disposici6n por una Hipotdtica Corte Japonds.
iQue sucederia si este caso hubiera sido probado en una hipot6tica
corte japonesa? ,Cambiaria el resultado? Comenzari por la aplicaci6n de
los principios generales del C6digo Civil. Primeramente, como
previamente discutido, la corte no impediri la introducci6n de la prueba
que los Laths habfan hecho un acuerdo oral con la Sra. Mitchill.
Consiguientemente, el acuerdo oral entre las dos partes constituiria una
parte de la evidencia. En este momento, haria ya una diferencia
significante porque la (nica raz6n por ia cual la mayoria en ia Corte de las
Apelaciones de Nueva York no pudo considerar la introducci6n de la

62. Id.
63. Id. at 647 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).

64. Id.
65. ld. at 646.
66. El Juez Lehmen disiente en este caso e intenta de dividir el acuerdo en dos partes. En
otras palabras, Juez Lehmen dice que el acuerdo que fue escrito para transmitir la tierra y el
acuerdo oral para quitar la hielera eran dos acuerdos separados. Por Io consiguiente, Juez

Lehmen dice que elacuerdo no adapta latercera condici6n y, por lo tanto, no es excluido por el
parol evidence rule. Mitchell, 160 N.E. at 648-50.
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evidencia era la existencia del Parol Evidence Rule.6 7 Ademis, el lector
del caso puede inferir ficilmente como la corte estaba poco dispuesta de
decidir a favor de los Laths en mirando ciertas expresiones por la corte,
como "nosotros no decidimos sobre las delincuencia morales," 6 1 implicaba
de ese modo que los Laths fueran moralmente culpables.
El C6digo Civil adem s provee que la regla sobre la lealtad y la
honestidad tambi6n requiere que las cortes interpreten el contrato
consiguientemente. El problema aqui es que si la corte interpretaria el
contrato asi, segon los principios de la honestidady la confianza, daria lo
mismo el resultado de la corte de Nueva York porque la obligaci6n no
estaba proveido en el contrato. El foco principal, sin embargo, del
requerimiento de la lealtad y la honestidadesta sobre la conducci6n de las
partes y, por lo tanto, el C6digo Civil requeriri que los Laths quiten la
hielera.
En Sanjo-Kikai-Seisakusho Inc. v. Sanko Diesel Inc. ,69 los
demandados intentaron escapar la responsabilidad de pagar una cantidad de
dinero obtenida por un negocio que adquirieran de los demandantes. El
demandante habfa transferido el negocio segfin un contrato hecho varios
aflos atrAs. Ademls, los demandados hicieron mejoramientos al negocio y
usaron las instalaciones que fueron asignados a los demandados segfin el
contrato.
La disputa surgi6 porque los demandados no habian pagado la
cantidad de dinero por el negocio que adquirieron los demandantes. El
argumento del demandado fue que el traslado del negocio no estaba
proveido en los Articulos de la Incorporaci6n conforme con el Articulo
168 pirrafo 1, articulo 6 del C6digo Comercial. En otras palabras, los
demandados hicieron el argumento considerablemente similar al de los
Laths, el cual es "usted no lo puso por escrito." La Corte Suprema
Japonesa, sin embargo, retuvo que el argumento de los demandados
estaban contra de la honestidad y la lealtad. La Corte Suprema Japonesa
explic6 que acordando a ejecutor conforme a un acuerdo oral, y
consecutivamente tomando ventaja del hecho de que el acuerdo no estaba
por escrito, era una violaci6n al requerimiento de la confianza y la
honestidad.
Aplicando los principios derivados del caso Sanjo-KikaiSeisakusho, podemos inferir que la corte japonesa hubiese requerido que
los Laths quitaron la hielera, aun cuando el lenguaje no estuviese proveido
67. Id. at 647.
68. Id. at 646.
69. Judgment of Sept. 11, 1986, Saikosai (Corte Supremaj, 624 HANREi TIMES 127
(Japan).
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en el acuerdo escrito. Adems, aunque el C6digo Civil no provee
especificamente por ello, la ley del contrato japon(s requiere que las partes
extiendan la honestidad y ia confianza a sus deberes colaterales de los
contratos. 70 En otras palabras, requerimientos como los de divulgar el
tiempo del acuerdo y informar a la parte contraria de cualquier dificultad
ocurriendo durante el desempefio del deber, es un requerimiento que debe
cumplirse ain en ausencia de tales t6rminos en el contrato. 7'
Consiguientemente, la corte miraria a cualquier deber colateral que las
partes estuviesen obligados a desempefiar.
Otro anilisis se puede hacer aplicando una teoria aniloga a la
teoria estadounidense del promissory estoppel (permitiendo la recuperaci6n
de dafios causado por la confianza en una promesa sin cumplir). Los casos
japoneses, despuds de la guerra, muestran una aplicaci6n del requerimiento
de la confianza y la honestidad. Uno de los conceptos que pueden
derivarse de estas aplicaciones por las cortes es un concepto similar a la
teoria del promissory estoppel de impedimento. Se describe que ia
aplicaci6n de este principio fue usado para controlar la conducto amoral de
las partes.72 Algunos casos discuten situaciones en la cual una parte se
conduce de una manera y se desempefia de otra forma, contradiciendo su
conducci6n previa. Esta es una situaci6n donde las cortes aplican una
teoria similar a la teoria estadounidense del promissory estoppel.73
Consiguientemente, el resultado que una corte japonesa puede alcanzar
puede ser precedida por una aplicaci6n de la teorfa del promissory estoppel
de impedimento sin aplicar el ParolEvidence Rule.
La secci6n 90 del Restatement of Contracts provee en la parte
pertinente que:
[unal promesa en la cual el prometedor debe de esperar
razonablemente para inducir una acci6n o indulgencia por
parte del tenedor de una promesa o una tercera persona, y
que induce tal acci6n o indulgencias obligatoria si una
injusticia puede ser evitada solo por la aplicaci6n de esa
promesa. El remedio otorgado por ese rompimiento puede
ser limitado y determinado por la justicia.74

70. Vea generalmente 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.03(3)(f.
71. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09 (3)(f) (Deberes Incidentales).
72. IGARASHI ET AL., supra note, at 20.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
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Una ilustraci6n proveida en la secci6n 90 describe una situaci6n lo
cual es similar al hecho modelo del caso Mitchill, excepto por la existencia
del documento escrito. Si el documento escrito constituy6 solo una parte
de la evidencia y hay otra parol evidence, esta ilustraci6n se adaptaria
perfectamente a los hechos del caso Mitchill.
Esta ilustraci6n provee lo siguiente, "A promete a B de no fallar
en juicio, por un tiempo especificado, una hipoteca que A retiene sobre ia
tierra de B. B asi prosigue en hacer mejoramientos sobre la tierra. La
promesa de A lo compromete y puede ser impuesta por un fallo en juicio
antes del tiempo reglamentado."" Esta ilustraci6n puede ser mis simple si
se describe la situaci6n como indicada a continuaci6n: "A promete hacer
X. B desempefia Y confiando en la promesa de A. La promesa de A se
impondri." En el caso de Mitchill, A es los Laths, B es la Sra. Mitchill, X
significa la promesa de quitar la hielera, y es la compra de la tierra y el
gasto de sumas considerables para mejorar la propiedad para su uso como
una residencia de verano.7' La corte decidiri que la promesa de A (los
Lath's) deberia ser impuesta. Consiguientemente, las cortes japoneses
alcanzaran un resultado contrario utilizando un concepto similar a la teoria
del promissory estoppel y, por Jo tanto, impondria ia promesa oral de los
Laths.
Segtin la corte de Mitchell, en muchos casos las cortes han
retenido que la introducci6n de los contratos colaterales dichos de haber
sido ia causa inducida del contrato principal." La corte cit6 muchos casos
como autoridad sosteniendo que una estipulaci6n oral, dicha ser la causa
principal por la ejecuci6n subsiguiente del arrendamiento a saber,
concierne a algfin acto hecho por el propietario, o alguna condici6n con
respecto al local arrendado, no podria ser mostrada.71
Las cortes
japoneses, sin embargo, quisieron Ilegar a un resultado diferente en cada
uno de estos casos. Si el adversario es capaz de producir amplia
evidencia, incluyendo acuerdos orales anteriores y de hecho, cualquier
evidencia pertinente para establecer de buena fe ia dependencia en el
acuerdo oral, el juez debe imponer el acuerdo colateral conforme al
requerimiento de la lealtad y la honestidad.

75. Id. § 90 cmt. a, illus. 2.
76. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
77. Id. at 648.
78. Id. El caso de Mitchill cita casos tal como Daly v. Piza, 94 N.Y.S. 154 (1905); Love
v. Hamel, 69 N.Y.S. 251 (1901); Taylor v. Hopper, 62 N.Y. 649 (1878); Wilson v. Deen, 74
N.Y. 531 (1875); Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N.Y. 280 (1873).
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3. Disposici6n por una Corte Estadounidense Hoy en Dia.
La aplicaci6n del Restatement (Second) of Contracts," que es
utilizada como una autoridad por muchas cortes hoy en dia, puede rendir
un resultado diferente que en el caso de Mitchill. Seg-in el Restatement, si
el documento es un acuerdo integrado obligatorio, se despide cualquier
acuerdo anterior si ese no es consistente con ellos. 2 Adems, si el
documento esta integrado completamente, el documento "despide los
acuerdos anteriores si est~n dentro de su alcance."i' Con respecto a si un
documento esta integrado se "determina por el juez en la primera instancia
como una pregunta preliminar a una decisi6n interpretativa o a la
aplicaci6n del Parol Evidence Rule."82 Ademis, el determinar cuales
documentos son integrados o no es una pregunta de hecho para ser
determinada segtin toda la evidencia pertinente.11 En otras palabras, el juez
tomarit toda ia evidencia pertinente en consideraci6n y entonces
determinari si el documento es integrado o no. Consiguientemente, en el
caso de Mitchell, el juez tomaria en consideraci6n el hecho que los Laths
habian hecho un acuerdo oral para quitar la hielera en determinar si el
documento estaba integrado o no.
La Corte de las Apelaciones de Nueva York encontr6 que el
documento estaba integrado y, por lo tanto, no permitieron la introducci6n
de la evidencia.
Sin embargo, bajo la vista moderna, la evidencia
probablemente seria admitida porque el Restatement emplea una norma
mts liberal en comparaci6n a la norma usada en el caso de Mitchill.
Ademis, el jurado (suponiendo que este sea un proceso de jurado)
consideraria el acuerdo oral hecho entre las dos partes y probablemente
requerirfa que los Laths quitara la hielera.
Esta conclusi6n muestra que las cortes estadounidenses van hacia
en una direcci6n que admite cualquier evidencia pertinente mientras no
cree un fraude. El problema de los fraudes es prevenido por un sistema de
selecci6n conducida por los jueces procesales. El juez determina si la
evidencia existente es creible con respecto a cualquier acuerdo oral o
escrito anterior o simulttneo, o cualquier otro parol evidence. Si el juez
tribunal deternina que la tal evidencia existe, el juez determinard que el
79. Este artfculo refiere al RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS porque no es
necessario a referir al primer RESTATEMENT.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1).

81. Id.§ 213(2).
82. Id. § 209 cmt. c.
83. Id.
84. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
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documento escrito no era integrado, esto permitiri cualquiera evidencia
que entre y dejara que el probador de hecho determine si hubo de hecho
un acuerdo oral o no. Este proceso de selecci6n, conducido por el juez,
parece ser una barrera suficiente y que el juez esta familiarizado con la ley
de contratos asi como con las reglas de evidencia. Los jueces podrian
estimar el dafio potencial que la introducci6n de la parol evidence pudiera
ocasionar al adversario de la evidencia, y ser, capaz de evitar cualquier
injusticia que puede crearse. La tendencia hacia ]a destrucci6n del Parol
Evidence Rule es adicionalmente efectuada en los casos siguientes desde
California en 1968.
B. La Trilogia Traynor5
1. Masterson v. Sine
En 1968, la Corte Suprema de California, por la opini6n del
Justicia Traynor, considerablemente disminuyo la importancia del Parol
Evidence Rule. 6 Comenz6 con el caso de Masterson v. Sine.8' Los hechos
de este caso son detallados a continuaci6n. Dallas Masterson y su esposa
Rebecca, quien son los demandantes, transfirieron una hacienda a los
demandados, Medora, quien es la hermana de Dallas, y Lu Sines, quien es
el apelante en el caso, por una propiedad describiendo que:
[rieservando a los otorgadores, aquf, una opci6n de
compra ia propiedad descrita en o antes de 25 de Febrero
de 1968, por la misma consideraci6n como siendo pagada
hasta ahora m s su valor de depreciaci6n de cualquier
mejoramiento que los cesionario puedan agregar a la
propiedad desde y despu6s de dos afios y medio de esta
fecha
Despuds de la transferencia el otorgador se adjudic6 quebrado, y el
sfndico de la bancarrota y Rebecca trajeron una demanda para establecer
sus derecho en ejercer dicha opci6n.11
Los demandados intentaron introducir en evidencia un testimonio
que mostrarfa que "las dos panes quisieron que la propiedad quedara en la
familia de los Mastersons y que la opci6n fuese por lo tanto personal a los
85.

La discusi6n de estos tres casos emascularon el parol evidence rule basado en el

articulo PETER LINZER, A
86.
87.
88.
89.

CONTRACTANTHOLOGY,

313 (1st ed. 1989).

Id.
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 562.
Id.
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otorgadores y no de ser ejercida por el fideicomisario en la bancarrota."9°
La Corte, sin embargo, rechaz6 el argumento del demandado y excluy6 ia
evidencia que la opci6n fuese personal a los otorgadores." La Corte
Suprema de California, avanzada por el Juez Traynor, revoc6 y retuvo que
el juez procesal err6 en excluir la prueba externa.92
En su discusi6n inicial, el Juez Traynor describi6 que los "casos
en California han decidido que cuando una integraci6n debe ser
determinada finicamente por la cara del instrumento, [citaci6n omitida] la
decisi6n de la cone es si el documento aparenta ser un convenio
completo."" El Juez Traynor adicion6, que "[n]inguna de estas reglas de
aplicadas
han
sido
embargo,
sin
estrictas,
formaciones
consistentemente." 94 El ofrece dos p6lizas que acomodan el Parol
Evidence Rule. Una es que "la evidencia escrita es m s precisa que la
memoria humana," y la otra esti basada en el "temor de la defraudaci6n o
invento sin intenci6n por testigos interesados en el resultado del litigio que
puedan extraviar al determinante de los hechos. "'9 Pareciera que el Juez
Traynor se referfa especificamente al jurado en su uso de las palabras el
determinadorde los hechos. Esto lo vemos mis tarde cuando el describe
"la tendencia del jurado en encontrar mediante la simpatia y falta a la
probabilidad de defraudaci6n o memoria defectuosa que las panes hicieron
un acuerdo oral al contrato escrito, o que los acuerdos tentativos
preliminares no fueron abandonados cuando omiti6 este del escrito."9
Por resultado, el Juez Traynor concluy6 que la "[e]videncia de
acuerdos orales colaterales deberian excluirse tinicamente cuando el
determinador de los hechos pueda ser confundido."97 Nuevamente, en este
contexto, se puede decir que determinadorde hechos describe el puesto del
jurado en este caso. Adicionalmente, el Juez Traynor provee normas en la
cual la credibilidad de la evidencia pueden evaluarse se encuentran en el
Restatement y en el Uniform Commercial Code.98 El corolario de este
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564 (nota editorial: traducido de lngl6s).

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Vea RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1)(b) (1932).

El Restatement

permite que las pruebas de un acuerdo colateral sea admitido si ese "acuerdo estA como podria

naturalmente haberse acordado por las partes al contrato escrito." En otras palabras, el
Restatement emplea un examen para determinar sise puede admitir tal evidencia, llamado el
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argumento es que ParolEvidence Rule se basa por lo menos en una parte
considerable, si no totalmente, sobre la desconfianza de la corte hacia la
capacidad del jurado.
El peligro de no tener una regla similar al del Parol Evidence Rule
se reduce considerablemente en las cortes japoneses porque el sistema
legal japon6s no utiliza un sistema de jurado. En otras palabras, todos los
procedimientos en el Jap6n son tratados con un juicio en banca. Por lo
consiguiente, el peligro que el deteriminador de los hechos sea confundido
es disminuido considerablemente, o por lo menos reducido al nivel como si
el Parol Evidence Rule estuviese en vigor. Esto no es decir que el jurado
nunca es capaz de evaluar la verdad, pero para describir que la no existencia del Parol Evidence Rule en el Jap6n no es un problema como en
los Estados Unidos con el aspecto de la p6liza descrita por el Juez
Traynor.
2. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drainage &
Rigging Co.
(Pacific Gas) fue el segundo caso en que ]a Corte Suprema de
California, quitado por el Juez Traynor, discute los problemas de
interpretaci6n y el Parol Evidence Rule.99 Fue una acci6n por dafios
causados a la propiedad del demandante bajo una cliusula de
indemnizaci6n en el contrato.1:® El demandado entr6 en un contrato con el
prop6sito de proveer labor y equipo para quitar y reemplazar una cubierta
superiora de metal a la turbina de vapor. El acuerdo escrito proveo, en
pane, que el demandado "promete desempefiar el trabajo bajo su propio
riesgo y costo, mlis indemnizar al demandante contra toda perdida, dafio,
gasto, o responsabilidad que resulte de cualquier daflo a la propiedad,
proviniendo de cualquier modo en concesi6n con el desempeflo de este
contrato." 10
' En el curso del desempefio, la cubierta se cay6 y se lastim6 el
rotor de la turbina que estaba expuesto. Subsiguientemente, el juez

examen "mas natural." El Uniform Commercial Code aplica una prueba mas liberal. Secci6n 2202 provee en parte pertinente que: "[sli los trminos agregados son tales que, si acordados,
hubiesen sido integrados, ellos seguramente habrian sido incluidos en el documento en la visi6n
de la corte, entonces cualquier evidencia de su elaboraci6n alegada debe guardarse del
determinador de los hechos." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1994) (nota editorial: traducido de
Jngl6s). En otras palabras, el Uniform Commercial Code emplea un examen descrito como el de
'Iacerteza.
99. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
100. Id. at 643
101. Id.
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procesal retuvo que la clusula de indemnizaci6n cubria el dafio y decidi6
2
a favor del demandante.'
La disputa del caso era si la corte habia errado en excluir la
evidencia ofrecida por el demandado para mostrar, "que la clfusula de
indemnizaci6n significaba para las partes a solo incluir dafios a la
1 03
propiedad de terceros tinicamente y no a la propiedad del demandante."
En sostener que la corte err6neamente rehus6 considerar la prueba externa
ofrecida para mostrar que la cliusula de indemnizaci6n en el contrato no
estaba intencionada a cubrir dafios a la propiedad del demandante, la corte
describi6 que, "[a]lgunas cortes han expresado la opini6n que las
obligaciones contractuales son creadas por el uso de palabras ciertas, haya
o no un intento para incluir tales obligaciones."'°4 Este idioma describe la
teoria del intento objetivo o la teoria de no-determinacion que es una
tradici6n de los seguidores del Juez Holmes.0 5 El Juez Traynor describi6
que, "[blajo esta visi6n, las obligaciones contractuales fluyen, no desde la
intenci6n de las partes, pero desde el hecho del uso de ciertas palabras
mgicas. La evidencia de las intenci6n de las partes, por lo tanto, llega a
ser insignificante."'0 Esto describe, aunque exageradamente, la teorta
objetiva, la cual esti fundada en el sistema de la ley comtin tradicional
estadounidense.
El Juez Traynor, como un juez destacado en el sistema legal
estadounidense retuvo que en el caso de California, "sin embargo, la
intenci6n de las panes como expresada en el contrato son el origen de los
deberes y derechos contractuales."' ' Ademis, Juez Traynor declaro que
"[una] corte debe determinar y dar efecto a esta intenci6n por medio del
significado de las palabras que las panes utilizaron. "' Finalmente el Juez
Traynor agreg6 que, "la exclusi6n de la prueba externa pertinente para
explicar el significado de un instrumento escrito podria justificarse solo si
fuese factible para determinar el significado dado a las palabras en el
instrumento por las partes."' '° Esta afirmaci6n trae en su andlisis legal la
metaffsica que el sistema legal estadounidense ha rechazado

102. Id. at 648.
103. Id. at 643.
104. Id. at 644.
105. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.at 641.
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vigorosamente.1" 0 Este caso describe el movimiento de la teoria de
relaci6n hacia la teoria de determinaci6n. El Juez Traynor concluy6
describiendo que las palabras, "no tienen referencias absolutas y
constantes."' 2 ' En otras palabras, la visi6n del Juez Traynor, sobre las
teorfas tradicionales de interpretaci6n como la integraci6n y Parol
Evidence Rule, es que ya no tienen lugar en la jurisprudencia
estadounidense.
3. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito
2 donde un
El tercer caso es el de Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito,Ir1
fabricante trajo una demanda contra el distribuidor por el rompimiento de
un acuerdo de distribuci6n. El acuerdo escrito de distribuci6n proveia en
parte pertinente que, "[sli el distribuidor fracasa en distribuir de cualquier
modo y en cualquier afio el numero minimo de dispositivos para ser
distribuida, este acuerdo estarfa sujeto a una terminaci6n por [el
fabricante] sobre 30 dias de aviso."" 3 El contrato escrito adicionaba que
"[e]n el suceso de rompimiento del acuerdo por cualquiera de las partes, el
partido que predomine en cualquier acci6n recibiri dafios o el derecho de
obligar los t6rminos del acuerdo a la otra parte, mis autorizari a la
recaudaci6n razonable de los costos de abogado." 11 4 El distribuidor fracas6
en distribuir el numero mfnimo de dispositivos de ser distribuido, y el
fabricante termin6 el contrato y trajo esta demanda para recuperar los
dafios por la falta del distribuidor en comprar la cuota de los primeros afios
bajo el acuerdo. La corte rechaz6 el argumento del distribuidor que el
tinico remedio disponible para el fabricante era terminar el contrato, y
fallar en contra al fabricante." 5
El Juez Traynor retuvo que,

[Il]a prueba de admisibilidad de la prueba externa para
explicar el significado de un instrumento escrito no es si
110. KINOSHITA, supra note 47, at 4. En este artfculo, el Profesor Kinoshita describe que
Holmes define la responsabilidad contractual acumulada, como un encuentro de las mentes, o en
otras palabras, una sintesis cierta de voluntades existentes, pero porque las palabras usadas por el
prometedor para describir su aceptaci6n razonablemente inducen el acuerdo de la otra parte en
que un negocio debe de tener lugar. Ademds, Kinoshita cita las palabras de Holmes: "La teorla
de contrato es exclusivamente formal y externa." Id. (citada desde OLIVAR WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 195-264 (1881) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s)).
111. Paific Gas.& Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
112. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
113. Id. at 786.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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aparenta a la corte ser simple y inequivoco sobre sus
hecho, pero si la evidencia ofrecida viene al caso para
probar el significado al cual el lenguaje del instrumento lo
16
haria razonablemente susceptible.'
La corte encontr6 el idioma de la ch~usula de terminaci6n ambiguo porque
era susceptible a dos interpretaciones razonables.'" Uno era que las partes
podrian incluir la clusula de terminaci6n para deletrear especfficamente la
condici6n sobre el cual el fabricante se disculparia del desempefio
adicional bajo el contrato. 8 La otra interpretaci6n razonable, segfin el
Juez Traynor, era que "este coloc6 un remedio exclusivo para el repudio
del acuerdo en mantener la cuota en cualquier afto. ""' Como resultado,
esta corte retuvo que la corte err6 en excluir la evidencia ofrecida para
probar el significado de la clusula de terminaci6n para el distribuidor.'1
En este caso, el Juez Mosk, quien concurri6 en los dos casos
previos,' 2 1 not6 en su disensi6n que "[diado los dos empresarios
experimentados, ambos representados por un consejo competente, es
virtualmente imposible bajo la reciente evoluci6n de las reglas de evidencia
de redacci6n que un contrato escrito pueda producir resultados predicables
en corte. "' 2 Esta opini6n describe el problema claramente cuando no hay
una regla que le de prioridad al acuerdo escrito. Aunque esta finalmente
fracase en persuadir las cortes, el argumento que las partes estin en
desacuerdo con la interpretaci6n del lenguaje del contrato rinde el contrato
ambiguo, y asi puede predominar.'P Si esa situaci6n sucede, el significado
de un documento escrito seria reducido a nada ms que una de las posibles
evidencias.
Los tres casos discutidos, sin embargo, no exponen las reglas
generales actuales en las. cortes estadounidenses hoy en dia. Las cortes
todavia retienen la validez del parol evidence.y excluyen la prueba externa
que no pasa el examen de la certeza segura. Los casos siguientes
describen el estado actual de esta regla.
116. Id. at 787 (citando Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 641).
117. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 787.
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Masterson v Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d
at 648.
122. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 789.
123. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 1975).
Aunque altamente criticado y virtualmente rechazado, fue la Icy en Minnesota que en ese punto

dos partes disintieron en que la interpretaci6n de una palabra en particular fuese ambigua.
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C. El Estado Actual de La Regla
Un profesional debe tomar en cuenta que las reglas que pueden
extraerse desde los tres casos de California son mis bien extremos.
Consiguientemente, la visi6n general adaptada por las cortes actuales
deben de determinarse. Por lo menos una corte ha considerado la regla
recientemente. Los pr6ximos tres casos fueron decididos en la corte de
Apelaci6n de los Estados Unidos en el S~ptimo Circuito por el Juez
Posner.
1. Briston v. Drake Street Inc. 1
Este caso surgi6 de un rompiniento de un contrato de empleo. La
demandante fue contratada por el demandado para producir una obra para
la cual el demandado era el autor y productor.'12 La demandante buscaba
el sueldo que ella habrfa de recibir entre la terminaci6n y la expiraci6n
programada del contrato.'1' El acuerdo escrito provefa que el demandado
debfa de autorizar la terminaci6n del contrato sobre treinta dias de aviso
escrito anterior, o si el patr6n cesara de conducir su negocio, o llegara ha
estar insolvente.
El acuerdo escrito adicion6 que solamente si el
demandado fuese convicto de un crimen podria terminar el contrato sin
responsabilidad hacia la demandante. 1,. Los remedios en el acuerdo
proveia que, "si el empleado era terminado por el patr6n por cualquier
motivo excepto el de una convicci6n de actos ilegales en tomo al
desempefto de sus deberes bajo el acuerdo, entonces tal terminaci6n se
considerar, un rompimiento del acuerdo."'I Adems, el contrato inclufa
una clAusula de integraci6n.'1
La corte rechaz6 el argumento del la
demandante que el acuerdo escrito estaba claro e inequfvoco sobre su
cara, "Oy pemniti6 el testimonio del demandado que aseguraba que el pago
del salario estaba contingente en la apertura del especticulo. La corte no
tomo en cuenta el testimonio del la demandante que adicionaba que ella
habia "insistido sobre un contrato firme cabalmente a causa de los despidos
incesantes al cual el demandado la habfa sometido.""'

124. Briston v. Drake Street Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994).
125. Id. at 350.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id, at 345.
130. Briston, 41 F.3d. at 350.
131. Id. at 350-51.
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La Corte de Apelaciones del Sdptimo Circuito, conducido por el
Juez Posner, revoc6 el reglamento del juez procesal y retuvo que el
contrato estaba claro sobre su cara y permiti6 la entrada de la evidencia
para contradecir la escritura propiamente excluida por el Parol Evidence
Rule. La corte detail6 que:12
r
si un contrato con tal redacci6n puede ser alterado por el
testimonio oral para beneficio propio de una de las panes a
lo que debe de ser su desempefto realmente depende de
una condici6n no expresada en el contrato y
completamente contradicho por las palabras en el contrato,
el Parol Evidence Rule esta muerto y las clAusulas de
integraci6n ineficaz.',
La corte adicionalmente anoto que ellos no tienen ninguna intenci6n en
abolir la regla.'1'
La corte explico los peligros que se pueden impedir en usando el
Parol Evidence Rule. La selecci6n por el juez, en permitir admisi6n de
cualquier prueba externa para determinar si las partes del acuerdo crefan
que el acuerdo significaban algo diferente a lo que aparentaba significar,'3 '
y su consideraci6n de evidencia en uso comercial,'1' son mecanismos que
los jueces usan para impedir resultados absurdos.'"1 Uno de los motivos,
aunque no expresamente mencionados en la opini6n, que la corte invoco
en utilizar el Parol Evidence Rule es en circunstancias cuando personas
son adversamente afectadas por el acoso sexual de un patr6n. La doctrina
del contra proferentum, frecuentemente mencionada en casos de seguros
para impedir resultados injustos al asegurado, es posiblemente la clave en
este taso.1'1 En otras palabras, el proponente de la prueba externa oral
132. Id. at 351.
133. d.
134. Id. at 345 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
135. Solo el juez puede, si es persuadido por laevidencia, dejar que el jurado lo determine.
Esto fue referido por [a cone como ladoctrina de "ambigfiedad extrfnseca." Id. at 351-52.
136. La corte explica que el uso de comercio permite esta evidencia, "porque se relaciona a
hechos pfiblicos, significados ptiblicos, que son menos ficil de falsificar. Permitir evidencia esto
en por Iotanto, hace menos daflo que el deseo de las partes que entran en un contrato escrito
acordar una forma del proteger compromisos contra eltrastomo del jurado." Briston, 41 F.3d at
352.
137. Id.
138. Similarmente, en casos japoneses, [a doctrina de contra proferentwn, fue invocada.
Por ejemplo, los contratos de adhesi6n son generalmente interpretados en favor del partido que Io
escribi6. Una Corte Superiora de Tokio, donde el propietario redacto un acuerdo escrito
proveyendo que "en caso de incumplimiento del pago del inquilino de un mes, elpropietario
adquirirfa el derecho de evacuar inmediatamente sin considerar la existencia de un deposito de
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parol no puede dar end6mica sobre su propio testimonio, establece la
ambigiiedad a fin de introducir la evidencia especialmente cuando el
proponente esta en una mejor posici6n de negociaci6n.
2. AM Internacional,Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates,
Inc. ''
Los hechos de este caso estn a continuaci6n: anbas partes son
fabricantes de maquinas de impresi6n utilizadas en el Ambito periodistico.
Una de estas maquinas, lamada "el colador de peri6dicos," viene
equipado con Extrafio Sistema de Reparaci6n de Inserci6n (MIRS). Estas
complicadas y costosas maquinas, deben ser personalizadas a la
especificaci6n del comprador.110 AM trajo una demanda de transgresi6n de
patente que termino en un arreglo, incluyendo un acuerdo de licencia
efectivo en el dia del arreglo."' Este acuerdo autoriza AM a una regalia de
$200,000 sobre cada MIRS, equipado este con el colocador de peri6dicos
hecho por GMA, y embarcado despu6s de la fecha de acuerdo y antes del
dia o la expiraci6n de la patente que era aproximadamente tres anos mds
tarde. 141
Ademns, una excepci6n a este acuerdo fue incluido que dictaba
que "al comienzo de Enero 1, 1991 hasta Julio 23, 1991 esta regalia
acumularfa sobre el recibo de GMA de la compra ordenada de buena fe,
con tal que el producto sea embarcado con anterioridad de Diciembre 31,
1991."141 De aquf en adelante, GMA fue ordenado a proveer nueve
maquinas de este tipo especial al comprador.I" Cuatro de ellos no fueron
embarcados hasta despuds de Diciembre 31, 1991. Las otras cinco fueron
embarcadas entre Septiembre y Noviembre de 1991, pero antes de
Diciembre 31.
AM contiende que la regalia se venci6 sobre estas
maquinas.
La corte, en AM InternationalInc., retuvo determinante que si el
idioma de un contrato es ambiguo o no, las cortes deben de mirar la

seguridad," la corte retuvo que "los partidos en esta siwaciones comtinmente solo intenta
entraren un acuerdo de arrendamiento y no intentar dar efecto a las palabras escritas a Inenos que
ellos especificamente negocien y den atenci6n a los partidos. Consiguientemente, aunque el
contrato entero sea acordada y firmado por el inquilino, la clAusula dicha es solo una frase
hipot6tica y no tiene ningun efecto obligatorio." MINSHU 13-366 (Feb. 26, 1934).
139. AM Int'l Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc. Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 574.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (nota editorial: .traducido de Ingles).
144. Id. at 575.
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tendencia objetiva y subjetiva de la posible ambigiledad. 14S La corte
reincorporo la regla que "un testimonio autodeclarativo de un partido el
cual no comprendi6 el significado del contrato (olo que aparentaba decir)
no es suficiente" ' 6 para puertas abiertas a la prueba externa. La corte
tambidn dijo que, "solamente una oferta que demuestra a cualquiera que
entienda el contexto del contrato bastaria aunque un lector novato no
entendiera el significada." t47 Aunque las partes en este caso, diferentes a
los del caso previo, estdn en la misma posici6n de negociaci6n, la regla del
testimonio auto servido sigue siendo insuficiente para dejar la admisi6n de
evidencia de parol."'
Dos de los casos notables de las cortes japoneses valen la pena
mencionarse. Uno viene de la Corte Suprema Japon6s, y el otro desde la
Corte Fukuoka Mis Alta. El de la Corte Fukuoka Mis Alta es un caso en
el cual lo siguiente ocurri6: 49 X y Y entraron en un contrato de
abastecimiento donde X iba abastecer petr6leo en una cantidad no excedida
a 2,000,000 Yen. El problema interpretativo proviene de la siguiente frase
contractual: que "en caso de impedimento al contrato, el comprador debe
pagar por el petr6leo proveido, y el vendedor puede inmediatamente
adquirir el derecho de recuperar por la cantidad de 2,000,000 Yen en
dafios.' " En otras palabras, proveia una cliusula liquida de dafios por el
partido dador.
El comprador repudio sobre el pago, y el vendedor afirmo que
ellos tenian el derecho de recuperar 2,000,000 Yen conforme al acuerdo
escrito aunque ninguna evidencia existia que el petr6leo proveido valia
2,000,000 Yen. La corte, sin embargo, retuvo que el vendedor no podia

145. AM Int'l, Inc., 44 F.3d at 575.

146. Id.
147. El Juez Posner explica que:
hasta los devotos mas fuertes de laregla significando claro de interpretaci6n
estatutaria, una regla que se asemejaba a la ley de los cuarto rincones de contratos,
permite el doblegarse cuando necesario para evitar resultados absurdos. (Citaci6n
omitida). Una absurdidad en laaplicaci6n de laregla significado claro comdnmente
resulta cuando se compara el significado aparentemente claro alsignificado en el
mundo real en elcual los estatutos son aplicados. Por Iomismo es que un documento
claro puede ser tallado incierto . ..por que conecta o fracasa en conectar, con las
actividades el cual regula.
Id. at 577. El concluyo que [a "[d]iscrepancia entre [a palabra y el mundo real es una fuente
comdin de problemas interpretativos donde quiera." Id. En otras palabras, el Juez Posner por Io
menos reconoce la utilidad en doblegar esta regla rfgida de interpretaci6n cuando es necesario.
148. Id. at 575.
149. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, KOMINSHU (Japan).
150. Id. at 263 (nora editorial: traducido de Japonds por el escritor).
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recuperar la cantidad en exceso del valor del petr6leo provino al
comprador.'5 ' La corte razono que el acuerdo incluyo un acuerdo ticito
donde en caso de una falta de pago, el valor del petr6leo provefdo al
comprador no excedia la cantidad de 2,000,000 Yen. ' El comprador
pagaria los dafios de 2,000,000, pero a la vez adquiriria el derecho al
reembolso por la cantidad en exceso. "IAdems, la corte describi6 que era
injusto interpretar el acuerdo como afirmado por el vendedor. '-4
Aunque la corte japon6s ignora el idioma explfcito en el acuerdo
escrito, llegarlan al mismo resultado en el caso AM International. Una de
las razones por lo cual ]a corte cre6 esta nueva provisi6n, con la cual ni los
partidos podrian acordar, era que la corte vio injusto forzar que el
comprador pague una cantidad de dinero por algo que no recibieron."
Ademins, la corte sinti6 que la adquisici6n inmediata del derecho de dafios
al vendedor, en caso de falta al contrato, constitufa una penalidad que la
corte querfa evitar.'"
En el caso AM International, por otra parte, la protecci6n de las
propiedades intelectuales no son suficientes para que una corte japonds
revise el contrato. "' Despu~s de todo, en AM International,el poseedor de
la patente cobro la regalia del licenciado cerca a la cantidad completa
afirmada por el concedente.u Intentar a cobrar mfis regalia simplemente
produciendo un testimonio subjetivo puede constituir un uso abusivo de los
derechos de las cortes japoneses.
El otro caso viene desde la Corte Suprema de Jap6n.'19 Este caso
involucra una hipoteca sobre una tierra que fue fallada en juicio.'1° El
151. Id. at 264.
152. Id. at 265.
153. Id. at 267.

154. Id. at 265'
155. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, KOMINSHU (Japan).
156. Id.
157. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 574.
159. MINSHU 22-12-2710 (Nov. 19, 1968).
160. A causa de diferencias estructurales en elArea de la ley de bienes raees, las palabras
no - recurso y recurso no se usaran. En ireas de mis claridad, los tdrminos siguientes se usaran:
Daibuslu-Bensai, elcual es elconcepto parecido a las reglas de acuerdo y satisfacci6n en laley

estadounidense; Saiken-Tanpo, que es un concepto parecido alconcepto de transacci6n asegurada
donde el acreedor adquiere un derecho del primero pago por la cantidad completa y elresto va a
los acreedores secundarios. La diferencia simple en la dos conceptos es que en ]a situaci6n
anterior, elacreedor adquiere lapropiedad cueste lo que cueste alvalor y, en lasituaci6n
posterior, elacreedor adquibre elderecho de recuperaci6n completa y nada mis. MINPO, arts.
377, 378, 482.
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acuerdo escrito fue provefdo por el Daibustu-Bensai, pero la corte retuvo
que el acuerdo escrito debi6 interpretarse para significar al Saiken-Tanpo.
Nuevamente, la corte interpreto las palabras para crear un nuevo efecto
legal. Probablemente, la intenci6n de la corte fue arriesgada en tratar de
impedir el decomiso contra el deudor porque la corte sinti6 que la mejor
practica era dejar que el deudor recupere su propiedad antes del remate de
la propiedad aunque el halla faltado sobre la deuda.
3. Canon v. Wittek Co. International161
Los hechos de este caso est~n a continuaci6n: demandante Canon
fie contratado como secretario constante flotador por Wittek Companies
International(mis adelante Wittek) quien provey6 un seguro de salud a sus
empleados mediante un plan de Health Care Service Corporation, the Blue
Cross Plan [de aqui en adelante Blue Cross].162 Bajo el plan, los nuevos

empleados se matricularon automticamente en el piano de seguro noventa
dfas despu6s de su primer dia de empleo. Canon estaba distanciada de su
empleo a causa de una reducci6n en empleomania de Wittek despu6s de
cincuenta y siete dias de su empleo. La hoja de transacci6n personal leia
suspensi6n de trabajo con respecto al tipo de separaci6n que le aplicaba a
Canon.
Luego ese mismo afio, Canon fue Ilamada a volver al trabajo sin
lienar Oingiin formulario de solicitud de trabajo o forma de aseguraci6n el
cual habia al principio de su empleo. Cincuenta dfas despues de su
regreso, ella sufri6 un ataque al coraz6n, y, incurri6 gastos medicos
considerables. A ese tiempo, ella habia trabajado por Wittek por ciento
doce dias no consecutivos, pero luego aprendi6 que Blue Cross negaba su
cobertura debido a la noci6n que Canon fue terminada, y, por lo tanto, los
noventa dias de periodo de espera fue reinstalado al tiempo que Wittek
reempleo a Canon.16 1 La corte del distrito mando que en ausencia de
cualquier lenguaje al contrario, los noventa dfas deben ser consecutivos y
no pueden ser sumados.'1' Como resultado, la corte de distrito neg6 Ia
cobertura de Canon por Blue Cross.,"
El tema importante a esta discusi6n que fue levantada en ape'aci6n
era si Wittek habfa terminado en vez de suspendido temerariamente a
Canon,'1 ya que podria ser clave en determinar si los 90 dias pueden
161. Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
162. Id. at 1283.
163. id.
164. id. at 1284.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1265.
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sumarse en fin de satisfacer la condici6n de pago sobre el plan de salud.
Despuds de determinar que la hoja de transacci6n personal controla el
punto de terminaci6n, la corte apunto a circunstancias fuera de la hoja que
indica que el tipo de separaci6n era una suspensi6n de trabajo mis bien
que un despido.' ' Aquf nuevamente, el empleador afirmo por su
testimonio que para beneficio propio aunque la hoja de transacci6n de
personal indicase una suspensi6n de trabajo, Wittek realmente intento
terminar con Canon.1" La corte rechazo este argumento y reincorporo
que: "si un contrato inequivoco puede ser abolido por el testimonio oral
de uno de los partidos (interesados) a lo que debe ser su desempleo en
realidad sobre una condici6n que no esta expresada en el contrato y
completamente contradicho por acuerdo escrito, entonces Parol Evidence
Rule muere. "'" La corte finalmente Ilego a la conclusi6n que, "si Wittek es
permitido ir detrs del idioma simple del contrato con solo su testimonio
sobre el significado real en la determinaci6n al estado de Canon y la hoja
de Transacci6n Personal, entonces el Parol Evidence Rule no tendria
ninguna fuerza."I" Consiguientemente, la corte reconoci6 que el Parol
Evidence Rule todavia vive hoy en dia.
Desde los casos anteriores podemos determinar que cuando las
cortes, enfrente de todas las circunstancias, concluyen que la introducci6n
de evidencia parol rendirfa resultados injustos, ellos prohibirin su
introducci6n.
Las circunstancias que rinden resultados injustos son
determinados en bases de caso a caso, porque cuando los hechos indican
diferencias en poder de negociar, existe una demanda independiente, y
falta de evidencia objetiva que los partidos hayan acordado sobre un
significado diferente, etc. Constituirian elementos que determinan la
admisibilidad de la evidencia parol.''
D. La Disposici6n de estos Casos en la Corte de Jap6n
Ciertas reglas pueden extraerse del anhlisis anterior de estos casos.
La corte de Jap6n considera toda las evidencias pertinentes en determinar
la intenci6n real de los partidos. Por otra parte, la corte estadounidense
primero introduce toda la evidencia pertinente para determinar si el
acuerdo escrito puede ser determinado como un acuerdo final. Como
materia practica, el resultado de las cortes de Jap6n son iguales porque no
167. Cannon, 60 F.3d at 1285.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
Id.
Id. at 1282.
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hay jurado que pueda ser engafiado por la introducci6n de la evidencia
parol. Las cortes estadounidenses introducirian la evidencia parol
solamente a los jueces.
Las cortes de Jap6n pr6ximamente determinarian si una
discrepancia realmente existe o no.
Las cortes estadounidenses
conducirian el mismo anlisis a este punto, pero pueden imponer la regla
que un testirnonio para beneficio propio no bastaria para rendir el
documento ambiguo a fin de introducir evidencia parol para probar la
intenci6n afirmada par ese partido. Por otra parte, las cortes de Jap6n
probablemente considerarian el testimonio subjetivo como evidencia para
determinar los hechos en discusi6n, porque como fue anteriormente
discutido, la traducci6n del C6digo Civil Continental enfoca en la
intenci6n de las partes. Puede decirse, t~cnicamente, que el testimonio
para beneficio propio tambi6n viene al caso en determinar la intenci6n de
las partes al acuerdo. Y consiguientemente, en determinar cualquier
discrepancia que puede existir desde esta etapa.
Esta diferencia puede que no sea tan importante, a causa de la
determinaci6n objetiva por los jueces de las cortes de Jap6n. Porque la
des confianza hacia el jurado no existe en las cortes de Jap6n, la
posibilidad de que una determinaci6n objetiva sea engafiada se disminuye
considerablemente. Ademls, las cortes de Jap6n pueden requerir que el
proponente de la evidencia parol muestre que su argumento esta basado en
hechos reales, aunque este ausente en el contrato, para prevenir una
violaci6n al requerimiento de la honestidad y lealtad.'" Si la corte
encuentra que el partido actu6 con respecto a un hecho que no estaba
incluido en el acuerdo fimal, el otro partido serg requerido generalmente a
desempefiar su obligaci6n.173
V. EL METODO PROPUESTO EN CONTRATACION ENTRE UNA
EMPRESA JAPONES Y UN EMPRESA ESTADOUNIDENSE

Habiendo descrito las diferencias en los dos sistemas legales,
puede parecer que la ley estadounidense ha Ilegado a ser mis liberal con
respecto a la introducci6n de evidencia parol y, por lo tanto, el contrato
escrito a perdido su importancia. Ademis, puede parecer que,a causa de
los requerimientos gubernamentales impuestos sobre las empresas
japonesas en archivar cada acuerdo entrado con una empresa extranjera,
una empresa japonesa puede decidir ejecutar un contrato escrito que
172. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09(4).
173. En el Jap6n, como en la mayorfa de los parses que tienen un c6digo civil, el
desempefto especifico es el remedio mas ordinario, y muy diferente a los Estados Unidos, en
donde los dafios monetarios son raros. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 14.
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excluya cualquier evidencia parol. Pero, esto no es suficiente. Como la
cultura japonts prefiere evitar documentaci6n de acuerdos, es ms
probable que tambidn eviten contratos detallados. Y por lo menos con una
entidad estadounidense, seria mis seguro presumir que el Japonds
recurriria a prueba extema cuando va a determinar su desempefio."
El primer problema enterado por los partidos es el de resolver cual
idioma va a controlar y redactar el contrato. Generalmente, los Japoneses
entienden el Ingles mis que los Estadounidenses el Japon6s. Generalmente
es poco, este comentarfa debe estudiarse cuidadosamente. Los partidos
deben entender que el idioma que estAn usando, no es solo Ingles, pero
frecuentemente el Ingles legal. Como anteriormente discutido, las
palabras se toman conjuntamente con las circunstancias y la situaci6n en
que se usan. Consiguientemente, puede que sea imposible acordar el
significado de una palabra que describe un efecto legal sin saber algo sobre
el sistema legal. Hasta ia palabra contrato se entiende de diferente
maneras en los dos sistemas.'" LLos partidos van a tener que describir la
teoria legal detrs de cada palabra usada? Desafortunadamente, la
respuesta debe ser "si" a fin de tener una comprensi6n completa. Una
soluci6n a este problema esta en negociar con abogados quien tengan un
vasto conocimiento de la ley en cual el documento esta redactado quien a
la vez es un hablador nativo, o un hablador fluido,del idioma que no esta
en uso en el contrato o en el acuerdo. Por ejemplo, si el contrato va a ser
escrito en Ingles, la entidad estadounidense de negocio debe negociar con
un delegado de la entidad japonesa quien tiene un conocimiento
considerable en el sistema legal estadounidense.
El segundo factor que los partidos deben concentrar en es la
clusula de la elecci6n de ley. Esto es dado a que la importancia de un
documento escrito puede ser significativamente diferente. Los partidos
174. "Los negociantes japoneses frecuentemente conflan en la confianza mutua en excluir la
contrataci6n formal. Ellos tradicionalmente yen la necesidad de contratar como una carencia de
buena fe, potencialmente lastimando futuras relaciones ... " Sabu, supra note 5, at 1260.
175. Los comentaristas dicen que:
[m]ientras un contrato en los Estados Unidos significa una promesa legalmente
ejecutable o un conjunto de promesas que acompalian los derechos y deberes keiyaku
(que significa el contrato en Japones) implica simplemente el proceso de negociaci6n, a
saber, la etapa promisoria, en que dos de los partidos acuerdan trabajar juntos para
crear una relacion mutuamente ventajosa. Las implicaciones de una transacci6n creada
por el keiyaku es incierto a los Estadounidenses porque mucha de la negociaci6n y [a
mayorfa de los detalles de las transacciones se destinan para ser Ilenos mas tarde....
[Miuchos negociadores japoneses deploran la especialidad y verbosidad en los contratos
porque ellos creen que estos son hecho para hacer un arreglo para un divorcio cuando

todavfa preparan el casaniento.
Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 3, at 206.
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deberfan primero determinar si cualquier disputas pueden surgir y si deber
ser gobernado por la ley japonds o la ley estadounidense. Esta elecci6n
determinara el modo entero de la negociaci6n. Ademis, esta elecci6n
determinara como el producto final lucird. Por ejemplo, si los partidos
determinan que la ley de contratos estadounidense regir, las disputas, el
documento escrito tendri que incluir cualquier acuerdo logrado. Si los
partidos fracasan en incluir alguna cliusula o acuerdo en el documento
escrito final, la posibilidad de que el acuerdo anterior oral o escrito estaria
sujeto a la evidencia parol seria significativo mandatario y, por lo tanto,
seria excluido como evidencia. Solo el juez determina que el documento
escrito es totalmente integrado, la regla aplicara y la evidencia parol se
excluir,.
Por otra parte, si los partidos acuerdan que la ley japon~s
determinara las disputas, no es necesario incorporar cada acuerdo logrado.
Desde un punto de vista practico, sin embargo, es mucho mis conveniente
para ambos partidos incluir todos los acuerdos logrados porque asi ser,
mis ficil refiriese a el de forma mis eficiente. El profesional,o cualquier
abogado que de consejo a su cliente,debe darse cuenta que los documentos
escritos no son creados para someter la evidencia en un Juicio.
Otra noci6n que el profesional debe tomar en cuenta es que aunque
el acuerdo oral de las panes escoja la ley japonesa como ]a ley gobernante,
todavia pudiera ser introducida en evidencia en una corte japonds. Y es
mejor meter la cliusula de la elecci6n de la ley en el acuerdo en caso de
que sea Ilevado a una corte estadounidense a pesar de que los partidos
oralmente acordaron escoger el Japon~s, y eventualmente, el acuerdo oral
con respecto a la ley gobernante puede ser excluido por Parol Evidence
Rule. Similarmente, si los partidos estipularon que la ley de contratos
estadounidense seria la ley gobernante, pero escogieron Ilevar la demanda
en una corte de Jap6n, una afirmaci6n oral que la ley japonesa fue
acordada puede ser considerado como evidencia a pesar de su falsedad.
En todo caso, la mejor idea es incluir una cliusula de la elecci6n
de ley aunque se manifieste en una actitud hostil hacia el otro partido
porque las panes se benefician de estas determinaciones en no tener que
preocuparse sobre si el documento escrito constituirl la referencia o no.
Similarmente, la clAusula de elecci6n del foro de ley puede ser importante
en ausencia de una clAusula de la elecci6n de ley porque la ley de ese corte
determinara si la ley aplicara o no. Aunque muchos de estos acuerdos
entre las empresas extranjeras se sometan al arbitraje, algunos consideran
mds ventajoso ir a travs de la corte. Consiguientemente, cliusulas de
elecci6n de foro y elecci6n de ley son mejores si son incluidas en el
acuerdo escrito final.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. Las DiferenciasDel Derecho
Hasta ahora hemos examinado las diferencias entre el derecho de
contratos estadounidense y el derecho de contratos japonds enfocando
sobre las reglas que afecta los documentos escritos. Ademis, hemos visto
que la brecha entre Ia interpretaci6n estadounidense del documento escrito
y Ia interpretaci6n japonds, es m~s estrecha. Esto es mostrado por el
requerimiento implicado del Uniform Commercial Code que en cada
documento hay un pacto de buena fe y negocio justos y hay liberaci6n de
Ia rigidez del Parol Evidence Rule."6 Un profesional, sin embargo, no
debe subestimar las diferencias.
Articulo dos de Ia Convenci6n sobre Ia Venta Internacional de
Bienes,'" en que los Estados Unidos ha firmado y aprobado, conforma a
los principios de C6digo Civil sobre Ia libertad de formas requeridos.18
Esto significa que el Statute of Fraud y el Parol Evidence Rule no tiene
aplicaci6n entre pafses signatorios. Sin embargo, el articulo 96 provee que
en un pais cuya practica ordinaria requiere un documento escrito, puede
optar salirse del requerimiento.11 Porque este articulo no esta interesado
con el efecto de Ia elecci6n de Ia clusula del derecho, pero si tiene inter6s
con la manera en que las empresas comerciales negocian. No habri
ningtin an~lisis con respecto a lo que sucede cuando un pais signatorio y
uno no - signatorio entran en un contrato. De cualquier modo debe
enfatizarse, que Ia transacci6n internacional produce discrepancias en la
importancia de un documento escrito.
Consiguientemente, en el contexto Jap6n - Estados Unidos, el
profesional estadounidense debe darse cuenta que los Japoneses estn
acostumbrados a los documentos simples y usualmente no requiere que
cada contrato estA en el documento. Por otra parte, los profesionales
japoneses deben darse cuenta que Ia practica del partido estadounidense
con quien estln negociando, sigue el Statute de Fraud, tambi6n los
japoneses deben darse cuenta de Ia noci6n de el ParolEvidence Rule.

176. "U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994).
177. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex 1(1980).
178. Id.
179. Id. at art. 96.
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B. Las Diferenciasde Las Culturas
Hasta ahora en el foco de la discusi6n ha sido en la explicaci6n por
la mayoria de las diferencias entre la actitud japonds y la actitud
estadounidense sobre el hecho de contratos. Sin embargo, hay un aspecto
importante que nunca debe ser ignorado. Eso es el aspecto de las
diferencias que surge de la cultura social. No es tan simple como decir
que el Japonds aprecia valores comunales y los estadounidenses aprecian el
individualismo. En otras palabras, el Japonds es tan agresivo como el
Estadounidense, y el Estadounidense tambidn aprecian el valor de la
comunidad. Cuando el foco esta sobre la sociedad en total, de cualquier
modo, cada sociedad podria tener una tendencia hacia apreciar
individualismo sobre los valores sociales.
La larga historia del desarrollo de la sociedad japonesa muestra
que el Japonds siempre habia requerido la contribuci6n de la sociedad por
el sacrificio de los valores individuales. Esto es cierto si hablamos de los
250 afios de retraimiento que Jap6n ha tenido del resto del mundo, o de la
desafortunada guerra mundial en que estuvieron involucrados.
La
expresi6n de ia individualidad fue casi un crimen durante la segunda
guerra mundial en Jap6n. Consiguientemente, los valores comunales que
el Japon~s comfinmente retiene no vienen de adentro de los individuos,
pero desde su historia social.
Lo que surgi6 desde esta sociedad comunales fueran algunas
normas que solo ellos en la comunidad podrian entender. Estas normas
son peculiares a una sociedad que se ha recluido a si mismo del resto del
mundo por mucho tiempo. Diferente a un pais como los Estados Unidos,
donde la diversidad de los ciudadanos es uno de los elementos mis
poderosos del pais, Jap6n tiene su poder en la homogeneidad de la
sociedad. En otras palabras, no es un requerimiento que el Japon6s
discuta un punto totalmente para alcanzar una conclusi6n, porque
frecuentemente los valores que aprecia la sociedad son los mismo valores
que aprecian los individuos.
Por otra parte, es la costumbre
estadounidense en retener una forma de dar cr6dito pleno a cualquier
opini6n minoritaria. Consiguientemente, la sociedad debe discutir un
punto totalmente al fin para alcanzar una conclusi6n, porque bisicamente
un valor es ms extrafio que otro. Como resultado, los Estadounidenses
tienden discutir cada aspecto de un punto al fin para obtener la conclusi6n
verdaderamente democrtica.
Sin embargo, hecho que la sociedad japon~s debe recordar, es que
ellos no viven en una sociedad homogeneo. A causa del hecho que sus
productos, y servicios estlin fluyendo a los Estados Unidos y por todas
partes del mundo, y porque lo mds de los alimentos que Ilegan en las bocas
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de los nifios japoneses estin importadas por todos lados del mundo, los
Japoneses saben que viven en un mundo verdaderamente internacional.
Consiguientemente, los valores y la actitud que solo podrfan ser apreciados
en una sociedad homogeneo debfan ser abandonados. Por lo menos en un
ambiente empresarial pero tambi6n incluyendo la empresa extranjera. La
adhesi6n al caricter totalitario, volviendo las normas que solamente las
personas adentro de ellos pueden entender, resulta en peores
malentendidos. Por otra parte, los Estadounidenses deben darse cuenta
que el carhcter hist6rico, que ha desarrollado por mis de mil afios no seri
abandonado fcilmente, a pesar de sus esfuerzos. Pensar que el proceso
lento de negociar del Japonds es solo una estrategia, pierde punto en su
totalidad.18 ° Ellos tienen que entender el carlicter de esta tradici6n larga.
En conclusi6n, to que puede ser y Io que debe ser requerido de
ambos partidos es que se comuniquen las arnbigiiedades uno al otro cuando
ellos no estAn seguros de un aspecto del acuerdo, si esta escrito o no. Esto
puede describirse como el requerimiento de presentaci6n. En los Estados
Unidos, ms y ms casos reconocen el requerimiento de presentaci6n,'8 ' y
deciden que la parte que se aprovecha de la falta del conocimiento del otro
en romper un convenio es una violaci6n al deber implicito de negocio de
buena fe.I" Esto parece como el contraparte estadounidense del Japon~s
honestidad y lealtad. Finalmente, los partidos no deben olvidar que el
Uniform Commercial Code, y el Articulo 1 del C6digo Civil Japonds,
requieren las nociones de buena fe, negocio justo, honestidad, y lealtad.
Aunque el preciso uso de las palabras sean diferente, ellos significan
absolutamente la misma cosa.

180.

Algunos comentaristas dice que los Japoneses usan [a t6cnica de pretender no

comprender Ingles o decir que ellos tienen que pedir superiores de [a empresa opinen a fin de
participar y traer una mejor soluci6n. Los estilos de negociaci6n Japones se discuten en Zhang &
Kuroda, supra note 3. Ademgs, un articulo mas bien patri6tico puede ser encontrado en Walters,
supra note 2. Este titulo Now That I Ate Sushi, Do We Have a Deal? al articulo es altamente
ofensivo, y mientras estos inadvertidos (o intencionales?) expresiones se usen, el camino hacia la
armonfa entre las dos sociedades seguir- retrasado.
181. Vea generalmente LINZER, supra note 85.
182" Id.
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La visi6n Judaica sobre la pena capital es que debe de
existir pero nunca usarse ...

[E]s el deber del Gobernador

Patakis de asegurar el orden. Sin olvidar que como lider
61 debe exponer atributos de ambos padre y madre. El
Gobernador Pataki es un hombre bueno. Pero si actfa
sobre la pena capital, 6l serfa el lider de un gobierno
sangriento.
Rabi Aaron Soloveichik'
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1. Rabbi Aaron Soloveichik, The One-Hundred Smartest New-Yorkers, N.Y. MAG., Jan.
30, 1995, at 52 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
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I. INTRODUCCION
Desde 1966 a 1972, a pesar de estatutos permitiendo la pena
capital en la mayoria de los estados, s6lo tres hombres fueron ejecutados
en todos los Estados Unidos.2 Un observador objetivo habria citado esta
tendencia como un pron6stico del abandono gradual de esta pena
definitiva.1 Sin embargo, en 1972 Ia Corte Suprema enfoc6 su atenci6n al
impacto que la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos tendria sobre la
imposici6n de la pena capital. Fue en el caso de Furman v. Georgia4
donde la Corte Suprema decidi6 que la Constituci6n exclufa la pena capital
como estaba siendo aplicada por los estados anteriormente.
Mientras que algunas personas anunciaron este evento como el fin
de la pena capital, ir6nicamente, Furman fue el precursor del
resurgimiento del castigo. Las opiniones totalmente divergentes en el caso
de Fuman, forzaron a los nueve miembros de la Corte Suprema a una
batalla rebelde sobre la naturaleza de un sistema constitucional de la pena
capital. Esta batalla eventualmente llev6 a la Corte Suprema a formular un
sistema constitucional que foment6 la frecuente aplicaci6n de la pena
capital y su implementaci6n.
A consecuencia, sobre trescientas
ejecuciones han ocurrido desde 1977,1 y 56 ejecuciones en 1995.6
La experiencia Judia con la pena capital es notablemente diferente.
La Biblia especifica ejecuciones mandatarios en un ndimero considerable de
crimenes.7 A pesar de este apremio, las ejecuciones en la- ley Judia son
sumamente raras. Esto ocurre debido al Sanedrin, la corte Judia mlis alta,

2. HUGO A. BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA 23, 25 (3d ed. 1982).
3. Vea en ejemplo, Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1789-94 (1970) (citando la presente insularidad de [a
pena capital como una sefial de su inconstitucionalidad); Amicus Curiae Brief for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund at 42-47, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (notando el aumento de
aversi6n plblica y ]a declinaci6n judicial en usar la pena capital como premisa de su abandono).
Ver tambien Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, y Brennan que
disienten de la negaci6n de certiorari) (afirmando que el certiorari debe otorgarse para decidir si
las tendencias populates actuales puede en circunstancias seguras rendir la pena capital
inconstitucional).
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. A partir de Enero 7, 1996 el numero extiende a 313. Vea, Executions on the Rise;
Capricious Penalty: With More People on Death Row, More Chances of Error, BALTIMORE
SUN, Jan. 7, 1996, at 2E.
6. Id.
7. Vea infra p. 3.
8. Vea infra pp. 17-18.
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que menosprecia la actitud hacia la pena capital.' El Sanhedrin formula
un sistema procesal que impide la emisi6n y realizaci6n de las sentencias
de muerte.10
El prop6sito de este ensayo es explorar las razones detris de estos
dos resultados divergentes mediante un estudio comparativo del desarrollo
judicial de la ley Judfa y la ley constitucional de los Estados Unidos sobre
la pena capital." Tambi6n, se contrasta el sistema Judfo de la pena capital
Mediante esta
con la experiencia judicial de los Estados Unidos.
exploraci6n judicial, el por qui y el c6mo del empleo escaso de la pena
capital en la ley Judia y su uso judicialmente fomentado en los Estados
Unidos serin examinados.' 2
Este ensayo comienza con una encuesta de las fundaciones
textuales de la pena capital en ambos la ley Judia y la Constituci6n de los
Estados Unidos. Los textos bisicos de ia ley Judfa y de la Constituci6n se
examinaran para determinar el debido tratamiento de la pena capital.
Estos textos sern examinados, buscando cualquier mitigaci6n potencial
sobre la imposici6n, estructura, y uso de la pena capital.
Habiendo establecido ]a ley fundamental, este ensayo continda
trazando el desarrollo judicial actual de la pena capital en ambos sistemas.
Tambidn se conducirA una comparaci6n de la interpretaci6n aplicada a los
textos bdsicos por la corte judicial mis alta de cada sistema. El ensayo
concluye contrastando las dos interpretaciones judiciales divergentes para
presagiar lo que ocasiona la estructura actual y la actitud judicial hacia la
pena capital en los Estados Unidos.
II.

FUNDACIONES TEXTUALES PARA EL CASTIGO CAPITAL

En la ley Judia, la legalidad Biblica de la pena capital es una
certeza. El texto de la Biblia afirma que la pena capital puede imponerse

9. Veainfra pp. 14-17.
10. Vea generalmente Israel J.Kazis, Judaism and the Death Penalty, CONTEMPORARY
JEWISH ETHICS, 326 (1979).
11. Este ensayo se limita tdnicamente a las experiencias judiciales con lapena capital. Por
lo tanto este estudio no examine lapena capital como distribuido legalmente por el Rey Judfo--la
Ilamada "Juez Rey." Para una exploraci6n de este aspecto de [a ley Judla Vea Bleich, Capital
Punishment in the Noachide Code, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS (1981).
12. Este ensayo no es penetrante en su alcance. Mis bien, toca sobre laestructura y
principios claves de ambos sistemas a fin de discernir los principios bisicos de su desarrollo.
Para ]a discusi6n comparativa adicional de estos dos sistemas, Vea Bruce Ledewitz, Reflections on
the Talmudic and American Death Penalty, 6 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (1993). Para una
encuesta m~s comprensiva de [a experiencia moderna de laCorte Suprema con lapena capital
Vea WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987)..
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en treinta y seis crimenes diferentes.'3 Mientras que la imposici6n de la
muerte es discrecional para algunos crimenes, en la mayoria de los casos
es mandatario si se encuentra culpabilidad."1 La Constituci6n de los
Estados Unidos esti opaca sobre el estado legal de la pena capital. No hay
ninguna barra explicita ni una expresi6n de su uso permisible en el

documento.
Sin embargo, hay inferencias fuertes que su uso es
permisible. La frase de apertura de la Quinta Enmienda provee que
"[n]inguna persona tendri lugar para contestar un crimen capital, a menos
que sobre una presentaci6n o denuncia de un gran jurado.'5
La ciusula de la Doble Penalidad de esta Enmienda prohibe una
"doble exposici6n por el mismo delito."' 6 Finalmente, la Cliusula del
Proceso Debido manda que el proceso debido de la ley se le de a un
acusado antes de "privarle de su vida." 1
Bajo el sistema federal construido por la Constituci6n, lo qu6 no es
delegado al gobierno federal o excluido a los estados es dejado a los

estados."1 Por lo tanto, aparecerfa asi, que sin ia barra afirmativa en la

13.

Vea SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JEWS 45 (1991).

La

ley Judfa provee cuatro m6todos para Ilevar a cabo la pena capital; la lapidaci6n, el incendio, la
decapitaci6n y la estrangulaci6n. La lapidaci6n se consider6 la forma mis severa de las
ejecuciones, ia estrangulaci6n la mis d6bil. Dieciocho crimenes eran penables por apedreo:
1) el incesto con la propia madre; 2) con su madrastra; 3) el sexo con su nuera; 4) acto
sexual con una virgen prometida (violar); 5) la pederastia; 6) la bestialidad, practicada
por un hombre; 7) la bestialidad practicada por una mujer; 8) el reniego; 9) la
idolatrfa; 10) sacrificando a los nifios propios a Moloch; 11) instigar individuos a
abrazar la idolatria; 12) instigar comunidades para hacer lo mismo; 13) las adivinanzas;
14) la brujerfa; 15) la magia; 16) violar el dia de it a iglesia; 17) maldecir a un padre;
18) la violaci6n de un deber filial. Diez de estos Crfmenes eran penables por incendio:
19. el adulterio de la hija de un sacerdote; 20) el incesto con una propia hija; 21) con
[a hija de la hija propia; 22) el incesto con la hija de el hijo propio; 23) el incesto con
ia hijastra de uno; 24) el incesto con ia hija de nuestra hijastra; 25) el incesto con ia
hija de nuestro hijastro; 26) el incesto con su propia suegra; 27) el incesto con su
madre; 28) el incesto con la madre de nuestro padrastro. Dos de los crimenes eran
penables por decapitaci6n: 29) el asesinato; y 30) la apostabais comunal el Judaismo al
idolatria. Seis de los crfmenes eran penables por estrangulaci6n: 31) el adulterio; 32)
el magullar a un padre; 33) el secuestro; 34) la mala administraci6n; 35) Ia falsa
profecfa; 36) el profetizar en nombre de deidades paganas.
Id.

14: Vea, generalmente Maimonides 15:10-13.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Los contornos y la historia de la doctrina de la Decima
Enmienda estA trazada en New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Vea tambien Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (el anhlisis de la D~cima Enmienda requiere que examinen si
la Constituci6n autoriza acci6n federal); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.J
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Constituci6n e implicaci6n al contrario, la pena capital y la forma de su
implementaci6n seria discrecional a los estados individuales. Sin embargo,
dnicamente mediante una lectura deductiva puede cualquier lustre ser
puesto sobre la posici6n de la Constituci6n referente a la pena capital.
Esto eleva el espectro del auto interprete judicial de la Constituci6n, la
Corte Suprema," quien mediante referencia a otros pasajes, pueda
encontrar el documento prohibitivo o regulativo de la pena capital.
III. FUENTES POTENCIALES DE MITIGACION EN LOS TEXTOS JUDIOS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES

Inicialmente, en el encuentro con los textos primarios, el caso para
la pena capital estA claro en el c6digo Biblico y aparentemente se permite
en la Constituci6n. Sin embargo, este juicio se basa Anicamente sobre la
presencia o la ausencia de las declaraciones explfcitas dentro de los textos
en lo que concierne a la pena capital. Mas no examinan que peso podrian
tener otras secciones de ]a Biblia o ley oral Judfa o la Constituci6n de los
Estados Unidos sobre la pregunta de la pena capital.
A. La Ley Judia
En la Biblia uno de los pasajes principales con aplicaci6n
tangenciales a la eficacia de la pena capital concierne a la honradez moral
del perd6n: "[y] aun si la madre fuese una vaca o una oveja, usted no
matard ni a ella, ni a su joven en un dia. "I
La validez del perd6n sobre el castigo y la primicia del perd6n
tambi~n encuentra expresi6n en el Midrash, la ley oral Judia : "[l]os
sacerdotes perdonaron a [Saul por su papel en la matanza en Nob], pero
los Gibeonites no lo perdonaron, y por lo tanto Dios los rechaz6."2 '
528 (1985) (declarando que laD6cima Enmienda impide acci6n federal que invade las facultades
de los estados).
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declarando que "es enfdticamente laprovincia
y eldeber del departamento judicial para decidir que es laIcy') (nota editorial: traducido de
Ingl6s).
20. Leviticus 22:28. En comentarios subsiguientes este pasaje se ha usado para ilustrar la
mal colocaci6n del perd6n. El Midrash declara: Bar Kapara dijo "Doeg se llama eledomite
porque 61 prohibi6 que Sad] derramar ia sangre de Agag. Doeg dijo estA escrito en el Torah, no
matarais ni a ella, ni a su joven en el mismo dfa: aunque vosotros van a matar j6venes y viejos,
nifios y mujeres en un dia." (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingis) Midrash sobre Psalm (to ps.
52), 1, p. 479 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
21. ShmotRabbah 30:12 (nota editorial: traducido de lngds).
Otros pasajes de laley Judia se dirigen al papel del perd6n generalmente. El Talmud
Babilonio declara: "[Yo vi a Akathriel Jah, el Seflor de Anfitriones, sentado sobre un trono
enaltecido. El me dijo: Ishmael, Mi hijo, Bendlceme! Yo lecontestt: 'Quiero que sea su deseo
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Mis alli de el reino de la muerte el tema del perd6n fue adoptado
en el Midrash y tambidn empleado para mostrar la honrades del perd6n
sobre el no merecedor. Esto se vio en las acciones de Rabbi Joshua B.
Levi:
En el barrio de R. Joshua B. Levi vivi6 un Saducea quidn
lo inquietaba mucho con [sus interpretaciones del los
textos. Un dia el rabi . . . pens6 . . . 'Le maldecird.'
Cuando en ese momento lleg6, R. Joshua quidn dormitaba
[Al despertar] dijo: Yo veo en esto que mi intenci6n fue
impropia. Pues estd escrito que la misericordia estari
sobre todas sus obras. Y esta adicionalmente escrito, que
no es bueno que el honrado sea el que castigue. 22
Destilado de lo qu6 se ha detallado hasta ahora, el muy difundido
empleo de ia pena capital en la ley Judia es cierto todavia. Hay una
tensi6n del perd6n que est, presente; una tensi6n que es explicitamente
aplicable a esos convictos de crimenes capitales. Podria permitirse un
juicio moral en lo que concierne la validez y frecuencia de la pena capital.
Sin embargo, la pena capital, como se ha notado, est, en la ley Judaica
como un suceso mandatario. De tal manera, que esti por verse qu6 puede
hacer la calidad del perd6n directamente para evitar la pena capital en
circunstancias mandatarios.
B. El Derecho Constitucional
En la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos los pasajes
potencialmente pertinentes de la pena capital tienen calidades similares a
esos simplemente delineados en ia ley Judaica. Ambos permiten juicios
morales con la potencialidad de regular la pena capital, y en el caso de la
Constituci6n hasta arriesgarse para prohibir su uso. Sin embargo, ]a
Constituci6n, mientras mantiene un idioma que potencialmente puede ir
mis lejos que la ley Judia, no incluye el aspecto moral positivo de la ley
Judaica.
Mis bien, en la Constituci6n las cliusulas pertinentes
tangenciales son en su base moralmente neutral.
Pero pueden ser
empleados para poner un sello moral sobre ]a pena capital, aunque el fallo
no sea detallado.

que su perd6n pueda suprimir tu indignaci6n y predomine el perd6n sobre tus otros atributos."'
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 46b (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
22. Berakoth 7a (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
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1. El Proceso Debido Sustantivo
El primer pasaje pertinente de ia Constituci6n es la Cldusula del
Proceso Debido de la Quinta Enmienda. Esta clusula afirma que
"[n]inguna persona seri . . . privada de su vida, libertad o propiedad .
sin el proceso debido de ley. ""

Una examen ligero de este pasaje ocasionaria que uno asumiera
que la declaraci6n de la cliusula de que la vida pueda tomarse mientras
que el Proceso Debido sea seguido, negaria cualquier mitigaci6n potencial
sobre la pena capital. Sin embargo, esta mirada inicial, aunque correcta,
ignorarfa la interpretaci6n que la Corte Suprema ha puesto sobre esta
clusula. Si esta interpretaci6n se explora, la condici6n y el uso de la pena
capital serd una perspectiva discutible.
La Corte Suprema ha decidido que esta clusula personifica un ser
que la Corte ha Ilamado el proceso debido sustantivo.2 ' El proceso debido
sustantivo ha sido interpretado por la Corte como una barra a la
interferencia gubernamental con prncticas que son las tradicionales e
fundamentales en nuestra sociedad, a menos que una raz6n apremiante
exista." Esta prohibici6n ha sido expresada por la Corte como una
protecci6n de esos actos esenciales al concepto de la libertad ordenada.2 6
Tambidn se ha expresado como un mandamiento negativo que impide que
el gobierno se comprometa en conducta que "escandalice a la
conciencia. "27
La Corte, aunque afirmando que cuando un acto se encuentra
fundamentalmente necesario para la libertad ordenada y por lo tanto es
protegido de interferencia por el proceso debido sustantivo, nunca ha
definitivamente dictado como el acto se determina ser fundamental o
implicito a la libertad ordenada. Sin embargo, una encuesta de casos
d6nde la Corte ha encontrado que una prdctica es protegida por la
interferencia del gobierno, expone un modelo en el anilisis de la Corte.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. La Cldusula del Proceso Debido tambi6n contiene una especie conocido como del
proceso debido procesal. Pero, como la pena capital es en gran parte el dominio de los estados,
cualquier estructura procesal bajo la clIusula del proceso debido tendria que ser impuesta

mediante el derecho sustantivo procesal. Vea en ejemplo, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Esta exposici6n puede por lo tanto ser limitado a ese concepto.
25.

Vea Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1967) (Harlan, J., disintiendo de la negaci6n

de certiorari).
26. Vea Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
27. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles). Vea
tambien Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (esplicando que el gobierno infringe
el proceso debido cuando actda sin racionalidad fundamental porque es azorante al sentido de
justicia).
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La Corte mayormente emplea el proceso debido sustantivo para proteger
las necesidades tradicionales al hogar y la familia, y para excluir acciones
particularmente brutales por el gobierno.Y
No obstante a los usos que el proceso debido sustantivo haya
protegido, nunca ha incluido un elemento moral explicito. Mds bien, el
proceso debido sustantivo ha sido definido y proveido mediante las

percepciones subjetivas de la Corte. La Corte mediante su empleo de las
pruebas anteriormente mencionadas, a usado la composici6n ideol6gica de
sus propios miembros para determinar el alcance y la composici6n del
proceso debido sustantivo.29 De tal modo, un elemento moral se
comprende dentro de las opiniones de los miembros individuales, aunque
no tenga una exposici6n explicita como en la ley Judia del perd6n.
2. La Octava Enmienda
El segundo texto pertinente es la Octava Enmienda que excluye "el
castigo cruel e inusitado."" La Octava Enmienda se erigi6 inicialmente
para prohibir la tortura y otros castigos birbaros.1 Sin embargo, a travds
del tiempo la Corte ha interpretado la Enmienda como adoptando "los

conceptos anchos e idealistas de dignidad, normas civilizadas, humanidad,
y decencia." 2 Como tal, la Corte ha interpretado la enmienda como un

texto flexible que prohibe el castigo contradictorio

"con las normas

28. Vea inter alia Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declarando que el matrimonio es un derecho fundamental); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (declarando que la procreaci6n es un derecho
fundamental); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (declarando que la contracepci6n
es un derecho fundamental); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (declarado que la
familia es una tradici6n fundamental). Vea generalmente Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481-86 (1965); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798); United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1939); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)
(explicando que el Proceso Debido impide que el gobierno arbitrariamente medique a los
individuos); Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1967) (Harlan, J., disintiendo de la negaci6n de
certiorari) (explicando que la cladisula del debido proceso prohibe que el gobierno aprese
individuos sin prop6sito); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Vea tambien Kinsella v.
United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (declarando que el gobierno infringe el proceso debido
cuando actda sin racionalidad fundamental, azorante al sentido de justicia).
29. El alcance y contenido exacto del proceso debido sustantivo ha sido una fuente de
discusi6n candente. Compare los opiniones concurriendo de los Jueces White, Harlan, y
Goldberg con las opiniones disintiendo de los Jueces Black y Stewart. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
31. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
32. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (nota editorial: traducido de Inglis).
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evolucionarias de decencia que marca el progreso de una sociedad
madura. ""
La determinaci6n de una norma social de decencia ha sido una
fuente de controversia en la Corte. La Corte a veces ha dicho que la
decisi6n de un castigo esti en pugna con las normas de decencia y deben
ser tomadas con referencia a ambas normas nacionales e internacionales.
Las normas internacionales son las convenciones internacionales y las
prcticas de las naciones.3 La determinaci6n de lo qut son las normas
nacionales es una fuente de controversia dificil de resaltar. Sin embargo,
la Corte en diversas ocasiones ha sacado referencia de sus propias
percepciones," las actitudes de la plebe,'6 las legislaturas estatales," y de
las prActicas de los jurados. Es mas bien intitil indicar que como en el
caso del proceso debido sustantivo, ninguna de estas decisiones
contundentes, excepto alguna legislaturas estatales, personifican un
elemento moral que pueda definirse sin referencia a las percepciones
subjetivas de los jueces de la Corte Suprema.
3. Conclusi6n
El caso para la interdicci6n o la regulaci6n de la pena capital en el
piano constitucional es moralmente neutral. Hay pasajes que pueden
excluir potencialmente o regular el proceso. Sin embargo, estos pasajes
difieren a los de la ley Judaica sobre el perd6n porque no tienen una fuerza
moral explicita. MIs bien, ellos son neutrales y dependen de indicios
subjetivos para su composici6n moral. Asi, cualquier efecto potencial de
estos pasajes sobre la pena capital dependeria de la evaluaci6n y la
definici6n subjetiva que le den los Jueces.

33. Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (pluralidad); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 593 (1977) (opini6n de pluralidad) (explicando el consenso internacional contra la pena
capital para la violaci6n pesa contra la validez del castigo); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
333-34 (1976) (declarando que la muerte obligatoria es invlida porque la sociedad rechaza
castigos id6nticos para cada criminal convicto) (nota editorial: traducido de Inglis).
34. Vea Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citando normas internacionales para encontrar que ]a pena
capital para la violaci6n estA excluida por la Octava Enmienda).
35. Vea Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976).
36. Vea Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
37. Vea Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
38. Vea Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280. 295-96 (1976).
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IV. ASPECTOS PROCESALES DE LA PENA CAPITAL
A. La Ley Judia
Basado en la descripci6n breve conducida arriba, uno conjeturaria
que la pena capital seria un suceso comdn bajo la ley Judaica. Ese no es el
caso. Las ejecuciones en el antiguo Israel eran una rareza. Esto fue
debido a los procedimientos que lIa ley Judia y el Sanhedrin requerian para
la implementaci6n de la pena capital. La interpretaci6n hecha por el
Sanhedrin, de los manuscritos y sus mdtodos, hicieron un cuerpo de
procedimiento que hacia que "la ejecuci6n fuese una imposibilidad
virtual.""
Desde el comienzo la Biblia requiri6 un ndmero preciso de testigos
en un caso capital. Numera 35:30 afirma: "Si cualquier individuo mata
una persona, el asesino serd puesto a la pena capital por la evidencia de los
testigos: pero ninguna persona se pondr, a la muerte s6lo con el
testimonio de un s6lo testigo."
Este pasaje se repite sin un contexto
capital en el Deuteronomio 19:15: "Un caso puede ser vilido solamente
con el testimonio de dos testigos o mis.""
El requerimiento Biblico de dos testigos es uno muy estricto. Sin
embargo, en su implementaci6n de estos pasajes el Sanhedrin los interpret6
para requerir procesos adicionales en las escrituras. De tal modo, esos
pasajes se leyeron ampliamente y fueron empleados para eliminar el uso de
la evidencia circunstancial para condenar a un acusado. El Gemara
afirma: "[el juez] le dijo a ellos; Quizis usted lo vio corriendo detris de
su pr6jimo a una ruina, usted los persigui6, y Io encontr6 con la espada en
mano con la sangre goteando ahi, mientras el hombre occiso se retorcia: Si
esto es lo qu6 usted vio, usted no vio nada."' 2
El Sanhedrin tambi6n interpret6 la necesidad de que dos testigos
excluyeran el testimonio del asesino a si mismo. Asi, una confesi6n propia
del asesino, no importa su valor declarativo, seria inadmisible en un
crimen capital. Esta fue una regla estrictamente protegida y todas las
declaraciones que podrian implicar la culpabilidad se interpretaron como
no ser admitido.41
39.
Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment - The Classic Jewish Discussion,
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS 310, 317 (Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1979) (nota editorial:
traducido de lngl~s).
40. Vea, Numbers 35:30. Vea. tambien Deuteronomy 17:6 (nota editorial: traducido de
Ingles).
41. Vea, Tosephta Sanhedrin 11:1 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
42. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 37b (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
43. Vea generalmenteAARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 36-37
(1970).
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Tambidn era un requisito que en el testimonio de los testigos no
hubiese ninguna disputa respecto a cualquier hecho. Si habia cualquier
discrepancia con los testimonios se exclufa. El Sanhedrin emple6 est,
regla para efectivamente excluir el testimonio de atestaciones qu6
testificaran a la culpabilidad del demandado." Los Judios interrogaban a
los testigos separados, y entonces les preguntaban sobre los detalles mis
diminutos del crimen. Si los testigos se contradecian el uno al otro con
respecto a cualquier hecho, sus testimonios serian excluidos.
La
intensidad de las interrogaciones del Sanhedrin fueron ilustradas por Rabbi
Yochanan Ben Zakkai quidn interrog6 en una ocasi6n a unos testigos sobre
el ndimero de higos que crecian sobre el irbol debajo del cual se cometi6 el
crimen11
El Sanhedrin tambi6n requiri6 que el demandado fuera advertido.
Onicamente si el demandado fuese advertido de antemano de las
consecuencias de su crimen por los dos testigos, podria ser sentenciado a
morir." El acusado tambi6n debia tener nociones de la pena antes de
proseguir.4 1 Este requerimiento era aplicable s6lo a los casos d6nde la
pena capital estuviese en disputa y no al arresto."
El acusado tambi6n estaba obligado ha ser condenado por una
corte inferior calificada de veintitr6s jueces." Si despu6s de oir la
evidencia todos los veintitr s de estos jueces votaban para condenar al
acusado, 61 seria absuelto. El acusado podria (inicamente ser condenado si
alguno de los miembros votaban para absolverlo."
El Sanhedrin tambi6n no reconocia la pena capital de homicidio
involuntario cometido durante un delito grave. Por lo tanto, un accesorio

44. Talmud8lb.
45. Sanhedrin 41a. Vea tambiMn Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a (declarando que R. Johanan y R.

Elezar impedirfan las atestaciones de testigos que respondfan sobre detalles fntimos como tales:
"Tom6 usted-nota si la vfctima sufria de algtin afecto mortal o estaba perfectamente saludable?"
Rabbi Ashi elabor6 sobre esto afirmando que la respuesta podria ser "perfectamente saludable,"
ya que ellos podrian estar avergonzados en preguntar, "QuizA la espada tinicamente empeor6 una
lesi6n interna existente.") (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
46. The Code of Maimonedes, 14 Judges 34, ch. 12, §§1, 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. El juez en un caso capital estA obligado en recibir el semikhah. Vea Bleich, supra note

11, at 342 n.2.
50. The Code of Maimonedes, 14 Judges 28.
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no seria sujeto a la pena capital." El individuo sentenciado a morir tenia
que ser el que directamente ocasion6 la muerte.-2
Finalmente, cuando ninguno de estos procedimientos podria parar
la implementaci6n de la pena capital, habia una cldusula de escape en la
ley Judia. Las cortes inferiores, compuestas de veintitr~s jueces, podrian
implementar la pena capital 6nicamente si el Gran Sanhedrin se encontraba
dentro de los recintos del Templo." Cuarenta afios antes de la destrucci6n
del Segundo Templo, el Gran Sanhedrin movi6 sus deliberaciones del
Templo para impedir el uso de ia pena capital.-"
El castigo capital bajo la ley Judia era un suceso raro. La
frecuencia exacta del castigo capital es tema de especulaci6n. Han habido
sugerencias en los comentarios que las ejecuciones que iban en demasia
una vez cada siete afios o hasta una ejecuci6n cada setenta afios eran vista
No obstante, los nfimeros crudos (cuales son
como inaceptables. 3
desconocidos)," las leyes procesales sobre la implementaci6n de la pena
capital Judia y su interpretaci6n y uso hacen que las ejecuciones sean una
cosa verdaderamente rara. Esto es indisputable.
B. El Derecho Constitucional
A pesar del potencial para la amplia - diseminaci6n del castigo
capital en la ley Judia, los requerimientos procesales hicieron que este
castigo fuese una rareza. En contraste, la experiencia constitucional de los
Estados Unidos con la pena capital ha sido todo lo contrario a la
experiencia Judia. Desde el 1970 la Corte Suprema ha estructurado su
jurisprudencia constitucional de ]a pena capital para disminuir ia estructura
procesal y reducir la supervisi6n judicial en las apelaciones, ocasionando
mds sentencias de muerte y su mis frecuente implementaci6n.
El primer encuentro modernizado, de la Corte Suprema con la
pena capital ocurri6 en el caso de McGautha v. California." En
McGautha, la pregunta en disputa era si la cliusula del proceso debido
Sin
prohibe la sentencia de muerte a un individuo sin un criterio.'
51. El podrfa, set juzgado bajo procedimientos no - capitales y ser encarcelado. Sanhedrin
24:26. Sin embargo, si el juicio de un accesorio se trat6 bajo las escrituras capitales 1 seria
adjudicado inocente y liberado. Sanhedrin 18:8.
52. Sanhedrin 78b.
53. Hilkot Sanhedrin 14:11.
Gemara Sanhedrin 41a.
Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a.
Id.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
"58. Id. at 185.
54.
55.
56.
57.

19961

Davidoff

319

embargo, detrAs de esta pregunta estrecha hay una mis amplia sobre la
constitucionalidad de la pena capital.
Esta fue por lo tanto una
oportunidad para la Corte, mediante la cliusula del proceso debido, para
regular o abolir la pena capital. Esta Corte declin6 hacerlo. En
McGautha, la Corte, por el Juez Harlan, rechaz6 la noci6n que la clusula
del proceso debido requeria cualquier regulaci6n o barra sobre la
implementaci6n de la pena capital."
A pesar de ]a decisi6n en McGautha, dos afios despu6s la Corte
tom6 la pregunta de si la Octava Enmienda impone algfin impedimento
sobre la pena capital. El caso fue Furman v. Georgia," d6nde la Corte
mal astill6. Dos de los Jueces escribieron que la Octava Enmienda excluia
la pena capital en todas las circunstancias." Cuatro de los Jueces
decidieron que la Octava Enmienda no tenfa ningdin efecto sobre los
procedimientos o la existencia de la pena capital. 2 De tal manera, la
decisi6n de la Corte Suprema sobre esta pregunta fue regida por los
restantes tres Jueces Douglas, Stewart, y White que escribieron sus
opiniones propias.3 La opini6n de Juez Douglas es insignificante, ya que
se retiro el afio despu6s y su punto de vista no influy6 las futuras
decisiones de la Corte sobre la pena capital." Sin embargo, las opiniones
de Juez Stewart y Juez White son de gran importancia porque marcaron
dos ideologias divergentes cuales formarian el desarrollo de la
jurisprudencia de ia Corte Suprema sobre los requerimientos de un sistema
constitucional de la pena capital.
En Furman, el Juez White escribi6:
Pero cuando la imposici6n de la pena alcanza un grado
seguro de infrecuencia . . . seria [un] castigo cruel e
inusitado violando la Octava Enmienda . . . [la pena

capital] es tan infrecuentemente impuesta que la amenaza

59. Id. at 204.
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
61. Id. at 314 (Marshall, ., concurriendo); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurriendo).
62. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., disintiendo); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., disintiendo); id. at 414
(Powell, J., disintiendo); Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., disintiendo).
63. Id. at 306 (Stewart, I., concurriendo); id. at 310 (White, J., concurriendo); id. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurriendo).
64. La opini6n de Douglas se bas6 sobre un examen total del sistema de la Octava
Enmienda igualada al razonamiento de su protecci6n, fue rechazada explicitamente por la Corte
en McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.279 (1987).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J.,
concurriendo). Han habido ajustes de resurgimiento en afios anteriores. Vea Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., disintiendo desde la negaci6n de certiorari).
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de ejecuci6n se atenda demasiado para ser de servicio
considerable al Juez delictivo.'3
En contraste, el Juez Stewart escribi6,
[e]stas sentencias de muerte son tan crueles e inusitadas del
mismo modo que ser golpeado por un reld.mpago es cruel e
inusitada . . . . [E]lI peticionante estl entre un grupo
selectivamente escogido . . . .
[L]a Octava y

Decimocuarta Enmiendas no permiten que esta pena s6lo
sea tan perversamente y arbitrariamente impuesta.6
Asi, el Juez White decidi6 que la pena capital como impuesta, tan
poco frecuente durante ese tiempo, Ilegaria ha ser una violaci6n a la
Octava Enmienda. En contraste, el Juez Stewart, qui6n no se uni6 a la
opini6n de Juez White, encontr6 que la pena apital era una violaci6n a la
Octava Enmienda porque se distribuy6 sin una base racional a qui6n fuese
sentenciado a muerte. En futuras opiniones estos puntos de vista se
traducirian a la posici6n de que los procedimientos estrictos serian
necesarios para asegurar que solamente un nicleo de personas, los
asesinos de lo peor, consiguieran la pena capital.
Sacar cualquier decisi6n singular de Furman es casi una
imposibilidad, sin embargo, la Corte ha consistentemente afirmado que
Furman decidi6 que la pena capital como implementada antes de 1972
estaba infringiendo la Octava Enmienda porque se impone
"arbitrariamente y caprichosamente." 6
Mientras que la Corte ha
deletreado una decisi6n en Furman, no obstante, los jueces han discutido
sobre la composici6n de los estatutos legislativos estatales necesarios para
implementar este castigo bajo los dictImenes de esa decisi6n. La fuente de
este choque ha sido los puntos de vista divergentes de Juez White y Juez
Stewart y sus intentos de implementar requerimientos constitucionales
diferentes en un sistema de muerte. 61
65. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-13 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
66. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurriendo).
67. Vea en ejemplo, Callins, 510 U.S. at 1148 (Blackmun, J., disintiendo de la negaci6n de
certiorari) ("Furman exigi6 que las sentencia ... minimizarfa el riesgo de sentencias arbitrarias y
caprichosas") (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-59
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurriendo en parte); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
68. Compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-30 (1980) (la pluralidad de Stewart,
Powell, y Stevens, JJ.) y Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opini6n de pluralidad de
Stewart, Powell, y Stevens, JJ.) con Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 444-57 (White, J., disintiendo) y
Lockett, 438 U.S.at 622 (White, J., concurriendo en parte y disintiendo en parte, y concurriendo
con la decisi6n final). Vea generalmente Jim Liebman and Adam Haven-Weiss, Fatal Distortion:
Judicial Oversight of the Death Penalty 1972-1992 (in~dita).
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Este conflicto comenz6 cuatro afios mis tarde cuando ia Corte
consider6 la validez de un quinteto de estatutos capitales efectuados tras
Furman. Estas cinco opiniones, que decidieron que la Octava Enmienda
no excluye la pena capital en todas las circunstancias, constituy6 una
victoria para el Juez Stewart sobre el Juez White. El Juez Stewart
parcialmente triunf6 en su meta de limitar la pena capital a selectas
sentencias, la pena de muerte mandatario se encontr6 ser inconstitucional
en dos de las opiniones.1o
En otras tres opiniones la Corte aprob6 los esquemas de
determinaci6n de sentencias a los estados de Georgia, Tejas, y Florida.,,
La opini6n mis importante en este trfo posterior fue el que provey6 la
aprobaci6n del plan de sentencias de Georgia - Gregg v. Georgia.n En
Gregg, el Juez Stewart explic6 su visi6n de como el sistema constitucional
de la pena capital deberfa lucir. El repetidamente se refiri6 al estatuto
capital contenido en el C6digo de Modelo Penal (MPC)." tl elogio la
direcci6n que este estatuto da a los jurados con los agravantes y mitigares
proveidos, y el jurado recibe instrucciones concretas sobre como
considerar estos."4 Juez Stewart tambi6n expres6 su satisfacci6n con la
bifurcaci6n del juicio en ambos el MPC y el estatuto de Georgia."
Finalmente, Stewart ensalz6 las virtudes de la proporcionalidad y revisi6n
estricta sobre la apelaci6n.' 6 El modelo de Juez Stewart fue utilizado,
detallando un conjunto estricto de procedimientos a ambos niveles del
juicio y la apelaci6n para la imposici6n de la pena capital, y una limitaci6n
sobre la aplicaci6n de la pena a s6lo unos cuantos. Esto fue disefiado para
asegurar que solamente los mis meritorios, los asesinos de 1o peor, reciban
la pena de muerte.
La pr6xima decisi6n importante en la jurisprudencia capital de la
Corte Suprema fue Coker v. Georgia." Esta fue otra victoria para el punto
de vista de Juez Stewart. En Coker, una pluralidad decidi6 que la pena
capital para el crimen de violaci6n de un adulto era una violaci6n a la
69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

70. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325.
71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Profin, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262.

72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (pluralidad de Stewart, Powell, y Stevens, JJ.).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
74. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 198, 206.

77. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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Octava Enmienda.11 Asf, Coker restringi6 la pena capital, s61o para
asesinatos.79 Este fue otro paso en la meta de Juez Stewart para limitar la
pena capital a tinicamente los mis merecientes.
A pesar de estas victorias iniciales, sin embargo, la creaci6n de un
sistema capital conmensurado a la visi6n de Juez Stewart no sucedi6. En
vez, el Juez White gan6. La Corte Suprema rechaz6 el punto de vista de
Juez Stewart y adopt6 la ideologia capital del Juez White. El sistema del
Juez White, deletreado en Furman, requiri6 un sistema constitucional de la
pena capital que distribuye e implementa la sentencia de muerte con
frecuencia para evitar imposiciones caprichosas.w Esto exigi6 un sistema
constitucional que fomentarl la sentencia de muerte y su ejecuci6n. La
Corte, bajo el liderazgo de Juez White, tom6 cuatro trayectorias para
realizar esa meta.
Primero, la Corte Suprema enfoc6 en el aspecto tinico del juicio
capital la fase de sentencias. Desde 1978 a 1993, la Corte, nuevamente
bajo el liderazgo ideol6gico de Juez White, triunf6 en despojar el juicio de
sentencias capital de cualquier requerimiento constitucional de
procedimiento.l
La Corte, bajo ia delantera de Juez White,
consecutivamente encontr6 que: un jurado es libre para considerar
cualquier tipo de evidencia como un agravante durante la fase de
culpabilidad del juicio,d un estado no estatutario puede emplear los
agravantes en consideraci6n a la pena,"I la evidencia mitigadora puede
ignorarse, 84 un juez puede rechazar el veredicto de un jurado de una
sentencia de vida y cambiarlo por uno de muerte, 5 y finalmente que la
def'mici6n de agravantes podrfa ser ampliamente interpretados sin sentido."
Esta disminuci6n de criterios procesales s6lo lo hizo mis ficiI para los
fiscales procurar una sentencia de muerte.
78. Id.
79. Coker dej6 abierta laposibilidad de una sentencia de muerte para laviolaci6n de un
nifio. Id. at 597.
80. Vea supra note 65 con el texto acompafiante.
81.
Vea generalmente Liebman & Haven-Weiss, supra note 68; Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305. Vea tambitn Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,

1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., disintiendo de lanegaci6n de certiorari).
82. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
83. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (opini6n de pluralidad).
84. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (declarando que un estado no tiene que proveer
efecto pleno a laevidencia potencialmente mitigadora).
85. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
86. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)
(norma indulgente para larevisi6n constitucional de laconstrucci6n de los agravantes); Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 137, 147 (1994).
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La segunda lfnea de casos de la Corte expandi6 el ntimero de
individuos que pueden recibir una pena de muerte. La Corte dibuj6 una
categoria amplia de esos co-conspiradores que podian ser sentenciados a
muerte,s" la corte decidi6 que las mocedades de tan poca edad como
diecis6is afios, y posiblemente hasta de quince, podrfan ser ejecutados,, y
que los mentalmente atrasados podrfan ser ejecutados1 9
Sin embargo, estas dos lIfneas de decisiones no fueron las tinicas
marcas de la Corte sobre la regulaci6n de la pena capital. La ideologia del
Juez White, para cumplir la visi6n adoptada en Furman, de la
diseminaci6n de la pena capital dictaba no solamente que el n(Imero de
sentencias de muerte incrementara, pero tambi~n que el niimero de
Esto requiri6 las manos de los jueces,
ejecuciones aumentara.
particularmente los federales, fueran restringidas en su capacidad para
volcar convicciones de muerte. Esto result6 en dos diferentes lineas de
decisi6n.
La ristra primera de estos casos repudi6 cualquier requerimiento
constitucional de que la revisi6n estatal de apelaci6n en casos capitales
necesitara una inspecci6n exigente.9' La Corte sucesivamente decidi6 que
la revisi6n proporcional de las sentencias capitales no estaban
constitucionalmente mandadas, 9' que una corte de apelaci6n estatal si
deseaba podria volver a considerar la evidencia si un error se habia hecho
a nivel de juicio en un caso capital.9 Tambi~n decidi6 que la Constituci6n
no requiri6 un anglisis de apelaci6n para el racismo en la implementaci6n
de la pena capital,"3 que la norma constitucional era minima para un
anlisis de apelaci6n en casos de ineficacia de consejo legal para esos
encarando la pena capital,94 y que la Constituci6n coloc6 un andlisis
increiblemente alto para la apelaci6n de una pena de muerte injusta. 9'
La segunda linea de decisi6n fue una circunscripci6n de la
habilidad de la corte federal inferior para volcar convicciones estatales

87. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147 (1987) (adoptando un despego imprudente adoptivo
a lavida humana para lapena capital a co-conspiradores).
88. Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
90. Vea generalmente Weisberg, supra note 81.
91. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

92. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
93. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
94. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993) (1. White, concurriendo) (afirmando que
una exhibici6n persuasiva de inocencia encontrarfa desagravio bajo laConstituci6n).
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sobre el habeas corpus.6 Para realizar esta tarea la Corte estableci6 un
sistema de reglas por omisi6n moras procesales draconianas. 9' La Corte:
estableci6 normas estrictas para peticiones sucesivas y abusos del anilisis
de la orden judicial,"' implement6 una regla estricta de retroactividad que
neg6 al peticionante del habeas los beneficios de las nuevas reglas," aplic6
las norma de Kotteakos para afirmar solicitudes del habeas corpus
estatal,'1 creo procedimientos estrictos para la falta de comparecencia de
reclamos de habeas que no fueron presentados primero en la corte
estatai,'°' y finalmente neg6 que se requiri6 la asistencia efectiva de un
abogado para los peticionante del habeas.'I
Entonces la Corte Suprema creo un sistema de aumentar el nfimero
de las sentencias de muerte acelerando su implementaci6n. Sin embargo,
esta conclusi6n no es una deducci6n. Mfis allt de la declaraci6n explicita
de Juez White en Furman, en los pasado diez afios, diversos miembros de
la Corte han admitido que mucho del razonamiento detrds de su decisi6n
ha sido para aumentar el nfimero de ejecuciones.103 El afio pasado, el Juez
Scalia se quej6 durante un argumento oral que el Centro de Recursos de
Tejas (la organizaci6n que maneja todas las apelaciones de la pena capital
en Tejas), era demasiado demorado en sus archivos y consiguientemente
no habia un ntimero suficiente de ejecuciones.' 1 El Juez Kennedy en un
discurso en Georgia rumi6 sobre como el odia a los abogados que
96. Para una cr6nica mis Ilena de este suceso vea Testimony of George Kendall, NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, House Judiciary, Habeas Corpus Reform (Oct. 22, 1993). Vea tambien
Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557 (1994);
Michele M. Jochner, 'Til Habeas Do Us Part: Recent Supreme Court Habeas Corpus Rulings, 81
ILL. B.J. 250 (1993); Lisa S. Spickler, Brecht v. Abramson, Another Step Toward Evisceration of
Habeas, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 546 (1993); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro" the
Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionin Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 537 (1990).
97. Estas reglas son tan duras que hoy el resultado tipico es que aun siun error
constitucional se encuentra sobre el habeas, el desagravio es excluido comcinmente a las
escrituras procesales. Vea Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1158 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
disintiendo de lanegaci6n de certiorari) (notando este hecho).
98. Wainwright v.Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (ocasiona y predispone norma para solicitudes
de peticionante del Habeas sucesivas); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (ocasiona y
predispone normas para el abuso de laorden judicial).
99. Teagu6 v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Vea tambien Stringer v.Black, 503 U.S. 222
(1992) (bajo el umbral para determinar nuevas reglas).
100. Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
101. Rose v.Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
102. Coleman v.Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
103. Furman v.Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311-13 (1972) (White, J.concurriendo).
104. Yea Linda Greenhouse, Court Confronting Results of Limiting Death Row Appeals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, atAl.
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defienden a los sentenciados a muerte y sus intentos repetidos de demorar
las ejecuciones.10
El resultado final de estas actitudes y de los precedentes es que ia
ley ha tenido una elevaci6n brusca en el ntimero de sentencias y
ejecuciones. Cinco afios antes de el tiempo que se decidi6 Furman no se
habian hecho ningunas ejecuciones,'1 y antes de eso habia ocurrido un
descenso en los nfimeros de ejecuciones.'0' El afio pasado hubieron
cincuenta y seis ejecuciones.'I
Han habido sobre tres cientos trece
ejecuciones desde la muerte de Gary Gilmore.109 Hoy en dia hay mas de
tres mil individuos esperando ejecuciones a lo largo de la naci6n.20 Estas
son estadisticas impresionantes, y sus ndimeros continian elevindose."'
V.

EL C6MO Y EL POR QUt,

A. Introducci6n
LY por qud sucedi6 esto? Al comienzo de este papel la conjetura
habrfa sido que el uso de la pena capital serfa generalizado en la ley
Judaica. La Constituci6n, en contraste, tuvo poco o nada que decir en lo
que concierne a su uso. Sin embargo, como delineado, los dos sistemas
han estatuido procedimientos disefiados para producir resultados muy
diferentes. En el caso de la ley Judia es la rareza de la ejecuci6n. En la
experiencia constitucional ha sido el resultado del esfuerzo consciente de la
Corte para aumentar el niimero de ejecuciones. Por lo tanto, Lporque
sucedi6 esto?

105. Vea tambiin Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., disintiendo de
la negaci6n de certiorari) (afirmando que la marcha y el nimnero de ejecuciones se demora
demasiado); Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910 (1989) (Stevens, J., respetuosamente concurriendo a
la negativa del certiorari) (afirmando que la marcha y ntimeros de ejecuciones se demora
demasiado); Autry v. McKaskley, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984) (Marshall, J., disintiendo de la negaci6n
de certiorari) (afirmando que la Corte, en su presteza para acelerar las ejecuciones, no dedica el
tiempo suficiente a los m6ritos de las peticiones del habeas); Fast Track for Executions, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 1989, at A14 (detallando la formaci6n del comitd del Juez Rehnquist para
acelerar y aumentar el ntmero de ejecuciones).
106. BEDEAU, supra note 2, at.23, 25.
107. Id. (En los aflos de 1960-67, el number of ejecuciones eran 56, 42, 47, 21, 15, 7, 1, 2).
108. Executions on the rise; Capricious penalty: With more people on death row, more
chances of error, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan., 7, 1996, at 2E.
109. A partir del I de Enero del 1996 el ntimero exacto fue 313. Id.
110, Id.
111. Id.
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B. El Derecho Judio
En la ley Judaica hay una yuxtaposici6n entre la ley y el valor
moral. En la ley Judia la religi6n es la ley. Una fuerza moral en la
religi6n y la plebe se dati, desde luego debe darse, efecto explicito en la
ley por el Sanhedrin. En la ley Judia hay dos fuerzas morales que pueden
ser responsables por la aversi6n del Sanhedrin y la estructuraci6n de su
sistema capital para evitar ejecuciones. El primero de este se discuti6
arriba, en el requerimiento Biblico del perd6n.
La segunda base posible es el valor que la religi6n Judia ha puesto
sobre la vida individual. En el Judaismo la persona se ve como creada en
la imagen y la semejanza del Sefior. Como R. Akiba afirma "quienquiera
derrame sangre destruye la imagen de Dios." 121 Esto es cierto, no importa
la posici6n del matado. El hecho de que 61 sea un pecador no tiene
aparentemente ninguna consecuencia. Este punto de vista era expresado
por R. Meir un estudiante de R. Akiba quidn afirma que el ver un criminal
ser colgado desde un drbol en el Deuteronomio 21:22-3, provoca el
pensamiento de que "el Rey [o como Kellner expresa Dios] mismo a sido
colgado. "I"
Este respeto para la persona es reforzado o mediante el idioma
Biblico sobre la matanza. En la Biblia no hay palabras exactas para
diferenciar la matanza, el homicidio delictivo, el homicidio justificable, y
la ejecuci6n. Todos ellos son descritos mediante la misma palabra - Matar
(razach). Este uso se refleja tambi~n en el idioma del oficio del Rabinate.
Los pasajes en el Talmud de Jerusaln y el Mekhilta emplean la misma
tipologia como el idioma Biblico. Asi, el idioma de el antiguo Israel no
hace ninguna distinci6n entre los tipos de matanza. No importa su
postura, justificada o criminal, todos estAn descritos por la misma palabra
4
con la misma impresi6n moral - matar o razach."
La percepci6n y convicci6n moral se expreso mediante un llamado
al respeto de la persona y el escaso uso de ia pena capital. El Mishnah
afirma que un Sanhedrin que implementa la pena capital una vez cada siete
afios es una corte violenta.
Rabbi Eleazer B. Azariah dice que esto tambi~n es cierto de una
corte que pasa tal sentencia una vez en setenta afios. Y finalmente, Rabbi
Tarfon y Rabbi Akiba dicen "Y si hubi~ramos estado en el Sanhedrin

112. Blidstein, supra note 39.
113. Id.
114. Mishnah, Makkoth 7a (nota editorial: traducido de lngl6s).
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[durante el perfodo cuando posey6 la jurisdicci6n capital], ningfin hombre
se habrfa matado."115
Aunque estas declaraciones fueron hechas despu6s que el
Sanhedrin habfa perdido la jurisdicci6n capital, ellos son una iluminaci6n
de las percepciones de ese tiempo. Ellos expresan la fuerza moral que la
ley Judfa da al valor de la vida durante el perfodo de la existencia del
Sanhedrin. La existencia de esta santidad naci6 del requerimiento que los
jueces ayunaban en el dia de la ejecuci6n.
Asf, los valores Judios de la vida y el perd6n son la explicaci6n
plausible para los procedimientos estrictos erigidos alrededor de la pena
capital. Estos procedimientos se disefiaron para limitar su uso y dar la
expresi6n al interds moral, y los Judios lo lograron. Las ejecuciones eran
una rareza en el antiguo Israel. Esto fue debido a la fusi6n de moralidad y
religi6n en la ley Judia. Estos fueron incorporados en la ley, porque en el
Judafsmo la religi6n (valores morales) es la ley. Los valores religiosos
explfcitos de la vida y del perd6n se requieran que fuesen considerados en
]a erecci6n de los procedimientos referentes al uso de la pena capital. El
resultado ha sido delineado, un conjunto de procedimiento disefiado para
emplear la pena capital lo menos posible.
C. El Derecho Constitucional
En contraste, la Corte Suprema nunca ha impuesto una norma
moral sobre su regulaci6n constitucional de la pena capital. Esto se debe a
un ndmero de factores, pero primariamente se debe a la percepci6n que los
Jueces tienen sobre su papel en el plan constitucional. Para ponerlo mis
simplemente, la Corte Suprema, en su desarrollo del procedimiento
constitucional de la pena capital, lleg6 a estar interesada solamente con el
contenido del texto que ellos interpretaban y el principio juridico de
Furman. Los Jueces nunca se dirigieron a decir si lo que ellos estaban
haciendo era totalmente moral. Esto resulto en un esfuerzo consciente de
115. Otro ejemplo del respeto hacfa la vida del Talmudic estA ilustrado en el trataniento
que estos eruditos dieron a los cuatro mdtodos de lapena capital ordenada por la Biblia. El Juez
Haim H. Cohn en The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISR. L. REV. 53 (1970), detalla como del
Talmudic los eruditos volvieron a interpretar de nuevo los textos Biblicos para que estos castigos
fuesen meno's brutales. Asf, la lapidaci6n se transform6 en lamuerte por apedreo ptblico, un
procedimiento d6nde el convicto se tira fuera una lapidaci6n de dos pisos. Mishnah Sanhedrin
6:4. Aun mfis notable, laquemadura lleg6 a ser lamuerte por estrangulaci6n. B Sanhedrin 52a.
Y laestrangulaci6n por colgadura se rechaz6 por una muerte mis sigilosa de dos hombres que
tiran corbatas alrededor del pescuezo del condenado hasta que lo sofocan. M. Sanhedrin VII 3.
Estas medidas que los eruditos Talmfidicos tomaron obviamente fueron una sefial segura de su
aborrecimiento a lapena capital. Vea Moshe Sokol, Some Tensions in the Jewish Attitude Toward
the Taking of Jewish Life, 7 JEw. L. ANN. 97, 102 (1988) (notando la "dimensi6n de agravio" en
las matanzas justificadas) (nota editorial: traducido de 1ngh~s).
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la Corte de aumentar el ntimero de ejecuciones a fin de cumplir una teoria
judicial.
En el plan constitucional, el papel judicial ha sido el tema de una
discusi6n ideol6gica viciosa. Los punto de vista diferentes pueden
calificarse como una batalla entre los conservadores y los activistas
judiciales. Los conservadores judiciales, conducidos mds recientemente
por el Juez Scalia, creen que el papel constitucional de la Corte es
limitada. La Corte deberia restringirse a la interpretaci6n estricta del texto
constitucional con referencia a las tradiciones del tiempo de su ratificaci6n.
La Corte deberia delegar tambidn a la voluntad legislativa."' En contraste,
los activistas judiciales creen que los jueces debe de tomar una papel
socialmente progresivo.
Ellos creen que un juez debe ver a la
Constituci6n como un documento evolutivo para ser interpretado
ampliamente e independientemente a la voluntad legislativa."
La fortaleza de los activistas judiciales ha declinado en las ultimas
d6cadas mientras que ia Corte se ha convertido mds conservadora." 8 El
efecto de este desarrollo y un ejemplo de la influencia del punto de vista
conservador sobre la pena capital se ilustr6 en una declaraci6n por el Juez
Scalia el afto pasado. Esta fue una respuesta a la opini6n del Juez
Blackmun, un disidente del caso deCallins v. Collins,"9 afirmo que la pena
capital en su forma actual era inconstitucional. Scalia escribi6:
Esa explicaci6n [La afirmaci6n de Juez Blackmun que la
pena capital es inconstitucionall frecuentemente se refiere
a la percepciones 'intelectuales, morales y personales,'
pero nunca al texto y tradici6n de la Constituci6n. Es el
posterior mas bien que el anterior el que debe de controlar.
La Quinta Enmienda provee que '[nhinguna persona tendrf
lugar para contestar un crimen capital

116.

Vea ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:

....

a menos que

THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW (Free Press 1990); Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justice's Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the
Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1
(1993).
117. Vea John Ely, Another Such Victory, Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts are No Different Than Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991).
118. Para eltratamiento erudito completo de lamarea conservadora, yea DAVID SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE SUPREME COURT (Wiley 1990); Herman Schwartz, Trends
in the Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 559 (1991); Mary Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal
Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right,
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057 (1990).
119. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,disintiendo de la
negaci6n de certiorari).
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sobre una presentaci6n o denuncia de un gran jurado, ...
ni seri privado de la vida

. . .

sin el proceso debido de la

ley.' Esto claramente permite que ia pena capital sea
impuesta, y establece mis all de la duda que la pena
capital no es uno de los 'castigos crueles e inusitados
prohibidos por la Octava Enmienda.'
Asi, desde el comienzo, los conservadores judiciales han encontrado que el
texto no puede funcionar como una barra absoluta en la realizaci6n de la
pena capital. Sin embargo, el punto de vista conservador, y la agresividad
de sus proponentes, solamente ha logrado mantener la constitucionalidad
de la pena capital como una pregunta cerrada, tambi6n ha funcionado
como la guia principal de la Corte Suprema en desmantelar los
requerimientos procesales para la muerte. Este resultado en su mayoria es
un producto de la visi6n conservadora de nuestro sistema federalista.
Ellos creen que en la mayoria de las ocasiones, particularmente cuando un
juicio moral se hace, la Corte deberia delegar a la voluntad de ]a
legislatura.' 2' Asi, mientras que el campo conservador de la Corte se a
fortalecido, la Corte ha visto su papel en la pena capital subordinados a los
estados. Cualquier contexto moral a esta pena deberia, por lo tanto,
considerarse en la legislatura, y no en la Corte Suprema.
El crecimiento del punto de vista conservador y la transformaci6n
que a engendrado es hibilmente ilustrada en el desarrollo de la
jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema sobre la Octava Enmienda en los
tiltimos veinte afios. La Octava Enmienda es la cliusula mis importante en
la regulaci6n constitucional de la pena capital. En el caso de Gregg v.
Georgia,22 el Juez Stewart, que aveces es un activista judicial, escribi6 un
papel sobre la jurisprudencia de la Corte de la Octava Enmienda: "Parece
concedido por todos que la Enmienda impone ciertas obligaciones sobre el
sistema judicial para juzgar la constitucionalidad del castigo y que hay
castigos que la Enmienda excluiria si la legislatura to aprobara o no."'2
Sin embargo, esta visi6n que permiti6 que la Corte pusiera su
lustre moral propio sobre la Octava Enmienda, ripidamente cay6 victima a
una marea conservadora. Solo unos afios despuds, en el caso de Coker v.

120. Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurriendo en la negativa del certiorari) (nota editorial:
traducido de Ingls).
121. Para un comentario por un ide6logo conservador sobre la ilegitimidad de opiniones
morales por Jueces de la Corte Suprema Court vea Herrerav. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427 (1993)
(Scalia J., concurriendo).
122. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123. Id. at 174 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
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La Cone, por el Juez

White, en vez abog6 unos indicios mis objetivos para el desarrollo de la
Octava Enmienda:

"El juicio no deberia ser . . . [las] visiones de los

jueces individuales, [en un anilisis de la Octava Enmienda] tambidn se
debe dar atenci6n a las actitudes ptiblicas . . . actitudes legislativas, y la

respuesta de los jurados. "I"
Las opiniones de los miembros individuales de la Corte se
cambiaron por medidas mis objetivas de ]a voluntad popular. Sin
embargo, este nuevo examen todavia contiene la oportunidad de que la
Corte imponga un juicio moral. La composici6n de actitudes pfiblicas
siempre es incierta. La selecci6n de un juez de los indicios para medir
este sentimiento podria reflejar su moralidad propia.
Sin embargo, en el caso de Stanford v. Kentucky',2 la Corte
descart6 esa posibilidad limitando los elementos contenidos en una
evaluaci6n de la Octava Enmienda. El papel del jurado y la actitud
pdtblica se rechaz6. En su lugar la Corte adopt6 un anilisis de la Octava
Enmienda que se enfoc6 casi exclusivamente en la legislatura. Como el
Juez Scalia escribi6:
[Los peticionante buscan demostrar [la actitud ptblica]
mediante otros indicios, incluyendo encuestas de opini6n
ptiblicas, las visiones de grupos de interds y las posiciones
adoptadas por diversas asociaciones profesionales.
Nosotros declinamos la invitaci6n de colocar la ley
constitucional sobre tales fundaciones inciertas.
Un
consenso nacional enmendado . . . debe aparecer en los

actos operativos (leyes y aplicaci6n de las leyes) que las
personas han aprobado.121
De tal manera, el ascenso de los conservadores judiciales ha resultado en
un rechazo del papel del Juez en un anilisis de la Octava Enmienda.'1

124. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
125. Id. at 591 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
127. Id. at 377 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
128. Esta abdicaci6n de ]a capacidad judicial para tomar un anlisis por todo el sistema
moral dentro de la Octava Enmienda ha coincidido con el rechazo de la Corte a cualquier noci6n
de la proporcionalidad de las sentencias dentro la misma Enmienda. En Hannelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991), la Cone decidi6 que una cadena perpetua por [a posesi6n de 680 gramos de
cocafna no era una violaci6n a [a Octava Enmienda. Ahi, la Corte rechaz6 esencialmente
cualquier papel moral en el an~lisis de la Octava Enmienda y en vez prefiri6 que tales
responsabilidades se le deje a las legislaturas. Vea Lisa Tatulli, Casenote- Harmelin v. Michigan, 2
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Mis bien, la Corte ha reformado su jurisprudencia de la Octava Enmienda
para que cualquier juicio moral se haya cambiado completamente a las
legislaturas estatales. Ellos son los tinicos quidn pueden decidir lo qu6 es
moral o no.'"

La consecuencia ms amplia de este suceso ha sido un rechazo casi
general por la Corte de cualquier papel moral en el sistema del proceso de
decisi6n bajo la Octava Enmienda. ' " Esto ha conducido la Corte a tomar
una visi6n amoral de la pena capital, cual ha sido admitido en numerosas
ocasiones.'3 La Corte ha tomado este hecho e a ido aun mds allh. Ellos
han decidido que la moralidad de la pena capital es ahora el dominio de la

legislatura, la moralidad de como se implementa y su frecuencia, tambi6n
seri dejado a ese cuerpo.'32
Los estados incondicionalmente, por lo menos en el concepto,
abrazan con frecuencia y flojedad procesal la realizaci6n de la pena

capital. Por lo tanto, la Corte, bajo la gufa de la decisi6n del Juez White
en Furman y la noci6n conservadora del papel de la Corte, ha comenzado
a incrementar el nirmero de ejecuciones como un medio de implementar la
voluntad de las legislaturas estatales. 0 para afirmar lo mediante un lente
mds largo, comenz6 porque la Octava Enmienda en su nticleo es
moralmente neutral. Es el lugar de la Corte en darle un contexto moral.

Sin embargo, la Cone, despu6s de pasos iniciales en ia otra direcci6n,
abandon6 su papel subjetivo en esta evaluaci6n y en vez, transform6 un
juicio de la Octavo Enmienda en un juego contador de las legislaturas

estatales. En hacer esto, la Corte se absolvi6 de cualquier deber de
valorar moralmente el desarrollo de los procedimientos de la pena
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 409 (1991); Kelly A. Patch, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate
Sentencing Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1697 (1992).
129. Para un tratamiento mis completo de este desarrollo yea Note, Wilkins v. Missouri:
The Court Searchesfor A Consensus to the Cruel and Unusual Question, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J.
125 (1990); Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death; Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1978).
130. La Corte todavfa retiene lacapacidad para hacer juicios morales directos sobre una
base individual mediante la tradicional prueba 'chocando a laconciencia' empotrada en la
Cldusula del Proceso Debido. Sin embargo, casos recientes han expuesto una desgana por la
Corte a invalidar una sentencia capital sobre esta estrecha base individual. Vea en ejemplo,
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (lasentencia de muerte dada d6nde un fiscal en su
argumento de cierre se refiere a una previa sentencia de muerte luego de revocar no disminuy6 la
responsabilidad del jurado como para infringir el proceso debido).
131. Vea Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 286, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., disintiendo); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurriendo en parte y concurriendo en el juicio).
132. Vea en ejemWlo, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 446 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
disintiendo) (afirmando que "esta Corte estA ansiosa de deshacerse de cualquier restricci6n sobre
el poder de los Estados para ejecutar a quienquiera y como quiera") (nota editorial: traducido de
Ingles).
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capital.'" Asi, sin un contexto moral, la Corte se ha concentrado
finicamente en cumplir la opini6n del Juez White en Furman y la voluntad
legislativa. La Corte hasta el presente, no se ha sentado y preguntado sil o
que estA haciendo es moral.'"4 Esto ha resultado en un desarrollo de un
sistema que bien o mal fomenta la ejecuci6n de individuos.

VI. CONCLUSI6N
Este ensayo ha evitado tomar una posici6n moral sobre la validez
de la pena capital. En lugar de ello, ha buscado encontrar mediante una
comparaci6n de dos sistemas legales diferentes, los factores bisicos que
influyen al desarrollo del sistema de la pena capital.
Entonces, la
conclusi6n ineludible despuds de la descripci6n conducida, es que el papel
de la moralidad es la diferencia en el desarrollo de los sistemas capitales
del castigo en la ley Judia y en la Constituci6n. Un texto inferior y la
causa de esta diferencia es el papel estructural que estd en los textos
bdsicos proveidos a la Corte Suprema y en el Sanhedrin.
En ]a ley Judia, la existencia de gufas morales que el Sanhedrin
podria seguir en el desarrollo de un sistema de la pena capital eran
explicitas. Es mis, como una fuente religiosa estas guias tenian que ser
consideradas y seguidas en la implementaci6n de la pena capital. Asi, el
Sanhedrin emple6 el punto de vista Judfo sobre la vida y el perd6n para
desarrollar un sistema procesal estricto para la distribuci6n de la pena
capital. Esto se realiz6 ficilmente a causa de la postura estructural del
Sanhedrin. El Sanhedrin era ambos el poder judicial y legislativo dentro
de la ley Judia. De tal manera, sin vacilaci6n el Sanhedrin podria
implementar su interpretaci6n de la composici6n de los manuscritos. Ellos
podrian tambidn, mediante esta intersecci6n de ley y la moral, examinar el
sistema de moralidad en la pena capital.
En contraste, la Corte Suprema fue una victima de su posici6n en
el plan constitucional. Las cl~usulas mediante las cuales podria haber
mitigado el efecto a la pena capital estaban claramente presentes. Sin
embargo, estas cliusulas en si eran moralmente neutras en su tono. Los
Jueces tuvieron que darles contenido y definici6n a estas cliusulas. Pero
la Corte Suprema solo es uno de los jugadores en el plan federal. El
debate sobre el papel exacto de la Corte Suprema en la interpretaci6n y Ia
133. El mejor ejemplo de esto es Herrera, 506 U.S. at 390, d6nde [a Corte se equivoc6
sobre si la Constituci6n, particularmente la Octava Enmienda protegla al inocente de la ejecuci6n.
134.

El desarrollo del sistema de la pena capital y como se ha permitido de todos los

actores, incluyendo la legislatura, para absolverse asi mismos de culpabilidad moral se cubren en
Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982).
Stephen Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187 (1991).

Vea tambi~n

19961

Davidoff

implementaci6n de las leyes continda. El punto de vista ideol6gico de la
mayoria de la Corte sobre esta discusi6n condujo eventualmente a definir
la Octava Enmienda como una evaluaci6n de factores mlis all del control
de sus percepciones subjetivas.
La Corte, de tal manera destruy6 su capacidad para examinar tras
de un sistema amplio el resultado moral del andlisis de la Octava Enmienda
cual es la cliusula que la Corte eligi6 para regular la peiia capital.'" En
este vacfo moral, la efectividad de la opini6n del Juez White en Furman
fue un acto totalmente racional que estremeci6 nociones conservadoras
personificadas dentro de la jurisprudencia de la Corte sobre la Octava
Enmienda. Como resultado la Corte conscientemente comenz6 a aumentar
el mimero de ejecuciones.

135.

La Corte fue negada el uso de ]a Clusula del Proceso Debido.

McGautha habia

mandado que esta clusula no tuviese ningdn sosidn sobre los procesos empleados en la
distribuci6n de ia pena capital.
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LA COMPETENCIA Y EL PAPEL DE LA LEY
ANTIMONOPOLIO

En el modelo de la competencia perfecta el mercado estA tan
poblado por vendedores y compradores que ninguno de ellos puede - bien
mediante la manipulaci6n de aporte o rendimiento - influenciar el precio
del mercado. "Todos los precios pertinentes son conocidos por cada
productor, quien tambidn sabe de todas las combinaciones de aporte
t6cnicamente capaces de producir cualquier combinaci6n especifica de
rendimientos, y quien toma decisiones de aporte - rendimiento tinicamente
para aumentar las ganancias al miximo."' Todos los individuos son
seguidores econ6micos. Los productores aumentan sus ganancias al
mximo produciendo a un nivel en el cual el costo marginal iguala al
precio del mercado e iguala al costo promedio.
Sin embargo, los mercados fracasan. Los mercados no son
perfectos. Los individuos no saben siempre si el precio de un artfculo es
el mismo en el almac6n de la esquina como en el de la puerta siguiente.
De hecho, normalmente el precio de aquel mismo articulo est, rebajado en
el superalmacdn a causa de las Ilamadas economias de escala. Hay costos
sociales para ciertas actividades y hay cargas fiscales para distintos niveles.
Los productos no son realmente homogeneos, y la publicidad si hace una
diferencia. Si existe proteccionismo gubernamental y barreras artificiales.
Con el paso del tiempo, las empresas acumulan el poder del
mercado porque "las fuerzas del mercado [no] son suficientemente fuerte y
bien dirigidas para garantizar los resultados que la competencia perfecta
traeria."2 Este tipo de fracaso del mercado se debe al monopolio o al
oligopolio, lo cual es una de unas cuantas empresas que producen un
producto sin sustitutos cercanos. Las empresas ya no son seguidores
econ6micos. Mis bien, las empresas aumentan sus ganancias al mximo
buscando el precio ms conveniente. Si estas empresas producen a un
nivel donde la renta marginal y el costo marginal igualan el costo de
promedio, entonces son capaces de vender a un precio mis alto con el cual
las curvas de oferta y las de demanda del mercado se cruzan.
Correspondientemente, los gobierno interviene en el mercado
usando sus leyes y agencias de antimonopolio para corregir los susodichos
fracasos del mercado. Las leyes de competencia confrontan dos problemas
que provienen de demasiado poder del mercado "la asignaci6n de los

1. PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES

8 (4' ed. 1981) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingis por el escritor).
2. Id. at 13.
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recursos de mal rendimiento y la distribuci6n injusta de las ganancias del
intercambio.

"I

Paises tal y como Costa Rica acaban de promulgar leyes de
competencia.4 Basado en la experiencia de los Estados Unidos, este
articulo trata de explicar como ciertas partes de la ley de competencia
costarricense deberian interpretarse, y proporcionar razones para la
interpretaci6n sugerida.
Este articulo sigue la trayectoria de los decretos estadounidense de
Sherman Antitrust Act (ley federal antimonopolio de los Estados Unidos) y
Clayton Act (ley federal con reglamentos contra monopolios de los Estados
Unidos) y la siguiente jurisprudencia. Las decisiones judiciales que se
citarnn corresponden en su mayoria a esas estudiadas en el curso de otofio
de 1995-1996 de Derecho De Antimonopolio ensefiada en la Facultad de
Derecho de Harvard por el Profesor Louis Kaplow. Actualmente solo dos
casos han sido presentados a la Comisi6n costarricense, los cuales todavia
no se han decididos. La Comisi6n no ha iniciado investigaciones de
oficio, con lo cual, no ha habido pronunciamiento de ninguna decisi6n
judicial o administrativa costarricense.
II. ARTICULO 11: LAS PRACTICAS MONOPOLISTICAS ABSOLUTAS

Las pricticas monopolisticas consisten de esas acciones, contratos,
acuerdos, arreglos, o combinaciones entre competidores econ6micos,
cuyos objetivos son:
a) Fijar, aumentar, manipular el precio de venta o de compra de bienes
o de servicios en el mercado, o intercambiar informaci6n con el
mismo objetivo o consecuencia [de aquf en adelante la provisi6n de
precio].
b) Establecer la obligaci6n para producir, procesar, distribuir, o
comercializar solo una cantidad restringida o limitada de bienes, o
rendir un niimero, volumen, o una frecuencia restringida o limitada
de servicios [de aqui en adelante la provisi6n de cuota].
c) Dividir, distribuir, asignar, o imponer partes del mercado presente o
futuro de bienes y servicios por medio de clientes, suministradores,
espacio o tiempo [de aquf en adelante referido como la provisi6n de
distribuci6n de mercados].

3. Louis De Alesi, The Public-Choice Model of Antitrust Enforcement, THE CAUSES AND
THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 192 (Fred S. McChesney
et al. eds., 1995) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingis por el escritor).
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST:

4. Ley de Promoci6n de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor (de aquf
adelante P.C.D.E.C.], no. 7472, 19 Dec. 1994, art. 10 (Costa Rica).
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Establecer, concertar o coordinar la participaci6n en licitaciones,
subastas o la abstenci6n en el proceso. En la aplicaci6n de esta
provisi6n, la Comisi6n controlarfi de oficio o por requerimiento, esos
mercados con pocos suministradores. Las prdcticas referidas en esta
provisi6n serAn anulados y los agentes econ6micos que participan en
esas prhcticas se sancionarin en conformidad con esta ley [de aquf en
adelante la provisi6n de concentraci6nde licitaciones].

A. El Alcance de PrdcticasMonopolisticas
Aunque el articulo 11 se refiere a las prficticas monopolisticas, el
articulo no regula monopolios o los actos de 6stos. 6 No regula ia conducta
individual sin considerar si ocasiona una restricci6n indebida sobre la
competencia.' Todas las actividades descritas en los subprrafos de a) a d)
del articulo 11, requieren la concentraci6n de un minimo de dos partes, los
cuales deberian ser el producto de "acciones, contratos, acuerdos,
arreglos, o combinaciones entre competidores econ6micos."s
El articulo 11 regula los oligopolio que ocasionan una restricci6n
indebida sobre la competencia, igual que la secci6n I del Sherman
Antitrust Act estadounidense tambi6n lo hace. El Sherman Antitrust Act
provee que cada contrato, "combinaci6n . . . o conspiraci6n, en la
restricci6n de comercio o del comercio entre los varios estados, o con
naciones extranjeras, es declarada ilegal por la presente. .. ."
Es cierto que ni el articulo 11, ni la secci6n 1, se refieren
expresamente a los oligopolio.
Sin embargo, para que las acciones
incluidas bajo ambas provisiones ocasionen una restricci6n de competencia
indebida, deben ser producidas por los oligopolio.' 0
El oligopolio se define simplemente como un monopolio
compartido por relativamente pocas empresas que reconocen su
interdependencia y que actian segfin tal interdependencia." Areeda y

5. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (enfasis afiadido).
9. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (nfasis afiadido) (nota editorial: traducido
de Ingl6s por cl escritor).
10. P.C.D.E.C. art. II (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
11. Vea generalmente 6 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1985); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655
(1962); Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969).
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Kaplow mencionan cuatro elementos claves para que un oligopolio sea
pr6spero. 12 Para los objetivos de este estudio, estos sern elementos
considerados el ntcleo de actuando segtn tal interdependencia. Los
cuatro elementos son los siguientes:
a. Un consenso sobre las necesidades de precio debe ser proporcionado.
Las diferencias en costos tienen que ser desatendidas. Un precio de
fondo serli establecido por la empresa menos eficiente. En todo caso,
ya que el nivel de producci6n serA fijado al punto donde la renta
marginal y el costo marginal iguala al costo promedio, las empresas
serin capaces de vender a un precio mts alto en el cual las curvas de
oferta y demanda del mercado se cruzan. Para que un consenso sobre
precios sea alcanzado, los canales de comunicaci6n deben estar
disponibles y utilizados. La comunicaci6n puede ser formal o
informal.
b. Las empresas deben ser capaces de comparar sus propios precios con
los precios, la calidad, y la promoci6n, de otras empresas.
c. El fraude debe ser avenguable y castigable.
d. Por iltimo, pero de gran importancia, los productores deben disfrutar
colectivamente el poder del mercado.
De forma acorde, el articulo 11 es aplicable solamente a los
oligopolio que entran en contratos que restringen la competencia
indebidamente. Bajo la ley costarricense, si hay una reclamaci6n contra
un partido que no es un oligopolio, o contra un oligopolio que no concierta
con otro oligopolio para restringir la competencia, entonces la reclamaci6n
deberfa ser descartada. A fin de determinar si una firma pertenece a un
oligopolio, los elementos mencionados deben ser tomados en cuenta
conjuntamente.
B. Significado de Acuerdo
El articulo 11 alude a acciones, contratos, acuerdos, arreglos, o las
combinaciones entre competidores econ6micos.14 La redacci6n de este
articulo es parecido a la de la secci6n 1.15 Un acuerdo escrito y expreso
entre competidores para restringir la competencia indebidamente para su
beneficio propio es claramente ilegal bajo la ley estadounidense y
costarricense.6

Los problemas provienen, sin embargo, cuando se

12. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 278.

13. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
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establece la existencia de acuerdos ticitos o de acuerdos expresos
inferidos.
La jurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos ha concluido que
paralelismo mero en el comportamiento de no es un antimonopolio ilegal.
En Theatre Enterprises v. ParamountFilm DistributingCorp, se estableci6
que la conducta comin entre demandados existe. Los demandantes
uniformemente rechazaron el pedido del demandante para obtener las
principales peliculas de estreno para su teatro." ,Surgi6 la repulsa del
demandado debido a los requisitos del demandante de una decisi6n
independiente o de un acuerdo tcito? La corte contest6 que:
[E]lI comportamiento de negocio es indicio vehemente
admisible del que el apoderado puede inferir un acuerdo..
pero esta Corte nunca ha sostenido que una prueba del
comportamiento paralelo de negocios establece acuerdo o,
expresado de manera diferente, que tal comportamiento
por si mismo constituye un delito del decreto de Sherman.
Los indicios de comportamiento paralelo consciente puede
haber producido fuertes incursiones, 6n la actitud judicial
tradicional hacia la conspiraci6n, pero 'el paralelismo
consciente' adn no ha establecido la conspiraci6n fuera del
decreto de Sherman enteramente.
En Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., los
demandantes alegaron que los demandados habian conspirado para cobrar
precios indebidamente bajos. Aqui la Corte sostuvo que, atin contando
con la presencia de una causa para conspirar, la Corte no podria establecer
la existencia de un acuerdo sin una inferencia de conspiraci6n real. ,9Asi,
la conducta paralela y algunos otros factores se requeririan en los Estados
Unidos a fin de determinar que un acuerdo ticito o inferido existe. 1*
Por ejemplo, en American Tobacco v. United States, el
comportamiento paralelo fue acompafiado por la prueba de que el aumento
conexo de precio habia ocurrido a pesar de precios disminuyeses de
aporte. Adicionalmente, los demandados no pudieron ofrecer ninguna

17. Theater.Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).

18. ld. at 541 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
19. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1946).
20. "Los otros hechos que sirven para transformar elparalelismo en laconspiraci6n ... se
caracterizan frecuentemente como 'factores afiadidos'." AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1,at
308.
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explicaci6n con respecto a por qu6 los precios en la industria aumentaron
mientras los costos disminuyeron. 2 ,
En Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States, la Corte sostuvo que:
[L]as conspiraciones son raramente capaces de
demostraci6n por testimonio directo y se puede inferir de
los actos incurridos realmente, y cuando en este caso por
la acci6n concertada los nombres de los comerciantes
fueron proporcionados peri6dicamente a los otros
miembros de la asociaci6n como quienes habian hecho
ventas a los consumidores, la conspiraci6n para realizar lo
que era la consecuencia natural de tal acci6n se puede
inferir claramente."
Asi, la decisi6n del revendedor de no comprar, no fue
independiente; fue el producto de un acuerdo materializado en la lista
circulada de ofensores.
Los factores requeridos para determinar que un acuerdo existe no
han sido definidos claramente por las cortes de los Estados Unidos. Sin
embargo, las decisiones citadas arriba proveen cierta orientaci6n. Algunas
consideraciones que pueden tomarse en cuenta son como sigue:
a. Un intercambio de comportamiento inesperado ocurre repentinamente
a trav6s de ia industria.
b. "a." no es explicado razonablemente por otros factores.
c. "a." involucra riesgo.
d. Un beneficio (y por lo tanto un motivo) se derivaria de "a." (mientras
que sea a trav6s de la industria), y
e. Los cuatro elementos requeridos para la existencia de un oligopolio
detallado previamente bajo el punto "1." estin presentes.
Consecuentemente, bajo la ley de los Estados Unidos, dadas las
circunstancias mencionadas anteriormente en un grado que puede permitir
una inferencia razonable, es posible que un apoderado determine que un
acuerdo existe aunque no hay un acuerdo escrito, ninguna prueba de
conversaciones, o intercambio de documentos.
Sin embargo, para que tal determinaci6n ocurra ciertas
condiciones econ6micas del mercado pertinente deben existir; ya que las

21. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
22. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
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ganancias potenciales de la colusi6n son determinadas por (precio) la
elasticidad de demanda, 1,
[en] casos de colusi6n alegadas o sospechosas [tcito] ser,
posible hacer un fallo umbral con respecto a si las
condiciones en el mercado indican que la elasticidad de
demanda al precio competitivo es probablemente tan alta
que seguir la valuaci6n colusoria seria una estrategia indtil
aunque fuera ficil confabular. Tal fallo ayudar, a las
agencias de ejecuci6n asignar sus recursos inteligentemente
y evitar el seguimiento de sombras y quimeras - que
desafortunadamente es una gran parte de la ejecuci6n
antimonopolio hoy. 2,
Posner enumera las condiciones econ6micas favorables a la colusi6n: el
mercado concentrado en el lado del vendedor, pocos vendedores
pequefios, la demanda fija a un precio competitivo, la entrada en el
mercado toma mucho tiempo, la normalizaci6n del producto (lo menos
normalizado un producto es, lo mAs dificil ser, para los vendedores del
producto para coludir efectivamente), las empresas principales venden al
mismo nivel en la cadena de distribuci6n del producto, tener precios
competitivos es mAs importante que otras formas de competencia, alto
indice de costos fijos a variables, la demanda estAtica o declinante a trav6s
del tiempo. 21
El peso de ia prueba, por supuesto, estA con el demandante.
Adicionalmente, de acuerdo con el caso de Matsushita Electronic Indus.
Co., el demandante debe presentar prueba actual "que tiende a excluir la
posibilidad que los conspiradores alegados actuaron independientemente." 2I
Por lo tanto, el demandante debe, primeramente, someter la prueba sobre
la existencia de un acuerdo inferido confiando en los factores arriba
descritos, y segundo, excluir la posibilidad de acci6n que no es
conspiradora.
Segtin la ley costarricense, el umbral serfa ms estricto. El
articulo 11 abarca acuerdos expresos y ticitos.27
Los acuerdos no
23. La elasticidad de demanda puede ser definida como el porcentaje de intercambio en la
cantidad exigida como resultado de un por ciento de intercambio en precio.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 50 (1976) (nota
editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
25. Id. at 55. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
26. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1946) (citando
Monsanto Co. v. Spry-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)) (nota editorial: traducido de
Ingl6s por el escritor).
27. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
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necesitan ser anotados a fin de encontrar el umbral. " Sin embargo, prueba
suficiente con respecto a la existencia real del acuerdo se requerirfa: los
minutos de reuniones, conversaciones de telfono, intercambio de
documentos al efecto, etc. 29 Por lo demlis, las condiciones econ6micas
favorables para la existencia de tal acuerdo deberian existir porque, en su
ausencia, la existencia de un acuerdo para colusionar es muy improbable
(simplemente no serfa lucrativo). Finalmente, tal como en los Estados
Unidos, el peso de la prueba estarfa con el demandante. ,
C. La Provisi6nde Precio del Articulo 11
La provisi6n de precio del articulo 11 de la ley de competencia
costarricense prohibe las dos pricticas siguientes:1' 1) fijar, aumentar,
manipular el precio de venta o de compra de bienes o de servicios en el
mercado [de aqui en adelante fijaci6n de precio], 2 y 2) cambiar
informaci6n con el mismo objetivo o consecuencia." Cada prohibici6n
merece un andlisis separado e independiente, que sigue.
1. Fijaci6n de Precio
La fijaci6n de precio puede ser beneficiosa no solamente para las
partes que se comprometan a ello, pero tambidn para otros grupos, la
sociedad, y el mercado libre. Una conclusi6n resultante de lo ante
mencionado es que la fijaci6n de precio no es siempre perjudicial y,
consecuentemente, no siempre deberia ser ilegal.
Los costos legales y de notarios en Costa Rica son establecidos por
3
ley.
Un buen abogado deberia cobrar lo mismo por un caso de 2
millones de colones que un abogado recidn graduado de una escuela de
leyes.
Aunque en Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, la Corte Suprema de
los Estados Unidos encontr6 ilegal un programa de servicios legales de
costos minimos de una asociaci6n de curia del condado." La Corte lo hizo
solamente porque la corte estatal no Jo habia requerido especificamente .36
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
34. Id.
35. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
36. Id.at 790.
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Si el programa hubiera sido requerido por el estado, probablemente se
hubiera pronunciado como legal.

La Corte si sostuvo, sin embargo, que

aunque una regla de asociaci6n de curia que prescriba costos minimos para
servicios legales viola la secci6n 1 del Sherman Antitrust Act, ciertas
pricticas por miembros de una profesi6n erudita podrian sobrevivir
escrutinio aunque ellos sean vistos en otro contexto como una violaci6n del
decreto de Sherman."
Correspondientemente, las normas de seguridad o 6tica, en
general, pueden proveer una justificaci6n aceptable para fijar precios."
Un C6digo de Etica de una profesi6n erudita puede imponer normas
razonables. 9 En ciertos casos, la competencia directa entre profesionales
(ingenieros, doctores, etc.) puede ser contraria al interds piiblico, 4 Sin
tales normas, los profesionales pueden optar por instrumentos o m6todos
de operaci6n mis baratos e ineficaces. La presi6n competitiva para
ofrecer servicios al precio ms bajo afectaria la calidad adversamente.
Conceder un contrato al licitante quien somete la oferta mis baja, sin
considerar la calidad, podria ser peligroso para la salud, seguridad, y
bienestar del pfiblico.4'1 En National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v.
United States, la Corte sostuvo que:
nosotros nos adherimos a la vista expresada en Goldfarb
que, por su naturaleza, los servicios profesionales pueden
diferir significativamente de otros servicios de negocio y,
en conformidad, la naturaleza de la competencia en tales
servicios puede variar. Las normas 6ticas pueden servir
para regular y promocionar esta competencia, y asi caer
dentro de la Regla de Raz6n.z
La Corte reconoci6 en la nota 22 al pie de la pligina que:
las Cortes han, por ejemplo, sostenido restricciones del
mercado relativas a la seguridad de un producto, con tal
que ellos no tengan un efecto anticompetitivo y que sean
subordinados razonablemente al objetivo principal del
vendedor de proteger al pfiblico de dafios o a si mismo de
37. Id. at 792.
38. National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (sacado de los

argumentivos de los peticionariios que fallaron).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 696 (nota editorial: traducido de lngl6s por el escritor).
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la responsabilidad del producto. (Vea, Tripoli Co. v.
43
Wella Corp., 425 F. 2d. 932 (3d Cir. el 1970) (en banc).
Asimismo, los negocios conjuntos y las alianzas estrategicas en
que entran los competidores no son necesariamente ilegales. En United
States v. Joint Traffic Assn., la Corte decidi6 que la formaci6n de
corporaciones y asociaciones, citas de agentes conjuntos de ventas, y los
arrendamientos, nunca han sido entendidos como una restricci6n del
comercio, tal y como ese t6rmino se define legalmente.u En Broadcast
Music (BMI) v. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), la Corte pronunci6
que negocios conjuntos y otros arreglos cooperativos tampoco son ilegales
cominmente, por lo menos no como los planes de fijaci6n de precio,
donde el acuerdo sobre el precio es necesario para comercializar el
producto.4
Otras justificaciones posibles, razonables, y aceptadas
judicialmente por acuerdos que fijan precios son: "la integraci6n de
ventas, la verificaci6n y aplicaci6n contra el uso sin autorizaci6n de
propiedad literaria", el mejoramiento de eficiencia, la reducci6n de costos,
y la creaci6n consecuente de un producto o mercado nuevo.4
En Broadcast Music, la pregunta era si la emisi6n de licencias
generales para registrar en el Registro las composiciones musicales bajo
costos negociados por ellos era, por sf mismo, ilegal bajo las leyes de
antimonopolio."1 La Corte encontr6 que las pricticas alegadas eran
razonables y que un anilisis cuidadoso de los hechos era apropiado a fin
de determinar su legalidad o la carencia de la misma."
Es interesante anotar que la Corte del Distrito, aunque negando la
sentencia sumaria a ciertos demandados, habia decidido, primeramente,
que las pricticas no cafan bajo la misma regla; segundo, despu6s de un
pleito de ocho semanas, el rechazo de la demanda y la negociaci6n de
Broadcast Music con los propietarios individuales de propiedad literaria
9
fue disponible y factible.'
La propia Corte Suprema justific6 la fijaci6n de precio aceptando
un argumento eficiente:
43. Id. at 696 n.22.
44. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).

45. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Vea generalmente
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 179 (1964); United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
46. BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 20 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737
(1975).
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Pero aun para la licencias de cadena de televisi6n . . .
[ASCAP] reduce costos absolutamente, creando una
licencia general que se vende solamente unas pocas, en vez
de miles de veces, y que evita la necesidad de controlar las
cadenas atentamente para ver que ellos no usen ms de lo
que pagaron. . . [ASCAR] tambidn provee los recursos
necesarios para las ventas generales y la ejecuci6n, los
recursos que no son disponible a la mayoria extensa de
compositores y casas editoriales. Adem.s, una licencia de
volumen de algfin tipo es una consecuencia de la
integraci6n necesaria para lograr estas eficiencias, y una
consecuencia necesaria de una licencia agregada es que su
precio debe establecerse ...Esta considerable reducci6n
de costos, que es por supuesto potencialmente beneficioso
para los vendedores y los compradores, diferencia la
licencia general, de las licencias de uso individual. La
licencia general es compuesta de las composiciones
individuales mts el servicio agregado. Aquf la totalidad es
verdaderamente ms grande que la suma de sus partes; es,
hasta algfin punto, un producto diferente . . . [Broadcast
Music], en suma, cre6 un mercado en el que los
compositores individuales son inherentemente incapaces de
competir totalmente de forma efectiva.Ademds, la Corte dijo en la nota 40 de su opini6n "a causa de la
naturaleza del producto . . . una composici6n puede ser simultineamente
consumida por muchos usuarios . . . los compositores tienen nunerosos
incentivos para producir tantos, que es improbable que la licencia general
ocasione un rendimiento disminuido, unos de los efectos normales
indeseables de un monopolio."'"
De forma acorde, la Corte Suprema devolvi6 el caso para
procedimientos adicionales para considerar cualquier punto no resuelto que
CBS pudo haber traido propiamente a la Corte de Apelaciones.12 Ms
importante, sin embargo, es el hecho que en reenvio la decisi6n original de
la Corte del Distrito fue reafirmada 3 concluyendo que la fijaci6n de
precio analizada estaba justificada y, por lo tanto, legal.
50.
51.
52.
53.
U.S. 970

Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 22 n.40.
Id. at 25.
CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cerr. denied, 450
(1981).
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Despuds de la decisi6n de Broadcast Music, la Corte Suprema
confirm6 que cada acuerdo de fijaci6n de precio no es necesariamente
ilegal. En National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, la Corte revis6 un plan adoptado
en 1981 para las temporadas de 1982 - 1985 destinado para reducir los
efectos adversos de la televisi6n en vivo sobre la asistencia de los partidos
de ftitbol.11 Tambi6n en 1981, el College Football Association (CFA)
obtuvo un plan alterno del National Broadcasting Co. (NBC)
que hubiera permitido un nmero mAs liberal de
apariciones para cada colegio universitario [parte del
CFA], y hubiera aumentado las rentas totales reportadas
por miembros del CFA. En su respuesta el NCAA
anunci6 ptiblicamente que tomarfa acci6n disciplinaria
contra cualquier miembro del CFA que haya cumplido
con el contrato del CFA-NBC.16
En realidad, el NCAA cre6 una restricci6n
horizontal - un acuerdo entre competidores sobre la
manera en que ellos competirdn uno contra el otro. Una
restricci6n de este tipo frecuentemente es razonable como
una cuesti6n de derecho. Porque esto pone un limite sobre
el ntimero de juegos que los miembros de las instituciones
pueden televisar, el acuerdo horizontal pone un limite
artificial sobre la cantidad de juegos de fitbol televisados
que es disponible a los locutores y consumidores.
Conteniendo la cantidad de los derechos de televisi6n
disponibles para la venta, las pricticas desafiadas crean
una limitaci6n sobre el rendimiento. .... 7
Sin embargo, el NCAA present6 una serie de explicaciones para su
plan. Despu6s de un andlisis cuidadoso de todos ellos, la Corte verific6
que las justificaciones pueden ser invocadas y, si aplicable, aceptadas en
curso debido: "[Broadway Music] sostiene firmemente que un arreglo de
venta conjunta puede ser tan eficiente que aumentar, el rendimiento
agregado de los vendedores y asi ser competitivo. Similarmente, como

54. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
55. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
56. Id. at 95 (nota editorial: , traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
57. Id. at 99.
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nosotros indicamos en Sylvania, una restricci6n en un aspecto limitado de
un mercado puede mejorar la competencia en todo el mercado. ''
Finalmente, la Corte concluy6 que
[e]l NCAA juega un papel critico en el mantenimiento de
una tradici6n reverenciada de diletantes en los deportes de
colegio universitario. No cabe duda que se necesita latitud
amplia para jugar ese papel, o que la conservaci6n del
estudiante o atleta en la educaci6n m s alta agrega riquezas
y diversidad al atletismo intercolegial y es consistente
enteramente con las metas del decreto de Sherman
Antitrust Act. 9
Mds recientemente un acuerdo de fijaci6n de precio entre las
universidades ms prestigiosas fue pronunciado legal. En United States v.
Brown, un acuerdo entre la Instituci6n de Tecnologia de Massachusetts y
otras ocho prestigiosas facultades y universidades fue pronunciado legal,
bajo un andlisis de regla de raz6n por justificaciones sociales del
bienestar.w
En suma, arreglos de fijaci6n de precio pueden ser legales. Bajo
la ley de los Estados Unidos, las justificaciones presentadas por
demandados deberia ser ofda y analizada cuidadosamente por las cortes y
agencias administrativas competentes. De la misma forma deberian ser
tratados bajo la ley de competencia costarricense. La provisi6n de precio
del articulo 11 no es una declaraci6n directa que no acepta pruebas. 6 1 En
t~rminos general, el dictamen en el caso de punto destacado de Chicago
Board of Trade v. United StatesQ debe ser seguido: "La prueba cierta de
legalidad es si la restricci6n impuesta es la que regula, y quizAs por medio
de eso, promociona la competencia, o si es tal que puede suprimir, o aun
destruir la competencia."

58.
59.
60.
include:
Harvard

Id. at 103.
Id. at 120.
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (1993). The eight Ivy League schools
Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College,
University, .Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.

61. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).

62. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
63. Id. at 238. El caso hace provisiones para gufa en especifico t6rminos, para
determinar lapregunta la cort debe considerar: los hechos particular al negocio quele
applican el restricci6n; lacondiciones antes y despues de el impuesto del restricci6n; la
esencia del restricci6n y sus effectos, actual y probable; lahistoria del restricci6n; la
maldad; laraz6n por adoptar el remedio; y el proposityo o final cual sesique; son todos
importante elemtentos.
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2. El Intercambio de la Provisi6n de Informaci6n
Bajo la ley de competencia costarricense, para que un intercambio
de informaci6n entre competidores sea ilegal, debe de tener el objetivo o la
consecuencia de fijar los precios." En otras palabras, el intercambio de
informaci6n serfa el instrumento realizando, o facilitando un acuerdo para
fijar precios, o con la intenci6n de hacerlo.
El tratamiento que los Estados Unidos le da a este punto coincide
con el enfoque costarricense, que es los intercambios de informaci6n que
realizan o facilitan un acuerdo son ilegales.6
Sin embargo, una
advertencia importante se requiere aqui el tratamiento dado por los Estados
Unidos a este punto es mucho mis amplio que por la ley de competencia
costarricense por cuanto no es restringido a los acuerdos que fijan
precios."

A. Los Intercambios de Infonmaci6n Que Realizan Acuerdos
En ambos Eastern y en Cement Manufacturers Protective
Association v. United States, el punto principal era si la circulaci6n
analizada de informaci6n eran en si mismos ilegales o si ellos, en realidad,
- constitufan un acuerdo para no negociar.1
Aunque ninguno de los
acuerdos trataba con la fijaci6n de precios, los andlisis Ilevados a cabo
podrian ser fitiles en determinar si el intercambio de informaci6n era
consecuente de ilegalidad.
En el caso de Eastern States, por acci6n concertada, los nombres
de mayoristas que fueron proporcionados como haber hecho ventas al
consumidor fueron remitidos peri6dicamente a los otros miembros de la
asociaci6n.61 La decisi6n del minorista para no comprar no era
independiente, era el producto de un acuerdo realizando en la lista
circulada de ofensores.69 Por lo tanto, la lista no era ilegal. El acuerdo
para no repartir se deriv6 de su circulaci6n.70
Por otra parte, en el caso de Cement Manufacturers, los miembros
de la asociaci6n comercial intercambiaron informaci6n sobre el crddito de
Id.
64. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
65. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).

66. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
67. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 601 (1914); Cement
Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
68. Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 608.
69. Id. at 609.
70.

d.
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los compradores y sobre contratos especificos de trabajo.' La informaci6n
simplemente indic6 individuos cuyas cuentas estaban atrasadas. 2 Aquf, la
informaci6n circulada no era ilegal. Ni tampoco era el rechazo de los
miembros de la asociaci6n para tratar con compradores delincuentes." En
fin, el intercambio de informaci6n no realiz6 un acuerdo ilegal.7 '

B. Los Intercambiosde Informaci6n que FacilitaronAcuerdos
De nuevo, intercambiar de informaci6n en si no es ilegal.11 En el
caso Maple Flooring ManufacturersAssociation v. United States, Ia Corte
Suprema examin6 la reuni6n, computaci6n, y distribuci6n entre los
miembros de la asociaci6n del costo promedio a los miembros de la
asociaci6n de todas las dimensiones y grados de suelo, imposici6n de fletes
para suelos, asi como tambidn las cantidades y la calidad de suelo vendido
y de precios recibidos."
La Corte decidi6 que la prueba no estableci6 la uniformidad de
precio a travds de la industria ni tampoco estableci6 que la uniformidad
considerada habia resultado desde las actividades de la asociaci6n.",
Ademls, la Corte retuvo que "tampoco habia ninguna prueba directa que
las actividades de la Asociaci6n habian afectado los precios de una forma
adversa a los consumidores .... "'
Para que un cambio de informaci6n sea ilegal, es decir, para
facilitar un 'acuerdo, un efecto sobre el rendimiento y los precios es
requerido.19 En American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, la
Corte analiz6 el "Plan Abierto de Competencia"' 0 en que entraron los
demandantes. El Plan permiti6 "un intercambio extensivo de informes,"

71. Cement Mfrs., 268 U.S. at 591.
72. Id. at 599.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id.

75. P.C.D.E.C. art. II (Costa Rica).
76. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
77. Id. at 567 (nota editorial: traducido de Inglds por el escritor).

78. Id. at 567.
79. American. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (Holmes,
Brandeis, and Mckenna, JJ., disenci6n).
80. Id. at 393. El piano dice: "Conocimiento sobre precios actualmente hechos es todo lo
que se hace falta para mantener los precios a un nivel estable y normal .

. .

. No hay ningun

acuerdo para seguir la practica de otros, anque los miembros naturalmente siguen los mas
inteligente competidores, si saben lo que estos competidores estaban en actualidad haciendo. .. .
Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de lngls por el escritor).
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complementado por reuniones mensuales cuando una oportunidad se
present6 para la discusi6n "de todos los temas de inter6s a los miembros
"8I

La Corte encontr6 que los miembros del plan comenzaron a
colaborar mediante reuniones, para suprimir la competencia mientras
restringfan la producci6n.
"Si no hay aumento en la producci6n,
particularmente en el roble, va a haber buen negocio

. .

. Ningtin hombre

esti seguro aumentado su producci6n. Si 61 Jo hace, 61 estarA en mala
condici6n, porque la demanda no vendrl,"12 ley6 el acta de una reuni6n de
miembros del plan. Asi, el plan afect6 rendimiento y precios.
En ambos casos citados, como tambi6n en United States v.
ContainerCorporationof America, en Jo cual no habia mucha controversia
dentro de los Jueces con respecto a ]a interpretaci6n de ]a ley aplicable y la
interpretaci6n de los hechos, la carga de demostraci6n caia sobre los
demandantes.
Por lo tanto, dos conclusiones se pueden alcanzar ahora: 11bajo la
ley estadounidense y bajo la ley costarricense, los intercambios de
informaci6n, por si mismos, no son ilegales.w Los demandantes deben
proveer la evidencia para establecer que el cambio actual de la
informaci6n se realiz6, se facilit6, o se prometi6, a realizar o a facilitar un
acuerdo, y por este medio tener un efecto sobre la producci6n y los
precios. Bajo la ley costarricense, sin embargo, tal y c*mo establecido
bajo la parte "b" segtin consta arriba, siendo el acuerdo que fue realizado
tAcito, las autoridades antimonopolio de ejecuci6n adicionalmente: a)
requeririan demostraci6n acerca de su existencia (actos de reuniones,
conversaciones de tel6fono, intercambio de documentos al respecto, etc.);
y b) Necesitarian establecer que las condiciones econ6micas favorables
para la existencia de tal acuerdo existieron (porque en su ausencia, la
existencia de un acuerdo para conspirar es muy improbable).,' Bajo el
articulo 1I-A de ia ley de competencia costarricense, solo los intercambios
tinicos de informaci6n materializando o facilitando (o destinando hacerlo)
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 402.
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).

85. POSNER, supra note 11, at 140, Considera que en el caso de American Column &
Lumber Co. u. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), des del punto de vista econ6mico, no habia
evidencia de un acuerdo para fijar los precfos porque no habia condiciones favorable para la
existencia de un acuerdo. En hecho, el considero que las circumstanicas de muy poco
concentracion en ]a industria, eran para que hubiera bastante evidencia de la existencia de un
acuerdo. Explicaciones posible para el cambio de informacion fue dado por el Juez Brandeis en
su opinion disidente.
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acuerdos de fijaci6n de precios son ilegales.
Los intercambios de
informaci6n dirigidos a cualquier otro tipo de acuerdo entre competidores
se excluyen."
III. ARTICULO 10: LAs RESTRUCCIONES HORIZONTALES ESTAN
SIEMPRE SUJETAS A LA REGLA DE LA RAZ6N
Generales Interdicciones del artfculo 10: los monopolios privados,
ptiblicos y prcticas monopolisticas que impiden o limitan competencia o el
acceso de competidores al mercado, o que excluye los competidores desde
el mercado, se prohiben y debe sancionarse segfin articulos 24, 25 y 26 de
esta ley (con las excepciones presentadas en el articulo 9)."
La discusi6n de estas pricticas restrictivas de negocio deberian
analizarse bajo la regla de raz6n o, por lo contrario, que las pr.cticas son
violaciones por si mismas de las leyes antimonopolio que han llenado una
cantidad considerable de p~ginas de mIs de cien afios de historia de leyes
de los Estados Unidos.
En general, para que una conducta sea ilegal tiene que estar en
contra, o no ser autorizada, por la ley.,, Especificamente, violaciones por
si mismas de la ley antimonopolio se consideran inherentemente anticompetitivas e injuriosas al ptiblico sin la necesidad de determinar si
realmente son perjudiciales a la competencia en el mercado.' 9 Segtin la
propia doctrina, las cortes no necesitan averiguar el raciocinio de una
conducta antes de determinar que es una violaci6n de las leyes
antimonopolio.1° Asi, por ejemplo, en United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. ,9 con respecto a ver si el precio que fija la Corte Suprema es contable:
La racionalidad de precios no tiene constancia debido a la
calidad dinmica de los hechos del negocio bajo las
estructuras de precio. Aquellos quienes fijaron los precios
razonables perpetuarian precios irrazonables mafiana, ya
que ese precio no estaria sujeto al reajuste y supervisi6n
administrativa continua en vista del cambio de condiciones
. . . el Congreso no nos ha dejado Ilevar a cabo si la
determinaci6n de un plan de fijaci6n de precios es
prudente o imprudente, saludable o destructivo
86. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
87. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica) (enfasis agregado).
88. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990) (definiendo lapalabra illegal).
89. Id. at 1142.
90. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
91. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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combinaciones de fijaci6n de precio que carecen de
sanciones federales son ilegales; ellas se evahian desde el
punto de vista de su objetivo, el fin o efecto en la
eliminaci6n de maldades competitivas."
Por lo tanto, si una conducta es ilegal por si misma, ningtin anilisis
deberia requerirse para ver si es razonable, justificada, o injuriosa.
Contrario sensu, una conducta no es ilegal por si misma - y sujeta a la
regla de raz6n - si un anilisis es requerido.
Sin embargo, de los anlisis reales hecho por la Corte Suprema,
durante el decenio de 1970 y el decenio de 1980, uno saca la conclusi6n
que un anilisis de la regla de raz6n se requiere siempre. Las cortes
analizan si realmente las justificaciones existen en el acuerdo entre
competidores que fijan precios, determinan si los acuerdos de fijaci6n de
precio son razonables o subordinadas, examinan si la competencia se
mejora o si se restringe. 3 Esta conclusi6n es confirmada expresamente por
el caso de punto destacado de BMI v. CBS. ' En el caso especffico de la
ley de competencia costarricense, el articulo 10, las Interdicciones
Generales, provee el umbral general requerido que debe ser encontrado.
El articulo 10 dirige un andlisis de regla de raz6n en todos los casos
revisados bajo la ley de competencia costarricense, si una queja es
archivada por un partido privado o si un caso se ofrece de oficio, bien sea:
una prfctica absolutamente monopolistica (restricciones horizontales del
comercio) bajo el articulo 11, una prictica monopolistica relativa
(restricciones verticales del comercio) bajo el articulo 12, o una fusi6n o
adquisici6n bajo el articulo 16. 91
En el caso de National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United
States,9' la Corte revis6 y resumi6 la doctrina de la regla de raz6n,"
entonces analiz6 los hechos en vista de la doctrina, y decidi6 que la
doctrina no se aplicaba a los hechos. Asi, la Corte no decidi6 que la
conducta era ilegal hasta que hubiera analizado la doctrina y los hechos. 9
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 218, 228 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1979).
Id.
P.C.D.E.C. arts. 11, 12, 16 (Costa Rica).
National Soc'y of Prof'l Engr's v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).

97. La corte analizo lo siguentes: Mitchel v. Reynolds 1 P. Wins 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(1711); Joint Traffic Assn. (direct/indirect test),171 U.S; then Circuit Judge William H. Taft's
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (ancillary test), 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affirmed,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); Standard Oil (naming the doctrine), 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65, 68 (1911);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, (pro-competitive effects test).
98. National Soc'y of Prof'lEngr's, 435 U.S at 696.
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Adems, en ambos Broadcast Music y NCAA, la Corte encontr6
que la fijaci6n de precio existe, agnusic lo eximi6 de responsabilidad
antimonopolio por si misma." Si la fijaci6n de precio, la restricci6n
horizontal mis condenada del comercio,
podria justificarse
razonablemente, entonces la conclusi6n inevitable es que las restricciones
horizontales no son ilegales por si misma.
En Broadcast Music, la Corte dijo expresamente: "No todos los
arreglos entre competidores reales o potenciales que tienen un impacto
sobre el precio son violaciones por si mismo del decreto de Sherman o aun
restricciones irrazonables."'0 Ademis, Juez Bork, en el caso de Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, estableci6 que "en Broadcast
Music, NCAA, y Pacific Stationary, ia Corte Suprema dio vuelta a la ley
en la f6rmula de Addyston Pipe & Steel y asi rechazo efectivamente a
Topco y a Sealy con respecto a la ilegalidad por si misma de todas las
restricciones horizontales. "10

De aqui en adelante, no todas las restricciones horizontales son
ilegales por si mismo. El silogismo es muy franco: Bajo ia doctrina, por
si misma, ningiin anlisis se requiere con respecto a que la racionalidad o
las justificaciones de la conducta a fin de determinar su ilegalidad. Bajo
una regla de raz6n, tal requerimiento es requerido. Las cortes necesitan
determinar, y realmente hacerlo la irrazonabilidad de una restricci6n
horizontal antes de establecer su legalidad o ilegalidad. Entonces, las
restricciones horizontales no son ilegales por si mismas y, de aqui en
adelante, estn sujetas a la regla de la doctrina de raz6n.
Ademds, en el caso de la ley costarricense, cada restricci6n de
comercio examinada bajo la ley de competencia tiene que cumplir con el
umbral general cotizado del articulo 10 y, al igual, esti sujeto a una regla
del andlisis de raz6n.'l
Cuando se examinan las circunstancias objetivas, el articulo 10
requiere la determinaci6n que ciertos resultados existen: impidiendo o
limitando la competencia o el acceso de competidores al mercado o
excluyendo competidores del mercado. 3 Este requerimiento iguala a una
mis estricto que lo que es requerido en los Estados Unidos, prueba de
razonabilidad y, de aqui en adelante, a una regla de raz6n completa.
99. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979); National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
100. BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 23.
101.

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 277, 229 (D.C. Cir.

1986) (nfasis afladido).
102. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).

103. Id.
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IV. ARTICULO 16: LAS FUSIONES
El articulo 16: La concentraci6n se entiende como ]a fusi6n,
adquisici6n del control, o cualquier otra acci6n en ]a virtud de que
corporaciones, surtido acciones, monopolio, o el activo en general se
concentran, mientras ocurra entre competidores, suministradores, clientes,
u otros agentes econ6micos con el objetivo o consecuencia de decrecer,
perjudicar, o impedir la competencia o la disponibilidad libre de bienes
similares y servicios o los otros considerablemente relacionados.
En la investigaci6n de concentraciones, los criterios para medir el
poder sobre un mercado pertinente se tomaran en cuenta, como
determinando por esta ley. El articulo 16 de la ley costarricense, la carta
y ]a aplicaci6n de la Secci6n 7 del decreto de Clayton de 1914 (como fue
reformado en 1950 y en 1980), y las Directivas de Fusi6n Horizontal del
Departamento de la Comisi6n de Justicia y Comercio Federal de 1992 (las
Directivas), serin las provisiones legales revisadas bajo esta secci6n.
Aunque en muchos aspectos en los Estados Unidos el tratamiento
de fusiones ha diferido del la derada de 1960 al decada de 1970, y al
decada de 1980 al decenio de 1990, cada vez mfis indulgente, los puntos
involucrados en tal tratamiento no han tenido: la definici6n del mercado
pertinente, la definici6n y ]a comprobaci6n del poder del mercado, la
facilidad de entrada al mercado, y la interpretaci6n de la cliusula de
efectos.
La Corte Superior bajo C.J. Warren defini6 las reglas en los casos
de Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (Brown Shoe),104 United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank (PhiladelphiaBank), " y en United States v.
Von's Grocery Co. (Von 's).'6 En los tres casos, la Corte fallo a favor de
los demandantes. Sin embargo, en 1974 el enfoque cambi6 radicalmente
con el caso de United States v. General Dynamics Corp. (General
Dynamics).'°7
El articulo 16, que debe leerse conjuntamente con los articulos 14
(que define el mercado pertinente) y 15 (que define el poder del mercado),
aunque careciendo de una mejor sintaxis en Espafiol, toma un enfoque
muy adecuado. Se requiere un poder del mercado considerable.'°0 Para la
determinaci6n del mercado y del poder del mercado, todos los criterios
104. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
105. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
106. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Stewart, J., disenci6n.
fuerte).
107. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). La opini6n fue
escrita por el Juez Stewart, el disidente ms fuere en el caso de Von's Grocery Co.
108. P.C.D.E.C. art. 15 (Costa Rica)..
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considerados que conducen a tal determinaci6n son permitidos.
El
mercado considerable no es suficiente para una ilegalidad del articulo 16,
el intento de monopolizar tambi6n se requiere y ninguna presunci6n de
intento o de "una probabilidad que disminuya la competencia
considerablemente" puede sacarse del poder exclusivo del mercado. ,09 El
articulo 16 se aplica solamente a los competidores que actdan entre si
mismos. Las corporaciones son las t6nicas cubiertas por la ley. Es decir,
las personas fisicas son excluidas de su alcance" ° y los negocios conjuntos
se excluyen de su alcance."'
A continuaci6n se presenta un resumen de los puntos mds
importantes con respecto al examen de fusiones bajo la ley de competencia
estadounidense y costarricense.
En general, la ley costarricense es
consistente con la tendencia mis indulgente que los Estados Unidos ha
experimentado recientemente.
A. La Definici6n del Mercado
Cuanto menos definido sea el mercado, mis fuerte el poder del
mercado que cualquier compafifa tiene. Los demandantes quieren definir
el mercado muy por encima, mientras que los demandados to quieren
definir ampliamente. Para medir un mercado, dos elementos necesitan ser
tomados en cuenta: el mercado del producto, y el mercado geogrdfico.
En el caso de Brown Shoe los dos elementos antedichos fueron
examinados.112 El mercado del producto se defini6 como zapatos de
hombres, mujeres, y nifios.1" Los mercados geogrificos se delinearon
como "las ciudades con una poblaci6n que excede 10,000 y los
alrededores en que [los partidos fusionados] detallaron zapatos mediante
sus salidas propias."I" Las Directivas se refieren a ambos elementos.
Aunque ni el artfculo 16, ni el 14, expresamente sacan esta distinci6n entre
el producto y los mercados geogrtficos, puede que sean fitil y disponible.
Con respecto ai mercado del producto, la sustituci6n del producto
es un concepto esencial. En United States v. E.L du Pont De Nemours &
Co. (Cellophane),"' ia Corte dirigi6 el punto especificamente. La Corte
encontr6 que un "grado muy considerable de intercambio funcional"

109. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).

110. Id.
111. P.C.D.E.C. art. 15 (Costa Rica).
112. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
113. d. at 327.
114. Id. at 339 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
115. United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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La Corte tom6 en
existi6 entre el celofin y otros productos.'6
consideraci6n la "demanda de la elasticidad transversal.""' Asi, defini6 el
producto del mercado como el "mercado material de empaque flexible,"
mejor que limitarlo al mercado de celofdn, estricto sensu, como el
El articulo 14 incluye el elemento de
gobierno habia avanzado.1"
sustituci6n del producto. 11"
Adems, las respuestas probables de suministro deberian ser
consideradas para definir el producto del mercado. Las empresas que no
estin vendiendo actualmente el producto pertinente, que son probables de
responder y entrar en el mercado pertinente "dentro de un afio y sin el
gasto de costos hundidos importantes de entrada y salida en respuesta a un
pequefio pero importante aumento de precio que no es transitorio, "'2 deber
incluirse cuando se calcula la sustituci6n del producto. El articulo 14
permite la lectura de respuestas probables de suministros en la
determinaci6n del mercado pertinente. 12
Con respecto al mercado geogrdfico, el suministro de
importaciones es crucial. En el caso de United States v. Aluminum Co.
(Alcoa), el resultado del caso cambi6 a causa de importaciones (]a
producci6n extranjera) siendo incluidas en la definici6n pertinente del
mercado geogrfico. ,2 La Corte dijo: "el caso es diferente sin embargo,
porque por obvio que parezca bien puede haber sido un suministro de
importaciones pricticamente ilimitado como el precio de lingote subi6...
Si Alcoa hubiera levantado sus precios, se hubiera importado ms
lingote."121 La posibilidad de incluir el suministro de importaciones puede
ser leido validamente en el Articulo 14 de la ley de competencia
costarricense.
.En general, todos los elementos incluidos en los estatutos y leyes
de caso estadounidenses para la determinaci6n del mercado pertinente se
pueden encontrar en la ley de competencia costarricense.

116. Id. at 399.
117. Id. at 400 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
118. Id. at 400.
119. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
123. Id. (Nuta editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
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B. La Existencia del Poder del Mercado
Los casos de fusi6n preguntan si combinando dos empresas crearia
un poder del mercado nuevo. "Pero hay que recordar que el poder del
mercado por si mismo no crea responsabilidad; es, a la mayoria, un
requerimiento umbral que debe ser satisfecho antes que la responsabilidad
se pueda imponer." 'u En General Dynamics, 21 la Corte Suprema regres6
al caso de Brown Shoe'2' para la propuesta que mientras los porcentajes de
mercado-acci6n son "los indices primarios del poder del mercado - su
estructura, historia, y el probable futuro - puede proveer ia escena
apropiada para juzgar el efecto anticompetitivo probable de la fusi6n. "'"
El poder para controlar los precios o de excluir la competencia es
el tipo de poder del mercado que las Cortes siguen. Los factores
siguientes deberian ser considerados para determinar si dos empresas
fusionadas adquiririn el poder del mercado con respecto al control de
precio o para excluir la competencia:
a. Acci6n del mercado: Es solo una base para inferir el poder del
mercado. La acci6n del mercado es una proporci6n: el denominador
es el mercado que se determina por arriba y que es expresado en
d6lares de ventas; el numerador es el volumen de ventas en ese
mercado. Sin embargo, ia capacidad para cobrar mis del precio
competitivo todavia tiene que ser determinado.1 8
b. Medida directa: Si costos + ganancias = precio, entonces ganancias
= costos de precio. En determinando las ganancias se puede concluir
si ellos exceden la industria normal del equilibrio competitivo de
vuelta.' 2' Sin embargo, el clculo de costos es frecuentemente muy
dificil.
c. Conducta de los partidos fusionados: Por ejemplo, el precio de costo
bajo mantenido que no se puede explicar de otra manera. ,-o

124. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1 at 582.
125. Vea United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, (1974).

126. Vea Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
127. Id. at 322 n.38.
128. POSNER, supra note 11, at 112, considera que "Ilia reviciones en nuestro pensamiento

sobre la consolidaci6n hace una necessidad para reglas sobere obligaci6n conservatrives."
Tambien alga que "hay poco fundamento para nuestro curriento pensamientos de intervenci6n
automatica en mercados donde las cuatros mas grande firmas tienen un mercado combinado que
sea menos de sesenta perciento del mercado total." Id.
129. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945) (usando un
analises de ganancias).
130. Id.
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Elasticidad de demanda: la aceptaci6n de consumidores a cambios en
el precio de un producto. Si es ineistico, es probable que hay poder
del mercado.' 3'
e. Sustituci6n y entrada de suministro: Este elemento es complementario
al concepto de la elasticidad de demanda. No es suficiente saber si
consumidores responderdn a intercambios en el precio, pero tamnbi6n
si los competidores (actualmente produciendo el articulo o que puede
eventualmente a corto plazo entrar en el mercado) pueden responder a
intercambios en el precio, eso es si ellos son capaces de expandir su
rendimiento con respecto a un aumento de precio por un competidor
con una acci6n alta del mercado.' 32
El articulo 15 de la ley de competencia costarricense permite el uso de
todos los susodichos elementos.
d.

C. La Cidusula de Efectos
El poder puro del mercado para restringir la competencia
indebidamente no es ilegal bajo ley de competencia estadounidense o
costarricense. La Secci6n 7 del decreto de Clayton prohibe solo esas
fusiones que pueden disminuir la competencia considerablemente o que
tienden a crear un monopolio.1" El articulo 16 prohibe fusiones y las
adquisiciones que tienen "el objetivo o la consecuencia de decrecer,
perjudicar, o impedir la competencia o la libre disponibilidad de bienes y
servicios similares o otros considerablemente relacionados."'
Mientras que la icy de los Estados Unidos requiere una posibilidad
considerable para que ia fusi6n restrinja la competencia, el umbral de la
icy costarricense es si la fusi6n realmente restringe la competencia o tiene
la intenci6n de hacerlo.
Los casos de la Corte de Warren citados arriba eran mis bien
severos en favor de demandantes y contra fusiones, por medio de eso
admitiendo las suposiciones sobre la existencia de restricciones desmedidas
a la competencia. En el caso de PhiladelphiaBank, por ejemplo, la Corte
pronunci6 que
una fusi6n que produce una empresa controlando un
porcentaje de acci6n desmedida del mercado pertinente, y
resulta en un aumento importante en la concentraci6n de
131. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
132. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-96 (1974).
133. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), como enmendado Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
134. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
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empresas en ese mercado, es tan inherentemente probable
que disminuya la competencia considerablemente que debe
requerirse en la ausencia de prueba mostrando claramente
que no es probable que la fusi6n tenga un efecto
anticompetitivo .... "1
Ninguna suposici6n se puede leer en la ley costarricense por dos
razones. Primeramente, el idioma del articulo 16 (a diferencia de la
Secci6n 7 del decreto de Clayton) requiere un intento o resultado
especifico, que tenga que ser probado consiguientemente. Ninguna de las
posibilidades de restricciones desmedidas (a diferencia de la Secci6n 7)
encuentran el umbral. '11 Segundo, las tendencias mostradas en los casos
examinados por la Corte en el decenio de 1970 ( Dinimica General, supra
anotar 56), y en la franqueza de las Directivas y su aplicaci6n por la
Comisi6n Federal de Comercio,'" indica que la operaci6n de tales
suposiciones no era positiva. I'8
Ademis, la Profesora de derechos, Eleanor Fox, de la Universidad
de Nueva York aplic6 las directivas - como promulgadas en 1982 - antes
de que enmiendas en 1984 y 1992 enmiendas acogieran atn mejor a las
fusiones - en Casos anteriores de la Corte Suprema. Fox lleg6 a la
conclusi6n que el gobierno probablemente no habria pleiteado en los casos
de Brown Shoe, Alcoa, Von's, y General Dynamics.'39 Ademfis, en
general, las fusiones desafiadas por el gobierno entre 1963 y 1978 no eran
anticompetitivas. '4 Finalmente, despu6s de las Directivas del 1992, los
valores de fusi6n en 1994, y en 1995, fueron registros altos con US $
347.1 billones y US $ 363.00 billones (a 6 de Noviembre),
4
respectivamente. 1'
Ademrs, el articulo 16 requiere que una restricci6n desmedida de
competencia sea ocasionada o destinada. La aplicaci6n reciente de las
Directivas puede proveer claridad en la interpretaci6n del articulo 16.

135. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (nota editorial:
traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
136. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
137. El FederalTrade Commission enfuerza las leyes del anti-monopolio.
138. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
139. Eleanor Fox, The New Merger Guidelines: A Blue Printfor Microeconomic Analysis,
27 ANTITRUST 519, 590-91 (1982). Vea tambienAREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 877.
140. Espen B. Ekbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A
Reexamination of the Market-Power Hypothesis, THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 147 ( Fred McChesney et al.).
141. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at Dl.
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Tambi6n puede el caso General Dynamics.'42 La aplicaci6n de la ley de
competencia de los Estados Unidos en el decenio de 1960, siendo
demasiado estricto sobre fusiones y demasiado indulgente sobre
demandantes, no deberia usarse como principio de orientaci6n.
D. Fusiones y Adquisiciones CubiertasBajo el Articulo 16
Secci6n 7, del decreto de Clayton:
Ninguna persona comprometida en el comercio o
en cualquier actividad afectando Jo adquiriri, directa o
indirectamente, la totalidad o cualquier parte de las
existencias u otro capital de acci6n y ninguna persona
sujeto a la jurisdicci6n de la Comisi6n Federal de
Comercio adquirir, la totalidad o cualquier parte del activo
de otra persona comprometida tambi~n en el comercio o en
cualquier actividad afectando Jo, donde en cualquier lfnea
de comercio, o en cualquier actividad afectando lo en
cualquier secci6n del pais, el efecto de tal adquisici6n
puede ser considerable para disminuir la competencia o
para tender a crear un monopolio. .... "4
Despu6s de comparar los textos de la Secci6n 7 y del articulo 16,
las conclusiones siguientes pueden alcanzarse con respecto a los tipos de
fusiones y adquisiciones incluidos en el articulo 16:
a. El articulo 16 incluye adquisiciones por personas fisicas. Antes de la
enmienda de 1950, la Secci6n 7 se referia solamente a corporaciones.
b. El articulo 16 incluye la adquisici6n de activo. Antes de la ennienda
de 1950, la Secci6n 7 se referia solamente a suministro.
c. El artfculo 16 excluye la adquisici6n de activo por un agente
econ6mico de un agente no-econ6mico. Por ejemplo, el propietario
de una mina puede comprar legalmente una hacienda de ganado que
es rica en minerales.
d. El articulo 16 no provee para una notificaci6n de pre-fusi6n ni para el
procedimiento de aprobaci6n y parecido a uno requerido por el
decreto de Hart-Scott-Rodino del 1976. Tal procedimiento seria muy
conveniente y aconsejable.
e. La redacci6n del articulo 16 no incluye ]a idea que eliminando un
competidor potencial puede ser una base de violaci6n de
142. Las directivas fueron pormulgado por el Justice Department y son usado para analizar
concilaciones.
143. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), como emendado Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1936) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
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antimonopolio.
La doctrina de potencialidad-competencia fue
aplicada por la Corte Suprema en el caso Federal Trade Commission
v. Procter& Gamble Co. (Clorox).'" Richard Posner est, correcto en
considerar que, de todos modos, la Corte no ha aplicado el concepto
de competencia potencial muy bien y que el problema esencial es la
imposibilidad de desarrollar reglas laborables de ilegalidad en esta
,rea:
No hay m6todo prictico de alineaci6n, los competidores
potenciales en un mercado con el objeto de identificar un
conjunto de entrantes muy probable o temido. Y an
cuando uno podria identificar tal conjunto mediante los
m6todos de litigaci6n, uno no sabria como evaluar la
eliminaci6n de uno de sus miembros . . .La doctrina de
competencia potencial se introdujo en la ley antimonopolio
por la Cone Suprema, y la Cone puede abandonarlo - y
deberia hacerlo . . . Se puede esperar que la eliminaci6n
de un competidor potencial individual no tendri ninguna
importancia competitiva, ya que hay presumiblemente un
nfimero de competidores igualmente potenciales - empresas
que pueden entrar en el mercado a un costo que no es ms
alto que el de la empresa eliminada y lo haria si el precio
del mercado fuera apreciablemente ms alto que el nivel
competitivo. Pueden haber casos en que esta presunci6n
puede rebatirse si nosotros solamente supi6ramos como
medir los costos de entrada de las empresas diferentes o
para determinar confiablemente las percepciones de las
empresas en el mercado. Nosotros no podemos hacer
ninguna de estas cosas, tal que si el gobierno tuviera que
probar como una cuesti6n de derecho que la eliminaci6n
de un competidor determinado altera la estructura de la
4
competencia, fracasarfa siempre."
V. MONOPOLIO Y MONOPOLIZACION
Bajo la ley de competencia estadounidense y costarricense, cada
oligopolio (y por el tamaflo no cada monopolio) no es ilegal. Cada
oligopolio (monopolio) no restringe la competencia indebidamente.

144. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
145. POSNER, supra note 11, at 122.
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Ninguna ley sanciona oligopolio (monopolios) tinicamente porque ellos son
oligopolio (monopolios).
Mientras la secci6n 2 del decreto de Sherman provee que "cada
persona quien monopolizari, o el intento de monopolizar, o combinard o
especule con cualquier otra persona o personas, para monopolizar
cualquier parte del comercio o el comercio entre los varios Estados, o con
naciones extranjeras, se considerard convicto de una felonia

. . ."'"

La ley

de competencia costarricense ni siquiera tiene una provisi6n similar que
prohibe la monopolizaci6n o el intento de monopolizar.
La ley de competencia costarricense, sin embargo, tiene el
requerimiento bajo el umbral general del articulo 10. '4 De acuerdo con
esa provisi6n, solamente los oligopolio que impiden o limitan la
competencia, que impiden o limitan la entrada de competidores, o que
fuerzan la salida de competidores del mercado serin sancionados. "I
En virtud de la carencia de una provisi6n similar para ]a secci6n 2,
]a ley costarricense no prohibe monopolios o monopolizaci6n.
Sin
embargo, ain si la ley de competencia costarricense proporcionara una
regulaci6n tal y como la Secci6n 2 del decreto de Sherman, debido a los
requerimientos de sine qua non del Articulo 10, no sancionarfa monopolios
que no restringen la competencia indebidamente, eso es no sancionaria los
oligopolio (y monopolios) tinicamente por el hecho que ellos son
oligopolio (monopolios).
A continuaci6n hay un andlisis breve de la interpretaci6n y
aplicaci6n de la Secci6n 2 del decreto de Sherman. Su objetivo es
establecer que, en general la teoria de antimonopolio, monopolios que no
restriegan la competencia indebidamente no son ilegales.
Los casos de Standard Oil v. United States, ,"9 United States v.
American Tobacco Co.,' y United States v. American Can Co. "',
representan los casos principales en la monopolizaci6n. En cada uno de
ellos ]a Corte encontr6 que, ademis del poder del mercado, la conducta
reprochable para lograr o mantener dicho poder tambi6n se requiri6.
146. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por
el escritor).
147. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
148. Id.
149. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55, 61-62, 75 (1911).
150. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
151. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901-902 (D. Md. 1916), appelaci6n
despidido, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
152. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 61-62, 75; American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781;
American Can, 230 F. at 901-902.
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En el caso Standard Oil, la Corte decidi6 que las muchas
adquisiciones y fusiones del demandado dan origen:
en la ausencia de circunstancias contrarrieles . . . a la

presunci6n de intento y objetivo primafacie para mantener
el predominio sobre la industria del petr6leo, no como
resultado de m6todos normales de desarrollo industrial,
pero por nuevos medios de combinaci6n . . . con fin de

excluir a otros del comercio y asi centralizando en la
combinaci6n un control perpetuo de los movimientos del
petr6leo y sus productos en los canales del comercio
interestatal ....

"I5

En American Tobacco, la Corte encontr6 que:
los actos resultantes justifican la inferencia que la intenci6n
existia para usar el poder de la combinaci6n como un
terreno de ventaja para monopolizar el comercio del
tabaco por medio de conflictos comerciales disefiados para
lastimar a otros, o sacando la competencia fuera del
negocio, o obligindolos a Ilegar a tomar parte en una
combinaci6n .... 1 4
En American Can, la' Corte
especificamente el tema de ilegalidad paralela:

confront6

El Congreso no ha aceptado la sugerencia de algunos
hombres influyentes que el control de cierto porcentaje de
la industria deberia ser penalizado. Atn no est! dispuesto
a Ilegar muy lejos en la manera de regular y controlar
corporaciones meramente porque son grandes y poderosas,
quizis porque mucha gente siempre ha sentido que ese
control del gobierno es en si una maldad, y deberia ser
evitado cuando no sea requerido absolutamente para la
prevenci6n de un agravio mayor.'"
Sin embargo, la decisi6n de Alcoa de 1945'6 cre6 una confusi6n
innecesaria, agrandando el alcance de "actos exclusionarios."'"
La
153. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
154. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el
escritor).
155. American Can, 230 F. at 902 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s por el escritor).
156. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945).
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decisi6n sugiere, - usando las palabras de Wyzanski de la Corte del
Distrito en United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ,"" "que quien ha
adquirido una acci6n abrumadora del mercado 'monopoliza' cada vez que
hace negocios, aparentemente aun cuando no ha mostrado que su negocio
envuelve una prictica exclusionaria." I" La Corte de Alcoa sostuvo que
"no hay ninguna exclusi6n mis efectiva que progresivamente abrazar cada
nueva oportunidad que se abre, y para enfrentar a cada reci6n ilegado con
nueva capacidad ya engranada en una organizaci6n excelente, teniendo la
ventaja de experiencia, conexiones comerciales y la 6lite de personal." ,60
Fue precisamente la Corte del Distrito Wyzanski en United Shoe
quien aclar6 el aforismo del Juez Learned Hand en Alcoa reiterando que,
de acuerdo con el Juez Hand, hay responsabilidad antimonopolio si el
monopolio no es adeudado a: la habilidad superior; productos superiores;
ventajas naturales (incluyendo la accesibilidad de materiales crudos o de
mercados); eficiencia econ6mica o tecnol6gica (incluyendo ia investigaci6n
cientifica), mirgenes de ganancia bajo mantenido permanentemente; y sin
discriminaci6n o las licencias conferidas por, y usadas dentro de, los
limites de ia ley (incluyendo patentes sobre las invenciones propias de uno,
o las franquicias concedidas directamente a la empresa por una autoridad
ptblica). I"

Asi, se deberia diferenciar entre los actos de negocios que son
exclusionarios y los actos de negocios que son simpleniente agresivos. La
competencia buena no significa una competencia mullida. La competencia
buena vincula los actos agresivos que no son exclusionarios que, por
ejemplo, no cumplen los criterios del articulo 10 de la ley de competencia
costarricense,'6 o que no son de la naturaleza de los actos incluidos bajo la
Secci6n 1 del decreto de Sherman.

157. La confucion no fue necessario porque, primero, [a corte verifico que el tamaflo
no detirmina la culpa; que tiene que haber algunas exclusi6n de competidores; que el
crecimiento tiene que hacer otra cosa en ve de natural o normal; que tiene que haber
un mal intento, o otra forina de un intento especifico, o que alguna fuerza fue usado; y
segundo, porque la corte encotnro que Alcoa's "tamnafio no nada mas le dio )a
opportunidad para el abuso, pero fue utilizado para el abuso."
d. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingls por el escritor).
158. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
159. Id. at 295 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles por el escritor).
160. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 416.
161. Id. at 416.
162. Artfculo 10 sanciona hechos cual impiden o limita: la competecion, la entrada de
competadores, o que enfuerzan la salido del mercado.
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Por lo tanto, la Secci6n 2 del decreto de Sherman requiere la
presencia del monopolio en la forma del poder del mercado, y el ejercicio
de tal poder del mercado, con el objetivo de lograr o mantener un
monopolio. La ley de competencia costarricense no prohibe la existencia
de un monopolio aim cuando son mezclados con actos de mutua exclusi6n.
Si se hizo, el umbral requerido generalmente bajo el artIculo 10 tendrfa
que ser cumplido, es decir, los actos de mutua exclusi6n tendrfan que estar
presentes.
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I.

LA PREMISA

Presuma que usted es el dictador de un pais
pequefio adyacente a una naci6n pr6spera e industrializada.
Usted tiene poca interacci6n con esta naci6n porque objeta
a la manera en que usted mantiene control de los disidentes
en su pafs.
Pero hay politicas internas de la naci6n
pr6spera que, si cambiadas, pueden traer un beneficio
econ6mico a su pais.
Las politicas podrfan ser tan
mundanas como un arancel o tan expansivas como un
embargo. Ya que la naci6n pr6spera se niega a negociar
(por lo menos hasta que usted pare de encarcelar y torturar
disidentes), y que usando la fuerza militar seguramente
resultaria en su destrucci6n propia, usted esti en un
aprieto. iPero espere!
Como con muchas dictaduras, la suya a
engendrado su porci6n de refugiados politicos. Es duro no
tenerlos cuando usted tortura y encarcela la gente por su
creencia polftica.
Debido al fin de la guerra fria, la
largueza de la superpotencia se ha secado, y su pais esta
J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 1996; B.A., The American University School of

International Service, 1992. El escritor le da la gracias a Professors Geoff Watson, Chris
Rideout, Ramona Writt, Dean James E. Bond y bibliotecario de leyes Bob Menanteaux por sus
comentarios y propuestas.
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despojado econ6micamente; otro motivo para que sus
ciudadanos huyen.
iQuizs este estado de asuntos no es todo malo!
Quizis usted podrfa controlar estos refugiados. Quizis
ellos podrian ser usados, inadvertidamente, para servir sus
metas polifticas. Ellos podrian ser usados para influir otras
naciones asi como esos viejos tanques que usted tiene que
est~n comenzando a desintegrarse.
Si, yo pienso que usted ha encontrado algo. Usted

alientaria refugiados a cruzar la frontera. En vez de
encarcelarlos por tratar de salir, usted abriria las puertas.
Claro, usted sabe que perderi mucha gente (incluyendo,
quizis, muchos de esos malditos disidentes). Pero no se
puede suponer que usted garantiria la frontera de otro pais.

LPueden?
Una vez que el problema alcance una condici6n de
crisis en la naci6n limitrofe, usted puede ofrecer su
asistencia restableciendo medidas previas para impedir
escapes. Por supuesto, tuviera que ser cambio de algtrn

tipo de quid-pro-quo.

No pueden suponer que usted

protegerfa las fronteras de otros estados por nada.
Si solamente esta naci6n pr6spera cambiaria esos
polifticas que lo hacen un estado vejando. Rebaja ese

arancel. Pare de fabricar ajustes. Ofrezca alguna ayuda.
Estas seguro que todo lo demis se puede lograr.
Los argumentos han aumentado para la intervenci6n humanitaria
en estados que infringen la ley internacional por cometer abusos de
derechos humanos.' Tales abusos de derechos humanos son detestables, y
1. Dos articulos excelentes que confirman lalegalidad de intervenciones humanitarias
recientes por laONU en Somalia y los Baleiricos son, Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The Legality
of UN Forcible Humanitarian Intervention. 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138 (1994), y
David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign
Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1994). Otro artfculo excelente de encuesta es,
Richard Lillich, The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis
Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (1995). Para articulos interesantes sobre el borde extremo de la intervenci6n
humanitaria, incluyendo laintervenci6n para restaurar el derecho de determinaci6n personal
como expresado mediante el gobierno democritico, y [a intrigante vista de punto que las
intervenciones humanitarias constituyen guerra, yea Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the
Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of HumanitarianAssistance to Restore
Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995); W. Miguel Reisman, Humanitarian
Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794 (1995); y Byron F.
Burmester, On HumanitarianIntervention: The New World Order and Wars to Preserve Human
Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269 (1994).
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los estados que son culpables deberian ser hechos responsables. Pero hay
una amenaza afin mayor que el abuso insensato a causa de lucha interna
por el poder o las diferencias politicas.
En este mundo despu6s de la guerra fria, pequefias naciones
totalitarias no tienen el poder de negociaci6n para convencer a las naciones
ms grandes, y ms pr6speras, que adopten politicas que proveen naciones
menores con beneficios.2 Viendo que los refugiados son uno de los
problemas primarios que vejan las naciones mds pr6speras,' las naciones
totalitarias han encontrado formas de explotar la situaci6n de refugiados.
Usando a los refugiados como un instrumento de politica extranjera que le
devuelve a tales naciones una medida de apalancaniento que perdieron con
el fin de la guerra frfa.
Desafortunadamente, tales acciones no son claramente prohibidas
por la ley internacional. Afmn, en usar resoluciones y tratados se puede
hacer un argumento que tales acciones ya se prohiben bajo la ley
internacional. Este articulo sugeriri las maneras en que la comunidad
mundial puede impedir la ocurrencia de tales situaciones en el futuro.
Como un caso de estudio para las propuestas, nosotros miraremos
las acciones tomadas por Cuba durante Agosto, 1994, Durante ese
tiempo, Cuba, una dictadura represiva con un registro largo de abusos de
derechos humanos y refugiados, abri6 sus fronteras. Esto permiti6 que
una inundaci6h de refugiados se derramaran en su vecino, el
econ6micamente pr6spero Estados Unidos. En cambio de detener el
6xodo, Cuba insisti6 que los Estados Unidos alzara una polftica comercial
interna, especificamente el embargo de mercancfas contra Cuba. Aunque
Cuba no triunf6, sus acciones ganaron algunas concesiones,
especificamente una politica enmendada de inmigraci6n en los Estados
Unidos. El peligro es que este 6xito limitado podria ilevar otras naciones

2. Mientras Egipto es probablemente elm:s obvio ejemplo de una naci6n que jug6 las
superpotencias contra el uno al otro; estados tal como Israel, Nicaragua, Cuba, los estados de
sat6lite Sovitico del Oriente Europeo anteriores, en realidad casi todo los estados en elmundo,
usaron larivalidad de las superpotencia para cosechar los beneficios monetarios.
3. Por ejemplo, Alemania ha estado en trato con mAs de 400,000 refugiados de [a crisis
Bale~rica. Alemania ha tenido problemas en el pasado integrando refugiados en su sociedad,
incluyendo refugiados Europeos del Oriente y Kurds. Para una lista de estados que han aceptado
refugiados Balehricos, vea Mary Williams Walsh, Germany May Repatriate Bosnian Refugees,
Los ANGELES TIMES, DECEMBER 23, 1995, at A10 Para informaci6n sobre como refugiados
han forzado cambios en las leyes Alemanas, y como las politicas sobre refugiados que han sido
enmendadas han tenido un afecto de domin6 sobre otras naciones, yea Igal Avidan, RefugeesGermany
Facts, Figures, and Costs Behind Policy, INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFO
NETWORK, July 20, 1993; y Germany Pulls welcome Mat From Refugees: In a Domino Effect,
Other Countries Are Preparing Their Own Restrictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 1,1993.
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en la situaci6n de Cuba, tal como Corea del Norte o Irak, a intentar
similares actos coercitivos.
Cuba deberfa ser Ilamada a responder bajo la ley internacional por
su uso de refugiados como instrumentos de politica extranjera. Sin hacer
esto, el mundo estimulara estados represivos a cultivar refugiados, tan solo
para ser utilizados en lograr metas politicas extranjeras. El mundo no
estard dispuesto a intervenir y remediar violaciones de derechos humanos
para su objeto propio; pero el mundo por lo menos deberfa reconocer un
inter6s en la defensa propia de una naci6n, que estl siendo inundada
intencionalmente por refugiados, de otro estado como parte de la conducta
de ese estado de sus asuntos extranjeros.

1I. Los HECHOS
El origen de la crisis de refugiados Cubanos puede ser trazado a
Enero 1, 1959, cuando un r6gimen totalitario tom6 poder. Desde 1959,
mas de 800,000 Cubanos han salido de Cuba para los Estados Unidos.'
Muchos Cubanos opuestos al gobierno se fueron de Cuba cuando la
revoluci6n ocurri6. Aun, muchos se quedaron, sin embargo, cuando la
severidad del nuevo regimen lleg6 a ser evidente, muchos otros trataron de
escaparse. Los Estados Unidos, con su proximidad cercana a Cuba, fue la
elecci6n l6gica de destino para esos tratando de escaparse.
Dos flotillas precedieron los sucesos de 1994, la flotilla de
Camarioca en 1965 y la mts bien conocida flotilla del Mariel en 1980. La
anterior fue pequefia, en un sentido relativo: solamente 5000 refugiados
Ilegaron a los Estados Unidos antes que el gobierno Cubano acordado a
una ayuda a6rea permitiendo que 268,000 Cubanos entraran en los Estados
Unidos entre los afios 1965 y 1973.1
La flotilla del Mariel trajo mas de 125,000 refugiados Cubanos a
los Estados Unidos antes que pasara algo.6 Siguiendo una incidencia en
que 10,000 gente tom6 refugio en ia Embajada Peruana, Castro anunci6
que cualquier Cubano que deseara irse del pais podria hacerlo a trav6s del
puerto Mariel. El gobierno Cubano control6 el 6xodo directamente,
determinando quien partiria sobre que barcos, y afiadi6 criminales y
enfermos mentales.
Es contra estos antecedentes que el 6xodo de 1994 de refugiados
Cubanos se puede medir. El punto de destello para este reciente xodo
masivo fue el hundimiento del remolcador el "13 de Marzo" en Julio 13,
4. Exodus From Cuba, DEPT. ST. BULL, July 1980 at 80.
5. Ronald Copeland, The Cuban Boatlift of 1980:
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC., 138, 140 (1983).

6. Id. at139.
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1994.' Este barco de madera con 115 aflos de edad se hundi6 con sesenta
y ocho pasajeros a bordo.1 Los sobrevivientes sostienen que el barco fue
golpeado por los cafiones de agua de tres remolcadores del gobierno, y
despu6s fue chocado por uno de las embarcaciones. Treinta y siete de los
pasajeros se ahogaron, mientras que treinta y uno fueron recogidos por
cafioneros Cubanos que observaron los sucesos.1 El gobierno Cubano
sostuvo que el hundimiento fue "accidental" y que los cafiones de agua
solo fueron utilizados para tratar de parar los motores del remolcador. En
las siguiente tres semanas, tres transbordadores de pasajeros fueron
secuestrados, junto con un avi6n y una embarcaci6n militar.10
Estos sucesos conducirin al alboroto de Agosto 5, 1994 en
Habana." Rumores divulgaron que un barco transbordador iba ser
secuestrado hacia la Florida atrajo ms de quinientas personas a los
muelles de la Habana, el primer disturbio antigubernamental desde que
Castro tomo poder ocurri6. Dos oficiales de la policfa fueron matados, un
tercero lastimado, y varios hoteles y tiendas cuales aceptaban solamente
d6lares fueron dafiadas."2
Castro contest6 el disturbio declarando, por la agencia de noticias
del gobierno Prensa Latina, "Pararemos de bloquear la salida de esos que
quieren salir del pals,""" y agrego, "no podemos continuar protegiendo las
costas de los Estados Unidos. ""
Con esas palabras el espiche se abri6. La huida de Cuba, que
habia sido una actividad castigada por una sentencia de prisi6n, cambio a
una perdonada por el gobierno Cubano. En Agosto 24, 1994, balseros
partieron de las muelas de la Habana, "en plena vista de edificios de
oficinas del gobierno y grandes multitudes de espectadores."'" En todo,
mis de 32,000 partieron.' 6
7. Tod Robberson, Story of Tug's Sinking Incited Cubans: Drownings That Launched
Exodus of Rafters May Be Portent, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at Al.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. John Rice, Castro Threatens to Allow Refugees to Flood Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 5, 1994 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
14. Id.
15. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24. 1994 at A24 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
16. Para una lista diaria del ndimero de refugiados recobrado en el mar, yea Daniel
Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on CastroDropping Trade Demands, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994
at A34.
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Los Estados Unidos respondieron mandando barcos de
guardacostas para recoger muchos de los balseros en el mar. Pero como el
nimero de refugiados ascendi6 entre los miles diariamente, los Estados
Unidos invertido una politica existente por treinta afios de asilo a los
refugiados Cubanos. 8 La administraci6n de Clinton primero impidi6 ]a
entrada directa a los Estados Unidos, en Agosto 19, 1994 declarando que
los refugiados recogidos en el mar se detendrian en la Base Naval de
Guanttnamo localizada, ir6nicamente, en Cuba."
Clinton comenz6
negociaciones en Septiembre 1, que culminaron' con un cambio politico de
inmigraci6n en los Estados Unidos.? Esta politica fue alterada en una
Declaraci6n Colectiva en Mayo 2, 1995.1 Con temores de otro 6xodo en
el verano, la administraci6n de Clinton anunci6 que los refugiados de alli
en adelante serian devueltos a Cuba.2n Estos anuncios fueron enfrentados
por demostraciones en gran escala en la poblaci6n de exiliados Cubanos,
asi como considerable contienda entre Representantes del Congreso de los
Estados Unidos.y3 El mi6rcoles, Mayo 10, 1995, el guardacostas sigui6 la
nueva politica cuando trece Cubanos recobrados en el mar fueron devuelto
a la isla.
Los costos de esta crisis fueron enormes. El Pentigono estim6 que
habia gastado $52 millones en mejoramientos ffsicos a la base de
Guantnamo, $10 millones al mes para proveer alimento y articulos
diversos para los refugiados, $93,000 al dia para fletar un buque donde
radicar personal militar extra, y $1.3 millones para patrullas de seguridad.
Agregue esos costos a los $44 millones que los Estados Unidos gasto
transfiriendo temporalmente un exceso de 7,450 refugiados a Panamd, y
los Estados Unidos gasto mas de $100 millones de d6lares, no incluyendo

17. Id.
18. Michael Dobbs, Lawmakers Assail New Policy On Returning Cuban Refugees, WASH.

POST, May 19, 1995, at A8.
19. President Clinton's Press Conference Remarks, U.S. Department of State Dispatch,
August 29, 1994, Vol. 5, No. 35.
20.
(1994).

U.S. - Cuba Joint Communiqut on Migration, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, 37,

21.

Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, 31 WKLY

COMP. PRESIDENTIAL DOC. 752 MAY 2, 1995 (de aqui adelante Joint Statement with the
Republic of Cuba).

22. Vea U.S.-Cuba, Joint Communiqui on Migration, supra note 20.
23. Dobbs, supra note 18, at A8.
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los costos incurridos al guardacostas para la operaci6n de rescate, o al
servicio de Inmigraci6n y Naturalizaci6n para procesar los refugiadosY2
De esto se pueden sacar dos conclusiones. La primera es que el
gobierno Cubano sabia que sus acciones provocarian una salida masiva
El gobierno Cubano us6 esta tActica
hacia los Estados Unidos.
anteriormente para servir metas politicas de Cuba, tal como librarse de
politicos "indeseables," asi como tambien exportar sus criminales y
enfermos mentales a los Estados Unidos. Ahora el gobierno Cubano tuvo
una agenda diferente, pero se mantuvo con una tActica probada.
La segunda conclusi6n es que las acciones tomadas por Cuba
tuvieron repercusiones, politicas y econ6micas, en gran escala dentro de
los Estados Unidos. Cuando volvamos al examen de los documentos
multinacionales pertinentes, debemos tener estos costos en mente.
III. LA POSICION DE CUBA

Durante la crisis del 1994, miembros de alta jerarqufa del gobiemo
Cubano hicieron demandas explicitas para: un fin al embargo comercial
de los Estados Unidoss y una alteraci6n a las polfticas de inmigraci6n para
detener la corriente de refugiados."6 Tales demandas tomaron muchas
formas.
Tan temprano en la crisis como los tumultos de Agosto 5, 1994,
Fidel Castro declaro que el gobierno Cubano "acabarfa la protecci6n de la
costa de los Estados Unidos, "2 a menos que los Estados Unidos cesaran
sus provocaciones. n
En Agosto 23, 1994, Jose Cabanas, un funcionario mayor del
Ministerio Extranjero Cubano quien dirige un departamento tratando con
comunidades migratorias Cubanas en otras naciones, indico que "la causa
fundamental del dxodo es el bloqueo contra Cuba." 9 Cabanas referia, al
lenguaje mis preciso, al embargo de los Estados Unidos y que Cuba estaba
esperando por "medidas Agiles y claras"'" de los Estados Unidos?' Castro
24. Douglas Farah, U.S. Begins Flying Cuban Refugees in Panama to GuantanamoNaval
Base, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1995 at A18. Dana Priest, Pentagon May Employ Others to Watch
Refugees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6. 1995 at A9.
25. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1994, at A24.
26. Id.
27. John Rice, Castro Threats Over Emigration Brings New Cuban Crisis to the U.S.,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 7, 1994, at A70 (nota editorial: traducido de Ingls).
28. Id.
29. Suro, supra note 15.
30. Id.
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reconoci6, en un discurso en Agosto 24, que tan temprano como Agosto
11 61 habia dicho, "ir al fondo del problema significa discutir el
bloqueo. "

Durante las negociaciones oficiales que comenzaron Septiembre 1,
Ricardo Alarcon, un diplomitico Cubano y ministro extranjero precedente,
fue entrevistado en Nightline (un programa de televisi6n)." Dijo que
mientras Cuba estaba dispuesta a discutir puntos de inmigraci6n, la
migraci6n sin control a los Estados Unidos no terminaria sin charlas de un
alcance politico mds amplio.4 Referente a la posici6n negociante de los
Estados Unidos (tratndose solamente con puntos de inmigraci6n), Alarcon
declaro, "Yo no estoy convencido por las promesas sobre la migraci6n.
Deberia de ser parte de un cambio estrat~gico, un cambio de politica
extranjera."" Alarcon tambi6n hablo de los beneficios que se ganarian en
Cuba si el embargo de los Estados Unidos fuera discontinuado.16 Durante
estas charlas, Alarcon tambi6n insisti6 que los Estados Unidos forzara a las
estaciones privadas de radio en la Florida a cesar la transmisi6n a Cuba."
Finalmente, el gobierno Cubano exigi6 que los Estados Unidos cambiara
su politica de inmigraci6n.3 9 Estas demandas incluyeron el otorgo de la
entrada a un pedido pendiente por llenar 9 de 150,000 Cubanos quien Cuba
reclamo que deberian ser permitidos entrar en los Estados Unidos bajo un
acuerdo conjunto de 1984.40
IV. LAS CONCESIONES OTORGADAS

El gobierno Cubano triunfo en sus intentos de alterar polfticas de
los Estados Unidos. Aunque Cuba no logro la eliminaci6n del embargo,
gan6 otras concesiones valiosas.
La concesi6n mis obvia fue la
enmendada politica de inmigraci6n de los Estados Unidos. Pero quizs la
concesi6n ms importante es que Cuba estableci6 un nuevo modelo de
31. Id.
32. CNN News Live Report, (CNN August 24, 1994), available in 1994 WL 3678276 (nota
editorial: traducido de Ingls).
33. Daniel Williams, Diplomat Encourages Talk About Embargo, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
1994 at A44.
34. Id.
35. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingls).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Daniel Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on Castro Dropping Trade Demands, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at A34.
39. Id.

40. Id.
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amenazas y actos coercitivos, seguidos por ]a conciliaci6n y la
negociaci6n, mediante los cuales podria lograr futuras metas.
Por el Comunicado Colectivo sobre la Inmigraci6n de Diciembre
14, 1984,' los Estados Unidos acord6 emitir hasta 20,000 visas de
preferencia a Cubanos nacionales residiendo en Cuba. Cuba, en cambio,
acord6 aceptar inmigrantes excluidos42 del Mariel. Este grupo consisti6 de
esos individuos quienes normalmente no serian permitido inmigrar a los
Estados Unidos a causa de sus registros criminales.4" Este Comunicado
Colectivo fue el acto que Cuba acus6 a los Estados Unidos de violar,
porque aunque el acuerdo provea que hasta 20,000 Cubanos serian
admitidos anualmente, solamente 11,000 visas se emitieron bajo el
programa."
Por el Comunicado Colectivo Estaunidense-Cubano de Septiembre
9, 1994 sobre la Migraci6n,'5 la mAxima de 20,000 visas se cambi6 por un
minimo.16 Un minimo de 20,000 visas se emitiria a nacionales Cubanos,
pero esta figura no, inclufa parientes inmediatos de ciudadanos de los
Estados Unidos." Como una medida adicional, los Estados Unidos acord6
un periodo de un afto durante cual emitirfa permiso a todos los nacionales
Cubanos quienes estaban en la lista de espera de visa de inmigrante.Adems de estos cambios en la politica de inmigraci6n, el acuerdo
de Septiembre 9, 1994, contuvo una inversi6n de la polftica
Estadounidense de hace treinta aflos que automiticamente liberaba a los
refugiados Cubanos a los Estados Unidos. El acuerdo expuso este cambio
politico en dos puntos. Los Estados Unidos primero acord6 que todos los
inmigrantes rescatados en el mar intentando de entrar a los Estados Unidos
no serian permitidos entrar, pero en vez serian instalados en facilidades
seguras de asilo afuera de los Estados Unidos.41 El segundo punto
discontinuo la prictica de los Estados Unidos de otorgar libertad
41. Joint Communiqui Between The United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 14, 1984,
U.S. - Cuba, T.I.A.S. No. 11,057 (de aqui adelante Joint Communique Between the United States
and Cuba).
42. Id.
43. Individuos quienes solamente habian cometido delitos contra ia Seguridad del Estado no
f'ueron incluidos en esta categoria de excluidos. Vea Joint Communiqui Between the United
States of America and Cuba, supra note 41.
44. Daniel Williams, Cuban Response to U.S. Immigration Offer "Outlandish," WASH.
PoST, Sept. 5, 1994 at A34.
45. U.S.-Cuba Joint Communiqui on Migration, supra note 20.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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condicional a todos los inmigrantes Cubanos que alcanzaran el territorio de
los Estados Unidos en maneras irregulares.10 En cambio, el gobierno
Cubano prometio tomar medidas efectivas en todo respecto posible para
evitar salidas inseguras usando m6todos principalmente persuasivos.' 1
En la Declaraci6n Colectiva con la Reptzblica de Cuba de Mayo 2,
1995 sobre la Normalizaci6n de Migraci6n, 2 el gobierno Cubano obtuvo
mIs concesiones. Los Estados Unidos acord6 liberar los refugiados
acomodados en Guantinamo.11 Los Estados Unidos tambidn acord6 que
los inmigrantes Cubanos interceptados en el mar por los Estados Unidos
intentando de entrar a los Estados Unidos se devolverian a Cuba.-"
Aunque podria ser de comodidad escasa a esos repatriados a la fuerza, los
dos gobiernos tambidn acordaron informar a los devueltos de los
procedimientos oficiales que los Cubanos podrian usar para entrar a los
Estados Unidos en la Secci6n de Intereses de los Estados Unidos en la
Habana." La concesi6n de Cuba en este acuerdo fue asegurar que ninguna
acci6n se tomaria contra esos inmigrantes devueltos a Cuba como
consecuencia de su intento de inmigrar ilegalmente."1
V. LAS VIOLACIONES DE CUBA DE LA LEY INTERNACIONAL

Las acciones de Cuba violaron dos categorias distintas de la ley
internacional. La primera puede describirse como violando los derechos
de un estado soberano. Cuba violo estos derechos deliberadamente
intentando de influir las polfticas internas de los Estados Unidos mediante
medidas coercitivas, especificamente inundando los Estados Unidos con
refugiados.
El segundo cuerpo de la ley internacional que Cuba violo mediante
sus acciones involucra los derechos de individuos, de usualmente conocido
como los derechos humanos. Cuba tiene una historia larga de tales
violaciones; atin sus acciones promoviendo y tratando con refugiados
ofrecen clara violaciones de acuerdos importantes multinacionales y
derechos humanos regionales. Cada una de estas violaciones se discutiera
a la vez.

50. Id.

51. Williams, supra, note 33.
52. Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba supra note.2 1.
53.

d.
54. Id.
55. id.
56. Id.
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La Carta Constitucional de ONU afirma, en el Articulo 2(4), que
todos los Miembros de Estados evitaran en sus relaciones internacionales
la amenaza o uso de fuerza contra la integridad territorial o independencia
politica de cualquier estado, o en cualquier otra manera inconsecuente con
los prop6sitos de las Naciones Unidas.17 El intento de Cuba de influir un
alcance de politicas internas de los Estados Unidos - incluyendo el
embargo, la transmisi6n de radio, y la inmigraci6n - seguramente
constituye una amenaza contra la independencia politica de los Estados
Unidos. Una naci6n que estd siendo forzada en cambios politicos apenas
puede ser politicamente independiente.
El territorio de los Estados Unidos tambi6n fue violado. Miles de
Cubanos corrieron hacia los Estados Unidos en un intento de entrar.
Unicamente el uso de las fuerzas militares de los Estados Unidos impidi6
la violaci6n de sus fronteras en masa, y esos refugiados quienes alcanzaron
los Estados Unidos en sus balsas violaron la integridad territorial de las
naciones. Este 6xodo fue por lo menos ticitamente, si no activamente,
fomentado por el gobierno de Cuba.
La tinica pregunta aparece ser si habia la amenaza o uso de fuerza.
,Es improbable usar como anlogo ]a promoci6n de un niimero grande de
refugiados a una fuerza de invasi6n? Ambas pueden ocasionar grandes
dafios y costos dentro del pais selecto. Ambas pueden usarse para los
mismos fines, la alteraci6n de la politica interna de otras naciones. La
(inica diferencia aparece ser la potencialidad para la p6rdida de vida
humana, y en este escenario Cubano, esto es cierto solamente por la
naci6n invadida. La fuerza de refugiados Cubanos seguramente tuvo la
m~is grande potencialidad para la p6rdida de sus vidas durante su peligrosa
travesia en balsa por el estrecho de la Florida.
La Carta Constitucional de ONU fue escrita en un tiempo cuando
el uso de fuerza era, si no aceptada, al menos no claramente prescrita. El
prop6sito de la Carta Constitucional era prescribir la guerra y los actos
violentos que pueden conducir a una guerra.58 Hasta cierto grado, ha
tenido 6xito. Ain la Carta Constitucional sufre de la curva aprendiz,
como hacen cualquier estatuto. Los infractores inteligentes encontrardn
nuevos m6todos para lograr las mismas metas (especialmente desde que el
uso de fuerza se impidi6, y fue completamente, por el ejemplo que el
mundo estableci6, invirtiendo la invasi6n de Kuwait por Irak). Atmn
cuando una invasi6n de refugiados se use para realizar los mismos fines
como una invasi6n de soldados, y de hecho puede ser mis exitosa que la

57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
58. Joint Communiqud Between The United States and Cuba, supra note 41.
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ausencia de la posibilidad de derrota militar, es finicamente l6gico para
someter tales estados a las mismas normas de conducta internacional.
Los derechos de los estados de ser libres de la influencia externa
de otros estados es declarada aun mis directamente en la Carta
Constitucional de la organizaci6n de Estados Americanos (Carta
Constitucional de OAS). 9 "Entre los principios que aboga el documento
es que cada estado

. . .

tiene el deber de abstenerse de intervenir en los

asuntos de otro estado.w Ninguna limitaci6n de medios se incluye;
cualquier forma de intervenci6n se deplora.",
El capitulo sobre los Derechos y Deberes Fundamentales de los
Estados ademis declara :
Articulo 14. El derecho de cada Estado para protegerse a
si mismo y vivir su propia vida no lo autoriza a cometer
actos injustos contra otro estado.
Articulo 18. Ningdin estado o grupo de estados tiene el
derecho de intervenir, directamente o indirectamente, por
cualquier raz6n, en los asuntos internos o externos de
cualquier otro estado. El principio anterior no solo
prohibe fuerza armada sino tambi6n cualquier otra forma
de interferencia o intento de amenaza contra la
personalidad del Estado o contra los elementos politico,
econ6mico, y cultural.
Articulo 19. Ningtin Estado puede usar o fomentar el uso
de medidas coercitivas de un caricter econ6mico o politico
a fin de forzar el soberano de otro Estado y obtener
ventajas de cualquier tipo.
Articulo 20. El territorio de otro estado es inviolable; no
puede ser el objeto, ni temporalmente, de ocupaci6n
militar o de otras medidas de fuerza tomadas por otro
estado, directo o no indirectamente, por cualquier raz6n.
Ningunas ventajas territoriales o ventajas especiales
obtenidas o por la fuerza o por otros medios de fuerza se
62
reconocerln.

59. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
60. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de ingl6s).
61. Id.
62. Id. at arts. 14-20.
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Cada articulo es especifico en su prohibici6n contra la intervenci6n
por otro estado. Esta es una visi6n mis expansiva que la Carta
Constitucional de ONU, 3 adin los estados Americanos, incluyendo Cuba,
optaron por firmar la Carta Constitucional de OAS en 1951.6 Las normas
que este documento promociona son las de negociaci6n y mediaci6n. Los
Estados en el sistema de OAS estAn comprometidos a discutir sus
desacuerdos, y tratar de ganar la alteraci6n de otras politicas de estado
mediante la diplomacia mts bien que por fuerza.Y
Las acciones de Cuba claramente violaron un ntdmero de los
preceptos enumerados. Primero, aunque es seguramente una expresi6n
moderada, la promoci6n de Cuba de un 6xodo extenso de refugiados
abriendo sus fronteras es un acto injusto dentro del significado del Articulo
14." Cualquiera de las violaciones de los Articulos que sigan, a priori,
violan la prohibici6n sobre actos injustos.6"
Los articulos 18 y. 19 son mis explfcitos. El derecho de intervenir
se prohibe, no solamente del punto de vista de la fuerza armada, sino en
cualquier otra forma de interferencia. Cualquier soborno de otro estado
soberano, cualquier presi6n aplicada en forma coercitiva que causa una
alteraci6n a las politicas de un estado por la interferencia en asuntos
internos de ese estado, es prohibido."
La violaci6n de Cuba en tales preceptos es precisa. Cuando uno
con
el conocimiento que esas acciones conducirin a un resultado
actfia
seguro, uno es responsable por ese resultado igual que los actos iniciales.
Cuba abri6 sus fronteras sabiendo que un 6xodo masivo resultaria.
Exitosamente us6 este resultado como una ficha de negociaci6n para forzar
a los Estados Unidos a alterar sus politicas de inmigraci6n. Esta era una
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
64. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
65. Id.

66. Id. at art. 14
67. Id.

68. La respuesta obvia serfa que los Estados Unidos estan violando laCarta Constitucional
del O.A.S. en mantener su embargo contra Cuba, y asi en alguna forma ha decomisado una
del alcance
defensa contra las violaciones de Cuba. Mientras esta Ifnea argumental ests mfs alib
de este articulo, este punto es digno de notar.

El embargo por lapane de los Estados Unidos es una polftica interna que no afecta
directamente lagobemaci6n interna de Cuba o sus polfticas. La dnica presi6n que pone en Cuba
es indirecta, por negarle a Cuba una oportunidad de comerciar con elmercado mis grande del
mundo. Es esta circunstancia que hace elembargo aparecer como una medida coercitiva. Si los
Estados Unidos no tuvieran lamis grande economia, pocos tendrfan preocupaci6n sobre los
efectos de esta forma de protesta. /,magine si Bermuda impusiera un embargo, responderfa
Cuba?

Para una fina discusi6n concisa de este tema vea 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA

INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-67

(1995).

OF

PUBLIC
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ganancia ventajosa69 dentro del significado del Articulo 19, y el acto mismo
cabe ficilmente dentro del alcance ancho del Articulo 18.10
El articulo 20 trata violaciones territoriales. Esta secci6n tambi6n
refiere a violaciones territoriales no ocasionadas meramente por el uso de
fuerza, pero por otros medios de coacci6n." Bajo este idioma, usar
refugiados es una violaci6n como la de usar un ejdrcito. La secci6n no
limita la ilegalidad de violaciones territoriales meramente a esos decididos
en adquirir tierra, pero extiende tal condenaci6n a cualquier ventaja
especiallz ganada por la violaci6n territorial.
LSostendria alguien
seriamente que la alteraci6n de otra politica de inmigraci6n de estado (o
cualquier otra politica) no es una ventaja?
Por miedo de que nosotros pensemos que estos dos documentos
sean reliquias aisladas despuds de la guerra, y que la comunidad de
naciones ha sido menos concernida con la intervenci6n, d6jenos examinar
materiales mis recientes.
Catorce afios despuds de la firma de la Carta Constitucional de
OAS, el principio de no intervencionista fue reforzado por la declaraci6n
de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas de 1965 sobre la Intervenci6n
Inadmisible en los Asuntos Dom6sticos de Estados y la Protecci6n de su
Independencia y Soberania."
Esta declaraci6n reconoci6 que la
observancia completa del principio de no intervencionista en los asuntos
internos o externos de otros estados es esencial al cumplimiento de los
prop6sitos y los principios de las Naciones Unidas."' El documento
declar6 que:
ningfin Estado tiene el derecho de intervenir directamente
o indirectamente, por cualquier raz6n, en los asuntos
internos o externos de otro Estado. Por consiguiente,
intervenci6n armada y toda otra forma de interferencia o
amenazas atentadas contra la personalidad del Estado o
contra su elemento politico, econ6mico, y cultural, es
condenado."

69. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 19.
70. Id. at art 18.
71. Id. at art. 20.
72. Id.

73. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A.Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, Dec. 21,
1965 (de aqui adelante Declaration on the Inadmisibility of Intervention).
74. Id.

75. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
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Aprovechando el idioma casi iddntico a ia Carta Constitucional de OAS, 6
la declaraci6n prohibe intervenci6n directa o indirecta" para obtener
ventajas de cualquier tipo.8
Como un ejemplo mis reciente, la Corte Mundial cit6 el principio
de no intervencionista en su decisi6n en 1986 contra los Estados Unidos
por el minado de puertos Nicaragiienses.79 Citando el principio como un
elemento de la ley internacional de costumbre, la corte defini6 el principio
como se indica a continuaci6n:
Una intervenci6n prohibida debe sostener sobre materias
en que cada estado es permitido, por el principio de
soberania de Estado, para decidir libremente (por ejemplo
la elecci6n de un sistema poliftico, econ6mico, social y
cultural, y ]a f6rmulaci6n de la polftica extranjera). La
intervenci6n es injusta cuando usa, con respecto a las
elecciones, m~todos de compulsi6n .... 90
El principio de no intervencionista persiste en las normas de la ley
intemacional. Importa poco si el instrumento usado es una fuerza de
invasi6n, descendencia de folletos de aviones, o la inundaci6n de una
naci6n con refugiados, si tales medidas se usan en un intento de influir
otras polifticas nacionales, entonces tales medidas son condenadas por la
ley internacional. Ain el uso de refugiados como un instrumento de
influencia extranjera es apenas reprobable meramente a causa de la
alteraci6n de unas cuotas de inmigraci6n de la naci6n.
Lo qu6 es
verdaderamente desafortunado es el costo humano de tales. El segundo
segmento de la ley internacional violada cuando los estados usan
refugiados en esta manera, es la violaci6n de los derechos de los mismo
refugiados bajo diversos acuerdos de derechos humanos.
Una vez mis se comienza con la Carta Constitucional de las
Naciones Unidas.Y Uno de los prop6sitos de la Organizaci6n, comenzado
en el Articulo 1, la secci6n 3, es el promover y alentar respeto por
derechos humanos y para libertades fundamentales para todos sin la
distinci6n con respecto a la raza, sexo, idioma, o religi6n.82
76. O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 18-20.
77. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 73.
78. Id.

79. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Junio 27) (opini6n
separado del Juez Ago).
80. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de lngl(s).

81. U.N. CHARTER.
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. (traducido a espafiol)
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Este idioma se usa ain nuevamente en el Articulo 55, la Secci6n c,
de la Carta Constitucional. Esta secci6n declara que las Naciones Unidas
promocionarin . . . respeto universal para, y observancia de, derechos

humanos y libertades fundamentales para todos sin distinci6n con respecto
a la raza, sexo, idioma, o religi6n.1' Esta secci6n convierte el mero
prop6sito"' del Articulo 1 en un deber afirmativo por parte de la
Organizaci6n a promocionar 5 derechos humanos.
Aunque las anteriores declaraciones se escriban desde el punto de
vista de la Organizaci6n, los Miembro de los Estados individuales han
prendado, en el Articulo 56, a tomar acci6n conjunta y separada en
cooperaci6n con la Organizaci6n para el logro de los prop6sitos colocados
en el Articulo 55."
Estos pasajes establecen un deber por parte de Cuba de
promocionar derechos humanos. Ahora uno tiene que determinar cuales
son esos derechos. El punto de partida es la Declaraci6n Universal de
Derechos Humanos," conjuntamente con el Pacto Internacional sobre
Derechos Civiles y Politicos.u
Al tiempo de su adopci6n la Declaraci6n Universal era,
t6cnicamente, una declaraci6n de principios que no era obligatoria. Ain
pocos hoy considerarian una desviaci6n de los preceptos abogados en este
documento como cualquier cosa menos una violaci6n de la ley
internacional.
La Declaraci6n Universal se considera como la
interpretaci6n autoritaria de las clusulas de derechos humanos en la Carta
Constitucional de ONU;8 ' o como una codificaci6n que, mediante la
citaci6n uniforme, defensiva, y adherencia sobre los pasados cuarenta y
siete afilos, ha logrado la condici6n de la ley internacional de costumbre.'
Cuba no es un partido en el Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos
Civiles y Politicos (PIDCP).'
Asi, el PIDCP compromete a Cuba
solamente al alcance que sus provisiones han Ilegado a ser ley /de
83. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, para. (c)
(traducido a espafiol).
84. Id.
85. M.
86. U.N. Charter, art. 56 (traducido a espahiol).
87. UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/1810 (1948).
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adoptado Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6,para. 1 (effectivo Mar. 23, 1976) (de aquf en adelante ICCPR).
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
90.
Para una fina discusi6n concisa de este tema yea THOMAS BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29-33 (1988).
91. ICCPR, supra note 88.
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costumbre mediante la prictica de los estados." Ya que las provisiones en
este documento son un espejo, en gran medida, con esos en la Declaraci6n
Universal, los Articulos pertinentes del PIDCP se incluyen para referencia.
El derecho mis bisico demarcido en la Declaraci6n Universal y el
PIDCP es el derecho a la vida. El articulo 3 de la Declaraci6n Universal
declara que todos tienen el derecho a la vida, libertad, y la seguridad

personal. 9 El pacto es aun mis explicito, afirmando en el Artfculo 6,
secci6n 1, que [tiodo ser humano tiene el derecho inherente de la vida.
Este derecho seri protegido por la ley. A nadie se privarl arbitrariamente

de su vida."
,Puede uno argumentar seriamente que, en alentar a
refugiados tomar al mar en balsas precarias, Cuba demostr6 algfin inter6s
por la vida? Desde luego, es el despego depravado demostrado por Cuba
de esos perdidos en el mar que constituye la violaci6n mis seria de los
derechos humanos de los que huyen.
La siguiente provisi6n potencialmente aplicable al uso de
refugiados como instrumentos de la politica extranjera es el Artfculo 9 de
la Declaraci6n Universal. Este artfculo declara que nadie se someter! al
arresto arbitrario, detenci6n, o expatriaci6n."
Mientras detenciones y
arrestos arbitrarios son comunes en Cuba, y han contribuido
definitivamente al desarrollo de refugiados, es la cliusula final que nos
concieme aqui. Un individuo enfrentado con un conjunto de abusos de
derechos humanos, quien busca refugio en una naci6n a excepci6n de la
suya propia, es forzado fuera de la naci6n de origen tan seguramente como
si 61 fuera escoltado al muelle a punta de pistola. De hecho, uno podria
ver una naci6n despiadada en el futuro que hace exactamente eso,
marchando refugiados sobre la frontera a punta de pistola.9 Ya hemos
visto vislumbres de tal escenario en el acto de limpiezas 6tnicas que han
ocurrido en Bosnia, donde miles de refugiados Musulmanes han sido
forzado fuera del territorio retenido por los Serbios. Mientras estas
acciones no han sido tomadas al fin de influenciar la agenda interna de otra
naci6n, uno podria ver ftcilmente tal tActica, probada viable en el conflicto
actual, aplicada a tal prop6sito en el futuro.
Dos articulos adicionales en estos documentos conciernen la
libertad de movimiento y residencia en un estado, Articulo 13 de la

92. El ICCPR tienes mas de 114 estados que son signatorios, un buen caso se puede ser
sobre este siendo una Icy costumbre de naciones. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.

UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 3.
ICCPR, supra note 88 at art. 6.
Unversal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 9 (traducido a espafiol).
O.A.S. CHARTER art. 20.
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Declaraci6n Universal' y Articulo 12 del Pacto." El articulo 13 de
Declaraci6n Universal declara que todos tienen el derecho a la libertad de
movimiento y residencia dentro de las fronteras de cada estado," y que
todos tienen el derecho para salir de cualquier pais, incluyendo su propio
pafs, y volver a ese pals.'0
El articulo 12 de la Convenci6n investiga los mismos derechos.
La secci6n I provee los derechos de libertad de movimiento y libertad para
uno escoger su residencia.
La secci6n 4 declara que nadie seri
arbitrariamente privado del derecho de entrar en su propio pals.'°'
Estos derechos han sido violados por Cuba. El gobierno represivo
que comete abusos diarios de derechos humanos causa que refugiados
salgan de sus hogares o sufran opresi6n. Dada la oportunidad de vivir en
una Cuba que no reprime libertades individuales, la mayoria de los
refugiados Cubanos lo harian. An esta elecci6n se les niega. Ellos no
pueden vivir en paz donde ellos escojan: dinicamente pueden irse tomando
medidas riesgosas de su vida, y una vez que ellos han partido a ellos se le
niegan la capacidad para visitar su tierra natal, ni tampoco poder
establecerse nuevamente.
La Declaraci6n Universal declara, en el Articulo 15, que todos
tienen el derecho a una nacionalidad,'" y que nadie se privarl
0
arbitrariamente de su nacionalidad.
El uso de refugiados, incluyendo ]a creaci6n intencional de
condiciones que generan refugiados y la capitalizaci6n subsiguiente de tal
recurso, causa que esos usados en tal manera pierdan su nacionalidad. En
ser forzados a buscar refugio en una tierra extranjera, los individuos se
privan de su ciudadania, su patrimonio, y en algunos casos su identidad
6tnica-cultural. Vivir en Miami en la Pequefia Habana puede imitar
aspectos de cultura Cubana, pero no es Cuba.
Ademis de violar las normas de los derechos humanos de las
Naciones Unidas, Cuba ha violado las provisiones de derechos humanos en
los instrumentos regionales primarios.
Estos incluyen la Carta
Constitucional de la Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos,' °' la

97. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.

98. ICCPR., supra note 88, at art. 12. Vea Mbitiru, infra note 127.
99. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.
100. Id.

101. ICCPR, supra note 88, at art. 12, para. 1, 4.
102. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 15, §§ 1. 2.

103. Id.
104. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
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Declaraci6n Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre,10° y la
Convenci6n sobre Derechos Humanos.'1' Cuba es un partido de ]a Carta
Constitucional de OAS y del Protocolo de 1967' 07 que enmend6 ia Carta
Constitucional. La Carta Constitucional misma incluye dos provisiones
distintas de derechos humanos. En el Articulo 3, secci6n K, los Estados
proclama los derechos fundamentales del individuo sin distinci6n con
respecto a la raza, nacionalidad, credo, o sexo.w La segunda provisi6n es
el Artfculo 16, que le garantiza a cada estado el derecho de desarrollar su
vida cultural, poliftica, y econ6mica, libre, y natural,109 siempre y cuando
en este desarrollo, el Estado respetarA los derechos del individuo y los
principios de la moralidad universal.1 °
Estas clusulas establecen el requerimiento normativo que
Miembros de los Estados respeten los derechos humanos, adn un contenido
definido debe darse a los derechos del individuo que deben ser protegidos.
A fin de definir estos derechos, uno puede mirar a las dos fuentes
primarias de la ley de derechos humanos: la Declaraci6n Americana sobre
los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre,"' y la Convenci6n sobre Derechos
Humanos."'
La Declaraci6n se adopt6 originalmente como una declaraci6n de
principios sin ser obligatoria.1" Ain, como con la Declaraci6n Universal
en el sistema de ONU, la citaci6n constante del documento lo ha
transformado en la interpretaci6n autoritaria de las provisiones de derechos
humanos en la Carta Constitucional de OAS.', Este argumento es aun mis
firme que su paralelo de sistema de ONU, porque la Declaraci6n es el
c6digo legal que la Comisi6n Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos
105. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX, Final Act of
the Ninth International Conference of American States, art. 23 (1948), reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 18 OEA/Ser. L.V./ I. 82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992) (de aqui adelante
American Declaration).
106. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, para. 1, abierto para signatura Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (effectivo Julio 18, 1978).
107. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States
("Protocol of Buenos Aires"), abierto para signatura Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (effectivo
Feb. 27, 1970) (de aqui adelante Protocal).
108. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 3, para. (k).

109.
110.
11.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at art. 16.
Id.
American Declaration, supra note 105.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106.
Id.
Id.
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aplica para determinar si los Miembros Estados han violado la Carta
5
Constitucional de OAS."
La Comisi6n es un Organo de la Carta Constitutional, ' 6 un brazo
del sistema de OAS, hecho asi por el Protocolo de Buenos Aires"' que
enmend6 la Carta Constitucional en 1967. La ley que gobierna las
operaciones de la Comisi6n define derechos humanos, en el Articulo 1,
Secci6n 2, como se indica a continuaci6n: a) Los derechos colocados en la
Convenci6n sobre Derechos Humanos, en relaci6n a los Estados Partidos
b) Los derechos colocados en la Declaraci6n Americana de los derechos y
Deberes del Hombre, en relaci6n a los otros Miembros de los Estados. 189
La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos reconoci6 la
condici6n normativa de la Declaraci6n cuando declar6 que para los
Miembros Estados de la Organizaci6n, la Declaraci6n es el texto que
define los derechos humanos referidos en ia Carta Constitucional . . . la
Declaraci6n es para esos Estados una fuente de obligaciones
internacionales relativas a la Carta Constitucional de la Organizaci6n.'"
En la misma opini6n, la Corte encontr6 el cardcter normativo de la
Declaraci6n apoyado por la prictica de los Miembros Estados de la
Organizaci6n.120

Cuba no es parte de la Convenci6n Americana sobre Derechos
Humanos. Sus provisiones comprometen a Cuba dnicamente al alcance
que lo han hecho, mediante la prictica de una mayoria extensa de los
estados en la regi6n, llegado a ser la ley internacional de costumbre.
Como las provisiones de la convenci6n que nos conciernen en este ejemplo
reflejan las provisiones similares en la Declaraci6n Americana' 2' que, como
nosotros demostramos anteriormente, comprometen a Cuba, la incluiremos
de referencia. Los derechos proclamados en el sistema igualan esos
derechos garantizados en el Sistema de ONU.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Protocol, supra note 107.
118. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 1. sec. 2 (nota editorial' traducido de Ingles).
119. Advisory Opinion No. OC-10/89, Interpretation of American Declaration of Rights
and Duties of Man Within Framework of Article 64 of American Convention on Human Rights,
1989 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser.A) No. 10, reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 379 (nota editorial: traducido de
lngl6s).
120. Id. at an. 1; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 4, para.
1.
121. American Declaration, supra note 105.
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Ambos

Artfculo 1 de la Declaraci6n Americana y Articulo 4, de la secci6n 1, de

la Convenci6n exponen este principio fundamental."1
Ambos documentos investigan el derecho de un individuo para
fijar su residencia, el derecho de mover sobre un Estado libremente, y el
derecho de no ser forzado a marcharse del Estado (Declaraci6n, Arte.
VIII, Convenci6n, Arte. 22, para. 1).111 La Convenci6n agrega una
clusula adicional al derecho posterior, que garantiza que "nadie puede ser
expulsado del territorio de un Estado del cual es un nacional o privado del
derecho de entrar en el.",
Ambas la Declaraci6n y la Convenci6n otorgan el derecho a una
2
nacionalidad, en los Articulos XIX y 20, respectivamente. '
Todo los derechos anteriores han sido violados por Cuba en el uso
de refugiados en la misma manera como Cuba violo las provisiones
correspondientes en la Declaraci6n Universal y el PIDCP.
Las listas anteriores de derechos son meramente esas implicadas
por el uso politico de refugiados como instrumentos de ]a polftica
extranjera. En casos individuales, tal como el hundimiento del remolcador
el '13 de Marzo,' mds claras y directas violaciones ocurren. Desde luego,
mientras el alcance de revisi6n aquf debe limitarse a esos derechos
directamente violados por el uso politico de refugiados, el catilogo de
violaciones responsables por crear un grupo suficientemente grande de
refugiados para tener un impacto sobre otras pol*iticas de Estado
inherentemente seria mucho mayor que esas violaciones implicadas por el
proceso mismo. '

VI. PREOCUPACION DE SEGURIDAD
La naci6n que es inundada por refugiados tiene que tratar con las
ramificaciones econ6micas y polfticas de su presencia.
Estas son
obviamente bastantes formidables, y una fuente importante de ventaja para
el estado que usa refugiados como un instrumento del politica extranjera.

1.

122. ld. at art. 4, para. 1.
123. d. at art. 8, American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 22, para.

124. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art, 22, para. 5.
125. American Declaration, supra note 105, at art. XIX; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra nota, at art. 20.
126. Para ejemplos de tales violaciones, yea Cuba's Human Rights Abuses Under the U.N.
Spotlight, U.S. DEPT. ST. DISPATCH 54 (1989); Human Rights Situation in Cuba, U.S. DEPT.
ST. DISPATCH 41 (1989), y diversas Amnesty International, America's Watch, y Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Country reportes de Cuba.
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Afin mas, posiblemente algiin descuid6 del estado receptor involucra la
posibilidad de agentes extranjeros entrando en sus fronteras entre una
poblaci6n de refugiados que no es controlada, o posando como refugiados
ellos mismos.
Pidale a cualquier funcionario del Servicio de Inmigraci6n y
Naturalizaci6n (INS) quien ha tratado con el procesamiento de grupos
grandes de refugiados y el o ella admitiri al ipice de turbaci6n en el
proceso. Los documentos de identidad son frecuentemente inexistentes, y
ia historia pasada de muchos refugiados no puede verificarse con
seguridad. Esta es la situaci6n perfecta para operativos de inteligencia
humana en una naci6n. Igual, uno podria plantar refugiados cuyo 6nico
prop6sito seria para despertar el enfado de la plebe local a fin de crear
mayor presi6n poiftica para terminar una crisis de refugiados. Tal acci6n
podria darle al gobierno, quien debe tratar con este incentivo, mayor
presi6n para capitular a la naci6n que puede aliviar tales problemas por
detener la corriente de refugiados.
Los agentes podrian levantar el nivel de presi6n cometiendo
hechos criminales. Como uno puede ver del grito en los Estados Unidos
sobre el crimen clasificado entre algunos de la poblaci6n de Marielitos, los
hechos criminales por refugiados crean un inter6s importante en la naci6n
que los alberga. Uno podria postular una naci6n que trate con tales
actores criminales por devolver los criminales a su pals de origen. Los
criminales, en realidad los agentes, se acogerian a sus hogares a unas
vacaciones en vez de una sentencia de circel.
Los agentes instalados en una naci6n mediante infiltraci6n de
refugiados, tambidn podrian reunir informaci6n valiosa sobre la poblaci6n
expatriada que frecuentemente contiene elementos que trabajan para el fin
del regimen totalitario. En una sociedad multicultural, los agentes
perturbadores podrian remover tensiones raciales o dtnicas. El uso de la
politica de refugiados le ofrece a las naciones totalitarias muchas
oportunidades de sembrar desacuerdo en paises vecinos mucho mis all, de
ia tensi6n inherente ocasionadas por los refugiados reales.
VII. LA CONCLUSION
Imaginese un escenario en que el gobierno totalitario de Corea del
Norte anuncia, con grande fanfarria y mucha ovaci6n, que desmantelara
sus fortificaciones a lo largo de la Zona Desmilitarizada y retirara sus
tropas estacionadas alli. Corea del Sur y los Estados Unidos, aunque
sospechosos, hacen lo mismo. Se proclama una gran victoria para la paz,
aunque la frontera siga protegida todavia y el movimiento libre entre las
dos naciones no existe.
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Corea del Norte entonces comienza las charlas del desarrollo y
comercio con su vecino del sur, mientras manteniendo control estricto de
su poblaci6n interna. En algiin tiempo se alcanza un atolladero, bien sea
sobre el acceso a la tecnologia nuclear o sobre la asistencia del desarrollo.
El Norte expresa su desilusi6n y abre sus fronteras. Un nuimero grande de
refugiados se derrama en Corea del Sur, ocasionando dificultades inmensas
polfticas y econ6micas.
Corea del Sur rpidamente capitula, y los
resguardos fronterizos Coreanos del Norte vuelven a sus estaciones.
ZSuena tal escenario lejos de realidad? Reconozca, tales medidas
coercitivas inicamente son efectivas si unos refugiados acumulados con
grandes potenciales suficientes estuvieran presente en un Estado, entonces
tales t6cnicas tinicamente serfan efectivas contra naciones que los
refugiados podrfan alcanzar. El uso de refugiados como un instrumento de
la politica extranjera por Irak podria tener un impacto considerable sobre
Kuwait, Jordania, o Turquia, pero podrfa apenas obligar a los Estados
Unidos en concesiones.
Tales escenarios son horribles. An parses como Cuba, Corea del
Norte, Irak, o Myanmar (Birmania), mandado por los intereses personal de
regfmenes totalitarios, podrfan recurrir a tales medidas para lograr
alteraciones polfticas especfficas de los estados vecinos.
Esto es
especialmente cierto cuando los estados vecinos son ricos y/o
democrticos. En tales estados es donde la tfctica de refugiados tendrfa un
impacto mas grande.
Es inverosfmil que inundando un r~gimen adyacente totalitario
tendrfa el efecto deseado. Primero, la probabilidad de una respuesta
armada es mucho mayor en tales naciones forajida que de estados
democriticos, en cual polftico a tal respuesta generarian discusi6n interna.
Segundo, es bastante posible que una naci6n vecina totalitaria podrfa
meramente rodear refugiados y marcharlos a trav6s de la frontera a punta
de pistola.'" Tercero, siempre hay la posibilidad que tal estado use sus
propio refugiados en la misma manera para lograr sus objetivos polfticos
extranjeros.
LNecesita el mundo realmente ver tal tdctica llegar a ser una
realidad repetida antes de tomar acci6n? Claro que no. Hay varias
medidas que las Naciones Unidas, o los cuerpos regionales apropiados,
podrian tomar a fin de impedir el uso futuro de refugiados como
instrumentos de la polftica extranjera.

127. En Agosto, 1995, expulsi6n/repatriaci6n de miles de refugiados Ruandeses por el
gobierno de Zaire, efectuada por el militar de Zaire, permanece como un ejemplo que tales
acciones ocurren. Vea Chege Mbitiru, Zaire Expels Rwanda Refugees, TACOMA MORNING NEWS
TRIB., August 23, 1995, at A18.
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El primer paso podria ser una Asamblea General de. ONU (o
asamblea regional) que declara tales acciones ilegales.. La condenaci6n
pfiblica de esta clase no es legalmente comprometedora, pero puede
todavia ser efectiva. Tal declaraci6n deberia ser fuertemente redactada y
fomentada por Miembros Estados .aconsiderar-el uso de un Estado de
politica de refugiado cuando colocan, sus agendas propias de .asistencia
extranjera.
Una medida mis concreta, pero an mds dificil, seria la
negociaci6n y la adopci6n de una Convenci6n separada tendiente a
eliminar el uso de refugiados como instrumentos de la politica extranjera.
La dificultad con este curso de acci6n es que es altamente inverosfmil que
un estado problemitico llegara a ser parte de tal tratado, y que escapara asi
a cualquier mecanismos de aplicaci6n que tal tratado podria contener. El
aspecto positivo de tal tratado es que comenzaria el proceso de
condenaci6n requerido a prescribir el uso politico de refugiados bajo la ley
internacional de costumbre.
Una propuesta mis discutible seria que el uso de refugiados fuera
incluido en la Definici6n de Agresi6n expuesta por la Asamblea General
de ONU.'1 Incluyendo el uso de refugiados en la definici6n de agresi6n
fisica, un derecho de defensa propia bajo el Articulo 51 de la Carta
Constitucional de ONU, adjudicaria en el Estado invadido.129 Esto haria la
amenaza de retribuci6n militar por tales estados legales y viables. La
capacidad para responder usando fuerza militar podrfa disuadir el uso
activo de refugiados en primer lugar, aunque hay que reconocer que la
prictica de tal respuesta militar seria horrorosa.
Sobre lo mismo, si el Consejo de Seguridad de ONU autorizara la
intervenci6n global o sancione para impedir un r6gimen totalitario usar
refugiados como instrumentos de la politica extranjera, quizds ese ejemplo
podrfa desalentar una tictica similar por otros gobiernos. Esto es
altamente inverosimil que ocurra, dada la naturaleza politica del cuerpo de
seguridad de ONU, a menos que la naturaleza humanitaria de la crisis
fuera de proporciones extremas, o a menos que los intereses nacionales de
los Miembros Estados en el Consejo de Seguridad fuera amenazado de
algtin modo.
Finalmente, quizis la soluci6n con la mds grande oportunidad a
6xito de largo plazo, y la aplicaci6n menos destructiva, es simplemente
continuar promocionando la democracia y los derechos humanos sobre una
128. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710
(1974).
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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escala a travds del mundo, para que las naciones forajidas con poblaciones
grandes con potenciales de refugiados cesen de existir. Esto puede parecer
simple, obvio, e inverosfmil de mostrar resultados inmediatos. Pero qdien
hubiese pensado, en los afios 80, que una d~cada luego muchos regfmenes
totalitarios en la Europa Oriental, America Latina, y Sur Africa se
desmoronarian, y que millones de gente comenzarian a disfrutar libertad y
democracia.

SEGURO DE CREDITO PARA LAS EXPORTACIONES
Y EL ACUREDO GENERAL SOBRE ARANCELES Y
COMERCIO
Rafael E. Cafas"
Eric Scharf 7"
A partir de la finalizaci6n de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se han
incrementado los esfuerzos para limitar la aplicaci6n de barreras que
afectan: el comercio internacional, perjudican la competencia entre paises
y impiden la globolizaci6n de un sistema de mercado libre. En virtud de
to anterior, se ha procurado que los subsidios de credito a las
exportaciones no constituyan un elemento de competencia en las
transacciones internacionales.
Uno de los instrumentos internacionales jurfdicos mis importantes,
que persigue y regula la eliminaci6n de los subsidios de cr~dito a las
exportaciones, es el denominado Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y
Comercio.' Como se indicari mfis adelante, el seguro de cr~dito para las
exportaciones podrfa estar considerado como un subsidio de crddito para
las exportaciones las cuales serin prohibidas por el GATT.
En vista de que Costa Rica es uno de los parses suscriptores del
GATT, y dado que tal convenio internacional es parte del ordenamiento
jurfdico de nuestro pals,2 es necesario estudiar las regulaciones que dicho
instrumento establece en relaci6n con el seguro de cr6dito a las

Universidad de Costa Rica (Licenciado Notario Publico, Honors, 1994). Grado de
Examinador de Jurado, Universidad Autonomo de America Central, 1994. Miembro: de la
Asociaci6n de Abogacla Costarricense; Phillip C. Jessup Asociaci6n de la Ley Internacional
Costarricense.
Universidad de Costa Rica (Licenciado y Notario Publico, Honores, 1994). Profesor de

Ley Romana, Universidad de Costa Rica Escuela de Ley, 1995. Miembro: de la Asociaci6n de
Abogacla Costarricense; Philip C. Jessup Asociaci6n de Ley Internacional Costarricense.
1. General Agreement on Tariff & Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATI].
2. Los tratados pdblicos, los convenios y los concordados internacionales, debidamente
aprobados por la Asamblea Legislativa, tendrIn, desde su promulgaci6n o desde el dfa que ellos
designen, autoridad superior a las leyes. LA CONSTITUC1N POLfTICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 7.
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exportaciones.- Asi, debemos analizar primero los tipos de financiamiento
para las exportaciones que generalmente son utilizadas, entonces analizar
las razones por cual algunos de esos sistemas son considerados como
subsidios y, por tiltimo, determinar si el seguro de crddito para las
exportaciones est, prohibido por GATT.
En primer lugar, debemos indicar que la liberalizaci6n de los
mercados en los - ltimos afios ha generado que las transacciones
internacionales adquieran mayor relevancia e importancia, no s6lo para los
exportadores que las Ilevan a cabo sino tambi6n para los paises en los
cuales se realizan tales exportaciones. En conformidad, los gobiernos han
incrementado la aplicaci6n de politicas tendientes a dar incentivos para el
aumento de exportaciones, una de estas sistemas es el de financiamiento
para exportaciones.
Entre las formas ms importantes del sistema de financiamiento
para las exportaciones, 3podemos citar las siguientes:
1) Concesiones de creditos para las exportaciones. Estos crdditos son
constituidos por prdstamos conferidos por el gobierno, o por bancos
privados, en favor de exportadores nacionales o importadores extranjeros.
Los cr~ditos permiten al comprador final diferir el pago del precio de los
bienes o productos importados. 4
2) La posibilidadde contratar seguros de crdito para las exportaciones.
Extendidos normalmente por agencias aseguradoras gubernamentales con
el fin de trasladar compaftfas la asunci6n de riesgos que podrian ser
provocados por los incumplimientos de pago o los costos de las
operaciones.
3) Asistencia gubernamental en general. Esta forma de financiamiento
tiende a facilitar a los exportadores en el desarrollo de sus operaciones y,
consecuentemente, a dar incentivo para el incremento de 6stas.
A pesar de la gran importancia que representan estos sistemas de
financiamiento para las exportaciones, tales mecanismos no deben
convertirse en elementos claves para el desarrollo de la competencia en el
mercado internacional. En otras palabras, el efecto del financiamiento de
los cr6ditos para las exportaciones debe ser neutral, y tal mecanismo no
deberia determinar la conclusi6n de una venta o compra internacional.,
3.
Vea Filip Abraham, The Effects. of Intra-Coamunity Comnpetition of Export you
Subsidize to Third Countries: The Case of Export Credits, Export Insurance and Official

Development Assistance, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Lux. 1
(1990).
4. Vea Andrew M. Moravacsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit
Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173, 176 n. 1 (1989).

5. "El efecto del financiamiento de los cr6ditos para las exportaciones debe set neutral y tal
financiamiento no debe ser usado para incitar ]a conclusi6n de venta." Orit Frenkel & Claude G.
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En el caso contrario, el financiamiento de las exportaciones se
pudiera usar como un subsidio para las exportaciones, tal subido afectarfa
enormemente la competencia entre paises e impedirfa el funcionamiento de
un sistema de mercado libre. De hecho, a la medida en que los gobiemos
han incrementado su apoyo al financiamiento de los cr~ditos y seguros
para las exportaciones, se ha intensificado la competencia entre los paises
para ofrecerle a los compradores los incentivos mAs atractivos al menor
costo posible. 6
Como ejemplos de sistemas de financiamiento que podrian
considerarse subsidios, podemos citar las siguientes situaciones: en casos
donde se confieran cr~ditos a tasas de interds mucho ms bajas a que las
establecidas en el mercado dom~stico, o en casos donde se contraten
seguros de cr~dito para las exportaciones con primas manifiestamente
inadecuadas para cubrir las p~rdidas. causadas por el no pago de cr6ditos
conferidos a los importadores.
GATT, al igual que otros instrumentos internacionales, ha
regulado la utilizaci6n de los subsidios para las exportaciones con el fin de
evitar la situaci6n indicada. .Originalmente, el, articulo XVI del GATT,
obligaba a los parses signatorios a reportar todos sus subsidios conferidos
que hicieran aumentar las exportaciones o disminuir las importaciones.7
Posteriormente, durante las sesiones celebradas en 1954 y 1955, el
indicado articulo XVI fue reformado con las siguientes dos prohibiciones:8
1) Se prohibi6 la utilizaci6n de subsidios a las exportaciones de productos
primarios que distorsionen considerablemente la comercializaci6n
intemacional de esos productos a los paises signatorios, y
2) Tambi~n se prohibi6 la utilizaci6n de los subsidios a las exportaciones
de productos no primarios le hubiese permitido a exportar el bien a un
precio menor al establecido en el pais del exportador.
En resultado, en los 1960s una comisi6n especial present6 un
reporte mediante el cual se enumeraban las prcticas que, bajo del articulo
XVI, deberian considerarse como subsidios. En abril de 1979 se aprob6 el
denominado C6digo de Subsidios [de aqui en adelante, el C6digo], que
consiste de un acuerdo en la interpretaci6n y aplicaci6n del articulo XVI

B. Fontheim, Export Credits: An Internationaland Legal Domestic Analysis, 13 LAW & POL'Y

INT'L BUS. 1069, 1085 (1981) (nota editorial: traducido de Ingl6s).
6. "En ia medida en que los gobiernos han incrementado su apoyo al financiamiento de los
cr~ditos y seguros par las exportaciones, se ha intensificado la competencia entre los palses para
ofrecerle a los compradores los incentivos mas atractivos al menor costo posible." Id. at 1070.
7. GATr, supra note 1, at art. XVI.
8.

Id.
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del GATT y otras provisiones. 9 El C6digo prohibi6 la provisi6n de los
gobiernos, o instituciones especiales controladas por el Estado de seguros
y garantias de cr6dito para las exportaciones que protegen contra el
aumento en los costos de los productos de exportaci6n o de los riesgos de
cambio (en efecto eliminando estos subsidios).' 0
El seguro de cr6dito para las exportaciones estA mencionado
expresamente como uno de los subsidios prohibido por el C6digo de
Subsidios interpretativo del GATT. Sin embargo;. la redacci6n del C6digo
en cuesti6n no es la m~is apropiada, por lo que algunos escolares han
interpretado la prohibici6n en estudio obteniendo las siguientes
conclusiones:
1) El articulo s6lo prohibe el seguro contra riesgos de cambio ode
aumento en los precios de los productos exportados. Se podria interpretar
que tal prohibici6n no es aplicable a otros tipos de riesgos.
2) S61o se prohiben los programas de seguros de cr6ditos para las
exportaciones en efecto eliminando estos subsidios. Primero que todo, no
queda clara la distinci6n entre el largo y el corto plazo. Aparte de esto,
basado en lo anterior, podemos interpretar lo siguiente:
I
a) Es posible asegurar todo tipos de exportaciones si la tarifa de la
prima esti bien calculada y es equivalente a los costos y las pdrdidas
eventuales que pudieran causarse con el incumplimiento del pago de la
operaci6n.
b) No son asegurables las operaciones a largo plazo cuya prima es
inadecuada para cubrir sus costos y p6rdidas eventuales. Sin embargo, si
seria posible asegurar operaciones a corto plazo cuyas primas retinen esas
caracteristicas.
3) Por filtimo, en la prohibici6n tinicamente se incluyen programas y
seguros de cr6dito para las exportaciones que sean conferidos por el
gobierno del pais del exportador o por instituciones controladas por el
gobierno. Podemos interpretar que no se prohibe ningfin tipo de seguro
que sea contratado con compafifas de seguro privadas.
En conclusi6n y analizando el caso de Costa Rica, GATT, del cual
es miembro de nuestro pais, y el respectivo C6digo de Subsidios, prohiben
expresamente la ejecuci6n de los seguros de cr ditos para las
exportaciones. Sin embargo, tal prohibici6n no es aplicable al seguro de
9. Id.
10. Las provisiones por los gobiernos (instituciones especiales controladas por elgobierno)
de seguros y garantias de cr&lito para las exportaciones contra aumentos en los costos de los
productos de exportaci6n, o de los riesgos de cambio, cuales son inadecuados para cubrir los
costos de trminos largos y perdidas de programnas. Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979,
GATT supra note 1, at arts. VI, XVI, XXIII.
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cr6dito para las exportaciones que ofrece el Instituto Nacional de Seguros
por las siguientes razones:
1) Los tipos de riesgos que actualmente son amparados por el seguro de
credito para las exportaciones ofrecido en Costa Rica no se encuentran
incluidos dentro de la prohibici6n del C6digo de Subsidios.
2) En segundo lugar, tal prohibici6n tampoco serfa aplicable al caso del
Pues, segfin lo que indicaron los
Instituto Nacional de Seguros.
funcionarios y los ex-funcionarios de la instituci6n, el clculo de las
primas se Ileva a cabo a travs de un procedimiento muy complejo que
asegura la proporcionalidad y correspondencia entre la cantidad de la
prima y los dailos y p6rdidas eventuales que pudiera sufrir el exportador
en caso de incumplimiento por parte del importador.
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I. INTRODUCCION
En una economia global, todos los paises cambien productos y
servicios entre si. El comercio Internacional es esencial para lograr una
economia global. Mientras que el mundo se mueve para hacer una
economia global, la necesidad de un comercio internacional de
mercaderias y servicios aumenta. Habian numerosos acuerdos entre paises
para facilitar el comercio intemacional, pero El Tratado de Libre

B.S., cum laude, Financia, Economfa, Justicia Delictiva, 1994, Universidad de la Florida;
candidato para Juris Doctorate, 1997, Nova Southeastern Universidad Shepard Broad Law
Center. Este papel gan6 2nd lugar en 1996 en ]a competici6n de Escribiendo Para la Realidad
patrocinado por la secci6n de leyes Internacional de la Bar de la Florida.
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Comercio' (NAFTA) firmado por el Canad,, Mdxico, y los Estados
Unidos, es el acuerdo comercial mis reciente. Fue firmado por cada
partido con la intenci6n de incrementar el comercio mediante la
eliminaci6n de la aplicaci6n de las barreras de tipo arancelario como no
arancelario.

Este documento estA disefiado para servir de gufa a abogados
practicantes en las leyes de comercio internacional. El papel se divide en
diez secciones. La primera secci6n es la introducci6n al documento. La
segunda abarca la historia de la adopci6n del NAFTA. La tercera secci6n
plantea los objetivos del NAFTA. Despuds de haber explicado los
objetivos generales del NAFTA, la cuarta trata con los requisitos para ser
un consultante legal extranjero en un Partido NAFTA. La quinta
desarrolla los procedimientos de resoluci6n de disputa sobre la provisiones
de NAFTA si hay un desacuerdo entre los gobiernos del los Partidos. La
sexta explora arbitraje y iitigaci6n en Mdxico. La s~ptima explica lo que
es el Tribunal Canadiense de Comercio Internacional (CITT). La octava
abarca la posibilidad que Chile llegue a ser el pr6ximo pais
latinoamericano en tener un acuerdo libre de comercio con los Estados
Unidos. La novena trata de los beneficios econ6micos que NAFTA
produce para cada Partido. La d~cima es la conclusi6n.
II. LA HISTORIA DE LA ADOPCION DEL NAFTA
El concepto para el Tratado de Libre Comercio comenz6 con el
acuerdo comercial entre los Estados Unidos y Canadai. En 1986, Canadd,
el socio ms grande de comercio de los Estados Unidos en ese tiempo,
pidi6 que los Estados Unidos negociara un acuerdo de libre comercio.,
Los Estados Unidos y el Canadd crearon el Acuerdo de libre comercio
entre los Estados Unidos y el Canadl (CUFTA) en 1988.. CUFTA se
disefi6 para promover el comercio entre el Canadd y los Estados Unidos.
En 1988, Mexico creci6 econ6micamente y lleg6 a ser el tercer
comerciante mis grande en intercambio con los Estados Unidos.' Mxico
tambidn quiso tener un acuerdo comercial con los Estados Unidos.6
I. North American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 12, 1992, pmbl., 32 i.L.M. 297, Hein's No.
KAV 3417 at 297 [mis adelante NAFTA].
2. Ellen G. Yost, The United States Perspective On Negotiations For A North American
Free Trade Agreement, 5 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 67 (1992).

3. Id.
4. BARRY APPELTON, NAVIGATING NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 (1994).

5. Yost, supra note 2, at 67.
6. Id.

A
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El Canada, M6xico, y los Estados Unidos tenian incentivos
econ6micos para adoptar un acuerdo comercial trilateral. La meta ms
importante de cada pais era aumentar el comercio.' Los Estados Unidos
consider6 que la eliminaci6n de barreras, tanto de tipo arancelario como
no arancelario entre los Estados Unidos y M6xico, crearian nuevas
oportunidades de inversi6n y comercio.' Los Estados Unidos tambi6n
queria aumentar las exportaciones al Canada y a Mkxico. 9 El Canada
querfa procurar acceso para sus propias mercaderas, servicios, y capital
en M~xico.' 0 Mexico quiera un acuerdo con los Estados Unidos que
tuviera nuevas oportunidades para su creciente mercado."
La d~cada de los 80s fueron marcados por la creaci6n de bloques
regionales comerciales.
Esto ocurri6 porque los bloques regionales
comerciales permitian que los paises llegaran a ser menos dependientes del
comercio internacional. Los bloques comerciales son eficientes en costos
y beneficiosos a los paises que son miembros del bloque.' 2 Por ejemplo,
los precios de las importaciones y las exportaciones pueden reducirse
porque los costos navieros entre paises limitrofes son mis inferiores que
los costos navieros entre parses distantes. Debido a estos precios mds
bajos, los individuos paises dentro de un bloque regional comercial pueden
beneficiarse por la disminuci6n del costo de consumo.
Estos bloques comerciales posan amenazas serias a los paises que
no son miembros. Los miembros tienen un incentivo para proveer
tratamiento favorable a los productos y servicios del uno al otro y
fortalecerse como un bloque de comercio.
Los paises que no son
miembros sufren una desventaja por el aumento a las barreras tanto de tipo
arancelario como no arancelario. Las exportaciones de los paises no
miembros a bloques regionales comerciales disminuyen a causa de sus
precios mis altos que son ocasionados por las barreras comerciales.
El comercio entre las naciones Europeas lleg6 a ser mis unido en
la d~cada de los 80s.'3 La fuerza de la Uni6n Europea (F-U) posa
amenazas serias a la futura posici6n que tomara los Estados Unidos en el

7. Id.

8. Id.
at 68.
9. Id.
at 67.
10. RONALD J. WONNACOTr, Canada's Role in NAFTA: To What Degree Has It Been
Defensive, MEXICO AND NAFTA: WHO WILL BENEFIT 163, 165 (1995).
11. RONALD H. BROWN, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., U.S. GLOBAL TRADE OUTLOOK 1995-2000:
TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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mercado mundial." Los. tres paises norteamericanos querian un acuerdo
trilateral a causa del mercado tinico en la Comunidad Europea." Varios de
los miembros principales de la EU son el: Reino Unido, Alemania,
Francia, Italia, Espafia, Austria, Finlandia, y Suecia.6 Los paises
norteamericanos querian fortalecer sus economias para competir con la
EU, que es el bloque de comercio ms grande del mundo." NAFTA se
concibi6 parcialmente para proveer una vlvula de seguridad para el
comercio norteamericano en caso de que !a Comunidad Europea
comenzara a excluir paises no miembros de ia uni6n.'"
El Canadd, M6xico, y los Estados Unidos, concluyeron que un
acuerdo de libre comercio regional mantendria la posici6n econ6mica de
cada pais en el mercado mundiai."9 Las Naciones tambi6n toman parte en
acuerdos comerciales ,libres por otras razones. 21 Primeramente, un pais
candidato puede escoger un .arreglo de comercio libre a fin de mantener
acceso al presunto mercado de su socio.2' Segundo, un acuerdo de libre
comercio puede mejorar las relaciones bilaterales de inversi6n y
comercio.2 Finalmente, las naciones que rebajan las barreras comerciales
pueden promocionar el comercio diverso, e igualar su balance comercial
bilateral .21
Desde 1980, los Estados Unidos ha sufrido una transici6n en sus
exportaciones.2 A causa del gran crecimiento econ6mico en Asia y
M6xico, y el crecimiento moderado en Europa, los Estados Unidos ha
aumentado sus exportaciones a Asia y M(xico.Y Los Estados Unidos se
alej6 de los mercados europeos tradicionales y se movi6 hacia los
mercados asiiticos y mexicanos. Esto ocurri6 porque el mercado para
productos estadounidenses en Mdxico y Asia se ha expandido y a su vez se
14. BROWN, supra note 11, at 32.

15. GABRIEL SZEKELY, The Consequences of NAFTA for European and Japanese Trade and
Investment, MEXICO AND NAFTA: WHO WILL BENEFIT 149 (1994).
16. BROWN, supra note 11, at 30-31.

17. Id. at32.
18. SZEKELY, supra note 15, at 149.
19. BRENDA M. MCPHAIL, NAFTA Now! THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NORTH AMERICA vii (1995).
20. KENT S. FOSTER & DEAN C. ALEXANDER, PROSPECTS OF A U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 32 (1994).
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 33.
24. BROWN, supra note 11. at 23.
25. Id. at 24.
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ha aumentado la inversi6n extranjera en M6xico produciendo rtpido
aumento de: comercio, capital, y mercaderias intermedias.26 NAFTA se
utiliz6 como una herramienta para lograr la transici6n de los Estados
Unidos a los mercados europeos y mexicanos.
III. LOS OBJETIVOS DEL NAFTA
La meta de NAITA es establecer un firea 'de libre comercio.Y El
articulo 101 de NAFTA establece el area de libre eomercio de acuerdo con
el Artfculo XXIV del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y Comercio
(GATT).8 En el Artfculo 103(1) de NAFTA, los Partidos afirman sus
obligaciones y derechos existentes del GATT y bajo de cualquier otro
29
acuerdo del que los tales partidos sean miembros.
El acuerdo de GATT se firm6 en 1947 por veinticuatro naciones. 0
El objetivo de GATT es levantar el nivel de viviendo, asegurar empleo
total, lograr una economia con gran ingreso volUminoso creciente y una
demanda efectiva, desarrollando el plenio uso de los recursos del mundo, y
exp'andiendo ia producci6n y cambio de mercaderias." Para cumplir .con
estos objetivos, cada partido signatorio quiso eliminar el tratamiento
discriminatorio del comercio internacional. n
NAFTA no elimina las provisiones de GATT. NAFTA reconoce a
GATT y pernite que los partidos mantengan sus derechos y obligaciones
bajo GATT. GATT y NAFTA son similares porque cada acuerdo busca
promover el comercio internacional con la metida de eliminar la aplicaci6n
de barreras tanto de tipo arancelario como no arancelario.11 Sin embargo,
si hay un cionflicto entre dos partidos de NAFTA y GATT cual tiene
resoluciones diferentes bajo de los acuerdos, el NAFTA predominari al
alcance del conflicto particular, excepto si se hacen distintas provisiones en
NAFTA.1
Los acuerdos de libre comercio como el NAFTA, les permiten a
los parses fortalecer sus relaciones econ6micas mediante la eliminaci6n de

26. Id. at 23. Las mercaderlas intermedias son las mercadertas que no estAn en su forma
final. Son las mercaderfas que se usan en los procesos adicionales de fabricaci6n.
27. NAFTA, supra note 1.
28. Id. at art. 101.
29. Id.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 639.
31. Id.at 641.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 103(2), at 297.
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barreras comerciales."
El Prefimbulo de NAFTA estableci6 el
compromiso de trabajar juntos entre los Estados Unidos, el Canadd, y
M6xico. Los gobiernos hicieron una resoluci6n para fortalecer su amistad
y cooperaci6n, para contribuir al desarrollo y expansi6n del comercio
mundial, y para proveer un catalizador para incrementar la cooperaci6n
internacional.2
Los gobiernos querian crear un mercado expansivo y seguro para
las mercaderias y los servicios producidos en sus territorios. Tambi~n
querian reducir las distorsiones del comercio, y establecer reglas claras y
mutuamente beneficiosas para gobernar su comercio.Y Los gobiernos
tambidn querian asegurar una estructura comercial predicable para la
inversi6n y planificaci6n de negocio." Cada pais deseaba incrementar sus
obligaciones y derechos respectivos bajo el GATT y otros instrumentos
multilaterales y bilaterales de cooperaci6n. 1
El Prefmbulo de NAFTA incluye el deseo de cada pais mejorar la
competencia de sus firmas negociantes en mercados globales, criar
innovaci6n y creatividad, y promover el comercio en mercaderias y
servicios los cuales son el tema de derechos intelectuales de propiedad. 4
El Preimbulo afirma que cada pais tiene que implementar NAFTA con los
mismos ideales. Al implementar NAFTA, cada pais debe: proteger,
mejorar, y establecer derechos bfisicos para trabajadores."
Los
implementos deben ser consistente con las protecciones sobre el medio
ambiente y polfticas de conservaci6n de los Partidos al NAFTA.' 2
Finalmente, el prop6sito de NAFTA es: crear nuevas oportunidades de
empleo, mejorar las condiciones de trabajo, y mejorar las normas de
vivienda en cada pais respectivo.4"
Los objetivos del Prefimbulo, y el primer capftulo, se aplican a
todos los veintid6s capftulos del NAFTA. Los objetivos del primer
capitulo incluyen la facilitaci6n del movimiento fronterizo de mercaderias
y servicios mediante la eliminaci6n de barreras, tanto de tipo arancelario
como no arancelario." Cada pais quiere promover la competencia
35. FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 23.
36. NAFMA, supra note 1, at pmbl., at 297.

37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. NAFTA, supra note 1. at pmbl., at 297.
43. Id.
44. Id. at art. 102(1)(a), at 297.
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solamente en el ,rea de libre comercio para aumentar oportunidades de
inversi6n en los territorios de los Partidos.4 5 NAFTA debe proveer
protecci6n adecuada y efectiva en derechos de propiedad intelectuales en el
territorio de cada Partido." Los objetivos del NAFTA tambi6n incluyen el
deseo de los Partidos de crear procedimientos efectivos para el implemento
y aplicaci6n de NAFTA, y establecer una junta administrativa para la
resoluci6n de disputas.
Parecido al Preimbulo y Capitulo uno, el Capitulo tres de NAFTA
es tambidn aplicable a todos los veintid6s capitulos del acuerdo comercial.
En el Articulo 301(1) del Capftulo tres, "cada Partido acordart tratamiento
nacional a las mercaderias de otro Partido conforme . . . con el GATT.""
Segdin el Articulo 301(2), el trato nacional significa un trato por el valor
acordado y semejante a mercaderias producidas domesticamente.
El
articulo 302 abarca la eliminaci6n de las arancelarias. En el Articulo 302,
ningtin Partido puede aumentar las tarifas de aduana o adoptar alguna
tarifa de aduana sobre una mercaderia original, y cada Partido eliminard
progresivamente las tarifas de la aduana sobre articulos de origen. ' Sobre
el pedido de cualquier Partido, los Partidos se consultarin para considerar
49
el aceleramiento de la eliminaci6n de deberes de aduana.

IV. Los

REQUISITOS PARA UN CONSULTANTE LEGAL EXTRANJERO

DENTRO DE UN PARTIDO AL NAFTA
NAFTA abarc6 el comercio tanto de mercaderias como el de
servicios. El cruce del comercio fronterizo se abarca en el Capitulo doce
de NAFTA." El Anexo 1210.5 secci6n B del Capitulo doce trata el tema
de los consultantes legales extranjeros.1' "Cada Partido permitir, que un
nacional del otro Partido practique o aconseje sobre la ley de cualquier
pais en que esa persona se autorice a ejercer como abogado."I
NAFTA tiene directivas que cada pais debe seguir para licenciar a
un abogado que practique o aconseje en otro territorio del Partido.
NAFTA requiere que cada partido consulte y obtenga consejo de sus
cuerpos profesionales sobre qu6 tipo de asociaci6n un abogado dom6stico,

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at art. 102(1)(c), at 297.
Id. at art.
102(1)(d), at 297.
Id. at art.
301(1), at 299 (nota editorial: traducido de ingles).
NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 302(1), (2), at 300.

49. Id. at art. 302(3), at 300.
50. Id.at ch. 12, at 649.
51. Id.at Annex 1210.5(B), at 652.
52. Id.at Annex 1210.5(B)(1), at 652.
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y un consultante extranjero, necesitan crear."
Ademis, los cuerpos
profesionales de cada pais deben recomendar normas y criterios que los
consultantes legales extranjeros: deben seguir para poder ser autorizados a
consultar en el territorio del .otro, partido. NAFTA permite que los
cuerpos profesionales recomiendan normas y criterios para cualquier
materia relacionada con servicios legales extranjeros.1'
Cada Partido signatorio del NAFTA acuerda consultar el uno con
el otro en el irea de consulta legal extranjera.s NAFTA requiere que cada
partido establezca programas nacionales para crear procedimientos
comunes para la autorizaci6n de consultantes legales extranjeros.5 Si un
Partido recomienda un curso de acci6n, el otro Partido debe implementar
ia recomendaci6n mediante sus autoridades dentro de un afio de la fecha de
la recomendaci6n. 5'
El articulo 1210 contiene los requisitos para la licenciatura y la
certificaci6n de consultantes legales extranjeros. ' s El articulo 1210 forma
la parte de NAFTA que tratare asegurar que no sean creadas barreras
innecesarias para comerciar1 -El Artfculo 1210(1)(a) dice que cada
Partido asegurari que cualquier medida sea basada en criterios objetivos,
tales como la competencia y la capacidad para proveer un servicio, y que
no seri mis grave de lo que es necesario para asegurar la calidad de un
servicio.? Adems, "las medidas no deben ser restringidas sobre servicios
6
fronterizos. " 1
Cualquier requisito de ciudadania o de residencia fija va a ser
eliminado en el afio 1996.6 Asi, un individuo no necesita vivir o ser
ciudadano de un pais de Partido para ser un consultante legal extranjero en
ese pais. Un Partido puede ordenar un requisito permanente de residencia
si otro Partido decide imponer los mismos. El requisito de residencia
puede mantenerse mientras que el otro Partido mantenga su requisito de
residencia.63 Un Partido puede reincorporar cualquier requisito al nivel

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(a), at 652.
NAFrA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(b)&(c). at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(3), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(4), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(5), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(B)(2)(b), at 652.
Id. at art. 1210(1), at 650.
NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1210(1)(a)&(b), at 650.
Id. at art. 1210(l)(c), at 650 (nota editorial: traducido de Inglis).
62. Id. at art. 1210(3), at 650.
63. Id.
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federal, estatal, o provincia. El Partido que reincorpore el requisito debe
avisarle al Partido que no estd cumpliendo con la reincorporaci6n."
Las medidas adoptadas o mantenidas por: un Partido con respecto
a la licenciatura o la certificaci6n de un proveedor de servicios
profesionales deben conformarse con el Anexo 1210.5." La secci6n A del
Anexo 1210.5 abarca las provisiones generales de los servicios
profesionales incluyendo el procedimiento de las aplicaciones para
licenciatura, y certificaci6n."6 El otorgue de una.licencia o certificado serfi
entregado dentro de un tiempo razonable despu~s de que la aplicaci6n para
una licencia o un certificado sea completada."
Las, autoridades le.
informarin al solicitante si se necesita alguna. informaci6n adicional."
Cada Partido al NAFTA fomenta a sus cuerpos profesionales fen
sus territorios respectivos para que desarrollen normas y: criterios para la
licenciatura y certificaci6n de sus servicios, profesionales.69 Las normas y
los criterios pueden set desarrollados respecto a la educaci6n, los
programas acaddmicos, y la educaci6n continua para mantener la
certificaci6n profesional.70 Las normas de los exmenes para los requisitos
de licenciatura pueden ser establecidas por cada pais. Un solicitante, .al ser
entrevistado, puede tener que someterse a un examen oral. Ademris; cada
pals puede requerir cierta, cantidad de experiencia antes de que un
solicitante pueda ser otorgado una licencia.1.1
NAFTA permite el establecimiento de otras normas. Un Partido
puede limitar el alcance de la prictica solamente .para las actividades
permitidas. n Un Partido puede mandar requisitos de conocimientos sobre
las leyes locales, las normas, el idioma, ,la geografia,. o el clima.7 . Un
Partido puede crear normas para ia protecci6n del consumidor. 7"
Cada partido puede colocar normas y criterios sobre la conducta y
la 6tica que deben, seguir los consultantes legales. extranjeros. Estas
normas pueden incluir la conducta profesional y la naturaleza de acci6n

64. Id. at art. 1210(3)(a)&(b), at 650-51.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at art. 1210(5), at 651.
NAFrA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(A), at 651-52.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(1)(a), at 651.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(1)(b), at 651.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(2), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(a)&(e), at 652.
Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(b)&(c), at 652.
NAFTA, supra note 1. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(f), at 652.

73. ld. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(g), at 652.
74. Id. at Annex 1210.5(A)(3)(h), at 652.
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disciplinaria para los que no concuerden con esas normas.11 La Asoeiaci6n
Internacional de Abogados cre6 el C6digo Internacional de Etica en el
1956 que sirve como gufa de 6tica para abogados internacionales.6 Segfin
el C6digo Internacional de Etica ,un abogado quien emprende el trabajo
profesional en una jurisdicci6n donde 61 no es un miembro de la profesi6n
local, se adherir, a las normas de 6tica profesional de la jurisdicci6n en
donde el sea un miembro."" Un abogado es sujeto a las mismas normas
de 6tica de los abogados en .el pais donde 61 est6 trabajando.18
La Asociaci6n Estadounidense de Abogados enmend6 sus Reglas
de Modelo de Conducta Profesional en agosto del 1993, para proveer
atraves de la Regia:8.5, que un abogado puede ser sujeto a la autoridad
disciplinaria de esta jurisdicci6n y tambi6n de otra jurisdicci6n donde el
abogado a sido admitido por la misma conducta."9 Los abogados que
practiquen o consulten en jurisdicciones extranjeras pueden ser sujetos a
las reglas de 6tica de mis de una jurisdicci6n."
La Comisi6n de Libre Comercio se cre6 -bajo NAFTA para
supervisar implementos del Acuerdo." La Comisi6n de Comercio acord6
reunirse, dentro de un afto de la fecha que entr6 en vigor. a este Acuerdo,
"con una vista de evaluar el progreso total de la Secci6n doce. La
Comisi6n evaluara el progreso en ennendando o quitando las reservas que
se pusieron sobre el. consultante legal extranjero, y para evaluar cualquier
otro. trabajo adicional que pueda ser apropiado con respecto a los
consultantes legales extranjeros."82
V. PROCEDIMIENTOS DE DISPUTAS DE NAFTA
En caso de que haya una disputa de gobiernos entre Partidos, el
consultante legal extranjero debe conocer los m6todos de resoluci6n de
disputa. . NAFTA tiene ciertos procedimientos para resolver los
desacuerdos. El capftulo veinte de NAFTA provee los procedimientos para
el arreglo de disputas.' 3 La resoluci6n comienza con consultas que deben
75. Id. itAnnex 1210.5(A)(3)(d), at 652.
76. Helena M. Tavares, The United States Perspective on Traveling With The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Checked or Carry-On Baggage, 7 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 9 (1994).
77. Id. (Nota editorial: traducido de Ingles).
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. HAMILTON LOEB, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS 100 (1993).
82. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 1210.5(B)(7), at 652.
83. LOEB, supra note 81, at 101.

19961

Chrusch

4
409

ser los medios primarios de radicar las disputas. Si la consulta no rinde
una resoluci6n dentro de treinta a cuarenticinco dfas de su inicio, un
Partido consultante puede pedir una reuni6n de la Comisi6n de Libre
Comercio, que tambi6n es responsable de resolver disputas con respecto a
la interpretaci6n o la aplicaci6n de NAFTA. La Comisi6n puede confiar
en consejeros t~cnicos, convocar expertos o grupos de trabajo, buscar
conciliaci6n, mediaci6ri, u otros procedimientos de resoluci6n de disputa
en un esfuerzo para resolver la disputa ripidamente.
Si la consulta no es exitosa, un Partido puede pedir un panel
arbitral. Un tercer Partido con un interds considerable puede unirse como
un partido demandante ante el panel.' El panel arbitral consiste en cinco
miembros normalmente elegidos de-una lista de expertos en los campos de
la ley, el comercios u otros asuntos abarcados por el Acuerdo. Los
Partidos en disputa primero eligen un director al panel. Cada Partido
entonces selecciona a dos miembros adicionales cuales deben ser
ciudadanos del otro Partido disputador."
El panel entregar, un informe definitivo evaluando los puntos de
disputa.5 - Si el panel determina que una medida tomada por un Partido no
es consistente con las obligaciones de NAFTA o que ciertos beneficios
proveidos en el Acuerdo estin perjudicados, y los Partidos no han
alcanzado una resoluci6n mutuamente'satisfactoria, el Partido demandante
puede suspender la aplicaci6n de los beneficios equivalentes al otro Partido
hasta que ellos hayan Ilegado a un acuerdo.16
VI. EL ARBITRAJE Y LA LITIGACION EN MEXICO

Una entidad de negocio estadounidense puede acordar con su socio
mexicano de negocios para someter sus disputas a arbitraje obligatorio11
M6xico ha adoptado legislaci6n que facilita la aplicaci6n de un otorgue de
arbitraje en sus cortes. u Sin embargo, si los Partidos no han provefdo un
procedimiento para la selecci6n de -un hrbitro, una corte Mexicana
nombrard a un irbitro. La corte escogerS dos firbitros cuando se requiera
un panel de tres personas; y esos dos Arbitros elegidos seleccionarn a un
tercer drbitro. Generalmente no hay ningfin derecho para apelar a las
personas nombradas por la corte.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 102.
86. Id.
87. Ernesto Cordero, How U.S. Firms.Can Stay Out of Trouble, CAL. L. Bus., May 15,
1995, at 19.
88. Id. at 29.
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. A menos que una entidad haya incluido clusulas apropiadas de
resoluci6n de disputa en su contrato, la entidad puede encontrarse litigando
en las cortes Mexicanas. 9 La litigaci6n contra una entidad Mexicana no
puede proceder en una corte de los Estados Unidos, a menos que el
demandado haya consentido a la jurisdicci6n o que tenga contactos con el
foro. Antes de confiar en precedentes judiciales, las cortes Mexicanas
primariamente utilizan como fuentes, la ley, la constituci6n, las
provisiones estatutarias, o provisiones administrativas. El descubrimiento
para las demandas en Mexico es mas limitado que en los Estados Unidos.
La ley. no le provee a los Partidos el derecho de conducir
interrogatorios escritos o deposiciones fuera de ]a presencia de la corte.
La producci6n de documentos, y. la mayoria de otros tipos de
descubrimiento, ocurren durante el juicio. El descubrimiento limitado
puede emprenderse solamente en torno a esfuerzos para obtener una orden
de la corte, conservando la condici6n o prohibiendo de cierta conducta,
comparable con una prohibici6n judicial u orden restrictiva temporal.
Despu~s que un fallo por registrado, el cliente se enfrenta con
imponer el fallo. La aplicaci6n puede ser dificil si los procedimientos
apropiados no se siguen. A fin de aumentar la probabilidad de que
cualquier fallo de los Estados Unidos se imponga contra la entidad
mexicana, el servicio debe realizarse por medio de un m~todo reconocido
como apropiado en los Estados Unidos y en Mexico. El servicio de
proceso se realiza mediante la transmisi6n de papeles legales entre los
Estados Unidos y las cortes Mexicanas.
El mtodo de servicio que todos los partidos deben utilizar es el de
la Convenci6n Interamericana sobre Cartas Rogatorio y Protocolo
Adicional (la Convenci6n Interamericana),firmado por ambos-los Estados
Unidos y M6xico. Una corte Mexicana no impondri un fallo obtenido en
un juicio que no a sido entregado segiin la Convenci6n Interamericana.90
Generalmente, el Departamento de Estado ayuda en las transmisiones de
papeles legales. Sin embargo; la corte mexicana se hace cargo de
entregarle al demandado, y la demostraci6n de servicio se transmite al
demandante o a la corte de los Estados Unidos.
Una vez que el fallo de los Estados Unidos se obtenga, las cortes
Mexicanas lo impondrin sujeto a ciertas limitaciones. La obligaci6n que
debe ser impuesta no debe contravenir con la polftica o la ley piiblica de
M6xico. El fallo tambi~n debe crear una responsabilidad personal,
opuesto a una declaraci6n sobre los derechos de propiedad. El proceso de
servicio personal debe de haberse hecho sobre el demandado Mexicano
89. Id.at 19.
90. Id. at 29.
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conforme a la Convenci6n Interamericana, y la corte que emite el fallo
debe considerarse competente bajo las normas internacionales. 9'

VII. EL TRIBUNAL COMERCIAL INTERNACIONAL CANADIENSE
Negociar en el Canadi requiere que el consultante legal extranjero
tenga conocimiento de las instituciones que tengan que ver con puntos
comerciales
canadienses.
El Canadd tiene una instituci6n
judicial/consultiva que se responsabiliza por las preguntas referentes al
comercio.9
Como parte de sus funciones judiciales, el Tribunal
Canadiense de Comercio Internacional (CITT) acttia como una corte
administrativa y es responsable por todas las apelaciones de la aduana y de
decisiones de impuestos.' 3 En su capacidad consultiva, el CITT se
responsabiliza de informarle al gobernador de Consejo cualquiera sobre
materia comercial que se relacione con los intereses econ6micos o
comerciales del CanadA con respecto a mercaderfas o servicios.
Hay varias maneras en que un caso puede someterse al CITT. Un
caso puede ser iniciado por el Ministro Diputado de Renta del Canada, por
un productor de mercaderfas dom6sticas o por una asociaci6n de
productores. La determinaci6n preliminar de dafio material se hace por el
mismo departamento que examina el punto." Una decisi6n sobre el caso
debe hacerse entre 255 y 300 dias despu6s del inicio del caso. 91 A menos
de que sea especificado de otra manera en el contrato, una entidad que
haya hecho negocios con Canad! puede ser sujeto a una decisi6n del
CITT.
VIII. LAS PERSPECTIVAS DE QUE CHILE LLEGUE A SER UN PARTIDO
AL NAFTA
El Canadl, Mdxico,. y los Estados Unidos son los Partidos
originales del NAFTA. NAFTA no le prohibe a ningfin otro Partido
tomar parte de acuerdos libres de comercio con otros paises. Es muy
probable que Chile sea el pr6ximo pais latinoamericano para negociar un
acuerdo de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos.'9 En 1990, los Estados

91. Id.
92. ANDREw D.M. ANDERSON, SEEKING COMMON GROUND:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN THE NINETIES 51 (1995).

93. Id. at 52.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id.
96. FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 30.
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Unidos y Chile establecieron el Consejo sobre Comercio e Inversi6n.91 El
objetivo del Consejo era controlar las relaciones de inversi6n y comercio,
incluyendo la identificaci6n de las Areas donde hacia falta la
liberalizaci6n.'
El Presidente Clinton y el Representante de Comercio
Mickey Kantor expresaron un deseo de promover las relaciones
comerciales entre los Estados Unidos y Chile, y de entrar en un acuerdo
de libre comercio con dste.w
Ademts de las razones generales para tomar parte de un Acuerdo
de Libre Comercio (FTA), existian otras razones para Ilegar a un acuerdo
de libre comercio entre los Estados Unidos y Chile.10° Primero, el FTA
cumpliria parcialmente las metas del EAIS, con otras naciones
latinoamericanas y caribefias con las cuales los Estados Unidos tuvo
acuerdos de libre comercio.' °' Segundo, Chile tiene una de las economias
mds avanzadas y abiertas en Am6rica Latina .,01
Tercero, los intereses de

los Estados Unidos serian cumplidos porque los paises latinoamericanos
observarian los beneficios recibidos por Chile a causa de sus tradiciones
democrdticas y sus reformas de mercado libre.' 03 Cuarto, los Estados
Unidos declaro que Chile es la dinica naci6n que debe entrar en un FTA.'1'
Quinto, las compaiiias de los Estados Unidos ganarian mayor acceso al
mercado chileno.
IX. Los BENEFICIOS ECONOMICOS DE NAFTA
Cada pais ha realizado unos tremendos beneficios econ6micos
tremendos del resultado de NAFTA. La distribuci6n de exportaciones
estadounidenses al Canadd y a M6xico han aumentado desde 1980 a los
tiempos actuales. En 1983, los Estados Unidos export6 21.1 por ciento de
sus exportaciones fabricadas al CanadA y 4.4 por ciento a M6xico. 05 Las
exportaciones de los Estados Unidos a M6xico han aumentado
considerablemente sobre los iltimos diez afios, y en 1992 M6xico lleg6 a
ser el segundo mercado mis grande de mercaderias fabricadas en los
97. Id. at 29.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31-32.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. El Presidente Bush estableci6 una meta a largo plazo de un drea libre para
comercio hemisf6rico que seria desde Alaska hasta Argentina. Es conocido como la Empresa Para
La Iniciativa de las Am6ricas [mis adelante EAI]. Id.
102. FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 34.
103. Id. at 34-35.
104. Id. at 35.
105. BROWN, supra note 11, at 24.
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Estados Unidos.10 En 1994, los Estados Unidos exportaron veinticuatro
por ciento de sus exportaciones fabricadas al Canada y 8.9 por ciento a
M~xico.' 7 Con aranceles inferiores sobre las mercaderias mexicanas
exportadas, las importaciones Mexicanas en los Estados Unidos esperan un
crecimiento de siete por ciento a diez por ciento en el afio 2000.10, En
anticipaci6n del NAFTA, M6xico realiz6 5 billones en la inversi6n
extranjera en los primeros tres meses de 1992.'09
NAFTA provee ventajas para que los inversionistas
estadounidenses establezcan negocios en Mdxico requiriendo que los
Estados Unidos o las compafiias canadienses sean tratados iguales como los
negocios Mexicanos." 0 En el Articulo 301 del Capitulo Tres, el NAFTA
provee que cada Partido acordard tratamiento nacional a las mercaderfas
del otro Partido."' Segtin los datos del Departamento de Comercio para
1994, las exportaciones de Estados Unidos a Mdxico subieron a 50.8
billones, de 41.6 billones en 1993, un aumento de veintid6s por ciento.1'2
Las exportaciones de Mdxico a los Estados Unidos han aumentado de 39.9
billones en 1993 a 49.5 billones en 1994.' La inversi6n en fibricas y
equipos tambi~n han crecido como resultado del NAFTA. " Los Estados
Unidos y las compafifas canadienses invirtieron 2.4 billones en Mdxico
durante los primeros ocho meses de 1994."' Asia y Europa tambi6n han
aumentado sus inversiones en Mdxico."'
X. CONCLUSION.

Los acuerdos de libre comercio se adoptan generalmente para
aumentar el comercio entre paises y para disminuir o eliminar las barreras
comerciales. Los paises quieren que el aumento en cuanto al comercio
exceda el ingreso arancelario y que los beneficios econ6micos protejan sus
negocios locales de la competencia extranjera.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. MCPRAIL, supra note 19, at 90.
109. Id.
110. Nina Schuyler, The Mexican Connection: U.S. Business South of The Border Creates
Legal Problensas Two Different Cultures Blend Together, CAL. L. BUS., May 15, 1995, at 18.
111. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 301, at 299.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Schuyler, supra note 110, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Desde que NAFTA se adopt6, el comercio entre Mxico, el
Canadl, y los Estados Unidos ha crecido significativamente. Con el
comercio creciente entre. los Partidos de NAFTA, la necesidad para
consultantes legales extranjeros debe crecer. Consultar o aconsejar en un
territorio de Partido extranjero deberia ser mis ficil porque los requisitos
de licenciatura se enumeran en capitulo doce de NAFTA.
El capitulo doce de NAFTA lista los procedimientos y requisitos
para hacerse consultante extranjero o abogado en un pais miembro de
NAFTA. Un individuo tiene que solicitar una licencia, la cual serl
determinada dentro de un tiempo razonable despu6s de haber completado
ia solicitud. La solicitud puede comprender de un examen escrito y oral.
Tambidn se puede requerir la educaci6n contirna para mantener la
licencia:
Las provisiones de NAFTA pueden extenderse a Chile. Chile estA
bien ubicado para Ilegar a ser Partido al NAFTA. Si Chile se hace
miembro de NAFTA es probable que los mismos requisitos de licenciatura
sean aplicados a los consultantes o a los abogados que deseen practicar en
Chile. Primero, es prctico incluir las provisiones existentes a un nuevo
miembro. Segundo, las negociaciones para nuevos o diferentes requisitos
de licenciatura podrian demorar el procedimiento para que Chile Ilegara a
ser Partido de NAFTA. Tercero, cada pais necesitaria Ilegar a un acuerdo
sobre nuevos o diferentes requisitos de licenciatura.
Un contrato entre partidos de NAFTA debe contener una clusula
de resoluci6n de disputa. La litigaci6n en M6xico es diferente que la de
los Estados Unidos.
Un consultante legal extranjero debe tener
conocimiento del papel de el Tribunal canadiense sobre disputas
comerciales en cuanto al negocio canadiense. Un consejero local debe ser
utilizado si va a litigar en Mdxico o el CanadA. Este consejero debe ser
capaz de ofrecer informaci6n valiosa sobre las costumbres locales seguidas
tanto dentro como fuera de la corte.
Hay varias medidas que un individuo puede tomar para Ilegar a ser
abogado o consultante legal extranjero efectivo. Primeramente, un(a)
consultante debe saber el idioma y las costumbres de la ciudad y el pais
donde 6ste consultando. Segundo, un(a) consultante debe conocer a los
funcionarios de la ciudad en el supuesto caso de que haya cualquier
problema. Tercero, un consultante debe conocer a un consejero local para
pedirle informaci6n general o consejos. Estas medidas, si son tomadas,
facilitarlin los tri.mites entre los distintos paises y los asuntos no serin tan
dificiles de comprender.
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Este articulo pretende describir las normas y principios generales
del derecho internacional del medio ambiente surgidos a partir de tratados,
convenios y costumbres internacionales.'
La significancia de la
generalidad de estos principios es que se podrian aplicar a la comunidad
internacional para la protecci6n del medio ambiente.I
Bajo perspectivas tradicionales, el derecho intemacional pfiblico
nace de las siguientes cuatro fuentes: a) convenci6nes internacionales, b)
costumbres internacionales, c) principios generales del derecho
reconocidos por las naciones civilizadas, y d) decisiones judiciales y

Candidate for graduation at law from University of Costa Rica, 1996.
1. Para ladiferencia entre principios generales del derecho y principios generales del
derecho internacional, estos ultimo discutido aquf, yea M. Virally, The Sources of International
Law, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (1968). Los principios generales del
derecho intemacional del medio ambiente se refiere a las normas de laley consuetudinaria
internacional , a normas derivadas de tratados y a principios generales de laley como se declara
en elarticulo 38 (I) (c) del Estatuto de laCorte Internacional de Justicia o a propuestas l6gicas a
raftz de razonamientos judiciales. Vea tambien, G. Fitzmaurice, 2 General Principles Law, 92
HAGUE RECUEIL (1957).
2.

B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS

AND TRIBUNAL 376 (1953).
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ensefianzas de eruditos legales altamente calificados.' La relativamente
nueva ley internacional del medio ambiente se ha desarrollado a partir de
las fuentes anteriormente mencionadas, asi como de fuentes menos
tradicionales y vinculantes.
Es cierto que no hay un instrumento internacional de aplicaci6n
mundial que defina los derechos y deberes de los paises en materia del
medio ambiente. Sin embargo, resoluciones y declaraciones de agencias
internacionales a cargo de controlar el medio ambiente (como la Agencia
de Energia At6mica, el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el medio
Ambiente, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas prcticas de los
estados, asi como las decisiones de tribunales internacionales) han tenido
un papel importante en el desarrollo de estas normas. De la gran cantidad
de instrumentos internacionales que se relacionan con asuntos del medio
ambiente es posible destacar siete principios presentes. La consistencia y
aceptaci6n no es igual para cada uno, como veremos.
I. LA SOBERANIA DEL ESTADO Y LA RESPONSABILIDAD
El derecho ambiental internacional se ha desarrollado entre dos
principios aparentemente contradictorios. Primero, los estados tienen
soberania sobre sus recursos naturales. Segundo, los estados no deben
causar dafio al medio ambiente. A pesar de que el concepto de la
soberania del estado sobre sus recursos naturales esti basado en el
principio antiguo de la soberania territorial, la Asamblea General de Las
Naciones Unidas lo ha apoyado actualmente, declarando inter alia que el
derecho de las personas y las naciones a la soberania permanente sobre sus
recursos naturales y beneficios debe practicarse con el interds en el
desarrollo nacional y el bienestar de las personas de ese estado.' La
resoluci6n refleja los derechos de soberania permanente sobre los recursos
naturales como un derecho internacional y ha sido aceptado por los
tribunales como un reflejo de la costumbre internacional.5 La soberania
nacional sobre los recursos naturales ha sido afirmada en acuerdos
internacionales.6
3. Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de la Justicia, supra note 1. Vea tambiin L. HENKIN
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1986).

4. Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources Pe1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14,
1962); Vea tambiin, Declaration of the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
5. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 87
(Mar. 24, 1982); Kuwait v. Independent Am. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976.
6. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, art. 15, 11 I.L.M. 1358,
1363 [de aqul adelante UNESCO on Heritage]; United Nations Conference on Environmental
Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992. print. 2, 31 I.L.M. 818 [de
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El concepto de soberania no es absoluto y est, restringido por un
deber general de no causar dafto al medio ambiente de otros estados u

otras Areas fuera de la jurisdicci6n nacional. Como se afirm6 en la
Declaraci6n de Rio en 1992:

[I]os estados tienen, de acuerdo con la Carta de las
Naciones Unidas y los principios de la ley internacional, el
derecho de explotar sus recursos conforme a sus politicas
de desarrollo y medio ambiente, y la responsabilidad de
asegurar dichas actividades con su jurisdicci6n y cumplir
con el deber de no daflar el medio ambiente de otros

estados o Areas mas all, de los limites de su jurisdicci6n
nacional.'

Esto se deriva de la mdxima general de que la posesi6n de derechos
envolveri la ejecuci6n de las obligaciones correspondientes. s
La responsabilidad de no dafiar el medio ambiente precede la
Declaraci6n de Rio. Existe la obligaci6n de todos los estados de proteger

los derechos de los otros estados, como se elabor6 en el denominado Caso
de la Fundici6n de Trail (Trail Smelter Case),9 el cual declar6 que:
bajo los principios de la ley intemacional . . . ningin

estado tiene el derecho de usar o permitir el uso de
territorio en tal manera como para causar dafto por humo
en o hacia el territorio de otra propiedad o personas en
ella, cuando el caso es de consecuencias serias y los dafto
se establece por evidencia clara y convincente.'0
que adelante U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity]; Convention Relative to the Preservation
of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933, art. 9(6), 172 L.N.T.S. 241; Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2,
1971, art. 2(3), 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [de aquf adelante Rasmar Convention on Wetlands];
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, art. 1, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/ 11
Rev. 1 (1984); Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 12, 28 I.L.M. 649, 668; United Nations
Conference on Environmental Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, art. 14, 31 I.L.M. 849, 867 [de aqul adelante U.N. Convention on Climate Change].
7.
Vea United Nations Convention on the Rio Declaration of Environment and
Development, June 15, 1992, princ. 2, 31 I.L.M. 876 [de aquf adelante Rio Declaration) (nota
editorial: traducido por el escritor).
8. Vea Advisory Opinion Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
9.
Trail Smelter, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATiONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972) [de aqui adelante Stockholm Declaration].
10. Supra note 9. Vea tambiin Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 389 (opini6n
disidente de Juez Castro); (United States v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941)) nota editorial:
traducido por el escritor).
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Este principio fue posteriormente desarrollado en 1961 cuando la

Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas declar6 que "[l]os principios
fundamentales del derecho intemacional imponen la responsabilidad a
todos los estados en lo concerniente a las acciones que puedan causar
repercusiones biol6gicas daffinas para las personas de las generaciones
presente y futuras de otros estados, por medio del aumento de los niveles
de liuvia radiactiva."" El deber de evitar el dafio al medio ambiente
tambi6n ha sido aceptado en los tratados internacionales,' 2 asi como en
otras practicas internacionales."
Otras observaciones estin en orden. En el caso de recursos
compartidos, esto es un recurso que no esti completo dentro de la
jurisdicci6n de un solo estado, el concepto primario es ia obligaci6n de
utilizar el recurso equilibrado y armoniosamente " Esta obligaci6n esta
directamente relacionada con la cooperaci6n sobre la base de un sistema de
informaci6n y previa consulta y notificaci6n para alcanzar un uso 6ptimo a
dichos recursos sin causar dafio a los intereses legitimos de otros estados."
Finalmente, en aquellas greas fuera de los limites de la jurisdicci6n
nacional, como en alta mar, el concepto aplicable no es aquel de la
soberania, sino el concepto del patrimonio comdin de la humanidad. Los
bienes comunes globales estAn abiertos al uso legitimo por los estados pero
ellos no pueden apropiarse de ello, los estados solo deben de administrar

11. G.A. Res. 1629 (XVI) (1961). Vea tambiin G.A. Res, 2849 (XXVI), para. 4(a)
(1972).
12. Food and Agriculture Organization International Plant Protection Convention, Dec. 6,
1951, pmbl., 150 U.N.T.S. 68; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963,. art. i(l)(b), 480 U.N.T.S. 43; African Convention
on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource, Sept. 15, 1968, 4 U.N.T.S. 1001;
UNESCO on Heritage, supra noie 6, at art. 16(1)(b); Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation, July 3,
1978, art. IV, 17 I.L.M. 1045; Convention for.the Protection of the Maritime Environment and
Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Nov. 12, 1981, art. 3(5), International Environmental
Legal Materials and Treaties 337; Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 1985, art. 20, 24 I.L.M. 1142; United
Nationi Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 193, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [de aqui en
adelante Law of the Seal (esta diltima convenci6n afirma que ]a obligaci6n de prevenir el dafho
amibiental no es solo una obligaci6n negativa pero que tambidn debe existir acciones positivas
entorno a la protecci6n del medio ambiente).
13. Vea generalmente G.A. Res. 2996 (XXVII) (1972); Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, art. 30 (1974); 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
14. Vea por ejeIplo Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Aug.
1966, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
484 (1967).
15. Veaporejemplo G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 13, at ch. il,
art. 3.
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las riquezas de sus tierras;. Los estados deben de cooperar en su
conservaci6n, y deben de compartir esos beneficios econ6micos con dichas
dreas." Recientemente, el concepto de patrimonio de' la humanidad ha sido
aplicado a la protecci6n de AntArtica.'
11. PRINCIPIO DE BUENA VECINDAD YCOOPERACION INTERNACIONAL
El principio anteriormente declarado, es decir la responsabilidad
de no causar daflo al medio ambiente, se deriva del principio de la buena
vecindad. Este consiste en la obligaci6n bisica de cada estado de no
permitir la utilizaci6n de su territorio para actividades contrarias a los
derechos de otros estados o que pudieran dafiar otros estados o sus
habitantes." Esto se consilera como una aplicaci6n de la maxima sic utere
tuo, et alienum non laedas.20
El principio de buena vecindad estA estrechamente' relacionado a la
obligaci6n de cooperar en investigar, identificar y evitar el dafio
ambiental. La mayorfa de los tratados internacionales ambientales tienen
provisiones que requieren la cooperaci6n en generar e intercambiar

16. Vea generalmente A. KISS, Droit International de L'environnement, Paris, 1989;
Nouvelles Tendences en Droit Internationel de L'environnement, Y.B. INT'L L. (Dunker and
Humboldt, Berlin eds., 1990).
17. Vea Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at arts. 136,.137, 140, 21 I.L.M. 1261; Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [aquf adelante
Treaty on Exploration and Use of Space].
18. Protocol to the Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1990, 30
I.L.M. 1461 (1991) (no esta en efuerzo). El concepto de patrimonio comtin de la Humanidad ha
sido Otil; sin embargo provee un menor respaldo conceptual para la regulaci6n de asuntos tales
como el efecto invemadero y la protecci6n de la biodiversidad. Por lo ha aparecido otro
concepto, el de "preocupaci6n comdin de la humanidad." No se ha definido aun y creo que
nunca se definir, es precisamente su vaguedad la que ha hecho posible ]a regulaci6n
internacional para actividades que de otra forma caerfan bajo la jurisdicci6n interna de los
estados.
19. La cooperaci6n internacional fue dictado por la Corte Internacional de Justicia en el
Caso Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. (April 22). Vea tambin Lac Lanoux
Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 285 (Arbitral Tribunal affirmo "Francia tiene sus
derechos y puede usarlos, ella no puede ignorar los interes de los Esponoles"). Island of Palmas
(U.S. v. Neth.), 11 R.I.A.A. 829; Alabama Claims Arbitration, 7; J. MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1059-67; AMERICAN MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, TEXAS CATTLE
CLAIMS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 51; United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479
(1887); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96, 205-06 (1966).

20. La mixima tue invocada como una norma pot Hungria en su demanda en el caso
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1992 I.C.J. 32. Hungria sustento su'demanda
en el Caso Corfu Channel, Stockholm Declaration, supra note 19; Rio Declaration, supra note 7,
y el INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1990).
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informaci6n (cientifica, t6cnica, socioecon6mica y comercial).2 ' Este
deber de coopeiar no es absoluto. En vez puede ser limitado por
condiciones municipales como la protecci6n de patentes.22
El intercambio de informaci6n general es critico para monitorear
la implementaci6n dom6stica de las obligaciones internacionales.

Por

ejemplo, para trazar el curso de la poblaci6n animal, los paises estin
obligados en reportar el comercio de la fauna. 2 Lo mismo sucede con las
emisiones que provocan el efecto del invernadero.21
Debido a su

importancia, algunas convenciones han creado cuerpos internacionales
separados con funciones de generaci6n y distribuci6n de informaci6n. 5
Adicionalmente, muchas de las convenciones contienen provisiones en
relaci6n al conocimiento cientifico,1 a los cambios atmosf6ricos, 2 a la
contaminaci6n de la marina,2' y a la preservaci6n cultural. 9
Otros subprincipios incorporados en la regla general de buena
vecindad y cooperaci6n internacional son los principios de notificaci6n y
consulta previa. Esto obliga a los estados a proveer una notificaci6n
previa en tiempo, asi como dar informaci6n pertinente a cada estado
potencialmente afectado por los efectos ambientales adversos
21. Vea Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 200; U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 17; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1312; Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, art. 4, 26 I.L.M 1517 [de aqui adelante Ozone
Protection Convention].
22. Vea Ozone Protection Convention, supra note 21, at art. 4; 26 I.L.M. at 1530-32; Law
of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 17.
23. Vea Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Life and
Flora, Mar.3, 1973, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
24. Vea U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note6, at art. 12.
25. Vea id. at art. 9 (en el cual una Conferencia de las Partes para asesoramiento en materia
cientffica y tecnol6gica relacionadas a dicha convenci6n fue creada).
26. Vea generalmente Stockholm Declaration, supra note 9, at princ. 20; United Nations
Environment Programme Governing Council Decision: Principles of Conduct in the Field of the
Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, May 19, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1091 [de aquf
adelante U.N. Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources].
27. Vea U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at art. 15; Ozone Protection
Convention, supra note 21, at art. 3. La Convenci6n de la Capa de Ozono es un modelo
importante para laforma de reaccionar ripidamente a los problemas ambientales. Un anexo
elabora con gran detalle aquellas areas que necesitan de investigaci6n cientffica coordinada, como
por ejemplo las consecuencias del alza en laradiaci6n ultravioleta en lasalud humana y el
medioambiente. Esta es laraz6n primaria para el 6xito de las Partes en el combate contra la
degradaci6n del ozono.
28. Vea Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 200.
29. Vea UNESCO on Heritage, supra note 6.
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significativos.
Por supuesto, los estados deberfin notificar
inmediatamente a otros estados de cualquier desastre natural u otras
emergencias que puedan producir efectos transfronterizos.1' Ademis, las
notificaciones de emergencias son particularmente importantes en relaci6n
'3
a los derrames de aceite, " contra tiempos, industriales, y nuclearesY3
Ademis, ante el pedido de otro estado, el actuante estA obligado a
entrar en una consulta, de buena fe y sobre un perfodo razonable de
tiempo," con los estados posiblemente afectados. El estado actuante no
esti obligado por las opiniones de los pafses consultados, pero deberfa
tomarlas en consideraci6n. Finalmente, cuando un estado esta actuando en
el territorio de otro, la consulta y notificaci6n no es suficiente. Se requiere
conseguir un consentimiento informado previamente. Este consentimiento
es obligatorio en actividades tales como el transporte de desechos
peligrosos a travs de un estado,' prestar asistencia de emergencia despu6s
de un accidente, 37 y en la exploraci6n de recursos geneticos.u
30. Vea Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 19; Montreal Rules of International Law
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Sept. 1982, Report of the Sixtieth Conference of the Int'l L
Comm'n 1-3 [de aquf adelante Montreal Rules on TranfrontierPollution]; U.N. Convention on
Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ. 6; Law of the Sea, supra note 12,
at art. 206. Medidas especiales pueden proteger el flujo de informacidn como parte del
requerimiento de notifiaci6n. Vea por ejemplo Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development Council Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Nov.
14, 1974, Annex, 14 I.L.M. 242 [de aquf adelante OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier
Pollution]; United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council Decision: Guidelines for
the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, May 1989, art. 11.
31. Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 18.
32. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1319, 1434 (no esta en esfuerzo).
33. Council Directive 82/501, art. 5, 1982 O.J.
34. United Nations Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents, Sept. 26, 1986,
25 I.L.M. 1377.
35. Vea Montreal Rules on Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 30, at art. 8; U.N.
Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ. 6-7; OECD
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 30, at princ. 7; Nordic Convention on
the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 511.
36. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 1989, art. 6(4), 28 I.L.M. 649; Organization of African Unity: Bamako
Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. 773, 785.
37. No existe un obligaci6n positiva general de proveer asistencia de emergencia si el
estado que ayuda no es responsable del daflo. Sin embargo, la asistencia en el territorio del
estado afectado ha establecida en instrumentos internacionales. Vea en ejemplo Convention in
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, art. 2,
25 I.L.M. 1377; Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 18; Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at
art. 199; U.N. Convention on Conserving Shared Natural Resources, supra note 26, at princ.
9(3).
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PRNCIPIO DE AcCION PREVENTIVA

El principio de prevenci6n de contariinaci6n debe de ser
diferenciado al deber de evitar dafios ambientales. Bajo esta nueva regla,
un estado puede estar bajo la obligaci6n de prevenir dafio dentro de su
propia jurisdicci6n19 Por lo tanto, la descarga de desechos t6xicos en
ales cantidades o concentraciones que excedan la capacidad del ambiente
para degradarlas, debe ser detenido para. asegurar que dafios serios o
irreversibles no sean inflictos al ecosistema.40 Estas accionesi deben
tomarse en una etapa temprano para reducir la contaminaci6n, en vez de
restablecer Areas ya degradadas.
Para asegurar este principio, los estados tienen establecidos
procedimientos de: autorizaci6n, compromisos en estindares ambientales,
aeceso a informaci6n, uso de penalidades, y la necesidad de llevar a cabo
evaluaciones del impacto ambiental. 4" Por ejemplo, la evaluaci6n del
impacto ambiental ha sido incorporado como un instrumenio de decisi6n
por organizaciones intemacionales42 asf como en muchas convenciones.41
El principio de prevenci6n ha sido apoyado por instrunentos
internacionales previniendo la introducci6n de contaminantes," asi Como
38. U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 15(5).
39.
.Veh JUDGE N. SINGH, Foreword'TO ENVIROINMENTAL PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS xi-xii (1986).

':

40. Vea 'Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 6. El principal de preventiro se
puede trazar al afio 1933 con elConvention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in
their Natural State, supra.note 6 (creada pam prevenir laextinci6n de especies de flora y fauna).
41. La evaluaci6n de impacto ambiental es un procedimiento, previo a tomar decisiones,
para examinar, analizar, y evaluar actividades propuestas para minimizar los efectos adversos.
Involucra a autoridades gubernamentales y cuando es apropiado, participaci6n pfiblica en los
procedimientos.
42. Vea por ejemplo -World Bank Operational Directive 4.01 (1991); 1 WORLD BANK
ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCEBOOK 1990.
43. Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 17; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities, Jan. 29, 1988, arts. 37(7)(d)z(i), 39(2)(c), 54(3)(b), 27 I.L.M. 68,
princ' l1(c) (de aqui adelante Comention on Antarctic Minerals]; U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 14.
44. Vea generalmente Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, Mar. 22, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 546; Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, Feb. 15, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 290; Convention on. the. Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, supra note •21; .Convention on the
Protection of the Alps, Nov. 7, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 767 (no esta en efuerzo). Vea tambien
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 327
U.N.T.S. 3, pmbl.; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S.' 82, art. 25;
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb.
15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1; Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 194(1); Convention
Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S. 23, at art. 7;
Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, supra note 12,
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por acuerdos en el campo, del derecho': econ6mico interncional .4s
Finalmente,. ha sido reconocido pPr Ia jurisprudencia internacional
tambien."

IV. PRINCII'qoDE PRECAUCIN
Esta regla, aunque todavia en evoluci6n, estd reflejada en .el
Principio 15. de Ia Declaraci6n de Rio, -!o cual estipula que adonde hay
avisos de daflos seri.os o irreversibles, .Ia falta .de una completa-certeza
cientifica no seri utilizada como una raz6n para posponer medidas
efectivas en prevenir Ia degradaci6n ambiental.,' Ya que a,menudo. Ia
certeza, cientffica Ilega :demasiado. tarde, para que los politicos y los
abogados dirigen en contra de los peligros ambientales,. Ia.. carga de Ia
prueba se invierte. Esperar por :pruebas cientificas concernientes..al
impacto de contaminantes liberados-en el ambiente puede .resultar en un
dafio irreversible al ambiente y al sufrimiento humano.. Tradicionalmente,
los estados deseosos en adoptar ciertas medidas protectoras deben .probar
fuera -de toda :.duda el.: peligro y la urgencia de Ia acci6n.4'.
Afortunadamente -por el principio de. precauci6n, esto fue cambiado,. y
ahora. un .estado no tiene que esperar prueba.alguna de un posible dafto
como requisito para tomar acci6n. Otra posible interpretac16n del aspecto
probatorio, mencionado, .,es que los estados deseosos en tomar ciertas
actividades deberdn probar que no causarin dafto al ambiente.
El primer tratado que incorpora este. principio es la Convenci6n de
Viena de 1985 para Ia Protecci6n de la Capa -del Ozono;1 .-en el
Predmbulo. Posteriormente, 'el mtodo prevehtivo"ha sido menciona:do

at art. 1(1);.Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. .13, 1979, 18 I.L.M.
1442, art. 2; Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and the Environment of the
South Pacific Region, Nov. 25,.1986, 26 I.L.M. 38, art. 5(1).
45. -African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Fourth Lom6
Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783, art. 35 (no esta en .efuer?:o); Treatyon .European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 130r(2), 31 I.L.M. 247.
46.. .ea. Certain Phosphate Lan.ds in Nauru (Nauru v. Aus.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 244.
47.. Rio Declaration, supra note .7,
at princ. 15.
48. Vea por:ejenmplo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
S6urces, supra hote 44, at art. 4(4). '
49. : Esta interpretaci6n ha sido adoptada en Ia Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.LiM. 1069, -Annex 11, art. 3(3)(c).
Bajo este acuerdo, las partes tienen que reportar con anterioridad los resultados de los. estudios
.cientificos que demuestren que las operaciones de vertidos radiactivos no resultardn en peligros
para los seres humanos,, recursos vivientes y otros usos del mar. .
50. Vea Ozone Protection Convention, supra note 21, at pmbl.
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ampliamente para la protecci6n del. ambiente.:' Lamentablemente,. no
existe precisi6n en cuanto al contenido -del principio y sus formulaciones
varian. Lo que permanece :nebuloso es el nivel en el cual la falta de
evidencia cientifica no seria argumentada para posponer las medidas..,
LCuando puede una, acci6n preventiva ser legalmente requerida?
Mientras que la Convenci6n de Bamako en 19915 une los principios- de
prevenci6n y de precauci6n, mas no requiere que los posibles dafios, sean
serios (bajando el nivel en que la falta de evidencia cientifica produce la
acci6n),11 la Convenci6n para la Protecci6n del Ambiente Marino de la
Regi6n Noreste del Atlintico de 199214 incrementa el nivel en el cual las
acciones preventivas tienen que ser implementadas, requiriendo mis de
una minima posibilidad de dafio..
.
V. EL DEBER DE COMPENSAR POR LOS DAROS
Los estados son, responsables en asegurar que': las actividades
dentro de su jurisdicci6n no produzcan dafios ai medio ambiente de otros
estados o Areas fuera- de su jurisdicci6n nacional. Estos dafios resultarfan
en violaciones de reglas generalmente aceptadas.9 Cualquier 'estado
culpable de violar la ley internacional, tiene que cesar sus actividades
ilegales de inmediato y restablecer la condici6n que existia antes de que la
51. Vea id. at art. 2(2)(a); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 1992, 30 I.L.M. (1992) (no esta en efulerzo); Ministerial Declaration of the
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Bremen,. Nov. 1, 1984; Ministerial
Declaration of the Second North Sea Conference, London, Nov. 25, 1987; Third North Sea
Conference, The Hague, Mar. 8, 1990; Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in
the European Economic Community Region, Bergen, May 16, 1990; Convention on the'Ban of
Import into Africa and the Control of Traisboundary. Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within Africa, supra note 36, at art. 4(3)(f).
52. Organization of African Unity: Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Waste
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.'
53. Segdin el Art. 4(3)(f) de laconvenci6n Bamako, las partes tienen que adoptar e
implementar "el camino preventivo y precauci6n contra la poluci6n, el cual consiste en prevenir
laemisi6n de substancias que puedan causar dafto a los hombres o al medio ambiente aunque no
exista evidencia cientifica de su peligro." Esta formulaci6n tambi6n une los mdtodos preventivos
y de precauci6n.
54. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North - East Atlantic,
supra note 49.
55. Segdn el Art. 2(2)(a) de laConvention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North - East Atlantic, los m6todos preventivos.tienen que ser adoptados cuando existe, "causa
razonable de preocupaci6n ... aunque aun no exista evidencia conclusiva de la relaci6n.causa y
efecto." Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North - East Atlantic,
supra note 49. Este acuerdo tambi6n une los caminos de prevenci6n y precauci6n.
56. Vea Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ.'21; Rio Declaration, supra note 7,
at princ. 2.
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actividad ilegal comenzata...1 Si es imposible restablecer las condiciones, se
debe compensar." Un acto ilegal internacional existe cuando: a) hay un
conducto que consiste de una acci6n o falta de acci6n, la cual es atribuida
a un Estado bajo la ley internacional; y b). esta conducta es una violaci6n
de las obligaciones internacionales que tiene el Estado.51 Estas definiciones
presentan tres problemas con respecto.a las leyes internacionales del medio
ambiente. - Primero, Lcual es el criterio que se va a usar para imputar la
responsabilidad :a.un estado? Segundo,. 6cuai es la definici6n.de un dafto
ambiental? Y tercero, cual es la forina apropiada para conducir tal
reparaci6n?
Con respecto a la primera pregunta, existen tres opciones: falta
(negligencia), responsabilidad estricta (se presume la responsabilidad pero
una defensa se puede presentar), 9 y responsabilidad absoluta (no existe
posibilidad de justificarse y el estado es responsable hasta por una fuerza
mayor). Mientras que el concepto de la falta esta basada en esfuerzos del
estado, la- responsabilidad estricta y.absoluta "mpone la responsabilidad de
actividades no prohibidas bajo la ley internacional y enfatisa el dafto en vez
de la conducta.
Es la opini6n comn, que la ley internacional generalmente carece
de la responsabilidad absoluta y estricta.10 No existe una base Oinica de
responsabilidad internacional que se pueda aplicar a todas las
*circunstancias, sino varios fundamentos que dependen segfin la naturaleza
del caso." El resultado de esto es que la ley. internacional no presenta una
*norma 'de cuidado, que ,se debe seguir segtin las obligaciones. para proteger
el medio ambiente.
Por. ejemplo, .a responsabilidad estricta por
actividades ultra peligrosas se puede considerar un principio general de la
ley porque se encuentra a nivel .mundial en la legislaci6n municipal.c
Incluso, algunos tratados sostienen la idea de la responsabilidad estricta

57.

R. Wolfrum. Reparationfor International Wrongful Acts, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW 352; Vea tambien Certain German Interests 'in Polish Upper Silesia
(conocido como el Factory at Chorzow case) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at
377 (Sept. 13); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§901.(1986). " '"
..
.

58. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [19801 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 30-4.
59. I. Brownfie, System of the Law of Nations, State Respohsibility, Part I at 44 (1983).
Vea tambien, The Corfu Channel Case,' 1949 I.C.J. 4, 85-86 (April 9), (Azevedo, J., opini6n

disidente).
60. M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 539 (1968).
61. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (1955).

62. 11 A. TUNC, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW chap. V.
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por estas actividades. 6' Sin embargo, en otras actividades que no son ultra-

peligrosas es mis dificil sostener la. responsabilidad estricta y absoluta.'
Tambifn se debe considerar que el dafto puede ser producido directamente
por 6rganos del estado, por personas privadas dentro del territorio3 o en la
ejecuci6n de medidas legales.. 66
Con respecto a la segunda pregunta, el dafio al medio ambiente
debe set el resultado de la violaci6n a la ley internacional. Esto presenta
unliiema ya que ia ley internacional apenas esta emergiendo y algunos de
los tratados interniacionales dependen demasiado en la cooperaci6n

obligatoria.

Ademlis, el dafio al medio ambiente ha sido defmido como

8
cualquier daf&o a los recUrsos naturales, 6 la degradaci6n a estos recursos,6

y sus propiedades, tierra, y.amenidad ambiental.6
Finalmente, concentrindose en las reparaciones,
Permanente de Justicia declar6:

la Corte

[e]l principio bhsico detris de la idea de reparaci6n :es
eliminar, en cuanto sea posible, las consecuencias .de la

acci6n ilegal y restaurarlo

al .estad.o, en. que. .hubiera.

existido. En el evento de que esto no sea posible se tendrd
que presentar un pago que cubra el valor de los bienes

63. Vea Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.

29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, art I.
64. Algunos convenios contienen provisiones exculpatorios por force majeure (un estido
donde involuntariamente una persona se encuentra en una situaci6n donde es imposible a adoptar
un conducto..que es conforme con las obligaciones internacional) y conflicto (conformando con. la
obligaci6n es posible pero resultara en laperdida de vida). Vea en ejemplo., Law of the Sea,
supra note 12, at art. 18(2), 39(1)(e); International Convention for the Prevention of.Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, supra note 44, at art. V.
65. Vea British Property in Spanish Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 642 (1925), donde elarbitrador
Max Huber, sobre los dailo causado por individuos privados a lapropiedad BritAnica en Morocco
." (Nota editorial:
Espafia, declaro: "elistados es obligado a ejercer algdin vigilancia".
traducido de Ingl6s).
66. Por.ejemplo, el gobierno Italiano perdi6 propiedad que fue secuestrado por el gobierno
de Franc6s despui6s de perder laGuerra Mundial II: Case Comment, In re Rizzo, 22 INT'L L.
REV. 322 (1955). La Comimission de Concilacion dijo: "el acto contrario a laley internicional
no se puede-usar para medir un secuestro, pero una falta de vigilancia por la parte del estado de
Francs. .. en la ejecuci6n de tal mdida." Id.
*67. Vea generalmente Convention on'Antarctic'Minerals, supra note 43.
68. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 58, at art. 24.
* 69. Vea generalmente Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228.
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perdidos y, si. es necesario, .una recompensa que cubra el
valor que no se incluy6 en el pago.
El 'problema es que al nivel del medio ambiente, una
reconstrucci6n id6ntica pueda que sea imposible. Una especie extinta no
se puede reemplazar. Pero, por lo menos, el objetivo debe ser de limpiar
el medio ambiente y restaurarlo para que se cumplan por lo menos sus
funciones primarias. Pero, aun si la restauraci6n fisica fuese posible,
puede que no sea econ6micamente factible. Incluso, el costo de devolver
el ambiente a su condici6n previa puede resultar en un costo
desproporcionado al resultado. Estos elementos, ademds de la falta de
precedentes legales y la falta de responsabilidad del estado en determinar
el daflo ambiental, hacen el panorama dificil. 7,
VI. PRINCIPIO DE RESPONSABILIDAD COMON PERO DIFERENCIADA
La protecci6n del medio ambiente es un reto comdun para todos los
parses. Pero debido a diferentes patrones de desarrollo y la necesidad de
compartir la responsabilidad en la degradaci6n ecol6gica, algunos paises se
les pide ms en la carga de la conservaci6n. La idea es que los estados
deben cumplir con las obligaciones internacionales en conservar el medio
ambiente sobre la base de ]a equidad y el acuerdo con su responsabilidad
diferenciada pero comtin, asi como sus respectivas capacidades. Este
principio fue tomado en cuenta en la Declaraci6n de Rio, Principios 4 y 7.
El principio incluye dos elementos constitutivos. El primero es la
responsabilidad comfin de los estados en la protecci6n del medio
ambiente.71 Esto significa que los estados deben participar en el esfuerzo
mundial por la conservaci6n. El segundo elemento es una elaboraci6n
sobre las diferentes circunstancias de los estados." Por ejemplo, los parses
industrializados han contribuido al calentami6nto global en mayor medida
70. Vea Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 17, at 377 (Sept. 13).
71. Vea Communication from the European Community Commission to the European
Community Council and European Parliament on Environmental Liability, p. 32 (1993) (nota
editorial: traducido por el escritor).
72.
Vea Convention. for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, May 31, 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 72, at pmbl.; Rasmar Convention on Wetlands, supra
note 6, at pmbi.; UNESCO on Heritage, supra note 6, at pmbl.; Treaty on Exploration and Use
of Space, supra note 17, at art. 1; G.A. Res. 43/53 (1988),.44/207 (1989), 45/212 (1990). ,
73. Vea Stockholm Declaration, supra note 9, at princ. 23; Rio Declaration, supra note 7,
at princs. 11, 6; Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region (Abidjan), March 28, 1981,
art. 4(1), 20 IL.M. 746; U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at pmbl.; Ozone
Protection Convention, supra note 21, at art. 2(2); Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at art. 207.
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que las naciones subdesarrolladas. Por otra parte, la capacidad de los
paises en desarrollo para prevenir dafios puede estar menos avanzada. 4
Tambi6n, las p6lizas ambientales de los estados deberian impulsar y no
afectar el desarrollo presente y futuro de estos pafses." Todos los estados
estn obligados a participar en la soluci6n ambiental, pero la adaptaci6n de
estAndares nacionales y obligaciones internacionales pueden diferir. Por
ejemplo, el periodo para la implementaci6n nacional de las medidas
preventivas puede variar de pais a pals.1'
VII. EL PRINCIPIOS DEL DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE

El principio del desarrollo sostenible fue definido por el Reporte
Brundtland de 1987 como el desarrollo que soluciona las necesidades
(especialmente aquellas de los pobres del mundo) del presente sin
comprometer ia habilidad de las futuras generaciones para solventar sus
propias necesidades. Esto impone la idea de limitaciones a la capacidad del
medio ambiente en solventar las necesidades presentes y futuras."
El desarrollo sustentable propone que el foco principal de los
esfuerzos de protecci6n del medio ambiente es el mejoramiento a la
condici6n humana.7' De acuerdo con el enfoque antropoc6ntrico, la
protecci6n de la vida silvestre y los recursos naturales no es una meta en
sf, sino una necesidad para asegurar alta calidad, de vida para los seres
humanos.
El desarrollo sostenible, como es reflejado en acuerdos
internacionales, involucra tres elementos:
a.
Equidad intergeneracional. Se reconoce la •
responsabilidad de cada generaci6n con la siguiente
generaci6n, al deber de dejar una herencia de riqueza no
menos a la que ellos mismos han recibido. La generaci6n
presente posee los recursos naturales en calidad de

74. Vea G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 13, at art. 30.
75. Vea Protocol on Substances that Deplet the Ozone layer, Septiembre 16, 1987, art.
5(1), 26 I.L.M. 1541 (cual autoriza a los palses subdesarrollado que atrazen su sumisi6n con los
medidas de control si algunos requerimientos son cumplidos).
76. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland
Report).
77. Id.; Our Common Future, 43 (1987).
78. Vea Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at princ. 1.
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fideicomisarios .para las generaciones futuras .' Tratados
antiguo"*y recientes" han referido a este-principio.
b.
Uso sostenible, de los recursos naturales Las
rakees primarias -del .uso. sostenible de los recursos
naturales pueden ser rastreadas hasta 1.893, cuando los
Estado Unidos proclamaron-un..derecho.para asegurar el
uso de las focas y salvarlas de, la destrucci6n .2 - Este
t6rmino ha sido usado en convenciones conservacionistas.13
Se han hecho intentos de definir el uso de los recursos
naturales, pero no. existe una definici6n general.
Trminos
6 n jbiciosa,
como apropiado," prudente, . explotaci
manejo, ambientalmente adecuado," y uso, ecoi6gico.
adecuado y racional," son usados sin definici6n y de
manera intercambiable.
c.
Integraci6n del medio ambiente y desarrollo.
"Para alcanzar el desarrollo sostenible, la protecci6n

79.
E. Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L; 198 (1990).
80. Vea International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, pmbl.; African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource,
supra note 12, at pmbl.
81. Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, pmbl.; U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6, at
art. 3(1); U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note.6, at pmbl.
. -..
82. Bering Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration (Gr. Brit, v. U.S.), reprintedin J. MOORE.,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 755 (1893);. yea tambien Fisheries Jurisdiction.(U.K. v. Ice.)
1974 I.C.J. 34-35 (en donde ia obligaci6n de cooperar en la conservici6n y utilizaci6n sostenible
de los bienes comunes globales, incluyendo los recursos vivientes de alta mar, fue sostenida).
83. Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the
Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1109, pmbl.; U.N. Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at arts. 1, 8, 11, 12, 16-18; U.N. Convention on Climate
Change, supra note 6, at art. 3(4).
84. FAO Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the
Mediterranean, Sept. 24, 1949, 126 U.N.T.S. 237, art. IV(a).
85. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 22, 1979,
pmbl., 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980).
86. Act Regarding Navigation and Economic' Co-operation between the States of the Niger
Basin, Oct. 1963, pmbl., 587 U.N.T.S. 9.
87. Convention for the Protection and-Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, art. 4(1), 22 I.L.M. 221.
88. UN/ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17,
1992, art.2(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. 1333.
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ambiental debe constituir una parte integral del proceso de
desarrollo y no. puede ser considerada aislada de este."89
Por lo tanto, .en la implementaci6n de obligaciones
ambientales, el desarrollo econ6mico y social debe ser
tornado en consideraci6n y al revds.
Aunque tradicionalmente organizaciones internacionales (como el
Banco Mundial o la Organizaci6n-Mundialdel Comercio) nunca ponfan su
atenci6n sobre la protecci6n, ambiental, un cambio lento esti llegando.10
Con respecto al campo macroecon6mico, la meta hacia el desarrollo
sostenible requiere, por ejemplo, nuevos sistemas para evaluar el progreso
de las naciones. Este.nuevo sistema de conteo incluiria en los cAlculos del
producto nacional bruto (PNB) esfuerzos para combatir la contaminaci6n
asi como dafios ambientales. La extracci6n minera, por ejemplo, no
reflejaria inicamente un incremento en el PNB, sino tambi6n una
reducci6n en la riqueza de los recursos naturales. 91. En el campo
microecon6mico, el desarrollo sustentable - requeriria, ..por ejemplo,
imponer costos al dafio ambiental al creador de los mismos.Y
La integraci6n del ambiente y desarrollo puede ser rastreada hasta
la.Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Conservaci6n y Utilizaci6n
de los Recursos (1949),91 ]a cual reconoci6 las necesidad del ."desarrollo
continuo y. aplicaci6n amplia de las t6cnicas de conservaci6n y utilizaci6n
de recursos.".4. . Los tratados regionales"s y globales" tambi6n han tornado
en consideraci6n este enfoque.

89. Vea Rio Declaration, supra.note 7, at princ. 4.
90. Vea E. Iglesias, El papel de los organismos multilaterales de cooperaci6n en el
desarrollo sostenible: el casb de BID, 20 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES IBEROAMERICANAS
DE LA ASOCIACI6N DE INVESTIGACi6N Y ESPECIALIZACI6N SOBRE TEMAS IBEROAMERICANOS
:
147-57(1993).
91. "Veageneralmente STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DRAFT HANDBOOK
ON INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING (1992).

92.. Este es el principio.de quien contamina paga, el cual implica que el contaminador debe
cargar con los costos de la implementaci6n de las medidas de prevenci6n .o pagar por los dafls
causados porque no se internalizaron los costos ambientales en la producci6n.
93. United Nations Conference on Conservation and Utilization of Resources.
94. U.N. Res. 32(IV), Environmental and Social Council, pmbl. (1947).
95. Vea Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133; Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 12.
96. U.N. Convention on Climate Change, supra note 6; Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 6, at pmbl.
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VIIL CONcLUSIoNES"
La definici6n y consqcu ncia de, los principios legales
anteriormente enunciados permanecen abiertas. Algunos han evolucionado
en un periodo ' corto de tiempo y algunas veces en contextos muy distintos.
Ademris, la prictica estatal tambi6n'esti evolucionando. Otro elemento que
complica el .terreno ambiental :es'.que algunos principios no tienen un
significado defuniitivo. Todo esto hace~diffcil que estos principios puedan
ser vinculantes para la' protecci6n 'del ambiente sobre la; comunidad
internacional.
. Las reglas de soberanfa permanente sobre los. recursos naturales, ia
responsabilidad de no causar dafio .ambiental, la buena vecindad y la
cooperaci6n .en relaci6n con -la protecci6n; ambiental; parecen estar bien
establecidas y .enraizadas en la prctica de los estados y en instrumeptos
internacionales. - Es ms, .a soberanfa, permanente sobre "los recursos
naturales ya .1uede ser considerada. una costumibre internacional.
:
Por otro. lado, -el deber:delcompensar el dailo 'ambiental puede ser
visto comno un corolario del --deber general de compensar por dafios
provocados por. la comisi6n de. actos internacionalmente err6neos. Sin
embargo, la dificultad de. evaluar el daio ambientail dentro de las reglas
existentes de responsabilidad hace problemitica su aplicaci6n. Tambi~n,
no existe acuerdo sobre-el .tipo de responsabilidad, que se debe aplicar
(objetiva o subjetiva). .No obstante,. la tendencia es apartarse de estas
nociones vagas y definir las conductas requeridas a los estados para
prevenir el dafio a otros estados. Entonces, la obligaci6n de evitar el dafio
ambiental ha sido formulada como una obligaci6n de tomar ciertas medidas
para asegurar que las actividades dentro del control estatal estuviesen
conformes con los est~ndares mundiales de p'otecci6n ambiental. Estas
reglas de conducta serin las que' determinen los elementos pertinentes en la
"decisi6n sabre si a habidouna violaci6n a un acuerdo.9"
.. . La acci6n preventiva,. el principio precautorio, y el desarrollo
sostenible, son mis dificiles de mantener ya que son recientes y mucho
mfis inciertos. A pesar .de ello, merecen.,atenci6n-porque moldearian el
desarrollo futuro del derecho intemacional. Por ejemplo, depeidiendo de
]a fuerza del principio de 'desarrollo sostenible arraigarfa en el sistema
legal internacional, hkiendo qUe t6.das las decisiones sobre desarroilo
fuesen sujetas, al .escrutinio ambiental.

97. Vea L. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 529.
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Finalmente, la influencia del litigio internacional no debe ser

menospreciada." Las decisiones de tribunales internacionales, como la
Corte Europea de la Justicia (al cual se le otorga la jurisdicci6n supra
nacional dentro de la Comunidad Europea)" y la Cone Internacional de
Justicia, en materias ambientales, contribuirin a la codificaci6n de estos
principios.' ®

98. Para una opini6n en contra, vea Z. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 1007 (1992).
99. Vea P. SANDS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGISLATION AND
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1991) (notando varios casos recientes en que se afirman
fuertemente principios ambientales en Ia interpretaci6n de la legislaci6n europea).
100. En Julio de 1993, la Corte decidi6 establecer una Sala de siete miembros sobre
Aspectos Ambientales, con vista en los desarrollos en el campo del derecho ambiental y la
protecci6n a la Tierra que han tenido lugar en los diltimos aftos.

